269 Mo. 104 | Mo. | 1916
Lead Opinion
Action for personal injuries. The sum first claimed was .$50,000, but about the conclusion of the trial nisi, a gracious amendment of the petition reduced the sum to $25,000. Plaintiff was a metal polisher in the city of St. Louis, earning, when at work, four dollars per day, the amount to which the union of which he was a member limited the earnings of their members. Country-bred, he had not at the date of the accident been fully initiated in all the amusements of a great city
“Q. What interest have you in this case that you continually, when I ask you one question, put in something at the tail end that nobody asks you for? A. Well, this is a friend of mine, and we had it made up to stick together, and I am going to stick to the finish.”
On a Sunday evening early in May, 1910, these two friends, after partaking of a couple of bottles of beer each (according to Boardman), which beer was obtained from a negro bootlegger in the vicinity of plaintiff’s home, repaired to plaintiff’s home, where they had supper. After supper they visited Delinar Garden for a short time and then wended their way to Forest Park Highlands, and whilst there were attracted to the scenic railway or “Racer Dips.” The cars and tracks of this miniature railway were in plain view and could have been seen had they looked. The evidence shows, though not from these two parties, that the cars and most of the tracks were in open view for a person standing at the platform from which the trains started. The evidence shows that “The Racer Dips” was a device for public entertainment, consisting of two miniature railway tracks upon which separate trains of small cars were run and so arranged that there was the appearance of racing between the two trains. The tracks had a common starting point and a common ending point. By mechanical force the trains of cars were pulled up grade to a considerable height and then turned loose -to make the trip by gravity. This was accomplished by steep declines and elevations in the tracks so that the momentum gath
■ The evidence discloses that these trains were made up of three cars having three seats each, and which seats would accommodate two pleasure seekers. In other words, eighteen persons constituted a train-load. While plaintiff was not always clear in his testimony,' yet, taken as a whole, the evidence shows that plaintiff and his friend took passage on this pleasure device in the middle seat of the middle car of one of these trains. It is made quite clear that they were not in the front seat of the car. When the train was nearing the end of the journey plaintiff’s foot got out of the car and struck an object to the side of the car, and a severe fracture of the right leg resulted, together with some other injuries.
■ It appeared from the evidence that the Park Circuit & Railway Company was the holding companyfor the defendant Mountain Railway Construction Company, and was not, itself, engaged in the actual operation of the pleasure device known as the “Racer Dips.” But, whilst it held and owned the stock of the operating company, it was not, in fact, operating the device. Upon this showing plaintiff voluntarily dismissed as to such corporation.
The plaintiff’s case largely turns upon the testimony of himself and his friend, although he Introduced some other evidence which will be noted in the course of the opinion.
Going to the pleadings, it will be seen that the negligence of the defendant is thus stated in the petition:
*111 “That said racer dip, the ears and tracks thereon were so faulty and so defectively constructed and defendants so negligently and carelessly maintained and operated the same that by reason thereof the car in which plaintiff was a passenger as aforesaid vibrated and shook so that the plaintiff was thrown with much force against the back of the conveyance or car in which he had passage, and plaintiff’s right foot and leg were suddenly and violently thrown upwards and out of said conveyance or car, thereby causing his said right foot and leg to be caught in and thrown upon and against railings, posts and uprights along and outside of said conveyance or ear, through which plaintiff was greatly and permanently injured, as follows.”
The answer filed by defendant thus reads:
“Come now the defendants in the above-entitled cause and for answer to the plaintiff’s amended .petition deny each and every allegation' in said amended petition contained and set forth.
“Further answering, defendants say that what, if any, injuries were received by the plaintiff on the occasion in question and by and on account of the things mentioned in his amended petition were caused by the ordinary and usual movements of the racer dip mentioned in the plaintiff’s petition, which was an amusement device, the real attractiveness of which depended solely upon the sensations that rapid changes of speed give the person using it and that the plaintiff assumed all such dangers and risks and on account thereof cannot recover.
“Further answering, defendants say that what,, if any, injuries plaintiff received on the occasion in question and by and on account of the things mentioned in his amended petition were caused by his own negligence in this:
“That the plaintiff negligently and carelessly failed to remain in his seat in the car and negligently and carelessly threw his feet up and outside of the car and negligently and carelessly failed to hold to the car in which he was riding and negligently and carelessly failed*112 to keep a lookout for his own safety, and that by reason thereof threw his right leg up, above and outside of the car in which he was riding, whereby he received what, if any, injuries complained of in his amended petition and that the same were caused by his own negligence contributing thereto.
Wherefore, having fully answered, defendants pray to go hence and recover of plaintiff their costs herein.”
The reply was a general denial.
Upon a trial the court gave to the jury a peremptory instruction to find for the defendant, and plaintiff chose to submit his case to the jury rather than take an involuntary nonsuit. Verdict and judgment were for defendant, and plaintiff has appealed. The evidence in greater detail will be considered in the course of the opinion in connection with the points made therein
*113 “Q. Now, will you tell the jury if you had any accident there and how it happened? A. I was sitting in one of these, cars and sitting on the right side and it started out on the run and got very near all the way around and the car slackened speed and threw me forward and started up all of a sudden and threw me backward and shot up that way (indicating) and threw me to one side and threw my right foot out and caught my leg.
