MEMORANDUM OPINION
The chapter 11 debtor, Polysat, Inc., has filed an adversary proceeding seeking in-junctive relief against the defendant, Union Tank Car Company (hereinafter “UTCC”). The debtor contends that the discharge injunction found in 11 U.S.C. § 524, which arose by confirmation of the debtor’s plan under section 1141(d), bars UTCC from proceeding with litigation it commenced against the debtor in the Pennsylvania Court of Common Pleas. UTCC opposes the relief sought and argues that its claim against the debtor was not discharged.
The debtor initially sought preliminary injunctive relief. At a conference, both parties acknowledged that the relevant facts were not in dispute, and that the legal issue concerning the scope of the debtor’s bankruptcy discharge required an analysis of the Bankruptcy Code provisions found in sections 365 and 1141. Further, they agreed that this court (rather than the state court) should interpret these statutory provisions.
Accordingly, and with the agreement of both parties, I entered an order enjoining the defendant from prosecuting its state court litigation against the debtor, pending further order of this court. The parties also agreed that, in lieu of requiring the defendant to file an answer to the debtor’s complaint, cross-motions for summary judgment under Fed.R.Bankr.P. 7056 would instead be filed. Those two summary judgment motions are presently before me.
*888
As just noted, both parties concur that there are no material facts in dispute. They differ, however, on the scope of this court’s jurisdiction. While defendant UTCC suggests that this proceeding is non-core (UTCC Memorandum at 1-2), I agree with the debtor’s jurisdictional assertion. As the instant proceeding concerns the scope of the discharge injunction arising from sections 524 and 1141 of the Code, it is a core proceeding under 28 U.S.C. §§ 157(b)(2)(A), (I) or (0).
Accord, e.g., In re Jacobs,
. I.
On April 25, 1986, the debtor’s predecessor — Saturn Chemical, Inc. — entered into a lease agreement with UTCC for the rental of various railroad tank cars which were to be used to transport raw material or finished goods. Under the terms of that agreement, the lessee could obtain the use of specific tank cars from UTCC by entering into riders to the lease: one rider per tank car. The parties ultimately entered into three such riders: two by Saturn Chemical, Inc. and one by Polysat, Inc. (Ex. G, UTCC Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment.)
On June 20, 1989, the debtor filed a voluntary petition in bankruptcy under chapter 11. Among the claims listed on the debtor’s schedules was a prepetition lease claim of UTCC, which was not disclosed as disputed, unliquidated or contingent. 1 The debtor did not assume or reject the lease agreement at any time during its chapter 11 case. See generally 11 U.S.C. § 365. Nor did UTCC seek a court order compelling the debtor to assume or reject the lease agreement. See generally 11 U.S.C 365(d)(2). Furthermore, it is agreed that the debtor tendered no payments to UTCC after the bankruptcy filing in connection with its use or possession of the three tank cars.
There is no question that UTCC knew of the debtor’s bankruptcy filing prior to confirmation. Not only did it receive such notice along with other creditors, but it was a defendant in a preconfirmation adversary proceeding, Adv. No. 89-0976F, brought in this court by the debtor, concerning a chemical spill from one of the leased tank cars.
On July 26, 1991, an order was entered confirming the debtor’s chapter 11 plan of reorganization. The debtor’s plan did not provide for the assumption or rejection of the lease. See generally 11 U.S.C. § 1123(b)(2). By virtue of the debtor’s disclosure of UTCC’s uncontroverted prepetition claim in its bankruptcy schedules, UTCC holds an allowed unsecured claim. 11 U.S.C. § 1111(a). Pursuant to the debt- or’s confirmed plan, UTCC has already received (or will receive) a distribution of *889 fifteen percent on its unsecured claim of $3,974.95, as reported in the debtor’s schedules.
