POFF, EXECUTRIX, v. PENNSYLVANIA RAILROAD CO.
No. 484
Supreme Court of the United States
February 25, 1946
327 U.S. 399
Argued February 1, 1946.
Ray Rood Allen argued the cause and filed a brief for respondent.
MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS delivered the opinion of the Court.
Congress provided in the Federal Employers’ Liability Act (
“to his or her personal representative, for the benefit of the surviving widow or husband and children of such employee; and, if none, then of such employee‘s
parents; and, if none, then of the next of kin dependent upon such employee...”
The deceased, residing in Pennsylvania, was a rаilroad engineer employed by respondent and was killed while engaged in its service in interstate commerce. Respondent‘s negligence was conceded. The deceased left no widow, children, or parents. His nearest surviving relatives were two sisters and a nephew, none of whom was in any way financially dependent оn him. But petitioner, who was his cousin, was a member of his household and wholly dependent on him for support. The district court rendered judgment for petitioner. 57 F. Supp. 625. The circuit court of appeals reversed, holding that petitioner was not entitled to recover since there were nearer relatives, though not dependent ones, who survived the deceased. 150 F. 2d 902. The case is here on a petition for a writ of certiorari which we granted because of the importance of the question.
We assume, without deciding, that the circuit court of appeals correctly concluded that members of the second or third class, irrespective of their neеd, are not entitled to recover if there survives a member of the prior class. Cf. Notti v. Great Northern R. Co., 110 Mont. 464, 104 P. 2d 7. The liability is not “to the several classes collectively” but in the alternative to оne of the three classes. Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co. v. Wells-Dickey Trust Co., 275 U. S. 161, 163. Thus to an extent, at least, the order of priority is determined by relationship, not by dependency. See New Orleans & N. E. R. Co. v. Harris, 247 U. S. 367. Cf. Lytle v. Southern R. Co., 152 S. C. 161, 149 S. E. 692. But the circuit court of apрeals went further and applied that principle to determine which members of the third class (next of kin) were entitled to recover. It said that since parents or grandchildren, dependent on the deceased, are left without remedy if a widow or child survives, Congress could not have meant to recognize remote
We read the statute differently.
It is clear that “next of kin” is determined by state law. Seaboard Air Line v. Kenney, 240 U. S. 489. State law governs whether it is necessary to determine if one relative is closer than another, or if a claimant falls within or without the class. But under this Act, unlike the state statutes of descent and distribution, а member of the third class must be not only next of kin but also dependent on the deceased in order to recover. The emphasis on dependency suggests that Congress granted the right of recovery to such next of kin as were dependent on the deceased. And that interpretation seems to us to be more in harmony with the Act than thе construction adopted by the circuit court of appeals.
We are not warranted in treating as an antecedent class the nearer next of kin who are not dependent. That would be to rewrite the statute. Congress has created three classes, not four or more. Yet to hold that the existence of nearer next of kin who are not dependent bars recovery by more remote next of kin who are dependent is to assume that the former constitute a preferred class. Congress, however, placed all next of kin in one class. To use dependency as the selective factor in determining which members of a particular сlass may recover is no innovation under this Act. For the Court held in Gulf, C. & S. F. R. Co. v. McGinnis, 228 U. S. 173, that in a suit brought by a widow as administratrix for the benefit of herself and four children, a judgment in favor of an adult child who
Reversed.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.
MR. JUSTICE FRANKFURTER dissenting, with whom MR. JUSTICE BURTON concurs.
Congress might well have allowed recovery as a matter of course to any near relative of a railroad employee
What Congress did was thus analyzed by the court below:
“Congress, which was willing to leave unremedied loss suffered by parents, or grandchildren, who might be totally dependent upon the dеceased, could not have meant to recognize remote members of the deceased‘s other kin, similarly situated. The plaintiff‘s interpretation does not fulfill any rational purpose; it merely introduces an exception at the precise place where an exception is least to be desired or exрected; it mutilates the statute, as much in its purpose as in its language. As in the case of the first two preferred classes, ‘next of kin’ is defined by its hereditary, not by its pecuniary, relation to the deceased;
it means the next of kin as the law has always meant it; and dependency is only a selective factor, a condition upon reсovery by any members of that class, as it is among members of the first two classes. The case is not therefore one in which Congress has failed to express its obvious purpose, and in which courts are free to supply the necessary omission; it is a case where—whatever that purpose—it certainly did not include what the plaintiff asserts.” Poff v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 150 F. 2d 902, 905.
I do not find a persuasive answer to this analysis and am therefore of opinion that the judgment below should be affirmed.