*1 (No. 52957. al., Petitioners, et v. CHICAGO
PATRICIA POLICH al., et FINANCE AUTHORITY SCHOOL Respondents.
Opinion March 1980. filed *3 MORAN, J., dissenting. Strawn, Wendrow, Wilson & of Chicago (Edward J. Calvin Edward L. Foote and Sawyier, Thomas Campbell, J. for counsel), petitioners. E. Albert Valukas, Jenner, Anton R. Michael Jr., J.
Rovell, H. Mathias, Listrom, Linda L. and Robert Jr., John Markowski, T. Block, & Chicago (Jenner counsel), for School Finance respondent Chicago Authority. counsel,
William R. Quinlan, corporation Chicago Lee Schwartz, Healy assistant (Martin corporation J. counsel, of counsel), respondent City Chicago. Poltrock & A.
DeJong, Giampietro (Lawrence Poltrock, B. Wayne Kathrin A. Giampietro, Koenig, Freerksen, N. student, G. law Gregory Stephen Daday, for amicus curiae Union, Teachers Local No.
AFL-CIO.
MR. CHIEF GOLDENHERSH delivered the JUSTICE of the court: opinion
Pursuant to leave Ill. R. granted (73 381), peti tioners, Polich, Patricia Gierke, Norm Gierke, William Co., Gunthorp-Warren B. S. Miller and Herbert Printing VI, 1970, art. Loeb, filed this action Const. original (Ill. to revenue declaratory judg
sec. relating seeking 4(a)) Finance Act other ment the School 16, of Act January Public approved provisions 81 — 1980, are invalid. and resident of the city
Petitioner Polich is a citizen are Gierke teachers by of employed Chicago, petitioners of of the of the board education city Chicago (the Board), creditor Co. an unsecured Gunthorp-Warren Printing are of and Loeb holders
of Petitioners Miller Board. on Octo- of education bonds board respectively maturing 15, 1987, ber December 1981.
The relevant of Public Act will 81—1221 portions of forth to the extent discussion set necessary Finance Authority School issues. respondent, a five-member board is governed by Authority), (the the Governor directors, were two whom by appointed directors two mayor with Chicago; approval with the approval were mayor Chicago appointed Governor, director, and one jointly appointed the Governor and as chairman serves mayor, 34A—301. Sec. Authority. substantive issues
Prior to consideration it advisable to comment we deem briefly presented, action exercise of over an which our jurisdiction original no actual collection controversy concerning presents 2; IV, art. revenue. sec. Const. Historically (Ill. 5; VI, 1870, art. V, art. Ill. Const. Ill. Const. sec. been this court has vested with jurisdiction
sec. original 5) revenue, matters to the and neither the framers relating nor this court have deemed it neces of the constitutions define the term “revenue” as used sary precisely been those constitutions. The has sparingly jurisdiction to the revenue in causes issues exercised involving relating v. Rock People Deep great public importance (see 388; Mahin Oil Thorpe (1969), Corp. (1931), 36; Dee-El Inc. v. Korzen Garage, *5 1; Bank & Trust Co. Illinois National Continental and is Zagel 387), appropriately here. asserted the Finance the creation of
In addition to School Public Act for the termina- Authority, provided 81—1221 tion of all members of school board terms a new effective and the April appointment board reduced tax the maximum rate for (sec. 3); 34 — educational to from purposes 2.11% 1.61% (sec. 53); 34 — for the provided reduction of the State aid funds payable to the school district under section 18—8 an amount by to the for the equal budget operations Authority, of that to sum the payment 18—8 Authority (sec. (k)); and enumerated in the powers Authority control the finances and of the Board. expenditures Section 34A —401 of the Act provided “shall have Authority to or power to approve reject Plans, the Financial the Board,” Contracts of Budgets and other detail the manner provisions in which the is Authority to empowered fiscal affairs supervise of the Board. 34A —401 In order (Secs. 411.) out its fiscal may carry duties the Board with provide with which moneys operate, by