Although UTCC had actual notice of, and received all formal notices mailed in, the debtor’s bankruptcy case, UTCC has never filed a request for payment of an administrative expense claim in the debtor’s bankruptcy case. See generally 11 U.S.C. § 503(a). Rather, UTCC made several postconfirmation demands of the debtor for the return of the three tank cars.
On February 4, 1992, after the debtor failed to return the cars, UTCC filed, in Philadelphia Common Pleas Court, an action in replevin and breach of contract against the debtor seeking damages and the return of the tank cars. Court of Common Pleas, Philadelphia County, February Term 1992, No. 0343. On or about June 12, 1992, UTCC filed a motion for a writ of seizure. On June 19, 1992, the state court entered a consent order for the issuance of a writ of seizure pursuant to Pa.R.Civ.P. 1075.1. Thereafter, the debtor returned the tank cars.
On August 4, 1992, UTCC filed in state court an amended complaint seeking monetary damages (and fees and costs) from the debtor in excess of $30,000.00 for nonpayment of the three tank car leases, based upon theories of contract, conversion, quasi-contract and quantum meruit. UTCC asserted that damages began to accrue as of July 1989. The debtor responded in state court with counterclaims, seeking damages for storing the tank cars and as a result of a chemical spill from one of the cars.
On November 3, 1992, the debtor filed the instant adversary proceeding,
see generally
Fed.R.Bankr.P. 7001, seeking an order under 11 U.S.C. § 105(a) enjoining UTCC from proceeding for damages against the debtor in the state court. The debtor asserts that confirmation of its plan resulted in a rejection (within the meaning of section 365(a)) of any lease agreements with UTCC; moreover, it contends that confirmation resulted in a discharge of its obligations to UTCC by virtue of sections 365(g)(1) and 1141(d). Finally, it asserts that this discharge serves to enjoin the state court damage litigation pursuant to section 524, which is enforceable by section 105(a).
See generally Matter of Rostech,
At the hearing held on the summary judgment motions, the debtor modified its position. It conceded that 11 U.S.C. § 1141(d) could not discharge UTCC’s claim arising from the debtor’s postconfirmation use or possession of the tank cars. UTCC, in turn, acknowledged that section 1141(d) discharged its claim arising from the debt- or’s prepetition use or possession of the tank cars. Indeed, it was receiving a distribution under the plan for that prepetition claim. Thus, the heart of the present dispute is whether the debtor’s liability (if any exists under nonbankruptcy law) arising from its postpetition/preconfirmation use or possession of the tank cars was discharged by confirmation.
II.
At the outset, it is important to note that the only issue before me is whether the damage claims asserted by UTCC in the state court civil action have been discharged and thus enjoined by the effect of the order of confirmation. As no party has sought to remove that state court civil action to this court, whether UTCC has any valid claims and, if so, the amount of such claims is irrelevant to the issue posed in the instant proceeding.
See, e.g., In re McLaren,
A.
A debtor may, subject to court approval, assume or reject a prepetition lease agreement pursuant to § 365(a) of the Bankrupt
*890
cy Code. 11 U.S.C. § 365(a).
See, e.g., In re University Medical Center,
In a chapter 11 case, where a debtor has failed to expressly assume or reject a prepetition lease agreement or executory contract, that lease or contract will be unaffected by the bankruptcy filing.
In re BSL Operating Corp.,
This result is consistent with decisions under the former Bankruptcy Act. A lease or executory contract that is neither rejected nor assumed passes through the bankruptcy to the reorganized debtor.
See Smith v. Hill,
Accordingly, the instant debtor’s first contention is incorrect. The debtor never sought or obtained court approval to reject this lease as required by section 365 and Fed.R.Bankr.P. 6006. Had there been such a rejection, then by virtue of section 365(g)(1), the breach of the lease would have resulted in a prepetition claim, and that claim would have been discharged upon confirmation. But confirmation of the debtor’s plan by itself does not result in the rejection of all unassumed leases unless the plan so provides. Here, the debt- *891 or’s plan did not. Therefore, the UTCC lease, having been neither assumed nor rejected, passed through the chapter 11 case unaffected by bankruptcy. It remained valid postconfirmation, and post-confirmation breaches under relevant non-bankruptcy law may be asserted in a court of competent jurisdiction.
