Pollard v. HarlowPollard v. Harlow
- Reporters:
- , ,
- Before:
- Henshaw, Lorigan, McFarland, Shaw
Id.—Succession to Legal Title—Condition Subsequent—Effect of Deed.—It seems that, under section 700 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the purchaser under execution sale acquires the legal title of the judgment debtor, defeasible upon condition subsequent; and that the effect of the sheriff‘s deed is not to create a new title, but is merely evidence that the title of the purchaser has become absolute.
Id.—Certificate of Redemption.—The certificate of redemption need not state the capacity in which the redemption was made. The redemption is sufficient, where the redemptioner presented evidence of title, paid the money required, and received a certificate of redemption.
SMITH, C.—The plaintiff is a purchaser of the mortgaged premises at a sale, under a judgment entered April 7, 1899, in the case of the Farmers and Merchants’ Savings Bank of Oakland against Thomas Conway, Emma Crothers, et al., foreclosing a mortgage of Conway of date March 19, 1896, and is the holder of a certificate of sale of that date in due form. The suit was commenced December 29, 1898. The defendant is the commissioner who made the sale. Emma, or Mrs. Crothers, defendant in the foreclosure suit, is the
With regard to the former point, it may be assumed that Mrs. Crothers was not entitled to redeem as “a creditor having a lien by judgment,” on the mortgaged premises, or, in other words, as “redemptioner.” (
The authorities cited by the respondent‘s counsel do not stand in the way of this conclusion. Those of other states refer to laws different from ours; as, for example, the New York cases cited by Mr. Freeman in his work on Executions (sec. 317), and in Page v. Rogers, 31 Cal. 300, involving the system of that state, which is altogether different from ours. The case of Haskell v. Manlove, 14 Cal. 54, and the previous cases of Knight v. Fair, 9 Cal. 117, and McMillan v. Richards, 9 Cal. 412,2 involved the construction of section 229 of the Practice Act, prior to the amendment of April 27, 1863, which materially changed the law, and has been carried into the codes. The case of Page v. Rogers, 31 Cal. 301 et seq., was subsequent to the amendment, but the transactions involved were of date prior thereto, and what is said by the court must be regarded as applying to the case before it; and the same remark will apply to the case of McMinn v. O‘Connor, 27 Cal. 238, there cited.
In later cases, the court, following Haskell v. Manlove and other cases under the old law, sometimes refer to the title of the purchaser as “equitable,” but in none of them was the question involved or considered, or the change of the law by the amendment of 1863 remarked upon. (Semple v. Castle, 52 Cal. 649; Robinson v. Thornton, 102 Cal. 680.) Nor do we think that under the law, as amended, the title of the purchaser can be so regarded. The language of
We therefore have but little doubt that, under the provisions of the code as they now exist, the purchaser of real estate at execution sale acquires the legal title to the land, subject to defeasance by the happening of the condition subsequent. But, without passing definitely on this point, it will be sufficient to hold, whatever be the nature of the purchaser‘s title, whether legal or equitable, that he is a “successor in interest” of the judgment debtor, within the meaning of the term as used in
There is nothing in the objection that Mrs. Crothers did not redeem in the capacity of a successor in interest of the judgment debtor. She presented her evidence of title to the commissioner, paid the money required, and received her certificate. This was sufficient. (
We advise that the judgment appealed from be reversed.
Haynes, C., and Gray, C., concurred.
Henshaw, J., Lorigan, J., McFarland, J.
Hearing in Bank denied.
Shaw, J., dissented from the order denying a hearing in Bank, and filed the following opinion on February 24, 1903:—
SHAW, J.—In denying a rehearing in this case, I desire to say that that part of the opinion to the effect that the purchaser of land at sheriff‘s sale or commissioner‘s sale acquires the legal title to the land must be taken coupled with the qualifications stated in the immediate context. It is enough, for the purposes of the decision of the case, to say that such purchaser acquires a qualified title which is sufficient to, and does, carry with it the right to redeem from another sale. To hold thus does not make it necessary to also hold that the sale divests the judgment creditor of his right to redeem from another sale. The right may exist in both.