371 Mass. 332 | Mass. | 1976
On September 3,1975, a judge of the Housing Court of the City of Boston issued a preliminary injunction requiring the police commissioner of the city of Boston “to provide 24-hour security protection to the persons and residences of the named Plaintiffs and of the
The plaintiff presents two arguments to this court. First, he contends that the Housing Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over this case in view of the jurisdictional grant set forth in G. L. c. 185A, § 3, and, therefore, the plaintiff’s motion to dismiss should have been granted by the judge of the Housing Court. Second, the plaintiff maintains that the judge abused his discretion by issuing the preliminary injunction of September 3, 1975. We do not address this second argument, for we hold that the Housing Court does not have jurisdiction over this matter. Nevertheless, as will be seen, we do not order that the injunction shall be dissolved. Rather, we remand the case to the single justice for a determination on the merits in the county court or, after transfer in the discretion of the single justice, in the Superior Court.
The facts which led to this action are as follows. On August 26, 1975, black tenants of two public housing projects in East Boston, defendants in the case now before us, commenced a class action in the Housing Court naming as defendants, inter alia, the administrator of the Boston Housing Authority, the plaintiff, the Boston Housing Authority, and the Boston police department. The complaint seeks injunctive and declaratory relief and damages “to secure the protection of black public housing tenants in East Boston from racial harassment and threats and injury to their lives and property.” The tenants allege that the plaintiff and other officials failed to protect residents from
A hearing was held on August 26, 1975, on the tenants’ motion for a temporary restraining order. On the basis of the complaint and three accompanying affidavits, the judge issued a temporary restraining order which, in part, required the plaintiff to provide twenty-four hour police protection, as defined in the order, for the residents’ apartments.
On August 28 and 29, 1975, a hearing was held in the Housing Court on the tenants’ application for a preliminary injunction. The transcript of this hearing, including the testimony of seven witnesses for the tenants and three police officers for the plaintiff, as well as the findings and rulings of the judge are part of the record now before us on appeal.
The testimony of the tenants’ witnesses indicated that black families in two adjoining housing projects in East Boston have been subjected to harassment, threats and attacks by white youths. Although there was testimony about scattered incidents over a period of time, the main thrust of the testimony concerned events that occurred on August 25 and 26,1975. The sequence of events, during these two days, as culled from the testimony at the hearing, may be summarized as follows.
During the early evening of August 25, bands of white youths carrying rocks, bottles and baseball bats were seen
During these incidents, despite calls for help by black residents, the police appeared to take little action to quell the disturbances. An attempt was made by the police in the early evening to disperse the groups and to confiscate the weapons, but the situation did not improve. Two white youths were arrested. According to the rulings of the judge, the small number of policemen and the limited response by those present was “totally unreasonable” in view of the extreme violence, harassment and vandalism that was occurring.
During the early hours of August 26, one of the named tenants, Annie Mae Lewis, and several of her friends who had come to her apartment to aid her were ordered by police to disperse. Several witnesses testified that none of these individuals was throwing rocks or sticks, although a police officer testified otherwise. On refusing to disperse, six persons at the Lewis apartment were arrested for disorderly conduct, apparently in an effort by the police to remove them as a target of the disorders. As the arrests were taking place, surrounding crowds of whites yelled racial epithets.
After the hearing, the judge found that the police had not discharged their responsibility to maintain order and that their failure to take reasonable measures to protect black tenants and other persons constituted a denial of equal protection of the laws. The judge entered an order, see note 2 supra, requiring the plaintiff to provide twenty-four hour security protection to the persons and residences of the named tenants and of the class until such time as the need no longer exists.
Subsequently, the plaintiff’s motion for a stay of the preliminary injunction was denied by the judge. There
Initially, we note that, despite the defendants’ contention, this case is properly before us. In reaching this conclusion, we need not decide if Mass. R. A. P. 6 (a), 365 Mass. 848 (1974), applies to a petition brought under G. L. c. 231, § 118, or if, as argued by the plaintiff, Rule 6 (a) governs only an appeal from a final judgment (opposed to an interlocutory order), see Foreign Auto Import, Inc. v. Renault Northeast, Inc., 367 Mass. 464, 468-471 (1975), for even if we assume that Rule 6 (a) is applicable, we believe that the plaintiff has complied with that rule.
We now turn to the plaintiff’s first contention that his motion to dismiss should have been granted on the ground that the Housing Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over this matter. We conclude that the plaintiff’s position is supported by a reading of the statute which established the Housing Court of the City of Boston (G. L. c. 185A) and is consistent with the legislative history relating to the creation of that court. Accordingly, we decide that the issuance of a preliminary injunction in this case went beyond the statutory powers granted to the Housing Court under G. L. c. 185A, § 3.
As we noted in West Broadway Task Force, Inc. v. Commissioner of Dep’t of Community Affairs, 363 Mass. 745, 753 (1973), the Housing Court of the City of Boston was established by statute, G. L. c. 185A, effective January 1, 1972, so as to provide a specialized forum to handle all criminal and civil matters regarding housing that arise in Boston. Cf. Perez v. Boston Housing Authority, 368 Mass. 333, 343 (1975). It is a court of limited jurisdiction, the scope of which is defined in G. L. c. 185A, § 3, set forth below.