B.
Having determined that the UTCC lease survived the debtor’s bankruptcy, I must next consider whether § 1141(d) discharges any claims UTCC may have arising from the debtor’s use or possession of the tank cars.
Section 1141(d)(1)(A) provides, in relevant part, that
[ejxcept as otherwise provided in this subsection, in the plan, or in the order confirming the plan, the confirmation of a plan—
(A) discharges the debtor from any debt that arose before the date of such confirmation, and any debt of a kind specified in section 502(g), 502(h), or 502(i) of this title, whether or not—
(i) a proof of the claim based on such debt is filed or deemed filed under section 501 of this title;
(ii) such claim is allowed under section 502 of this title; or
(iii) the holder of such claim has accepted the plan[.]
11 U.S.C. § 1141(d)(l)(A)(i)-(iii) (emphasis added).
UTCC has recognized that § 1141(d)(1)(A) “discharged” its general unsecured claim arising from the debtor’s prepetition use or possession of the three tank cars. By virtue of the debtor’s confirmed plan, the debtor’s liability for any prebankruptcy breach of the lease will be repaid in a manner identical to other unsecured claims. As UTCC never objected to the terms of this plan (and as the revocation period established by 11 U.S.C. § 1144 has expired), it is bound by those terms, 11 U.S.C. § 1141(a), and cannot bring a post-confirmation state court action to recover prepetition damages. 3
Conversely, as now accepted by the debtor, section 1141(d)(1)(A) did not discharge any claim UTCC may have which arises from the debtor’s use or possession of the tank cars postconfirmation.
Holywell Corp. v. Smith,
— U.S.-,-,
III.
The only remaining issue is whether any liability which the debtor may have arising from its use or possession of the three tank ears after its bankruptcy filing, but prior to confirmation, is also discharged. As mentioned earlier, the debtor made no postpetition lease payments to UTCC.
Since section 1141(d)(1)(A) defines the scope of the chapter 11 debtor’s discharge to include “any debt that arose before the date of such confirmation,” courts have concluded that this statutory provision should be interpreted as written.
See generally Taylor v. Freeland & Kronz,
— U.S.-,
Similarly, in
In re Benjamin Coal Co.,
Obviously, the holding of the Third Circuit is binding upon me. Nonetheless, UTCC challenges this result by reliance upon pre-Code case law,
e.g., Federal’s, Inc. v. Edmonton Investment Company,
The former Bankruptcy Act (section 17a, 11 U.S.C. § 35a (repealed 1978)) discharged a debtor only from “provable” debts.
See generally
11 U.S.C. § 1(15) (repealed 1978) (providing, in relevant part, that “ ‘[discharge’ shall mean the release of a bankrupt from all of his debts which are
provable
in bankruptcy”) (emphasis added). “Obligations incurred by the bankrupt after the filing of the petition [were] generally not provable and therefore not debts for the purposes of pending bankruptcy proceedings” pursuant to the Act. J. Moore, 1
Collier on Bankruptcy,
111.14, at 91 (14th ed. 1987). “[T]he Act was clear that the date of bankruptcy was the point of cleavage” when determining provable debts.
Matter of Elmer’s Auto Parts,
Thus, under the former Act, postpetition debts in general were not dischargeable. But the Code discards the notion of provable debts,
see, e.g., In re Ozark Restaurant Equipment Co., Inc.,
Although such postpetition claims may be discharged, the Code makes provision for their payment. Postpetition lease obligations of the debtor represent an administrative expense by virtue of section 503(b)(1)(A),
accord, e.g.,
L. King, 3
Collier on Bankruptcy,
¶ 503.04[l][a][ii] (15th ed. 1993), which is entitled to a first priority payment under section 507(a)(1).