empowered 34A —501 issue general obliga- tion in bonds an amount not to exceed million. $500 Section 34A —503 in provides part: Bonds,
“(a) issuing Before or at any the time Authority shall demand City and direct the Council of City provide by levy ordinance for the and collection of a upon direct annual tax all property the taxable located within the school district limit or without rate amount to pay sufficient and discharge principal thereof at maturity on sinking or fund pay installment and to dates the interest thereon as it falls due. The taxes as levied shall include also such additional amounts to extent that the prior years collections pay were insufficient discharge principal such maturity, thereof at sinking such installments, any, fund if and interest as it fell due thereon and the amount placed so collected shall be in the debt service reserve City City fund. The Council shall levy and collect such tax as directed Authority. tax
Such shall be in addition to and exclusive maxi- mum of all taxes which the Authority, the Board or the City now, City be, Council of the hereafter levy authorized law to any purposes. and all school Any such ordinance upon adoption.” shall be in force its Act, Petitioners contend “the amendatory *6 the with fiscal setting up Authority supervisory powers over the Board of Education and the to incur debt power the Council to order compel Chicago City taxes in levy same, the violates the home pay clearly constitutional rule of the the Act powers City.” They confers argue the control over the upon financial complete affairs of the board of education the compels city council and collect such taxes as be directed levy by Authority. that, stated their contention Simply in violation of the rule constitutional home of the powers the statute city, to control the amount grants power to be raised taxes of the money by operation schools other than the authorities persons corporate of the city selected and persons approved them. Cited in ex this are support position People rel. Vermilion County Conservation District v. Lenover 209, Ill. 43 ex v. rel. New York (1969), People Bergan Central R.R. 30, Co. Ill. ex rel. Burow People (1945), v. Block Ill. v. Schusselle (1916), Morgan (1907), v. Wider 53 Ill. Lovingston 302. In decided under Constitution, the 1848 Lovingston, General an act intended to establish a passed force for East The St. Louis. act for the police provided the Governor of three commissioners who appointment would control The was police department. city for the funds required appropriate operation that, but were commissioners department, failing to issue certificates indebtedness in the empowered name of the which were to be out In of taxes. city paid had exceeded its under holding legislature powers IX, article of the Constitution
court said:
“The of this act can be con validity hardly court, sidered an since open question decision of ex rel. v. The People McCagg Mayor ex 17; rel. Wilson Chicago, Same Salomon, 37; v. ex rel. Park ib. South Com Same missioners The Common Council ib. Chicago, 58, and Harward v. St. Clair Company, Drainage ib. 130. held,
We cases, in these the fifth section of the ninth article of constitution, authorizing legislature authorities of give corporate cities and towns of taxation for right corporate to be construed purposes, as a limitation upon power legislature grant right or local taxation to other corporate any persons than the or local We further corporate authorities.
