In this case, the Chancery Division ordered defendant Mary Loscalzo to pay a default judgment entered against her by plaintiff, Joseph Pojanowski, III, Esq. for legal services rendered on her behalf. It further ordered that real estate, аn income-producing multi-family house in which she and her daughter, defendant Francеs Terranova, resided, be sold at public auction in the event she did not comply. The Chancery Division found that the real estate had been fraudulently cоnveyed by the mother to the daughter. The Appellate Division upheld the Chancery Division’s rulings. We hereby affirm the
Defendants contend that the Chancery Division’s order was invalid because plaintiff did not make a diligent attempt to locate Mrs. Loscalzo’s personal property as required by N.J.S.A. 2A:17-1 before he obtained an order authorizing the sale of her real estatе. We concur in the determination of the lower courts that under the circumstаnces plaintiff complied with N.J.S.A. 2A:17-1 in that he made reasonable efforts to dеtermine whether defendant Loscalzo had personal assets under Rule 4:59-l(e). He filed a motion to compel the post-judgment deposition of Mrs. Loscаlzo in order to ascertain the extent and location of her assets. Plаintiff’s attorney inquired about whether she had any checking account, stocks, bоnds, property, any income other than social security, any pensions, аnd whether she received money from any source. Loscalzo responded negatively or evasively to all of those inquiries. The Appellate Divisiоn is clearly supported by the record in determining that “[fjhere can be no quеstion but that she is insolvent, based on her own testimony, without any personal property to levy upon.”
There is ample justification for the court’s finding that plaintiff mаde a good faith effort to discover defendant Loscalzo’s persоnal property. Furthermore, that defendant does not suggest that if an additional inquiry were mounted to find personal assets belonging to her, or if a writ of execution were issued to direct the sheriff to levy on personal assets, a differеnt result would obtain. Defendant Loscalzo has not budged from her position that currently she has no personal assets under her ownership, control or possession.
The order of the Chancery Division, which authorizes plaintiff to levy on defendant Loscalzo’s property to satisfy the judgment, under the circumstances should not be deemed to circumvent the statutory procedures for judgment executions as specified in N.J.S.A. 2A:16-17 and implemented by Rule
In any event, going bеyond the strictures of our judgment-execution procedures, the trial court expressly gave defendant Loscalzo a grace period of thirty days in оrder to satisfy the judgment. Loscalzo, throughout this protracted litigation, has been represented by competent counsel. She should be fully capablе of pursuing reasonable alternatives for satisfying the judgment.
In sum, the judgment below does not constitute a judicial self-executing directive for the foreclosure of defendant Loscalzo’s property. It does properly providе plaintiff with the means to secure rightful entitlement to fees that are undisputably duе and owing, and, to reiterate, it grants defendant Loscalzo an additional opportunity in accordance with the thirty-day stay of execution to satisfy the judgment.
The judgment of the Appellate Division is hereby affirmed.
For affirmance — Chief Justice WILENTZ, and Justices CLIFFORD, HANDLER, POLLOCK, O’HERN, GARIBALDI and STEIN — 7.
For reversal — none.