See, e.g., Zagata Fabricators v. Superior Air Products,
Therefore, and consistent with the holding of
In re Benjamin Coal Co.,
IV.
A.
Having determined that UTCC’s postpetition, preconfirmation claim is “discharged,” I must next consider the effect of that discharge upon such claim. The parties here disagree upon this point and raise a number of contentions, only some of which need now be considered.
Section 524 of Title 11 describes the effect of “[a] discharge in a case under this title,” including a discharge “under section *894 ... 1141”. Specifically, § 524(a) provides, in relevant part, that a discharge
(1) voids any judgment at any time obtained, to the extent that such judgment is a determination of the personal liability of the debtor with respect to any debt discharged under section 727, 944, 1141, 1228, or 1328 of this title ...;
(2) operates as an injunction against the commencement or continuation of an action, the employment of process, or an act, to collect, recover or offset any such debt as a personal liability of the debtor ...; and
(3) operates as an injunction against the commencement or continuation of an action, the employment of process, or an act, to collect or recover from, or offset against, property of the debtor of the kind specified in section 541(a)(2) of this title that is acquired after the commencement of the case....
11 U.S.C. § 524(a)(l)-(3) (emphasis added).
Thus, UTCC is enjoined from asserting in state court any claim against the debtor for damages arising from the debtor’s possession or use of UTCC’s three tank cars prior to the date of confirmation of the debtor’s chapter 11 plan.
See, e.g., In re Braun,
However, one must recognize that while section 524(a) enjoins an entity from seeking to enforce the personal liability of a debtor on a discharged debt, “[a] discharge does not cancel the obligation; the obligation still exists. A discharge merely disables the creditor from enforcing its claim.”
In re Sure-Snap Corp.,
This was equally true under the former Bankruptcy Act.
Accord Wagner v. United States,
Because a discharge does not extinguish the debt itself, there is no prohibition in the Code against filing a proof of claim after the entry of the order of discharge. If the proof of claim is timely under the bankruptcy procedural rules, it is not barred by discharge.
*895 For example, Fed.R.Bankr.P. 3002(c), in relevant part, requires a creditor in a chapter 7 case to file a proof of claim “within 90 days after the first date set for the meeting of creditors called pursuant to § 341(a) of the Code”. Rule 4004(a), however, requires a creditor to file a complaint objecting to the debtor’s discharge under section 727(a) “not later than 60 days following the first date set for the meeting of creditors held pursuant to § 341(a).” Rule 4004(c) then states that “[i]n a chapter 7 case, on expiration of the time fixed for filing a complaint objecting to discharge and the time fixed for filing a motion to dismiss the case pursuant to Rule 1017(e) [which is also 60 days from the first meeting of creditors], the court shall forthwith grant the discharge.”
Therefore, although a bankruptcy court could grant the a chapter 7 debtor a discharge on the sixty-first day following the first date set for the § 341(a) meeting, creditors would still have 29 additional days to file proofs of claim. Thus, the entry of a discharge order does not, by itself, act as a bar to all later filed proofs of claim.
B.
The same result follows in chapter 11. That is, if the chapter 11 bar date established by a court under Rule 3003(c) is after confirmation, the entry of the confirmation order — even though it has the effect of ordering a discharge — does not preclude a creditor from filing a timely proof of claim.
In the instant dispute, UTCC’s prepetition claim was deemed allowed by virtue of the debtor’s schedules. Its posteonfirmation claim is not discharged, and that may be asserted in state court. Its postpetition/preconfirmation claim would have been an administrative claim, but UTCC never made a request for payment under section 503.
