381 F.3d 183 | 3rd Cir. | 2004
JOHN R. GIBSON, Circuit Judge: permits"). The amount and species of fish
that a particular vessel is licensed to catch often depends on that vessel's fishing
This case presents the novel history, and certain species cannot be question of whether, assuming a vessel's fished at all except by or in place of fishing history may be the subject of a vessels that have previously held permits maritime lien, the lien follows the transfer to do so. See, e.g., 50 C.F.R. § of the fishing history to a replacement 648.4(a)(1)(i). However, when a vessel vessel after the original vessel sinks. The sinks, its fishing history does not go down district court held that fishing history could with the ship; instead, the history and not be "salvaged" from a sunken vessel permits may be applied to a replacement and therefore any maritime lien that may vessel. See id. Thus, when the Miss have existed was extinguished at the time Penelope sank, Greenly applied her fishing of the sinking. We affirm, but on different history and permits to the vessel he bought grounds. to replace her, the F/V Miss Laura .
I. Greenly's purchase of the Miss Laura was financed by the appellee, PNC Maine Shipyard & Marine Railway, Bank Delaware, Inc., which made an Inc., provided repair services in 1997 to initial loan of $475,000 and later increased the vessel F/V Miss Penelope , which was the amount of the loan to $570,000. In owned by David Greenly. This provision exchange, Greenly executed and delivered of services entitled Maine Shipyard under a Promissory Note to PNC, which was federal law to a maritime lien against the secured by a Preferred Ship Mortgage on vessel and its appurtenances. See 46 the Miss Laura . Greenly later defaulted on U.S.C. § 31342 (2000); Gowen, Inc. v. the note. F/V Quality One, 244 F.3d 64, 67 (1st Cir. 2001). The Miss Penelope sank on PNC commenced the present action January 28, 1998. seeking the judicial sale of the Miss Laura .
Maine Shipyard intervened, claiming that As a result of a complex scheme of it held a maritime lien on the Miss Laura federal rules and regulations designed to to the extent of her fishing permits and protect declining fishing stocks and history because the permits and history had otherwise conserve fishery resources, the been transferred from the Miss Penelope . fishing history and fishing permits of a Maine Shipyard further contends that its vessel like the Miss Penelope are integral lien has priority over any security interest to the value of the vessel itself. See held by PNC. generally 16 U.S.C. § 1801 (2000); Gowen, 244 F.3d at 68 (some fishing II. vessels "are valuable significantly, and
Maine Shipyard rests its argument sometimes almost entirely, because of their primarily on Gowen, Inc. v. F/V Quality One, 244 F.3d 64, 67-70 (1st Cir. 2001), in fleet cannot be made liable under the which the First Circuit held that a vessel's [Federal Maritime Lien Act] for supplies fishing permits were appurtenances to the furnished to the others, even if the supplies vessel and therefore subject to a lien on the are furnished to all upon orders of the vessel. The court reasoned that the market owner under a single contract."); In re value and creditworthiness of the vessel Container Applications Int'l, Inc., 233 F.3d depended as much on the fishing permits 1361, 1365-66 (11th Cir. 2000) (following as on tangible items like the engine or Piedmont and denying maritime lien navigation equipment; thus, a creditor's because the purported lienholder did not lien should be understood to extend over provide necessaries to any particular the permits. Id. at 68-69. vessel). The vessel-specific character of
maritime liens results from the legal PNC persuasively responds that fiction that a vessel receiving services "is Gowen does not govern the instant considered to be a distinct entity situation because the fishing permits in responsible only for its own debts." Foss that case were still attached to the original Launch & Tug Co. v. Char Ching Shipping vessel, whereas the present situation U.S.A., Ltd., 808 F.2d 697, 701 (9th Cir. involves the transfer of the fishing permits 1987). Because Maine Shipyard provided to a replacement vessel. Thus, even if we no services to the Miss Laura , its attempt were to follow Gowen and hold that a to enforce a lien over that vessel violates vessel's fishing permits may be the subject this principle of maritime liens. The Miss of a maritime lien, we would still need Laura cannot be held responsible for the some legal basis for concluding that the debts of the Miss Penelope . lien extends to a replacement vessel once the permits are transferred. In resolving this case, we need not