held, that, authorities, by corporate used this clause of the constitution, must understood *7 those officers are either who municipal directly elected the . of the by or people municipality, in some mode to which appointed have they given their assent. held, We further the in first cases, above cited the of commissioners Lincoln Park authorities, were not and corporate in case, the last the were drainage company not such authorities of within the the meaning constitution. cases,
These in our are conclusive judgment, the of the act under against consideration. validity These are commissioners not police corporate Louis, of and, therefore, authorities East St. can have no of taxation.” Ill. power 304-05. IX,
Article section in Constitution of force when the decided, other cited cases were in provided
part: corporate general assembly may vest
“The cities, villages power with to of towns and authorities assessment, special by by improvements local make For contiguous property, or otherwise. special taxation municipal corporations corporate purposes, all other all taxes; may authority to collect be vested with assess and [***] if no 1970 contains comparable provi- Constitution debates shows “an examination
sion. Arguing to tax to the basic no intent concept power change above,” seek enunciated in the cases cited as petitioners to have hold that under constitution us present restricted. the General similarly power unit, to “the of a home rule argue qualify right They tax” to it will decide when levy having taxing power, Constitution, VII, 6, of article section the 1970 violates which provides part: Section, unit
“Except this a home rule limited perform pertaining any power any function exercise and including, government to its but not limited affairs to, public power regulate protection to for the tax; license; welfare; health, safety, morals to incur debt.” from Wider Lovingston
As shown by quotation constitutional provision pertaining a limitation was construed as taxing authority municipal right of the General Assembly grant power taxation but local anyone “corporate authorities.” IX, 1, of the 1970 Constitution
Article pro- vides part: power Assembly has the exclusive
“The General pro- except as limited or otherwise raise revenue law vided in Constitution.” article court, scope meaning
This considering *8 IX, in said Clark Hoffmann 402, 422-23:
“In the nature of the of the power discussing article, General under the revenue Assembly committee on and Finance, Revenue [Committee Convention, Constitutional that it explained 1970] to ‘vests the raise revenue in General power to the extent constitu- Assembly except tion such to grants local power governments otherwise limits legislature’s authority.’ (7 further the committee And Proceedings 2062.) stated:
‘Indeed, power government the inherent to tax is so undoubtedly well established that it would held be to any provi- in exist even the absence of constitutional *** result, authorizing any attempt sion it. As a specific power grant taxing in a state constitution becomes, effect, power. in a limitation the inherent place upon The Committee does intend to limits Assembly power, General in its exercise the tax but expressly they those limits are stated and are exclusive. very important
The Committee believes that avoid the narrow and often unintended limitations interpretations which resulted from court
existing provisions might constitutional and which again attempt if spell result we were out affirma- tively and in taxing powers. detail the state’s proposed wording objective achieves this
affirming power the sovereign of the state and the then, General in Section in later sections, setting specific forth the restrictions which are intended scope to circumscribe taxing power.
Section the General Assembly allows broad imposing latitude taxes ***. The did Committee not however, proposal, list these taxes in the because danger interpret any that a court might omission as a power impose denial of the specifically a tax not *** named in the constitution. The Committee’s approach, listing legislature not may taxes which the impose, recognizes during the life this constitu- taxation, existing forms, tion forms or variations of developed which the be free state should
adopt representatives choose. if its elected so General Committee believes that the Assem-
The power levy all of taxes. bly presently has the to kinds *** proposal any doubt on that score. This eliminates Assembly It to concentrate on the permits the General upon policy tax than the constitu- merits of rather places particular of form of taxation and it tionality a where policy legislature, tax in the the of formulation ’ belongs, (Emphasis it rather than in the courts. Proceedings Illinois
added.) 7 of] [Sixth [Record Constitutional Convention] 2066-67. there can be no doubt
From these explanations to raise reve- that the that it intended power the in taxation vested nue firmly through the inherent General both Assembly through the of that and by specific grant power body, the further clear that it was the Constitution. It is that be intent of the committee subject power in stated as are expressly such to limitations only limitations and that the the express Constitution to be exclusive. It was further concern a clearly are construction of the committee that court through and ‘unintended’ limits placed ‘narrow’ might the General Assembly’s upon power.” that,