The Bankruptcy Code, however, does not provide any deadline by which a claimant must file a request for payment of an administrative expense in the bankruptcy court. See L. King, 3 Collier on Bankruptcy, ¶ 503.01, at 503-3 to 503-4 (15th ed. 1993) (“The statute does not provide for a time when a request for administrative expenses should be made ... ”). Rather, section 503(a) merely provides that “[a]n entity may file a request for payment of an administrative expense.” 11 U.S.C. § 503(a) (emphasis added).
An administrative claimant technically is not a “creditor” as defined by the bankruptcy code, and, therefore, is not required to file a proof of claim by virtue of Rules 3002 or 3003. 11 U.S.C. § 101(10) (defining “creditor” as,
inter alia,
an “entity that has a claim against the debtor that arose at the time of or before the order for relief”).
See Matter of West Johnson Corp.,
The legislative history ... [accompanying § 503] stated that “[t]he Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure will specify the time, the form, and the method of such a filing.” H.Rep. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 355 (1977)_ Unfortunately, the rules do not give the guidance Congress had hoped they would. In fact, they give no guidance at all. Bankruptcy Rule 3003 is clearly drafted to implement Section 502, not Section 503. There is no implementing rule for the latter section, despite Congress’ suggestion.
In re MacDonald,
Although a bankruptcy court has the general authority to impose an administra
*896
tive bar date,
see In re Conroy,
The lack of any deadline, though, does not yield an unlimited time for administrative creditors to seek compensation from the bankruptcy estate. The equitable principles of laches and estoppel may preclude an entity from asserting an administrative claim.
See In re Chicago Pacific Corp.,
In the instant proceeding, however, I need not and do not consider whether lach-es or estoppel would preclude UTCC from recovering on its administrative claim in this bankruptcy court because UTCC has not sought the allowance of any administrative claim. Therefore, I decline the debtor’s invitation to resolve this issue within the present adversary proceeding.
In conclusion, UTCC has violated the section 524 injunction by pursuing the debtor’s personal liability on discharged preconfir-mation claims in a state court forum. Partial summary judgment in favor of the debtor is warranted, and the defendant shall be enjoined from violating section 524.
See, e.g., Matter of Rosteck; Matter of Phoenix Steel Corp.
(enjoining a creditor from proceeding against a debtor to recover on a discharged claim and requiring the creditor to dismiss its complaint);
Matter of Askew; see generally In re Morristown & Erie R. Co.,
UTCC may, however, proceed against the debtor in state court for damages arising from the debtor’s postconfirmation use or possession of the leased tank cars.
An appropriate order shall be entered.
ORDER
AND NOW, this 15th day of April 1993, for the reasons stated in the accompanying memorandum, it is hereby ordered that summary judgment is granted in part in favor of the plaintiff and against defendant Union Tank Car Company. Defendant is enjoined from proceeding with litigation outside of this court in which it seeks damages based upon the debtor’s possession or use of any property of UTCC on or before July 26, 1991, the date of the order confirming the debtor’s plan of reorganization. 11 U.S.C. § 105(a).
It is further ordered that summary judgment is partially granted in favor of the defendant and against the plaintiff/debtor. The effect of confirmation does not discharge any postconfirmation liability which the plaintiff may have for the use or possession of the defendant’s property after July 26, 1991. The defendant may proceed with state court litigation against the debt- or based upon its postconfirmation damage claims.
Notes
. In this proceeding, as well as in the state court litigation, the debtor contends that Saturn Chemical only, its predecessor corporation, was a party to the underlying lease agreement thus freeing Polysat from any liability to UTCC. While the liability of Polysat is not presently before me, the debtor’s position is highly problematic.
First, if Polysat did not become a party to the underlying lease agreement, how did it enter into a rider agreement with UTCC in March 1989? Second, as UTCC argues, Polysat brought suit in the bankruptcy court against UTCC for a chemical spill from a tank car leased to Saturn Chemical. In that litigation, Polysat testified that it was party to a lease agreement with UTCC for that particular tank car. And based upon that testimony, a finding was made to that effect. Third, if the debtor had no liability to UTCC, why did it schedule UTCC as an undisputed prepetition creditor when it filed its bankruptcy petition?
