160 Pa. 483 | Pa. | 1894
Opinion by
The learned counsel for the appellant states the point in controversy very fairly and clearly in the opening sentence of his printed argument. He says : “ The contention in this case is confined to the effect and subsequent history of the Callender lease, dated the first of October, 1828.” His position is that the lease granted only an incorporeal right to the lessee, to be exercised upon the premises covered by the lease. The appellees, on the other hand, contend that it granted the coal in place, under the land, absolutely. The words of the instrument upon which this question depends may be put together thus : “ Samuel Callender .... doth lease and to farm let to Thomas Meredith .... all the land that he now holds .... and the leas? is to continue for the term of one hundred years from this day. Possession of the leased premises shall extend only to their use as a coal field. The lessee shall have full power and possession to search for coal anywhere on the leased premises, in any manner he may think proper, to raise the coal, when found, from the beds ; to enter and carry away coal; and to sell the same for his own benefit and profit. He may occupy whatever land may be useful or necessary as coal yards .... for roads for transporting the coal; and in case it may prove necessary for securing the full enjoyment of the premises aforesaid as a coal field as aforesaid, then the said Samuel covenants and agrees to execute such further writings as counsel learned in the law may deem proper.” The purchase money or price of the coal is fixed at two hundred dollars. If the coal proved abundant and of a given thickness then another hundred dollars was to be paid. In addition to this the sum of one dollar per annum was to be paid as rent. The lessor reserved out of this grant the right for himself and his heirs to take coal for their own use so long as they should reside on the land.
But the contention that a right to mine coal in the land of another is an incorporeal ■ one cannot be successfully maintained. The grant of such a right is a grant of an interest in land: Hope’s Appeal, 33 Pitts. L. J. 270. When the grant is in terms or in effect a grant of all the coal on the lessor’s land, this amounts to a severance of the coal from the surface, and vests a title to the underlying stratum in the grantee : Sanderson v. The City, 105 Pa. 469. This underlying estate may be conveyed under the same general rules as to notice, as to recording, and as to actual possession, as the surface. After such a severance, the possession of the holder of each estate is referable to his title. The owner of the surface can no more extend the effect of his possession of his own estate downward, than the owner of the coal stratum can extend his possession upward, so as to give him title to the surface under the statute of limitations. The owner of the surface can be affected only by the invasion of the surface. The owner of the underlying stratum is not bound to take notice of the invasion of the estates that do not belong to him ; but when his own estate is invaded he is bound to take notice. The conclusion thus reached disposes of the title by possession set up by the plaintiffs, and of their right to recover in this case.
Upon a careful examination of the several assignments of error we are all of opinion that the judgment must be affirmed. Judgment will be entered accordingly.