“Q. When your foot was thrown out, what happened to it? A. It was caught against posts or uprights or rails and along side the track where the car was.”
Arthur Boardman, his friend, says:
' “Q. Was Pointer injured on that occasion? A. Yes, sir.
“Q. Will you state just how he was injured? A. Yes, sir. We was on the last curve coming in and the car was running at a high speed and the car slacked up, kind of, and he was throwed up forward and the car started up at a pretty high speed again, which naturally turned him hack and his right foot fell between the car and the railing, the outside railing.
“Q. Between what track? A. The railing.
“Q. Bid it catch on anything on the outside? A. When the car kind of wiggled, it naturally caught his foot.
“Q. What do you mean by wiggled? A. Well, (indicating) kind of shaked from one side to the other.”
Plaintiff’s Exhibit “C” shows the construction of the cars and the seats thereof, although it is conclusively shown by the evidence that there are three seats to the car. Plaintiff being in the middle seat his position can be. seen at a glance at this exhibit, which we here insert.
It is practically conceded that there is no case for the jury unless the doctrine res ipsa loquitur bridges over the chasm and puts the case to the jury. Under the facts, can snch doctrine be invoked? Of the several phases of this question later.
II. The doctrine res ipsa loquitur is not in this case, and without the invocation of that rule it is conceded that plaintiff’s case failed nisi.
Now, in the petition before us in this case the plaintiff avers (1) the faulty and defective construction of the cars used on the “Racer Dips;” (2) the faulty and defective construction of the tracks of the “Racer Dips;” and (3) a negligent maintenance and operation of the cars over such tracks.
This charge of negligence cannot be tortured into a general charge of negligence. It specifically charges (1) a negligent construction of the car upon which plaintiff was riding, and (2) a negligent construction of the tracks upon which such car was operated. This places the case beyond the reach of the doctrine of presumptive negligence nurtured by the rule of res vpsa loquitur.
In the McGrath case, supra, 197 Mo. l. c. 105, we said:
“But even if it were a case'to which, under proper pleadings, the doctrine would apply,' yet in this case specific acts of negligence are charged and not general negligence. In such cases where the plaintiff chooses in the petition to allege specific acts of negligence, the rule of law places the burden of proving such specific negligence upon the plaintiff, and a recovery, if had at all, must be upon the specific negligence pleaded. [Hamilton v. Railroad, 114 Mo. App. l. c. 509; Ely v. Railroad, 77 Mo. 34; Leslie v. Railroad, 88 Mo. 50; Yarnell v. Railroad, 113 Mo. 570; Bunyan v. Railroad, 127 Mo. l. c. 19; Hite v. Street Ry. Co., 130 Mo. l. c. 136; McManamee v. Railroad, 135 Mo. l. c. 447; Bartley v. Street Ry. Co., 148 Mo. l. c. 139; Gayle v. Mo. Car & Foundry Co., 177 Mo. l. c. 450; Breeden v. Mining Co., 103 Mo. App. l. c. 179.]”
In the Roscoe case, supra, 202 Mo. l. c. 587, we said:
*116 “The petition charges specific negligence and not general negligence, as plaintiff would have had the right to charge in this class of cases. A general allegation of negligence is all that is required in cases of accidents, where the relation of passenger and carrier exists. This general allegation of negligence is permitted upon the theory that the instrumentalities are in the hands of the defendant and he knows the condition thereof, whereas plaintiff does not or may not know them. Not only does the established rule permit a general allegation of negligence, but in making the proof it is sufficient ‘to show an accident and the resultant injury, whereupon there is a presumption of negligence, and a prima-facie case for plaintiff is made. .What we have said above applies to cases where there is a general allegation of negligence, but the rule is different where there are specific allegations of negligence. The rule as to proof is different, and the rule as to the presumption is different. General allegations of negligence are permitted because plaintiff, not being familiar with the instrumentalities used, has no knowledge of the specific negligent act or acts occasioning the injury, and for a like reason the rule of presumptive negligence is indulged. But, if plaintiff by his petition is shown to be sufficiently advised of the exact negligent acts causing, or contributing to, his injury, as to plead them' specifically, as in this case, then the reason for the doctrine of presumptive negligence, has vanished. If he knows the negligent act, and he admits that he does so know it by his petition, then he must prove it, and if he recovers it must be upon the negligent acts pleaded and not otherwise. In other words, the burden of proof is upon plaintiff as it would be in any other land of a case. The rule of presumptive negligence and the rule allowing the pleading of negligence generally, are rules which grew up out of necessity in cases of this character and are exceptions to the general rules of pleading and proof. Where plaintiff, by his petition, admits that there is no necessity, the rea*117 son for the rule ex necessitate fails, and with it the rule itself.”
But in the case at bar the plaintiff says his injuries were due to a negligently constructed car and a negligently constructed track. He points out the negligence of defendant which caused his injury. One cannot plead specific acts of negligence and rely upon presumptive negligence to bridge the chasm in making out a case for the jury. The trial court evidently so viewed this case, and as there was absolutely no evidence upon which a verdict could stand upon the specific negligence alleged, he rightfully directed a verdict for defendant.