Therefore, it seems likely that Polysat would be found as the personal property lessee of UTCC (as debtor’s counsel conceded at oral argument). Accordingly, I have assumed this finding for purposes of resolving the instant proceeding.
. Nonresidential real property leases are an exception. Absent a debtor’s motion to assume such leases within 60 days following the order for relief, or a debtor’s motion to extend the time to assume or to reject such leases within that 60-day period, nonresidential real property leases are "deemed rejected.” See 11 U.S.C. § 365(d)(4). See also 11 U.S.C. § 365(d)(5) (providing for automatic rejection of nonresidential real property leases of aircraft terminals or aircraft gates upon the "occurrence of a termination event ... (unless the court orders the trustee to assume such unexpired leases within 5 days after the termination event)", at the airport operator’s option, but only if the airport operator waives the right to damages flowing from the rejection). In a chapter 7 case, any “executory contract or unexpired lease of residential real property or of personal property of the debtor” that is not assumed "within 60 days after the order for relief, or within such additional time as the court, for cause, within such 60-day period, fixes, ... is deemed rejected.” 11 U.S.C. § 365(d)(1).
. UTCC may seek, though, to enforce the terms of the plan should the debtor fail to comply.
See In re Benjamin Coal Co.,
. UTCC had actual knowledge of the debtor’s bankruptcy filing and also received all notices mailed in that case. Accordingly, no due process issues arise concerning the discharge of UTCC's preconfirmation claims.
Compare Matter of Phoenix Steel Corp.,
. UTCC also raises a number of other contentions to support its position that a postpetition, preconfirmation claim is not discharged upon confirmation of a chapter 11 plan. These arguments are unpersuasive.
First, UTCC maintains that “the debtor was incapable of an ‘actionable breach' prior to rejection of the Lease" because UTCC “was precluded from enforcing any term of the Lease against Polysat during the pendency of the case.” UTCC Supplemental Memorandum at 5. However, when a debtor in chapter 11 fails to tender postpetition rent payments a lessor is entitled to seek both relief from the stay, pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 362(d), and adequate protection, pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 363(e).
See Zagata Fabricators
v.
Superior Air Products,
Similarly, UTCC erroneously contends that the debtor possessed the "exclusive power to reject the Lease" and by its failure to do so “PolySat did not allow these claims to ‘arise.’" UTCC Supplemental Memorandum at 6. But this position overlooks UTCC's ability to shorten the time period within which the debtor may assume or reject the lease. See 11 U.S.C. § 365(d)(2). In addition, notwithstanding the debtor's failure to assume or reject the UTCC lease, section 503(a)(1) would permit UTCC to seek an administrative expense claim for the debtor's use and possession of the tank cars.
See Zagata Fabricators,
Finally, UTCC's assertion that its postpetition claim is not discharged is inconsistent with its recognition at oral argument that its prepetition claim was discharged pursuant to § 1141(d). Just as that prepetition claim arose independently from the debtor’s failure to assume or reject the lease, so did UTCC's postpetition, pre-confirmation claim.
. To the extent In re Slaw Const. Corp., 17 B.R. at 747, may hold that postpetition, preconfirmation administrative claims pursuant to an execu-tory contract that passes through a debtor's bankruptcy case are not discharged pursuant to § 1141(d), In re Benjamin Coal Co. would overrule that conclusion.
. An administrative claimant may, however, become a "creditor" upon conversion.
See In re Johnson,
. Apparently, in 1991, the Advisory Committee to the Federal Bankruptcy Rules considered and then rejected a proposal to set a deadline for the filing of general administrative claims. See W. Norton, Jr., Norton Bankr. Rules Pamphlet 1992-93 Ed. 169 (Editors’ Comment to Fed. R.Bankr.P. 2016).