An examination of the legislative history of G. L. c. 185A reveals that the General Court did not intend to create a court to handle all problems affecting residents of Boston,
This theme was later incorporated in the two proposed bills that were introduced in 1969-1971 and that were the basis for 1971 House Bill No. 5873, which, with minor modifications, became G. L. c. 185A, inserted by St. 1971, c. 843, § 1. Both House Bills, 1971 House Bills Nos. 956 and 4202 (see also 1969 House Bill No. 1160, 1969 Senate Bill No. 621, 1970 House Bill No. 4642, and 1970 Senate Bill Nos. 518, 1579), contained the same preamble, which, although it was subsequently deleted in the final 1971 House Bill
In addition to the above cited legislative history, an examination of G. L. c. 185A supports the conclusion that the
In sum, we find no indication in either the statute or its legislative history that the seemingly broad, and perhaps ambiguous, language of G. L. c. 185A, 8 3, can reasonably be construed to cover the present case. Furthermore, it would be illogical to do so. If we were to accept the defendants’ position and conclude that the police conduct complained of in this case comes within the jurisdiction of the Housing Court, there would be no reasonable limits on that court’s jurisdiction. There are many conceivable disputes that affect the “health, safety, or welfare” of occupants of housing, but not all are properly within the ambit of the Housing Court since it is a court of limited jurisdiction. Although we need not at this time delineate the exact scope of the Housing Court’s jurisdiction, it is apparent from our prior discussion that police protection and allocation of police resources, despite their significant impact on the welfare and safety of Boston residents, are not suffi
The case is remanded to the Supreme Judicial Court for the county of Suffolk where further proceedings are to be had to determine the merits of the controversy. In the alternative, in the discretion of the single justice, the case may be transferred to the Superior Court (see G. L. c. 211, 3, 4A) for further proceedings on the merits. We do not at this time dissolve the injunction but leave it in the discretion of the single justice whether the injunction shall be dissolved or remain in effect pending further proceedings.
So ordered.
The protection was to consist of “the continual presence of one or more police officers or security guards in the immediate vicinity of each residence and sufficient numbers of police or guards in the area around the residences in order to deter persons intent upon perpetrating physical violence, extreme harassment and vandalism away from the residences.”
The tenants allege that the plaintiff and other officials interfered with their right to quiet enjoyment in violation of G. L. c. 186, § 14, and that, by failing to disperse rock throwers, the police officers did not fulfil their statutory duty under G. L. c. 269, § 1. Further, the tenants claim that the officials’ failure to perform their duty to protect the black residents from attack constitutes a deprivation of their rights under the Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. § 3601 et seq. (Supp. I 1971), 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981-1983 (Supp. I 1971), and the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
General Laws c. 185A, § 3, as amended by St. 1974, c. 700, § 1, provides in part: “The housing court shall have common law and statutory jurisdiction concurrent with the district courts and superior court of all crimes and of all civil actions, arising within the city, under sec
In its proposed legislation, the special commission suggested that the Housing Court’s jurisdiction extend to matters arising under certain enumerated statutes and under all general and special laws of the Commonwealth, city ordinances, and codes, rules and regulations of the Commonwealth, the city and government agencies or departments in so far as they are “applicable to or affect any building or dwelling used or intended for human habitation and every other structure or condition located within the same metes and bounds of the parcel of land as such building or dwelling, or any occupant thereof.” 1968 House Doc. No. 4498, app. A.
1971 House Bill No. 956 defined the subject matter jurisdiction of the Housing Court to include: “[A] 11 causes arising under sections one hundred and twenty-seven A to one hundred and twenty-seven K inclusive of chapter one hundred and eleven of the General Laws and section fourteen of chapter one hundred and eighty-six of the General Laws and all defenses under section eight A of chapter two hundred and thirty-nine of the General Laws.”
1971 House Bill No. 4202 provided an expansive definition of jurisdiction which more closely resembles that of G. L. c. 185A, § 3: “Section 4A. The court shall have and exercise concurrent original jurisdiction in rem and in personam over all causes, arising under sections one hundred twenty-seven A to one hundred twenty-seven K, inclusive, of chapter one hundred eleven of the General Laws, sections fourteen and eighteen of chapter one hundred eighty-six of the General Laws and chapter two hundred thirty-nine of the General Laws....
“Section 4B. The court shall have concurrent jurisdiction over all matters and proceedings arising under any general or special laws of the commonwealth and codes, ordinances or regulations in effect in the city from time to time, (1) which affect the use, condition, construction, rehabilitation, maintenance or operation of any building or dwelling used or intended for human habitation and every other structure or condition located within the same metes and bounds of the parcel of land containing such building or dwelling, (2) which relate to the health, safety, or welfare of any occupant of any building or dwelling used or intended for human habitation, and (3) matters and proceedings under section five of chapter one hundred eleven of the General Laws, chapter one hundred forty-three of the General Laws, chapter one hundred forty-eight of the General Laws, section 16 of chapter 270 of the General Laws, chapter 475 of the acts of 1938, chapter 217 of the acts of 1939, and chapter 314 of the acts of 1962 as the foregoing general and special laws of the commonwealth and codes, ordinances, and regulations, enacted pursuant thereto, may be amended from time to time.”