endorse the district court's position that Maine Shipyard simply ignores this fishing history cannot be salvaged from a problem, perhaps because neither Gowen sunken vessel. The court believed that nor other statutory or case law provides Maine Shipyard's lien over the fishing such a legal basis. Instead, the law of permits could survive the sinking of the maritime liens has consistently recognized Miss Penelope , if at all, only through that a maritime lien attaches only to the principles of salvage law. However, the specific vessel to which services are court concluded that salvage law was provided. See, e.g., 46 U.S.C. § 31342 inapplicable because it understood salvage (2004) ("[A] person providing necessaries to involve some sort of physical rescuing to a vessel on the order of the owner or a or saving of a tangible piece of property, person authorized by the owner– (1) has a which did not occur here. Thus, it held maritime lien on the vessel. . . .") that Maine Shipyard's lien extinguished at (emphasis added); Piedmont & Georges the time of the sinking. Creek Coal Co. v. Seaboard Fisheries Co., 254 U.S. 1, 4 (1920) ("[O]ne vessel of a We believe this rationale comes needlessly close to conflicting with the afloat," Maine Shipyard has not cited, nor theory of Gowen, and are mindful of our have we found, any cases where a lien obligation to avoid circuit conflict. Under over salvaged or never-sunken parts of a vessel was extended to a subsequent vessel the district court's reasoning, any lien held by Maine Shipyard over the Miss to which those parts became attached. Penelope 's fishing permits ceased to exist Instead, maritime liens have consistently once the vessel sank. It is possible that a been limited to the specific vessel to which court following Gowen would not agree; services were provided. See Piedmont, after all, the fishing permits continued to 254 U.S. at 4 ("The difficulty which under exist in at least some form, retained the general maritime law would have significant value, and contributed to the blocked recovery by the [purported lienholder] is solely that it did not furnish creditworthiness of the vessel in the first place. See Gowen, 244 F.3d at 68 ("Thus, coal to the vessels upon which it asserts a not only the market value but the maritime lien; and there is nothing in the [Federal Maritime Lien Act] which creditworthiness of the fishing vessel may well depend on its permits quite as much removes that obstacle."); see also 1 as on its engine, physical dimensions, and Thomas J. Schoenbaum, Admiralty and Maritime Law , § 9-1 (4th ed. 2004) ("A navigation equipment."); see also United States v. Freights, Etc. of the Mount maritime lien is a privileged claim upon Shasta, 274 U.S. 466, 470 (1927) maritime property, such as a vessel, arising (intangibles may be subject to maritime out of services rendered to or injuries liens against the vessel); The Fort Wayne, caused by that property."). We are bound to follow this long-standing principle here 6 F. Cas. 119, 122 (S.D. Ohio 1861) ("[I]f any part of the vessel is saved, this lien and therefore conclude that any lien held adheres to it, even to the last plank."). by Maine Shipyard on the Miss Penelope 's fishing permits and history ceased to exist Should a creditor attempt to foreclose on a sunken vessel's fishing permits before the once the Miss Penelope sank and the fishing history was incorporated into the permits become incorporated into a second Miss Laura . vessel, a court following Gowen might enforce the lien, whereas the district
Because we hold that Maine court's rationale clearly would deny it. Shipyard has no cognizable property interest in the Miss Laura , we need not Rather than in vite this possible conflict, we base our holding on the consider its assertion that PNC is ineligible to assert a lien in an in rem action against undisputed fact that Maine Shipyard did the Miss Laura . Maine Shipyard has no not provide services to the vessel over which it now claims a lien. Even if, as standing to make such a challenge. See, e.g., Citicorp Sav. of Illinois v. First Maine Shipyard metaphorically suggests, Chicago Trust Co. of Illinois, 645 N.E.2d the "valuable and transferable fishing permits and history remain very much 1038, 1045 (Ill. App. Ct. 1995) ("Standing requires injury in fact to a legally cognizable interest."); Southern Maryland Oil, Inc. v. Kaminetz, 272 A.2d 641, 644- 45 (Md. 1971) (party lacks standing to challenge a mortgage foreclosure sale unless that party has an interest in the proceeds of the sale or has an interest in the property which may be adversely affected as a result of the sale).
We will affirm the district court's judgment.
