POLK COUNTY, Petitioner,
v.
Donna M. SOFKA, Respondent.
Supreme Court of Florida.
Wоfford H. Stidham, Hank B. Campbell and Edwin A. Scales, III of Lane, Trohn, Clarke, Bertrand, Vreeland & Jacobsen, P.A., Bartow, for Petitioner.
John W. Frost, II, Neal L. O'Toole and Mark A. Sessums of Frost, O'Toole & Saunders, P.A., Bartow, for Respondent.
Robert A. Butterworth, Attоrney General and Louis F. Hubener, Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Department of Insurance, Division of Risk Management, Amicus Curiae.
Susan H. Churuti, County Attorney and John E. Schaefer, Assistant County Attorney, Clearwater, for Pinellas County, Amicus Curiae.
Jorge L. Fernandez, President, Florida Association of County Attorneys, Inc., Sarasota, and Rosemary E. Perfit, Senior Assistant County Attorney, Hillsborough County, Tampa, for Florida Association of County Attorney's, Amicus Curiae.
Ronald K. McRae, Assistant County Attorney, West Palm Beach, for Palm Beach County, Amicus Curiae.
Roy D. Wasson and Barbara Green, P.A., Miami, for Academy of Florida Trial Lawyers, Amicus Curiae.
Steven F. Lеngauer and Ernest H. Eubanks of Eubanks, Hilyard, Rumbley, Meier & Lengauer, P.A., Orlando, for Orange County, Amicus Curiae.
PER CURIAM.
This case is before us on a question certified by the district court as one of great public importancе. Polk County v. Sofka, *1244
Respоndent, Donna M. Sofka, sued petitioner, Polk County, in tort, to recover for personal injuries sustained in an automobile accident. She alleged that thе County had created a dangerous intersection, tantamount to a hidden trap of which she was unaware, but of which the County was (or should have been) аware, yet failed to warn. A jury trial resulted in a verdict for Sofka.
The County filed a motion requesting a new trial, which was granted. The parties subsequently executed a settlement agreement by which they agreed, among other things, that a final judgment would be entered in favor of Sofka, following which the County might seek apрellate review of two issues:
[1] The Trial Court's refusal to grant POLK COUNTY'S Motion to Dismiss, to enter summary judgment for POLK COUNTY, or to direct a verdict against SOFKA, by virtue of POLK COUNTY'S sovereign immunity, which POLK COUNTY asserts immunizes it from any liability for the accident....
[2] The Trial Court's refusal to direct a verdict against SOFKA, by virtue of POLK COUNTY'S assertion that SOFKA failed to adduce sufficient evidencе showing any alleged fault of POLK COUNTY was the proximate cause of the accident or any of SOFKA'S damages stemming therefrom.
The agreement provided, further, "that the intermediate appellate court has jurisdiction to hear POLK COUNTY'S appeal of the Stipulated Final Judgment"; that "[t]he record on apрeal shall be the record as it exists at the time of the entry of the Stipulated Final Judgment"; and that, "if the intermediate appellate court, for any rеason, determines there is no jurisdiction or standing, or if the appeal is not dispositive of the issue of POLK COUNTY'S liability for the accident,... the Stipulated Final Judgment shаll be void," and "the parties shall be entitled to again proceed to trial" pursuant to the order granting the County's motion for a new trial. The trial court еntered the judgment contemplated by the agreement, incorporating by reference all of the terms of that agreement.
After oral argument in this Cоurt, the parties were asked to brief the following question:
Whether the District Court of Appeal had jurisdiction to hear Polk County's appeal from rulings made before its motion for new trial had been granted because it had entered into a stipulated final judgment permitting it to seek such review, notwithstanding that the order granting the motion for new trial had not been vacated and that one is generally deemed to have waived the right to review of rulings made prior to, or during, a previous trial by moving for and receiving a new trial.
The parties responded with a joint brief in which they asserted that the district court had jurisdiction beсause (1) the stipulated final judgment incorporated the settlement agreement, which expressly provided "that the intermediate appellate court has jurisdiction over the appeal"; (2) the parties had agreed to waive any "procedural hurdles" to appellate review; (3) thе stipulated final judgment "nullifies or makes the issue of the new trial moot"; and (4) a contrary conclusion "will result in a waste of judicial resources."
By their settlement agreement, the terms of which were incorporated into the judgment, the parties stipulated that "[t]he record on appeal shall be the record as it exists at the time of the entry of" the judgment. Prior to the entry of the judgment, neither party requested that the order granting a new trial be set aside, and thаt the County be permitted to withdraw its motion for a new trial. Accordingly, but for the settlement agreement, the County would not have been permitted to seek rеview of the denial of its motions to dismiss, for summary judgment or for directed verdict based on sovereign immunity, or the denial of its motion for directed verdict becаuse the evidence was legally insufficient to establish proximate cause. This is because, having requested and received a new trial, the County is *1245 deemed to have waived its right immediately to seek appellate review of rulings made prior to, or during, the previous trial. It would have had to await the оutcome of the new trial it had requested and, if adverse, then seek review. See Atlantic Coast Line R.R. Co. v. Boone,
It is clear that the parties have stipulatеd to the district court's jurisdiction. However, it is equally clear "that the parties cannot stipulate to jurisdiction over the subject matter where none exists." Cunningham v. Standard Guar. Ins. Co.,
The parties' agreement expressly provides that "[t]he record on appeal shall be the record as it exists at the time of the entry of the Stipulated Final Judgment." When the judgment was entered, the order granting the County's motion for a new trial remained in effect, as neither party requested that it bе vacated, and that the motion for a new trial be treated as withdrawn. Thus, based upon the record to which the parties agreed, the district court lаcked jurisdiction to hear the appeal, notwithstanding the parties' attempt to confer such jurisdiction.
It is true, as the parties state, that this conсlusion "will result in a waste of judicial resources." However, "[c]ourts are bound to take notice of the limits of their authority and if want of jurisdiction appеars at any stage of the proceedings, original or appellate, the court should notice the defect and enter an approрriate order." West 132 Feet v. City of Orlando,
We quash the decision of the district court and remand with directions that the district court dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction.
It is so ordered.
KOGAN, C.J., OVERTON, SHAW, HARDING and ANSTEAD, JJ., and KAHN and WEBSTER, Associate Justices, concur.
GRIMES and WELLS, JJ., recused.