Plaintiff realizing that he had proved all that he could prove, chose to submit his case and take a verdict rather than to take an involuntary nonsuit.
It matters not whether his specific negligence was as well pleaded as it might or should have been. It is only necessary to determine that his plea was one of specific negligence. The defendant had the right to move for more specific pleading if he thought the specific negligence was not as well pleaded as it should have been, or it had the right to accept it as sufficiently pleaded. The negligent construction of a track is specific negligence, and we have so held. [Price v. Metropolitan Street Ry. Co., 220 Mo. l. c. 454.] So, likewise, is the negligent construction of a car specific negligence, and this' is in effect held in the Price case, supra.
The fact that the plaintiff chose to simply charge that the track was negligently constructed without naming the particular fault of construction simply gave him a roving commission to prove any and all defects; and if defendant chose not to challenge the pleading, it had a right so to do, but that does not make the charge any the less specific rather than general negligence.
A fair sample of a plea of general negligence appears in the Price case, supra, 220 Mo. l. c. 454.
Under the pleadings in this case the plaintiff cannot invoke the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, and his case failed nisi, and the judgment should be affirmed.
“In any event, where the cause of the accident by which a passenger was injured is known as well to the passenger as to the carrier, the presumption of negligence which arises from the fact of the injury of a passenger while on the carrier’s vehicle has no application, but the passenger must affirmatively show negligence.”
In this case the plaintiff avers that his injury was occasioned by a defective car and a defective track. He thus says that he knows the cause or causes of his injury, and. the rule just quoted applies.
There is no question as to what the rule is in Missouri. [Vide list of cases collated in McGrath v. Transit Co., supra.] In 5 R. C. L. 84 et seq., it is said:
“When the plaintiff chooses to allege the specific acts of negligence of which he complains, the authorities are not in harmony as to the effect of such allegation upon the operation of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. According to some authorities, the plaintiff, by thus alleging the specific acts of negligence, assumes the burden of proving them, and as in other cases, must recover if at all, upon the negligence pleaded, and the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur does not apply. Other decisions, however, are to the effect that the plaintiff does not lose the right to rely upon the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur by attempting to show particularly the cause of the accident, at least where at the close of the testimony the cause does not clearly appear, or if there is a dispute as to what such cause was.”
As to the first named rule in this quotation the Missouri cases and some others are referred to, and as to the latter rule cases from Washington, Massachusetts and Virginia are cited. All the text-writers recognize the Missouri rule and state it as we have stated it. Our cases proceed upon the very reasonable theory that if the plaintiff alleges in his petition the things which caused the injury, such allegations evince his knowledge of the causes of his injury, and he is bound there
In an extensive note to Walters v. Railroad, 24 L. R. A. (N. S.) l. c. 792, it is said:
“This question has arisen more frequently in Missouri than in any other jurisdiction, and the cases are for the most part harmonious in holding that the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur applies only where the petition charges negligence in general terms, and does not apply where it specifically pleads the negligent acts which caused the injury.”
Some twenty-odd Missouri cases from this court and the courts of appeal are collated, and all of them support the text. In accord with the Missouri rule the following cases are also cited: Norton v. Railway Co., 108 S. W. (Tex.) 1044; Traction Co. v. Leonard, 126 Ill. App. 189; Railroad v. Martin, 154 Ill. 523; Highland Ave. & Belt R. R. Co. v. South, 112 Ala. 642; Brewing Co. v. Willie, 114 S. W. 186.
“It has already beeh stated, that in actions of negligence (as indeed in all actions) the plaintiff must give some proof of his case beyond a mere scintilla of evidence, and if he does not, it is the duty of the judge to direct a nonsuit. The question of what is sufficient evidence to go to the jury is one for the judge in the particular case before him; but there are a class of cases in which there has been no direct evidence of any particular act of negligence, beyond the mere fact that something unusual has happened, which has caused the*120 injury; and upon the maxim, or rather phrase, ‘res ipsa loquitur,’ it has been held that there is evidence of negligence. As the phrase imports, there must be something in the facts which speaks for itself, and therefore each case will depend upon its own facts, and it will be difficult to lay down any guiding principles.”
The mere fact that the plaintiff was injured is not of itself evidence of defendant’s negligence. Nor will the mere fact of injury without other facts authorize the application of the rule of presumptive negligence as such rule is recognized by the doctrine res ipsa loquitur. Before the rule res ipsa loquitur can be invoked there must be shown facts, other than of the mere fact of injury to plaintiff, from which the negligence of defendant can be reasonably inferred. These other facts, in case of carrier and passenger, must show that something out of the ordinary, in the course of carriage, has happened, as to the means, or methods of transportation, and that this extraordinary happening was the cause of the injury to plaintiff. If there is no evidence tending to show that something unusual and out of the ordinary has happened, as to the means of transportation (which includes the appliances used in the transportation) or in the method of transportation (which includes the acts of agents, etc.), then the rule res ipsa loquitur cannot be invoked, although the facts may disclose injury to plaintiff. [Benedick v. Potts, 88 Md. l. c. 55 et seq.]
