Opinion by
This is аn appeal by James, P. Poliskiewicz (Appellant) from an order of the Court of Common Pleas of Monroe County, which sustained a preliminary objection in the nature of a demurrer filed by East Stroudsburg University (Appellee) and dismissed Appellants complaint.
In his complaint and amended complaint, Appellant alleged that he was employed by the Police Department of the Borough of Bangor and by Appellee as a police officer when, on February 10, 1985, he was involved in an incidеnt in a bar in'Monroe County, which resulted in his being arrested for disorderly conduct and public *15 drunkenness. On February 12, 1985, Appellant was suspended from both jobs pending the outcome оf the criminal proceedings instituted against him. Appellant further avers that on April 4, 1985 all criminal charges against him were dismissed; thereafter, Appellant was reemplоyed by the Borough, but not by Appellee. He further averred that Appellee has refused to reémploy him. Appellant maintains that his discharge by Appellee and the subsequent refusal to reemploy him is violative of Sections-9124 and 9125 of the Criminal History Record Information Act (Record Act), 18 Pa. C. S. §§9124, 9125. He further argues that his discharge was based uрon mere unproven accusations; that Appellees reasons for discharging him are not legitimate; that he- has suffered damages in that he has been unable tо secure comparable employment; and that his discharge was in violation of the personnel manual issued to him by Appellee. As a remedy, Appellant seeks monetary damages.
Appellee, in its preliminary objection in the nature of a demurrer, raises the defense of sovereign immunity. 1 Trial Judge Peter J. O’Brien, citing Allio v. Department of Transportation, (No. 84-C-723 filed October 30, 1984), an opinion of President Judge Backenstoe of the Court of Common Pleas of Lehigh County, held that sovereign immunity did operate to bar the instant suit. He, therefore, sustained the preliminаry objection and dismissed the complaint.
Section 8522 of the Judicial Code, 42 Pa. C. S. §8522, represents the current statute which pertains *16 generally to the waiver of sovereign immunity. It pertinently provides:
Exceptions to Sovereign Immunity
(a) Liability Imposed.—The General Assembly, pursuant to section 11 of Article 1 of the Constitution of Pennsylvania, does hereby waive, in the instances set forth in subsection (b) only and only to the extent set forth in this subchapter and within the limits set forth in Section 8528 (relating to limitations on damages), sovereign immunity as a bar to an action against Commonwealth parties, for damages arising out of a negligent act where the dаmages would be recoverable under the common law or a statute creating a cause of action if the injury were caused by a person not having available the defense of sovereign immunity.
(b) Acts which may impose liability.—The following acts by a Commonwealth party may result in the imposition of liability on the Commonwealth and thе defense of sovereign immunity shall not be raised to claims for damages caused by:
(1) Vehicle liability.
(2) Medical-professional liability.
(3) Care, custody or control of personal property.
(4) Commonwealth real estate, highways and sidewalks.
(5) Potholes and other dangerous conditions.
*17 (6) Care, custody or control of animals.
(7) Liquor store sales.
(8) National Guard activities.
(9) Toxoids and vaccines.
(Emphasis added.)
In ascertaining whether the immunity bar applies here, we must first decide whether Appеllee is “the Commonwealth.” Prior to the 1982 reorganization that created the State System of Higher Education, state colleges were held to be “the Commonwealth” for purposes of immunity.
See e.g., Finkelstein v. Shippensburg State College,
As is evident from a reading of Seсtion 8522 of the Judicial Code, the legislature has elected to waive sovereign immunity only in limited instances. Indeed, Judge Blatt, in discussing Section 8522(a) in
Davidow v. Anderson,
We interpret this section as being evidence of an intent on the part of the General Assembly to *18 exempt the sovereign from immunity only in specific, clearly-stated situations and that it is our duty, thereforе, strictly to construe the above sections.
Appellant, however, does not argue that he falls within the enumerated exceptions in Section 8522(b). Instead, he assеrts that “the spirit of [Sections 9124 and 9125 of the Record Act] evidences the intent of the legislature that the Commonwealth should not be allowed to assert the doctrine of sovereign immunity. ...” Brief of Appellant, p.' 10. Thus, the theory under which Appellant proceeds is that Sections 9124 and 9125 of the Record Act in and of themselves constitute a substаntive exception to the immunity bar. Section 9124, however, provides for the limited use of criminal record information by licensing agencies. Appellee here is not applying for a liсense and we fail to see how this section is relevant to his case. Section 9125 states as follows:
Use of récords for employment
(a) ' General rule—Whenever an employer is in receipt of information "whiсh is part of an em-' ployment applicants criminal history record information file, it may use that information for the purpose of deciding whether or not to hire the applicant, only in accordance with this section.
(b) Use of information.—Felony and misdemeanor convictions may be considered by the employer only to the еxtent to which they relate to the applicants suitability for employment in the position for which he has applied.
(c) Notice.—The employer shall notify in writing the applicant if the decision not to hire the applicant is based in whole or in párt on criminal history record information.
Further, Section 9103 of the Record Act, 18 Pa. C. S. §9103, makes it clear that the Record Act does apply *19 to, inter alia, “any agency of the Commonwealth” and, Section 9183, 18 Pa. C.1 S. §9183, does provide for civil actions where provisions of the Record Act are. violated. What the Record Act does not contain is a specific provision waiving immunity as to -the Commonwealth. We thus must decide whether an implied waiver оf immunity exists.
'' We begin with our State Constitution, which pertinently provides, “Suits may be brought against the Commonwealth in such manner, in such courts and in such- cases as the Legislature may by law direct.” Pa. Const. Art. 1, §11. At one time the view was that this provision substantively operated to establish sovereign immunity,
see e.g., Sweigard v. Pennsylvania Department of Transportation,
Pursuant to section 11 of Article I of the Constitution of Pennsylvaniа, it is hereby declared to be the intent of the General Assembly that the Commonwealth,' and its officials and employees' acting within the scope of their duties, shall cоntinue to enjoy sovereign and official immunity and remain immune from suit except as the General Assembly shall specifically waive the immunity. When the General Assembly specifically waives sovereign immunity, a claim against the Commonwealth and its offiсials and em *20 ployees shall be brought only in such manner and in such courts and in such cases as directed by the provisions of Title 42 (relating to judiciary and judicial procеdure) unless otherwise specifically authorized by statute.
(Emphasis added.)
It is axiomatic that the object of all statutory construction is to ascertain and effectuate the intеnt of the legislature.
See
Section 1921(a) of the Statutory Construction Act of 1972, 1 Pa. C. S. §1921(a). Further, the plain words of a statute cannot be disregarded where the language is free and clear from all ambiguity.
Hyser v. Allegheny County,
Therefore, we affirm the sound decision of the trial court, which sustained Appellees preliminary objection and dismissed the complaint.
Order
Now, January 22, 1988, the order of the Court of Common Pleas of Monroe County in the above-captioned matter is hereby affirmed.
Notes
Preliminary objections are a proper vehicle for raising the defense of sovereign immunity where, as here, the defense is apparent'on the face of the pleading under attack.
Ziccardi v. School District of Philadelphia,
Act of March 10, 1949, P.L. 30, as amended. Section 2016-A was added by Section 2 of the Act of November 12, 1982, P.L. 660.