In conclude contrary view we foregoing, contention, convention petitioners’ proceedings extent to which clear demonstrate intent change to tax. General Assembly may delegate power are restrictions cases cited by petitioners imposed consider the issue no Because we longer applicable. only of section 34A —503 validity presents tax, we find of the General Assembly’s power
question to address the raised respond suggestion unnecessary the Act is a limita ent brief because city Chicago’s a home rule tion on the municipality, taxing power Const. was needed to the bill three-fifths (Ill. majority pass VII, note, 1970, art. sec. We parenthetically, 6(g)). IX,
article Constitution section provides: pro- qualified Article limited “This is not or concerning of Article VII visions this Constitution majorities Assembly necessary size of the General deny power or limit of local granted tax to units government.” VII, note further that article
We the General Constitution empowers “selection” the officers of dis- school provide tricts, districts and other units of local special government. contention,
This made in reliance on negates petitioners’ constitutions, cases decided under members prior elected must be in a manner appointed *10 the by voters of approved city Chicago. the of section 34A—503 that
Concerning provision “the shall demand and direct the Council Authority City *** to ordinance for of collection by provide levy ***,” direct annual tax 22.2, we note that sections 34— — 22.4, 34 — 22.7 and 34 — 3of the School Rev. Code (Ill. 1977, Stat. ch. 22.2, 34 — 22.4, 34 — 22.7, pars. 34 — contain which are similar. 3) provisions substantially 34— In Latham v. Board Education 31 Ill. 2d (1964), of 181-82, in contention the board of rejecting education rather than the council made tax city levy for the school the court said: Chicago system,
“The fallacy plaintiffs’ argument Board makes the is clear when we consider levy even all have been though preliminary steps taken the Board and a final has by been budget not a of school be forth- adopted, taxes will penny without coming council adoption by city of an ordinance the tax.” levying
The rationale Latham is here. applicable
Section 34A—510 Act provides: pledges “The State of agrees Illinois with holders rights Bonds that the State will not limit or alter the powers by vested Authority respect in the this Act with through Sections 34A—501 hereof so as to 34A—512 Authority made any contract impair the terms rights and way impair any holders or in with such Bonds, together remedies of such holders until with thereon, any unpaid with installments interest interest on interest, with expenses in connection and all costs holders, any proceedings by or on behalf of such action or discharged provisions made their fully are met and include payment. Authority authorized to such any agreement resolution or pledge and of the State in Pub. Act contract with the holders Bonds.” 81—1221. effect, that,
Petitioners contend in foregoing from future legislatures “purports prevent provision Code abolish Authority.” ever School amending effect too “that in Act question pre They argue the Authority vents future from abolishing legislatures out bonds as has any 30-year which lasts long v. ex Barrett rel. City People standing.” Citing “The General Assembly they argue: (1940), all acts which the undoubted has right repeal legislative ***.” “A General the nature of a are not grant private authorized bind unless cannot its successors ***.” In Transpor Regional the Constitution Hoogasian tation Authority 4.04(e) Rev. Act (Ill. Regional Transportation which con Stat., ch. 111 2/3, par. 704.04), Supp., here, to that involved similar tained substantially language *11 debt.” that it created “State on the was attacked ground than more held that the did “nothing The court provisions of the on the an obligation part already existing recognize to holders not the note and bond to Authority’s State the with Authority their contractual relationship impair 117, In v. Transporta ***.” Ill. Day Regional 2d 128.) (58 533, con Ill. it was again tion Authority (1977), attack in Hoogasian, the under tended provision of for allocation with the provision providing coupled Under the debt. taxes, to create certain served State We that contention was rejected. rationale of Hoogasian future the binds in what manner section fail to perceive that as in the legislation General Assemblies hold the the in clause Day considered Hoogasian expresses the intent to bondholders consistent protection provide the with constitutional impairment provisions prohibiting 10; Const., I, of contractual art. sec. Const. U.S. rights.
1970, I, art. sec. 16.
Petitioners contend next Public Act 81—1221 board of educa- invalid for the reason in the reducing tax over tion’s authorized rate and its control eliminating the allocation of to and credi- revenues its various among tors, of contracts. The Act impairs obligation amends section to reduce the 34—53 School Code rate for maximum tax educational from 2.11% purposes Section 34A —404 Board submit 1.61%. requires for the Section budgets Authority’s approval rejection.
34A —405 empowers Authority regulations adopt which contracts must identifying categories types be submitted Board for its Authority or rejection. Section 34A —409 approval empowers direct the Board’s treasurer to establish Authority maintain the Board’s cash accounts manner pre- scribed and further Authority empowers to assume exclusive administration and bank Board’s cash accounts and to funds withdraw from these accounts for the Board’s lawful expenditures. Iron Faitoute & Park Steel Co. City Asbury 502, 1629, U.S. Ed. 86 L. Ct. S.