The reasoning of the Maryland case is so well stated that we quote:
“In no instance can the bare fact that an injury has happened, of itself and divorced from all' the surrounding circumstances, justify the inference that the injury was caused by negligence. It is true that direct proof of negligence is' not necessary. Like any other fact, negligence may be established by the proof of circumstances from which its existence may be inferred. But this inference must, after all, be a legitimate inference and not a mere speculation or conjecture. There must be a logical relation and connection between the cir*121 cumstances proved and the conclusion sought to be adduced from them. This principle is never departed from, and in the very nature of things it never can be disregarded. There are instances in which the circumstances surrounding an occurrence and giving a character to it are held, if unexplained, to indicate the antecedent or coincident existence of negligence as the efficient cause of an injury complained of. These are the instances where the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is applied. This phrase, which literally translated means that ‘the thing speaks for itself,’ is merely a short way of saying that the circumstances attendant upon an accident are themselves of such a character as to justify a jury in inferring negligence as the cause of that accident; and the doctrine which it embodies, though correct enough in itself, may be said to be applicable to two classes of cases only, viz.,, first,' ‘when the relation of carrier and passenger exists and the accident arises from some abnormal condition in the department of actual transportation; second, where the injury arises from some condition or event that is in its very nature so obviously destructive of the safety of person or property and is so tortious in its quality as, in the first instance at least, to permit no inference save that of negligence on the part of the person in the control of the injurious agency.’ [Thomas on Neg. 574.] But it is obvious that in both instances more than the mere isolated, single, segregated fact that an injury has happened must be known. The injury, without more, does not necessarily speak or indicate the cause of that injury — it is colorless; but the act that produced the injury being made apparent may, in the instances indicated, furnish the ground for a presumption that negligence set that act in motion. The maxim does not go to the extent of implying that you may from the mere fact of an injury infer what physical act produced that injury; but it means that when the physical act has been shown or is apparent and is not explained by the defendant, the conclusion that negligence' superinduced it may be drawn as a legitimate de*122 duction of fact. It permits an inference that the known act which produced the injury was a negligent act, but it does not permit an inference as to what act did produce the injury. Negligence manifestly cannot be predicated of any act until you know what the act is. Until you know what did occasion an injury, you cannot say that the defendant was guilty of some negligence that produced that injury. There is, therefore, a difference hettveen inferring as a conclusion of fact what it was that did the injury; and inferring from al known or proven act occasioning the injury that there ivas negligence in the act that did produce the injury.¡ To the first category the maxim res ipsa loquitur has no application; it is confined, when applicable to all, solely to the second. In no case where the thing which occasioned the injury is unknown has it ever been held that the maxim applies; because when the thing which produced the injury is unknown it cannot be said to speak or to indicate the existence of causative negligence. In all the cases, whether the relation of carrier and passenger existed or not, the injury alone furnished no evidence of negligence — something more was required to be shown.”
With this general outline of the law, let us get the facts of the case. In justice to defendant they should be fully stated. It is undisputed that nothing occurred until the train was turned over to the immutable law of gravity, a law of nature unbending and ever faithful when it has a duty imposed. Gravity is the same at all times under same and similar circumstances. Its work is done without a variance and only a variance in the means of its application will show variant results. Plaintiff proved by his own witness there was nothing wrong with the car upon which he rode or the track upon which said car traveled. Both he and his friend testified that they did not know that plaintiff had been injured until the journey was over, and the friend jokingly cursed the plaintiff and told him to get up out of the'car. Whilst they do say the car “slackened up, kind of,” and then “the car started up at a pretty high
The only other movement of the car is thus described by the friend of plaintiff in telling how plaintiff’s foot was caught. He says: “The car kind of wiggled,” and being asked what he meant by that, he said, “Well (indicating) kind of shaked from one side to the other,” and that this shaking was more on the last curve than on any other portion of the' dip. This is the sum total of the evidence upon the question of the movement of this ear. There is no evidence in the record or tendered in the record to the effect that the movements described by the witnesses were anything unusual for the cars in this particular mode of transportation. It was shown that this pleasure device was made up of tracks going down declines, ascending inclines and going around acute or sharp curves. There is not a syllable in the testimony that these “wiggles” or movements from side to side of the car were not usual movements of cars used in this mode of transportation. We shall discuss the mode of transportation more thoroughly in other paragraphs.
Something is said about the absence of a handhold for passengers. For that reason we have copied into our statement the drawings of the cars as such drawings were introduced in evidence by plaintiff. It is conclusively shown by the evidence that there are three seats in each car, and plaintiff says he was in the seat next to the rear seat of'the car, and that the rear seat was occupied by two other passengers. The drawings of this ear show that plaintiff could have held on to (1) the side of the seat, (2) the back of the seat, and (3) the back of the seat in front of him, yet he says that at the time of the accident he had his arm around his friend’s shoulders. He first said partly around the shoulders and partly upon the back of the seat, but being driven down to facts finally said his arm was only around his friend’s shoulders and the other hand was in his lap. He was on the right hand side of the car, and thus it appears he rode with his left hand around the shoulders of his friend and his right hand (the one next to the outside of the car and which should have had hold of the side of his seat for safety) was in his lap. Take one view of the drawing in the statement and the contributory negligence of plaintiff is apparent. It took four minutes to make the trip. It was one continuous ascent and descent and rounding of curves. Even if plaintiff had no knowledge of the danger in the first instance, he had gone far enough to see that common prudence would dictate the use. of his hands for safety. Barren as this case is of facts tending to show negligence, the trial court could have done but one thing, and that is just what it did do.
