delivered the opinion of the court:
This appeal requires us to construe an endorsement to an automobile liability insurance policy. The essential facts are not in dispute.
Appellant Burnell A. Polzin, at the time in question, was the president оf A.B.C. Lithoplate and Graining Service, Inc. of Chicago. He was the corporation’s chief executive officer and owner of 50% of its stock. The company owned two automobiles, both insured by appellee The Phoenix of Hartford Insurance Companies. One was a 1967 Cadillac originally purchased by Polzin who for tax reasons transferred title to the corporation. Polzin was Lithoplate’s only outside salesman. Therefore, he, more than anyone else, drove the Cadillac. The automobile insurance was obtained by Polzin who left the coverage details to an employee of the agеncy with which he did insurance business. Lithoplate was the only named insured on the Phoenix policy. The policy had a “Family Protection Coverage” endorsement which provided “uninsured or hit-and-run motor vehicle coverage” required by Illinois law. By the insuring agreements of the endorsement, Phoenix was obligated to pay all sums to which “the insured or his legal representative” should be entitled from the owner or operatоr of any uninsured automobile that caused bodily injury to the insured. The term “insured” in the endorsement meant:
(1) “the named insured as stated in the policy (herein also referred to as the “principal named insured”) and any рerson designated as named insured in the schedule and, while residents of the same household, the spouse of any such named insured and relatives of either;
(2) any other person while occupying an insured autоmobile; and
(3) any person, with respect to damages he is entitled to recover because of bodily injury to winch this endorsement applies sustained by an insured under (1) or (2) above.”
On June 15, 1968, at about 4:00 P.M., Polzin was standing оn the northeast corner of Jackson and Ashland Boulevards in Chicago. As the result of a collision, an uninsured motor vehicle owned by Robert E. Nalls careened and struck Polzin, seriously injuring him. Later, Polzin served Phoenix with nоtice, claiming that he was covered by the uninsured motorist endorsement on the policy issued to Lithoplate. Phoenix denied the claim. Then, relying on a clause of the endorsement that provided for аrbitration, Polzin demanded submission of his claim to a member of the American Arbitration Association. Phoenix resisted submission on the ground that Polzin had no coverage rights under the policy to Lithoplate. Phoenix cоntended that because a question of coverage was involved, the American Arbitration Association, whose auspices Polzin sought to invoke, was without jurisdiction to hear his claim. On the day of the arbitration hearing, Phoenix appeared and objected to commencement of arbitration. The objection was overruled and arbitration proceeded.
Polzin was the only witness. He testified that he bought the 1967 Cadillac, put the title in the corporation, and drove it most of the time; that he arranged for the insurance policy but never read it to see if it covered him; that tire corporation owned the insured automobiles. Then, Polzin and Phoenix stipulated that the automobile which injured Polzin was uninsured; that its driver’s negligence caused the injuries; and that Polzin’s loss exceeded the policy limit of $10,000. Thereafter, Polzin, through his сounsel, argued that though he was not a named insured in the policy, he had rights under the uninsured motorist endorsement because the “Family Protection Coverage” afforded recovery for bodily injury, a thing which Lithoplate, a corporation, could not incur. Therefore, the endorsement would be a nullity unless he, Polzin, the corporation’s chief executive officer and the person who was the principal оperator of one of the insured automobiles, had coverage for the injuries he sustained as a pedestrian.
Phoenix, by its counsel, argued that the policy to Lithoplate did furnish coverage for bodily injury. However, it was bodily injury suffered by a person who, with Lithoplate’s consent, was occupying one of the insured automobiles. Phoenix insisted that since Polzin was neither named in the policy as an insured nor an oсcupant of one of the insured automobiles, he had no coverage under the endorsement. After taking the submission under advisement, the arbitrator awarded Polzin $10,000, tire full amount of the policy.
Thereafter, involdng the Uniform Arbitration Act, 1 Phoenix filed a petition to vacate the award. Polzin answered. After hearing the parties, the trial judge vacated the award, finding that “[respondent (Polzin) was not an insured entitled to the uninsured motorist protection under the policy in question and the occurrence as described in the petition and answer.” Judgment was entered in favor of Phoenix “[o]n all questions relating to * * * coverage for the occurrence in question.” Thе issue presented is whether Polzin, not a named insured, and a pedestrian injured by an uninsured motorist, had coverage rights within the terms of the uninsured motorist endorsement to the policy which Phoenix issued to Lithoplate.
In the law of insurance, there cannot be recovery on a policy without proof that the loss claimed falls within the terms of the coverage provided. (Sell v. Country Mutual Insurance Company,
In this case, it is not suggested that either Polzin or Lithoplate was deceived by the automobile liabHity policy which Phoenix issued. In fact, in his testimony befоre the arbitrator, Polzin admitted that when the Cadillac was made a subject of the policy to Lithoplate, he did not request inclusion of his name as an insured on the uninsured motorist endorsement. Neither by testimonial nor documentary proof does the record disclose that Phoenix or any of its agents owed Polzin the duty to see that the principal operator of the CadiUac was named an insured in the pоlicy. Therefore, contrary to Polzin’s argument in this appeal, it is irrelevant whether the insurance brokerage company that obtained the policy was an agent for Phoenix. Under these circumstanсes, Polzin, as the corporation’s chief executive officer, is charged with knowledge that the policy issued by Phoenix insured only Lithoplate. This being so, when Polzin asserted his claim, he had the burden of proving that the pohcy covered him and that he had the right to sue on it. Compare Macaluso v. Watson (1966), La.App.,
Polzin begins the discharge of this burden with the argument that IUinois law (with exceptions not relevant here) requirеs every Hability insurer to furnish uninsured motorist coverage with the kind of policy Phoenix issued in this case. The statute, 2 Polzin insists, must be liberally construed and considered in pari materia with the Financial Responsibility Law 3 so as to еffectuate the pubKc pohcy of Illinois. Therefore, Polzin argues, Phoenix cannot escape hability under the uninsured motorist endorsement it issued to Lithoplate because (1) he was the president, сhief executive officer, 50% shareholder of the corporation and the principal user of the Cadillac; (2) the policy if carelessly written, was written by Phoenix; (3) Phoenix accepted a prеmium for protecting persons against bodily injury; therefore unless coverage (for the bodily injuries he sustained) is extended to him the uninsured motorist endorsement would be a nullity; and (4) Phoenix waived or is estopped from еscaping liability under the policy issued to Lithoplate.
There are cases which hold that an insured in an automobile liability policy with an uninsured motorist endorsement has coverage for injuries he sustains as a pedestrian. (Quick v. Michigan Millers Mutual Insurance Co.,
Judgment affirmed.
STAMOS, P. J., and SCHWARTZ, J., concur.