(1942), involved a New under statute which Jersey plan of the claims of adjustment creditors insolvent munici could made palities all creditors. The binding upon statute attacked was as an impairment right I, contract in violation of article Consti tution of the United States. The held that Court Supreme enactment within legislation police the State and power was valid. legislation Foundation, Renewal Inc. v. Similarly, Community Title & Trust Co. *12 202 court observed:
this to that the contract
“It is observe appropriate is not to be con of the Federal constitution clause an absolute sidered restriction prohibition that of contracts and against affecting be to the subject clause they recognizes reasonable and exercise police legitimate Home & Loan of the State. Building power (See Blaisdell, 398, 447, 78 L. Ed. v. Ass’n U.S. 290 Ct. the State 54 S. Where properly 231.) welfare, even for exercises power general established them contracts and though rights action, of this are the exercise affected its an unconstitutional is not infringement power an exercise the contract clause. Such police created will considered rights power superior East New under a contract between individuals. Hahn, L. 90
York Bank v. U.S. 326 Savings 69; & Ass’n Ed. Ct. Home Loan Building S. 398; v. Blaisdell, Chicago
v. U.S. City 307; Co., 4 Ill. Ry. and North Western Annunzio, Mercantile Co. Vissering 108.” found: General Assembly In section 34A —102 to the A is esstential sound financial structure “(ii) any system. It is vital operation of continued school commercial, cultural interests educational operation. goal, public remain in achieve that schools To to the systems have effective access public must school long funds. private market term borrow short promote integrity To the financial of boards (iii) exceeding having population of education of cities 500,000, necessary provide the creation of powers necessary finance authorities school with management assure the promote sound financial and to public operation continued schools.” are General erred in
We unable say within the enactment finding legislation exercise of its necessary appropriate power. police *13 hold, therefore, We that the enactment of the legislation was not an of contract either impairment proscribed by the United of States Constitution or the Constitution Illinois.
Petitioners contend next that the Act is invalid because it “constitutes direct of disavowal State Illinois of its constitutional and finance an obligation provide efficient of system education.” Peti- high quality public that Act, tioners under assert the State “assumes no added with the absolutely obligations” dealing financial crisis school facing system. X,
Article of section the 1970 Constitution pro- vides:
“SECTION 1. GOAL-FREE SCHOOLS A goal People fundamental of the of the is the State development persons
educational of all to the limits capacities. their provide
The shall State for an system high efficient quality public educational institutions and Educa- services. public tion in through secondary schools level shall be free. There be such other free education as the General Assembly provides by law.
The primary responsibility State has the for financing system public education.” Petitioner does not assert that the State contributes toward the nothing educational and public institutions services for Indeed the Chicago. is true. Under contrary section 18.8 of the School Code amended Pub. Act (as the State is still make 1221), aid obligated pay- 81— ments, attendance, based on to the school district and the Also we note Authority. that in December of 1979 the State provided funds to the emergency school both district in the form of an advance of State payments loans the form of State aid payment anticipation certificates.
The Board guaranteed of the payment principal interest on the loans would be out made of State aid for future payments This, note, months. we was accom- new without legislation. plished State, is position
Apparently petitioners’ Constitution, direct cash under required provide rather than make in order to alleviate this crisis payments done, bond has for financing repay- provision, ment taxes. We cannot out city agree.
In Blase the court con State X, article the last strued sentence reads “The State has Constitution which financing system public primary responsibility that the in that case contended education.” plaintiffs at least Constitution State 50% provide required assertion, of the cost education. Rejecting public the court said:
“In view of the history proposal *14 of its principal sponsor, repeated explanations be that in was it cannot said sentence question to a intended on the impose specific obligation to General Rather its state Assembly. purpose commitment, a Ill. a a 2d purpose, goal.” 100. of Blase that article X, view of the section
In holding no the General specific duty imposed be which must strong constitutionality presumption us, overcome to invalidate statute before we hold X, 1, of not the 1970 Act is violative article the crisis Constitution. taken alleviate measures are schools left wisdom Chicago facing properly Cronin v. the General Lindberg (1976), Assembly. 47.