Of the Missouri cases first:. In Brown v. Railroad, 256 Mo. l. c. 535, it is said:
‘ ‘ The evidence is undisputed that the train was thrown from the track by the fracture of one of the steel rails while passing over it and transporting plaintiff who was a passenger.”
This case is all right and in accord with what we now urge, but it must be noted that an unusual thing was shown, i. e., the derailment of a car.
In Dougherty v. Railway, 81 Mo. 325, a very unusual jerk of a car was shown.
In Gallagher v. Edison Illuminating Co., 72 Mo. App. l. c. 596, an are light was shown to have fallen from its position on plaintiff’s head as he passed thereunder.
In Redmon v. Railway, 185 Mo. l. c. 10, a train of two street cars came to a very sudden stop, thereby producing a very violent jerk, which injured plaintiff-very different from the case at bar, where the evidence is the car “slacked up, kind of” and then “the car started up at a pretty high speed again.”
In Logan v. Railway, 183 Mo. l. c. 606, the street car left the track.
The case of Turner v. Haar, 114 Mo. l. c. 346-7, is cited. That case does not involve the question at all. An employee was suing for an injury occasioned by the falling of a building in which the employer placed
Price v. Met. Street Ry. Co., 220 Mo. 457, is given as authority here. In that case there was a collision between two cars on a street railway. We shall not stop to argue that such a fact is not in the case at bar. There was clearly an unusual occurrence in the Prices case.
Suffice it to say that the text-books and the cases from the Federal and other state courts cited on this proposition are no nearer in point than the Missouri cases which we have analyzed. These cases and these texts are discussing unusual and extraordinary occurrences in the course of operation. The facts in the case at bar do not measure up to that standard. We concede that an unusual or extraordinary occurrence (excluding the mere fact of injury) may raise a presumption of negligence on the part of the carrier. If in the case at bar the train had been brought to a sudden stop in rounding this curve and going down the 'incline, a different case would be presented. It would have been an unusual occurrence. But here we only have the slackening of speed, which was natural as the train went up hill, an increase of speed, which was natural for a gravity train going down steep inclines, and a “wiggling” of the car, which was natural upon acute and sharp curves. Nothing unusual, under the facts shown, save mere injury to the plaintiff, and this of itself will not invoke the doctrine res ipsa loquitur.
Other suggestions are made as to the absence of an operator on the car, as to the absence of a handhold, and as to the sides of the car not being sufficiently high. We need not discuss these matters, because they were all known acts of negligence, and if relied upon should have been pleaded. However, the evidence in the record does not show or tend to show that these things or either of them contributed to plaintiff’s injury. The evidence shows that he could have held himself in the car by using the side of Ms seat or the back of the seat
“It seems now to be well-settled law here, as elsewhere, that where a railroad company carries passengers for hire on its freight trains ‘it must exercise the same degree of care as is required in the operation of its regular passenger trains, the difference only being that the passenger submits himself to the inconvenience and danger necessarily attending that mode of conveyance.’ [Whitehead v. St. Louis, I. M. & S. Ry. Co., 99 Mo. 263; McGee v. Mo. Pac. Ry. Co., 92 Mo. 208; Wagner v. Mo. Pac. Ry. Co., 97 Mo. 512; Hays v. Wabash Ry., 51 Mo. App. 438; Guffey v. Han. & St. J. Ry. Co., 53 Mo. App. 462; Ohio & Miss. Ry. Co. v. Dickerson, 59 Ind. 317; Chicago & Alton Railroad v. Arnol, 144 Ill. 261; Olds v. Railroad, 172 Mass. 73.] The rule upon this subject is very clearly expressed in the two cases last cited. In the last one, decided by the Supreme Court of Massachusetts in 1898, Knowlton, J., speaking for the court,*128 said: ‘The law is clearly expressed in Chicago & Alton Railroad v. Arnol, 144 Ill. 261, 270, as follows: “Persons taking passage npon freight trains, or in a caboose or ear attached to a freight train, cannot expect or require the conveniences or all of the safeguards against danger that they may demand upon trains devoted to passenger service, and are accordingly held to have accepted the accommodation provided by the company, subject to all the ordinary inconveniences, delays, and hazards incident to such trains, when made up and equipped in the ordinary manner of making up and equipping such trains, and managed with proper care and skill . . . But if a railway company consents to carry passengers for hire by such trains, the general rule of responsibility for their safe carriage is not otherwise relaxed. From the composition of such a train iand the appliances necessarily used in its efficient operation, there cannot, in the nature of things, be the same immunity from peril in traveling by freight train as there is by passenger trains, but the same degree of care can be exercised in the operation of each. The result in respect of the safety of the passenger may be wholly different, because of the inherent hazards incident to the operation of one train and not to the other, and it. is this hazard the passenger assumes in taking a freight train, and not hazard or peril arising from negligence or want of proper care of those in charge of it.” . . . The plaintiff in the present case well understood the kind of business in which the defendant was engaged, and the manner in which the business was conducted. So far as there were dangers naturally incident to the running of freight cars and a passenger car in the same train, the parties must be presumed to have contracted in reference to them, and the plaintiff to have assumed them.’ ”
