137 Iowa 742 | Iowa | 1908
Joseph Podhajsky, late of Linn county, died interstate July 26, 1904. In November, 1905, Mamie L. Podhajsky, administratrix of his estate, commenced this proceeding by presenting an application for an order requiring Charles Bednar — suspected by her, as she says, of having in his possession personal property belonging to said estate — to appear and submit to an examination. A citation issued, and an examination was had, following which the administratrix moved the court for an order directing Bednar “ to turn over the $1,000 of money, together with interest from July 26, 1904, that belonged to the deceased, Joseph Podhajsky, and that is admitted is in his possession . - . . This motion is based on the testimony given by said Bednar in a proceeding to disclose property,” etc. To the motion thus made Bednar appeared and filed an answer and re
When, therefore, Podhajsky thus delivered the deed in deposit and thus divested himself of the title to, the lots, he became, in turn, vested with a property right in the obligation of the grantee to pay the specified sum of $1,000, and this property right he could lawfully dispose of by will or by assignment or gift to' his children or to some third party for their use and benefit. It will not be disputed that it is entirely competent for a person, either by a duly acknowledged written instrument or even by parol, to turn over personal property, moneys, securities or choses in action into the hands of another, to be held and used for the benefit of some designated beneficiary, and that, when this is done, such beneficiary obtains an immediate and vested interest in the subject of the trust, which the trustor cannot revoke or disaffirm unless such power of revocation has been reserved in express terms at the time the trust was created. Hellman v. McWilliams, 70 Cal. 449 (11 Pac. 659) ; Nichols v. Emry, 109 Cal. 323 (41 Pac. 1089, 50 Am. St. Rep. 43) ; Ewing v. Buckner, 76 Iowa, 467 (41 N. W. 164) ; Millspaugh v. Putnam, 16 Abb. Prac. (N. Y.) 380. And this is none the
It is immaterial whether we call the transaction now under consideration a gift by the deceased to his daughters or a trust established by him for their benefit. Indeed, a voluntary trust is simply a device by which a donor effectuates a gift either of property or of its beneficial use and enjoyment to a designated donee. Even a gift causa mortis may be effected by delivery to a third person in trust for the donee, although the gift does not come to the knowledge of the donee, and is not accepted by him, until after the death of the donor. The acts of the trustee or third person receiving the property for the benefit of the donee are deemed to be in the interest of the latter, and the acceptance of the gift is presumed. Clough v. Clough, 117 Mass. 83; Gerrish v. Institution, 128 Mass. 159 (35 Am. Rep. 365) ; Pierce v. Bank, 129 Mass. 425 (37 Am. Rep. 371) ; Beals v. Crowley, 59 Cal. 665; Woodburn v. Woodburn, 123 Ill. 608 (14 N. E. 58, 16 N. E. 209) ; Devol v. Dye, 123 Ind. 321 (24 N. E. 246, 7 L. R. A. 439). No particular form of words- is required to create a trust in another, or to make the party himself a trustee for the benefit of another. It is enough if it
In Dettmer v. Behrens, 106 Iowa, 585, the owner of property executed a conveyance naming a member of his family as grantee, and deposited it in the hands of a third person, with instructions to deliver the same after his death upon payment by the grantee of $100 within one year after the grantor’s decease. After the death of the grantor, a controversy arose whether the property conveyed should not be treated as a part of his estate. We held the conveyance to be effective, saying: “ If, however, we agree with the appellant, and say that this deed shall not be construed as a part of the will, we must regard Behrens as having acquired title by this delivery. The rule is well settled that the death of a grantor will not prevent the delivery of a deed if the condition under which it is held by a third person is complied with.” We also said in the same case that: “ Delivery may be incomplete in life to become absolute after death, and, where the grantor places the deed in the hands of a third person to be delivered to the grantee named therein after the grantor’s death without reservation of power to recall, and it is not recalled, but remains in the hands of the depositary until the happening of that event, and is then turned over to the grantee, there appears to be no good reason why the delivery should not be regarded as valid and effectual, and relate bach to the first delivery.” If such be the case, then the acceptance of the deed and the performance of the condition must also relate bach to the same date. In Schollmier v. Schoendelen, 78 Iowa, 426, the deceased having a deposit in the banh, wrote in her banh booh an order directing that the deposit be paid to certain named persons after her decease. Belying upon this order or assignment, the persons named therein drew the deposit from the banh.
After the death of the donor, the administrator brought
The following cases have more or less direct bearing upon the question thus under consideration: Matson v. Abbey, 70 Hun, 475 (24 N. Y. Supp. 284) ; Ellis v. Secor, 31 Mich. 185 (18 Am. Rep. 178) ; Bostwick v. Mahaffy, 48 Mich. 342 (12 N. W. 192); Tarbox v. Grant, 56 N. J. Eq. 199 (39 Atl. 378); 14 Am. & Eng. Ency. Law (2d Ed.) 1028, note 2; Love v. Francis, 63 Mich. 181 (29 N. W. 843, 6 Am. St. Rep. 290) ; Stone v. King, 7 R. I. 358 (84 Am. Dec. 557); Martin v. Funk, 75 N. Y. 134 (31 Am. Rep. 446) ; 20 Cyc. 1207, note 64.
It follows that the decree of the court below was error; and the same must be, and is, reversed.