2d next Act
Petitioners contend Public 81—1221 face for a on its discriminatory provides (sec. 8.9(k)) 18 — deduction of State aid to the school district. paid Chicago discrimination, is its This they by argue, compounded effect. further marked racially argue discriminatory They clause of the Illinois Constitu equal protection I, con 1970, art. read in tion of 1970 Const. sec. (Ill. 2), with constitutional junction express provisions establishing education as fundamental State Const. (Ill. goal X, art. sec. mandate strict judicial scrutiny 1), statutes in of educational involving disparity provision services.
Section in 8.9(k) provides pertinent part: 18 — school operating
“For a district under the financial 34A, supervision Authority of an created under Article payable aid otherwise to that under State district this Section, other than attributable Title—I State aid students, by be equal shall reduced an amount to the bud- operations get for Authority as certified Education, Authority State Board of amount an equal paid Authority reduction be such shall to the created operating expenses for such district for its provided manner 18—11 of Act. The Section this any remainder of State school aid such district shall paid in accordance with Article 34A when that Article provides disposition for a provided by other than that Article.”
We need not and do not further contention. address this none of the are Obviously members class petitioners of school whom it is against contended statute pupils is and therefore no unreasonably discriminatory, parties to the action have its Cronin question validity. standing v. 47, 56; 66 Ill. Board Education Lindberg (1976), Bakalis 467. contend
Petitioners next if Authority treated as a unit local from the government separate School District then “Section 8.9(k), 18 — amended the Act to the delegates invalidly *15 determination, standard, without of the amount [by] which of funds to the appropriation Legislature *** Common Fund to be School is reduced in connection with the school district.” Petitioners argue section sets no and that the amount standards 8.9(k) 18 — to the school district “what payable is dependent upon for its Authority happens budget operations certify to the of State Board as its Education operating expenses.”
206 article contravenes it is section argued,
Consequently, Constitution, II, of the 1970 pertaining of powers. separation 552, 555, the court Ill.
In Hill v. 34 Relyea 2d said:
“There is a distinction between delegation to a true and the delegation legislative power to execute the law. subordinate authority Ill. Inc. v. 356 City Chicago, 230.) (Lydy, law involves a discretion as what former be; or discre the latter an authority shall merely under and execution, to be exercised as to its tion Warren, 11 Ill. of the v. law. (People pursuance 198; Wazau, 420; Ill. Evanston v. 364 City 2d Lueder, an Ill. It is estab v. 389 McDougall 141.) cannot dele rule that the General lished determine what its gate general legislative power However, the law shall be. may delegate to do those which others things authority do, do as but cannot might properly legislature advantageously. understandingly (Board 372; ex rel. People Education v. 33 Ill. Page, 2d 226; Belleville, Ill. Daesch v. 2d Mayor 22 Wazau, Ill. Absolute v. Evanston 198.) City of in the detail necessary criteria every whereby need not be of a law is enforcement anticipated The consti General Assembly. established by standards tution intelligible merely requires with enforce be set charged guide agency Ass’n, Smith, ment, Gardens Inc. v. (Memorial 116; Warren, Ill. v. People 2d 420,) 2d must and the standard precision permissible to the nature necessarily vary according involved. ultimate and the objective problems 372; Ill. People Board Education Page, Belleville, ex rel. Daesch v. Mayor 226.”