In this Wait ease, the plaintiff thus testified as to the things which caused his injury:
“ £I got on at the water tank, and the train started out. A man by the name of Rickett got oh with me, and there was one other man- on the train, both stran*129 gers to me. The train started out; and just as the caboose had got a little past the depot, I supposed the train had pulled out for good; and I raised up in my seat to take off my overcoat, and I stepped out of the seat kind of sideways, and I had my left arm throwed out like that, when all at once the train stopped suddenly and it throwed me. There was a seat directly in front of me that had no back on it, it was broke off; and the next seat was turned the other way and the other one this way and throwed two backs together; and I struck my back and side right across those two seats; and I went on there with force enough that I broke them right down, and it kind of stunned me at first, and it knocked the breath out of me and I lay there for a half minute, and got up and sat down in the seat. I could hardly speak and could hardly catch my breath ... I went on to Green Castle' and got off there. I could hardly get up town. When I went up street I vomited blood, and went and saw a doctor. That night I took .the passenger train for my home at Cedar Rapids, Iowa, and got there next day.”
Upon these facts, Judge Brace said:
“There is no conflict in the evidence. There is no evidence tending to show any defects in defendant’s track, train or any of its appliances. No evidence tending to show any want of skill or care on the part of its employees in the management of the train from the time plaintiff got on it until the accident happened, or that the train was stopped at an improper place, or in an improper manner, or that the shock which caused his fall was not a natural and ordinary incident of the stopping of such a train in a proper manner, by the proper application of the proper means, for that purpose. In other words, there were no facts proved from which an inference-of negligence on the part of defendant could be legitimately drawn.”
In the Wait ease, supra, the trial court sustained a demurrer to the evidence, and this court sustained that rule.
“Plaintiff’s account of what took place at Lamonte was that after the train got to Lamonte it was in a manner stopped; two of the trainmen had already left the caboose, and the plaintiff got up and started to the rear end of the car, and there was a jump, he did not know what happened, but thought the train had collided, and for a moment or two he did not know what had happened and when he came to himself, he felt that he was injured, and sat down on a seat — went to a seat and sat down, and at that time the train was perfectly still. The caboose, after the train stopped, was in the neighborhood of a hundred or a hundred and fifty yards from the depot at Lamonte. He testified that when he came to himself, he was on his feet, and could not state whether he had been thrown down or not. Pie testified that he had traveled a number of times in cabooses attached to freight trains, and on freight trains, and he was then asked the effect that the stopping of the train had, and he answered, ‘The reaction on the car was so severe that it upset the water tank in the caboose and spilled water all over the floor.’ ‘That jar was severe — the severest I ever experienced on a freight train.’ ‘The extent was so hard it upset the water tank in the car.’ ‘It jerked me senseless and injured my neck.’ On cross-examination, he testified that when he started to go to the rear end of the caboose ‘the train was barely moving, it was not running one mile an hour; not near as fast as a man could run or walk, it was not going as fast as a man could walk, the rate of speed was so that a child could walk and get off if it had not been jarred.’ 'He was asked whether he- was thrown down, and answered, ‘Well, I do not know whether I was or not, right there is where I never will be clear; I do not think I went to the floor. I was stunned for a minute or two.’ Asked whether or not he struck his head, neck or arm against anything in the caboose at that time, he answered, ‘I think I kind of caught myself on the—*131 against the door easing or against the door as it swung, the jar was so violent and severe.’ ”
After quoting and approving what we have quoted from the Wait case, supra, and after a thorough review of other Missouri authorities, Judge Gantt, proceeds thus:
“It is well settled that negligence cannot he presumed when nothing is done out of the usual course of business, unless the course is improper. There is nothing in this record to indicate that there was any act of omission or commission not usually incident to the constant moving of heavy freight trains under the control and management of skillful and careful employees. We are not unmindful of the contention of the plaintiff that the defendant jerked or knocked or bumped the train with unusual, unnecessary and extraordinary force against the caboose, but we are clearly of the opinion that in the light of the uniform expressions of this court and of the several appellate courts, the evidence in this case was wholly insufficient to establish any such unusual and extraordinary jarring and jerking.
“In our opinion the basic fact upon which a recovery must rest in this ease, to-wit, the negligence of the defendant, was not established either by the positive testimony of the witnesses or by any presumption of negligence arising out of the facts developed, and it results that the plaintiff was not entitled to recover, and the judgment of the circuit court must be and is reversed and judgment rendered here for the defendant.”
The ease law is so thoroughly reviewed in the Hedrick case, that a reading thereof will suffice as to the Missouri rule.
