14 Me. 141 | Me. | 1837
The action was continued, for advisement, and the opinion of the Court afterwards drawn up and delivered by
One of the questions presented by this bill of exceptions is, whether the contract declared on was under the circumstances a legal contract. To enable us to come to a right conclusion, it is desirable, that the principles by which we must be guided, should be, if possible, clearly stated.
Neither the law nor the Court can degrade itself by becoming the minister of evil. The consideration of a contract, or the matter out of which it arises, must therefore be legal. The object to be accomplished, or the act required to be performed by it, must also be legal. And although by itself considered the objects or
" These are principles alike valuable to the community, as they are necessary to maintain the character of the law and of judicial tribunals. But while they are by no means to be infringed, they must not be pushed to such extremes as to interrupt, or embarrass the complicated transactions of society. The principles do not, nor would it be consistent with the ordinary transactions of life that they should require all contracts to be considered illegal, which grow out of some matter, or property, in which there had been incorporated, or to which had before attached, some illegal act. The law may declare, that on account of such former illegal ingredient, the article shall no longer be considered the subject of property, and in such case, it cannot afterward form the basis of a-legal contract. But if, notwithstanding the illegal act or ingredient attaches to it, the law permits it to be the subject of property, either absolutely or conditionally, until forfeited by some act yet to be performed, it may form the basis of a legal contract.
When contracts are formed upon new or collateral considerations, and when they partake of the original illegal act, was much considered, and the cases were collected, in Armstrong v. Toler, 11 Wheat. 258. The Chief Justice says, “ how far this principle [that of illegality] is to affect subsequent or collateral contracts, the direct and immediate consideration of which is not immoral or illegal, is a question of considerable intricacy, on which many controversies have arisen and many decisions have been made.” This re
In the law of insurance an exception to these rules has been established in the most commercial countries of modem times, by declaring those contracts to be legal, which are made with the intention to violate the laws of trade of a foreign country. Such an exception breaks in upon the morality and harmony of legal science; and since the reasonings of Pothier, and of Story, and of Kent, and of other eminent jurists, the exception can only be sustained by allowing private interest to overcome the sense of moral and legal right. Whether the question can be presented so as to enable a court to act upon it de novo, or whether it must remain a blot upon the law, may be doubtful.
The policy, in this case, was not upon any particular voyage, but for the term of one year. There is nothing in the case, which shews, that any illegal voyage was contemplated by the contract, or that any such was in fact undertaken. The contract cannot
There is another aspect in which the same transactions are presented. It is insisted, that the enrolment should not have been admitted in evidence in proof of property, because an unlawful document cannot be used as proof. In considering this question, it will be necessary to bear in mind, that it does not appear in the case, that the vessel was insured as a vessel of the United States. Her national character does not appear to have entered into the contract. If such had been the fact, the plaintiff could not recover, because the laws of the United States declare, that if not registered by the former name, in case she has been built upon, “ she shall cease to be deemed a ship or vessel of the United States.” As she was not insured as a vessel of the United, States, and as the laws do not for such cause destroy the title to the property, their effect being only to take from that title the particular character of being a vessel of the United States, the document was properly admitted.
It is also contended, that not being properly and legally documented, she was not seaworthy ; and that she was not the proper subject of insurance. It is necessary here, again to notice a distinction. If, for the want of legal documents, the voyage is, by the laws of the country, rendered illegal, then the policy is void on account of the illegality of the voyage. Upon this principle alone, the case of Farmer v. Legg, 7 Term R. 186, could have been decided. But if, as in the present case, the laws do not declare
The next question presented, relates to the admission of the declarations of Benjamin Knight, a stockholder and one of the directors of the company. The declaration was not made while acting in the business of the company, but after the loss happened ; and it purports to state the knowledge of the company at the time the insurance was effected. Such declarations cannot be received as coming from an agent of the company, when he was not acting in that character. Haven v. Brown, 7 Greenl. 421. The rights of all corporate bodies would be wholly insecure, and at the mercy of each corporator, if the admission or declarations of one corpora-tor could charge the corporation. The principle cannot be admitted. And the testimony must be regarded as improperly received. 2 Stark. Ed. 580; 3 Day, 491, Hartford Bank v. Hart. But as these declarations related to a matter, as has already been determined, which did not affect the contract, they were immaterial to-the issue; and there is no sufficient cause for setting aside the verdict on that account.
A question is also made respecting the exclusion of the declarations of Joseph Bean, and the depositions of Freeman, Parsons, and Weare. It appears in the case, that Bean, with another person, had agreed with the plaintiff to employ the vessel for a certain time, paying for her use a share of her earnings, and that during that period she was lost, he being on board at the time of the loss. The declarations were not made while he was on board, but after the loss had happened. By the contract, Bean was not acting as the agent of the plaintiff, but on his own account. He could not bind the plaintiff in any contract made with others in consequence of the agreement for the employment of the' vessel. No
Whether the copy of the deposition of Young was, under the circumstances properly admitted, may depend upon the right of the plaintiff to use the original deposition if it had been then on file. And a majority of the Court are of opinion, [in which 1 do not concur,] that the 31st rule, taken nuconnection with the 43d, by implication gave the plaintiff the right to use the deposition; and that such a construction of the rules does not contravene the provisions of the statute. This objection is therefore overruled ; and judgment is to be entered upon the verdict.