As demonstrated the debates House Bill by the drafters of the were unable to provision question determine how much to for the Authori- budget operating In its first instance, the Authori- ty. year operation, would be to incur ty related to the required large expenses however, sale of bonds. Such would be expenses, expected to decline. In view of this and the nature of the unique of the General undertaking, inability set for the precise is understandable. budget Authority Moreover, when Act is viewed in its entirety, becomes clear that ex- to incur Authority’s power is not unlimited. penses Section of the Act 34A—201 provides part: purposes Authority
“The shall be to exercise finan- Board, cial control over the and to furnish financial assist- ance that the provide public so Board can education within jurisdiction the Board’s permitting while the Board to meet obligations its to its creditors and the holders of its notes Except bonds. expressly Article, limited Authority powers shall have necessary all to meet its re- sponsibilities and carry purposes out its pur- and the poses Article, of this including, to, but not limited the fol- lowing powers:
[*] [*] [*] pay (m) expenses operations; of its ***.” Thus, the discretion Authority’s is limited to ex incurring penses “necessary” its under discharge responsibilities the Act. In view of the of defin difficulty impossibility more standards ing precise which the is to determine its and hence the amount budget ultimately district, allocable to the school we cannot Public Act say an legislative constitutes unlawful 81 — 1221 delegation power. See also v. Public Paepcke Com. Building (1970), 330, 345-47; ex rel. People Stamos Public Com. Building 174-76.
Petitioners contend that the Act is invalid because two essential provisions 34—3 (sections were 502(a)) 34A— not a by three-fifths vote of the passed members elected to that sec- argue of the General Assembly. They
each house of 1970 of article IV of the Constitution and 10 tions 5(a) that a and that “It be read contemplated must together after introduced 1’ is one bill prior July ‘passed on the second Wednesday of the Legislature convening *17 that because of that calendar year.” They argue January was intro- in House Bill the Act had its 1264 origin (which 1979, not July and was prior duced in March passed 11, 1980, it 1, January when it was passed 1979) in accordance “after 30th.” They argue passed June IV the bill of article of section 10 the with provisions 1980, 1, unless it was effective until become July cannot elected of the members of three-fifths vote passed to each house. of 1970 10, IV, of the Constitution
Article section as follows: provides provide by law for a General shall “The July passed prior to 1 of a date for laws
uniform effective year. Assembly may provide for a The General calendar prior July any passed 1. different effective date in law effective passed not become A bill after 30 shall June year unless the Gen- July 1 of the next calendar prior to members Assembly by of three-fifths of the the vote eral date.” provides for an earlier effective elected to each house and the legislation constitutional Both provision 1977, Rev. in thereof Stat. enacted implementation (Ill. referred to a bill 131, “passed
ch. through 21 pars. 26) 1 of a calendar without when year” regard July prior been filed or its course through bill have prior 10; IV, 1970, Const. art. sec. process. (Ill. legislative clear 1977, 131, In our Rev. ch. Stat. par. opinion 21.) no construc constitutional and provision requires explicit in tion, contained and in accordance with provision a law. effective bill, it became becoming upon Act that Public contend 81—1221 Finally petitioners IV, 8, of the Con- not, article section could as required by stitution, “on three different have been read days” that it came that it is obvious either house for reason into and whole process existence “traversed legislative in one 1980.” Petitioners argue January day, with the filed in dealt solely House Bill March 1979 It was at that retirement certain school personnel. age It “An was time entitled Act to amend School Code.” House, in the read on three different days passed it House, and sent to the Senate. In the Senate was On received and committee. first was assigned reading 1980, the committee bill from was January discharged in the On its second Senate. given January reading but the and the title clause was everything enacting of what be- deleted from House Bill contents came Public Act were substituted. On same 81—1221 date Senate, was two House Bill given readings Senate, House, sent to the which was passed it passed as received. Subsequently approved Governor. Petitioners argue foregoing procedure “is such a IV, wilful violation of article gross that no 8(d) categorization these actions as being *18 and merely ‘procedural’ as somehow absolved the by ‘enrolled rule bill’ seems under the circum- adequate stances.” contend that it the