Now, reverting to the case at bar. Plaintiff knew that he was going to ride upon “Racer Dips” in an open car. He saw the car. Long before he got to the place of accident he knew that his course was up and down steep inclines and declines and around sharp curves. He had contracted for a pleasure ride upon a device which was open to his view, or was so open to his view in the greater part. No negligent act of
The cases holding that the parties in cases of this kind bear the relation of carrier and passenger are O’Callaghan v. Dellwood Park Co., 242 Ill. 336, and cases citing and following that case. This question, however, goes only to the measure of care, and there are several cases which take a different view .as to the
Dissenting Opinion
(dissenting). — The following opinion written by me in Division, with a few additions, is now filed as my dissent from the opinion adopted by the majority of this court.
Plaintiff sued the defendant for twenty-five thousand dollars for injuries sustained while riding on a scenic railway called the “Racer Dip,” operated by defendant for the transportation of persons for hire over and around double metal tracks supported by trestles and' proceeding over very steep high and low' grades so-' as to return on a circuitous course, after a trip of about three-quarters of a mile, to the starting station. Thesé tracks are situated in Forest Park Highlands, an amusement resort in St. Louis.
The cause of action stated by the plaintiff is, to-wit:
“Plaintiff further states that on or about the 8th day of May, 1910, for a valuable consideration paid defendant, they received the plaintiff into one of their conveyances or cars aforesaid,' for the purpose of conveying him therein as a passenger on and around the ‘racer dip’ aforesaid.
“That said ‘racer dip,’ the cars and track thereon were so faulty and so defectively constructed and defendants so negligently and carelessly maintained and operated the same that by reason thereof the car in which plaintiff was a passenger as aforesaid-vibrated and shook so that the plaintiff was thrown with much force against the back of the conveyance or car in which he had passage, and plaintiff’s right foot and leg were suddenly and violently thrown upwards and out*134 of said conveyance or car, thereby causing his said right foot and leg to be caught in and thrown upon and against railings, posts and uprights along and outside of said conveyance or car, through which plaintiff was greatly and permanently injured,” etc.
be the case under the examples and definitions of general negligence contained in the following -cases: Stauffer v. Railroad, 243 Mo. l. c. 325, 326; MacDonald v. Railroad, 219 Mo. l. c. 487; Briscoe v. Railroad, 222 Mo. l. c. 113, and cases cited; or it constituted an allegation of specific negligence as is suggested in the majority opinion. If it be construed as a mere joinder of general allegations of negligence in the construction and operation of defendant’s railway, then it stands admitted, and such is the universal law, that the case made by the plaintiff entitled him to go to the jury. On the other hand, if the theory of the learned majority opinion is correct, that the foregoing allegations constituted only averments of particular and spécific negligence (which I do not concede) then the case should have gone to the jury upon the phase of the evidence presented by the testimony of plaintiff and his companion. This case presents those two alternatives, for there can be no doubt, either upon reason or authority, that the defendant owning and operating the scenic railway for the transportation of the general public for hire was engaged in a calling essentially the same as that of a common carrier of persons. [Van Hoefen v. Taxicab Co., 179 Mo. App. 600; O’Callaghan v. Dellwood Park Co., 242 Ill. l. c. 343, 345; Tenn. State Fair Assn. v. Hartman, 183 S. W. 735; Best Park & Amusement Co. v. Rollins, 68 So. 417; Chesapeake Beach Ry. Co. v. Brez, 39 App. D. C. 58.]
Hence the only question is whethér any phase of the evidence adduced by plaintiff tended to make a case to which the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur would be appli
■“Q. "What sort of a track is there on the racer dip? A. There is two tracks.
. “Q. Is it a level track? A. Part of the way it is level and part it is inclines and steep hills and short turns.
‘ ‘ Q. Louder, please. A. Inclines and steep hills and short curves and semi-circles. .
“Q. Well, you say you had passage on one of these trains on the eighth of May, 1910? A. Yes, sir.
“Q. Now, will you tell the jury if you had any accident there and how it happened? A. I was sitting in one of these cars and sitting on the right side and it started out on the run and got very near all way around and the car slackened speed and threw me forward and started up all of a sudden and threw me backward and shot up that way (indicating) and threw me to one side and threw my right foot out and caught my leg.
“Q. When your foot was thrown out, what happened to it? A. It was caught against posts or uprights or rails and alongside the track where the car was.
“Q. Now, then, did it injure your foot or leg? A. It broke my right leg about an inch and a half above the ankle and threw the leg out of place, and tore all the flesh off my leg and broke it off right up about here-(indicating) and twisted the knee.
“Q. Did the accident render you unconscious or not? A. Yes, sir.
“Q. How long were you unconscious? A. Why, right after the accident I became unconscious and I didn’t know anything until Monday evening — until the following evening.”
Plaintiff’s companion on the trip testified, to-wit:
“Q. Will you state just how he was injured? A. Yes, sir. We was on the last curve coming in and the car was running at a high speed and the car slacked up, kind of, and he was throwed up forward and the car started up at a pretty high speed again, which naturally turned him back and his right foot fell between the car and the railing, the outside railing.
“Q. Between what track? A. The railing.
“Q. Did it catch on anything on the outside? A. When the car kind of wiggled, it caught his foot.
