Plourde v. LiburdiPlourde v. Liburdi
- Reporters:
- , ,
- Before:
- Covello
This is аn appeal from the denial of the petitioner Camille Plourde’s application for a writ of habeas corpus. The petition alleged an illegal confinement in that the warden had calculated the petitioner’s 120 dаy sentence following a third conviction for operation of a motor vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating liquor in violation of
The habeas court concluded that the language of
The issues presented by this appeal are: (1) did the court err in concluding that those convicted of a third violation of
Examination of the record discloses that on September 19, 1986, the petitioner pleaded guilty for a third time to the offense of operating a motor vehicle while intoxicated, in violation of
During his entire confinement, the petitioner served his sentence with good conduct and obedience to the rules and was, therefore, eligible for the “good conduct” credit that would have reduced the length of his confinement pursuant to
The warden calсulated the petitioner’s release date as January 16,1987, i.e., 120 days from September 19,
The petitioner points out that the “good time” credit statute,
The General Statutes, however, contain many provisions in which the sentencing authority of the court is limited. In each instance the statute clearly states: “may not be suspended or reduced by the court.”6 (Emphasis added.) In view of the consistent use of the phrase “by the court” when imposing a sentencing limitation on the court, it logically fоllows that had the legislature intended that the limitation of
There are three further principles of statutory construction that militate against the position advanced by the petitioner. First,
Second, as we have noted, the “employment credit” statute was originally enacted in 1969. Public Acts 1969, No. 198. The “good time credit” became law in 1976. Public Acts 1976, No. 76-358. The limiting language of
Finally, we note that “ ‘ “[t]he General Assembly is always presumed to know all the existing statutes and the effect that its action or non-action will have upon any one of them. And it is always presumed to have intended thаt effect which its action or non-action produces.” State v. Staub, 61 Conn. 553, 566, 23 A. 924 [1892].’ New Haven Water Co. v. North Branford [174 Conn. 556, 564-65, 392 A.2d 456 (1978)].” Beccia v. Waterbury, 185 Conn. 445, 458-59, 441 A.2d 131 (1981).7
The petitioner next argues that the singular unavailability of
“[T]he constitution of Connecticut, article first, § 20, is the state counterpart of the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment to the constitution of the United States. These provisions of the federal and state constitutions ‘have the same meaning and impose similar constitutional limitations.’ Karp v. Zoning Board, 156 Conn. 287, 295, 240 A.2d 845 [1968]. Both provisions therefore may be considered together. See Page v. Welfare Commissioner, 170 Conn. 258, 264, 365 A.2d 1118 [1976]; Tough v. Ives, 162 Conn. 274, 292, 294 A.2d 67 [1972]; Proctor v. Sachner, 143 Conn. 9, 17, 118 A.2d 621 [1955].” Lockwood v. Killian, 172 Conn. 496, 500-501, 375 A.2d 998 (1977).
“ ‘Equal protection analysis must commence with a determination of whether . . . the legislation impinges upon a fundamental right. Where the legislation impinges upon [such a] right . . . then it must be struck down unless justified by a compelling state interest. . . . Where the statute does not involve fundamental rights . . . the legislation will withstand constitutional attack if the distinction is founded on a rational basis. . . .’ Laden v. Warden, 169 Conn. 540, 542-43, 363 A.2d 1063 (1975).” (Citations omitted.) Frazier v. Manson, 176 Conn. 638, 645-46, 410 A.2d 475 (1979).
“ ‘Whatever views may be entertained rеgarding severity of punishment, whether one believes in its efficacy or its futility . . . these are peculiarly questions of legislative policy.’ Gore v. United States, 357 U.S. 386, 393, 78 S. Ct. 1280, 2 L. Ed. 2d 1405 [1958].” State v. Darden, 171 Conn. 677, 679, 372 A.2d 99 (1976). “The question of classification is primarily one for the legislature, and the courts will not interfere unless a сlassification presented by statute is clearly irrational and unreasonable. State v. Zazzaro, 128 Conn. 160, 166, 20 A.2d 737 [1941].” State v. Rao, 171 Conn. 600, 603, 370 A.2d 1310 (1976).
“ ‘To be constitutionally valid, a regulation made under the police power must have a reasonable relation to the public health, safety, morality and welfare.’ State v. Gordon, 143 Conn. 698, 703, 125 A.2d 477 [1956].” State v. Darden, supra, 680. “The limit of the exercise of the police power is necessarily flexible, because it has to be considered in the light of the times and the prevailing conditions.” State v. Gordon, supra.
Accordingly, we conclude that
There is no error.
In this opinion the other justices concurred.
Notes
The record reflects that the petitioner has served the 120 day sentence and is no longer confined. In light of this, we must decide whether the issues raised in this appeal have become moot. Connecticut Foundry Co. v. International Ladies Garment Workers Union, AFL-CIO, 177 Conn. 17, 411 A.2d 1 (1979). We conclude that they are not, because: (1) the issues raised are capable of repetition yet evade review because of the historically short terms of alcohol related confinements; (2) presently there are over 200 inmates identically situated and thus affected by this ongoing program of the state’s penal system; (3) the petitioner could very well be affected if convicted in the future; and (4) there is significаnt public interest in the disposition of alcohol related offenses. Delevieleuse v. Manson, 184 Conn. 434, 439 A.2d 1055 (1981).
See, e.g.,
In Kelly v. Dewey, 111 Conn. 281, 149 A. 840 (1930), this court was faced with the similar problem of resolving a conflict between two statutes that involved the mandatory sentencing provision of chapter 285 of the Public Acts of 1929, a predecessor to