Respondents was clear intent of the the Constitution, framers of and our in Fuehr holding meyer City 57 Ill. that (1974), 2d of made now argument be foreclosed. In by petitioners a Fuehrmeyer city Chicago argued house bill was not enacted for the reason that it was not validly read title in the Senate three In by times. that con addressing tention the court said:
“The City that House Bill Chicago argues 3636 was not enacted hence not did be validly come effective because it was not read title by three in the times Senate. Section of article 8(d) IV of the Constitution shall be ‘A bill provides: read on title three by different in each house.’ days from contention is based City’s upon excerpts of the Senate which debates transcript title, read
fail to show House Bill 3636 was by do bill called show although they Senate, third in the that there was a upon reading roll call and that the were taken yeas nays by vote. entered record were as They journal the Constitution. Section by required 7(b) article IV the Constitution of 1970 provides: ‘Each house shall a of its journal keep proceedings a of its debates. The shall transcript journal available to shall be transcript published think that We this contention public.’ is answered City subsequent provision of article IV which states: ‘The section 8(d) and the of the House of Speaker Representatives each bill that President of the shall Senate sign both houses passes certify procedural for have been met.’ Whether requirements passage title, or not a bill has been read as Constitu commands, tion to be characterized seems fairly matter, the determination which as procedural left officers of was deliberately presiding of the General two Houses Assembly.” 193, 198. 142, the In v. Devon Bank Benjamin of the enrolled-bill rule inso court validity recognized far it related to procedural passage requirements The court said: legislation. rule, ‘enrolled bill’
“The ‘certification’ or so-called IV, of article contained in last sentence of the House ‘The provides: Speaker 8(d), and the President Senate Representatives *19 to certi- both houses each bill that shall passes sign for passage requirements fy procedural met.’ have been on of the con-
The Committee the Legislature stitutional convention explained purpose this as follows: provision Entry ‘3. and Enrolled Bill Rules —Pres- Journal
ently entry” “journal has the rule distin- Illinois guished proposed from an “enrolled bill” rule. It is adopt rule. that Illinois the “enrolled bill” “journal entry” piece
The rule means that a be legislation challenged by pointing can in the courts journal. passage to a defect in its as reflected in the rule, passed by duely Under a statute [sic] signed General the Governor courts, merits, necessarily attacked in the not on its procedural but some or technicality error found in rule, legislative process. “journal entry” as a result, complex procedures leads to lititation over technicalities. provide
The “enrolled bill” rule would that when bill, presiding sign officers of the two a houses signatures their become proof conclusive that all con- procedures stitutional properly have been followed.
The “enrolled bill” permit challenge rule would not a procedural bill on grounds a regarding technical passage manner of if bill on its face showed properly passed. was Signatures by presiding would, course, proof proper officers constitute procedures were followed.
For thorough discussion of the Constitutional legal problems existing “jour- associated with the rule, entry” Cohn, nal see: Braden and The Illinois 153-154, pp. Constitution 157-158 and 159-160.
The method adopting recommended for “enrolled bill” rule add following phrase is to paragraph third of section c : 8(d)] [now certify “to procedural requirements ’ passage have been Proceedings met.” 1386-87.” 145-46.
This case is from in that distinguishable Benjamin defect alleged argued by would exami- petitioners require nation of the Journal, whereas failure to com- Benjamin, with the constitutional ply from provision apparent *20 212
the face of the bill. rule The enrolled bill is clearly appli- here, en- cable and we hold the was properly legislation acted.
For stated we hold that Public Act reasons is constitutional and became effective upon ap- 81—1221 16, 1980. January proval
Judgment for defendants. MORAN,
MR. dissenting: JUSTICE if an a only court issue may declaratory judgment This Contractors actual exists. controversy (Underground 375; Ill. v. City Association 2d Chicago (1977), Ill. Milk v. Aurora City Dean Co. (1949), on the It issue an based cannot advisory opinion 334.) National of future harm injury. possibility (Exchange 422; Ill. Bank Cook County (1955), Inc. v. Korzen Dee-El 11.) Garage, no us, admits that there is In before the majority the case such deficiency but fails why actual controversy explain from not act the court taking original does prevent “fear” that the obligations only plaintiffs jurisdiction. Finance be
due them School may impaired those To address Act Act (Pub. 1221). 81 — be to render an advisory “fears” would merely opinion. that a declara
It become when those fears reality is only brought. properly tory judgment