“Q. What do you mean, 'wiggled?’ A. Well, (indicating) kind of shaked from one side to the other.
“Q. Was that shaking more violent than at any other point in the ride around the dip? ... A. The shaking was more in the last curve than at any place on the dip.
“Q. What effect, if anything, did this decreasing of the speed and then starting of the car, as you state, have on you? A. Why it threw me back, but I was just lucky enough to catch my hold there or it would have threw me — I was lucky enough to catch my hold to keep from getting thrown out of the car; then I*137 grabbed Mr. Pointer’s arm and tried to prevent him from getting hurt, but it was too late.
“Q. What curve were you approaching on it at the time of the accident? A. It was on the last curve; going in on the last curve.
“Q. Sir? A. It was on the last curve; going in on the last run.
“Q. Have you, since that time, ridden on the racer dip? A. Yes, sir; I have.
“Q. Did it decrease and increase the speed in the manner in which you state it did so on the occasion when Pointer was injured. ... A. Yes, sir; and it looks like they had the speed moré under control afterwards. .
“Q. What would you say caused Pointer to be thrown; his foot to be thrown out of the car? . . . A. Why, the rate of high speed, and then the. sudden stop. The sudden slow-down in the speed and the start-up right quick, which naturally throwed him back and threw his foot out of the ear.”
The elevation of the track and its propulsive powers were these: The trains were started on their journey by being hauled up an angle of seventy-five degrees by means of an electric-power cable. When they reached this summit the physical force was released and the trains were carried thence by gravity and the momentum acquired by the sharp descent from the point where the electric force had been released. After the trains left the highest point to which they were carried by electric power, they started over a course of rapid descents and ascents and around sharp curves. The angles of the succeeding grades ranged from forty-fiveto sixty degrees and the trains are run “at a very high rate of speed.”
The defendant’s secretary testified that he could not tell what speed it was, although it took about four minutes from the time the train started to get to the returning point. He also testified that the scenic railway was opened on the twenty-third of April and that its operation was delayed a few days on account of the snow,
It is apparent if the version of the occurrence’ given for the plaintiff is to be accepted as true, that he had become a passenger upon a train without any warning whatever of the care and the prudence necessary to be observed to render the trip safe and was seated in a car which 'was not furnished with any handholds which he might seize in order to withstand the shock of a sharp descent or a whirl around a curve and which ran so near the uprights or posts supporting a structure of the side that, when the train reached its last ascent and began to descend from it on a sharp curve at a high rate of speed, he was thrown first forward and then backward by a sudden jerk so powerful as to throw his foot outside the car and cause his leg to be struck by the upright or post which supported the horizontal guard on which the side wheels of' the train ran.
As to the force and suddenness of the jerk, the testimony of the companion is that it was so great as to cause the injury as described in plaintiff’s testimony, and to prevent him from catching hold of plaintiff in time to save him from injury.'
If, however, we take the other view that the jerk or jar was an extraordinary event of. such force and suddenness as to cause the injury to plaintiff, then proof of that fact would necessarily call into play the rule of res ipsa loquitur, which is that where the thing causing the injury is under the exclusive control of one who owes a duty to another, and it is shown that the injury would not have occurred in the ordinary course of things if the agency inflicting it had been managed or operated with due care, then evidence of the happening of the injury, without the fault of the person injured, affords prima-facie evidence of negligence and will take the case to the jury and permit it to infer negligence, and then find from all the evidence whether this inference has been rebutted or overcome and the plaintiff has sustained the burden of proof imposed on him by law. This rule has been applied to injuries caused by railroads, elevators, electric wires and divers other appliances involving the use of powerful forces or machinery. [4 Wigmore on Evidence, sec. 2509, and cases cited in note; 5 R. C. L., sec. 713, p. 74; 29 Cyc. 591, and cases cited; Sweeney v. Erving, 228 U. S. 233; Brown v. Railroad, 256 Mo. 522; Dougherty v. Railway, 81 Mo. 325; Gallagher v. Illuminating Co., 72 Mo. App. 579; O’Callaghan v. Dellwood Park Co., 242 Ill. 336, 149 Ill. App. 34; Redmon v. Railway, 185 Mo. l. c. 10; Price v. Met. St. Ry. Co., 220 Mo. l. c. 457; Whittaker’s Smith on Neg., p. 552; Turner v. Haar, 114 Mo. l. c. 346-7; Hughes v. Railroad, L. R. A. 1916A, 927, and notes, p. 930 et seq.]
It follows that whether the allegations of the petition he construed as a charge of general or specific negligence, in either event under the undisputed testimony the plaintiff made a case entitling him to go to the jury, for the phase of the evidence above quoted tended to prove, as has been seen, the charge of defective construction and operation (which the majority opinion holds was a specific one) or it tends to show a. state
In these circumstances it was the duty of the defendant to rebnt the prima-facie case made by the evidence given for the plaintiff on one or the other theories of negligence alleged in his petition. Defendant took no steps to rebnt the weight of the evidence against it at the conclusion of plaintiff’s case but interposed a general demurrer thereto which should have been overruled and the case sent to the jury.
