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Pledger v. Illinois Tool Works, Inc.
812 S.W.2d 101
Ark.
1991
Check Treatment

*1 Revenues, PLEDGER, Commissioner C. James Administration, Finance and Dep’t of Arkansas State WORKS, INC. TOOL ILLINOIS 812 S.W.2d 90-242 Arkansas Court of 24, 1991 delivered June Opinion *2 Jones, Keadle, Theis, Robert L. Cora E. William John Bobo, Carson, and Beth B. Malcolm Kaufman, David Gentry, Pruett, Kinkead, for appellant. Rick L. Joyce by: Jones, Jack, P.A., G. for Sayre, appellee. Lyon by: Eugene & addresses for the first This tax case Justice. Tom Glaze, on Arkansas’s “unitary effect of the time the Act (UDITPA), for Tax Purposes Division of Income Uniform 723 (1987, Supp. 26-51-701 —to— Code Ann. Ark. §§ corporate Arkansas its governs imposes respective Act how This that have earnings of corporations franchise taxes on designed entities. UDITPA and multinational multistate *3 in which a conducts among corporation the states fairly apportion income fair amount of value or business its multistate business a Generally, activities in each state. earned corporations’ UDITPA, of a corporate net taxable “business income” under in a multistate business is apportioned upon involved taxpayer sales, tangible three factor formula of well-recognized property, and payroll. a multistate and (ITW), Illinois Tool Works

Appellee, multinational a worldwide business in having corporation tools, fasteners, and the manufacturing packaging products in seventeen leasing of ITW has divisions machinery. operating in the United States and conducts business in several places is located foreign manufacturing countries. One of ITW’s plants Bluff, in Its or “commer- headquarters Pine Arkansas. corporate cial domicile” is in Illinois. Chicago, that, for certain capi

ITW determined UDITPA purposes, 1983 from six gains through tal income it had earned income;” was “nonbusiness thus it ex different assets capital calculating cluded this income when its allocation of taxes to this Instead, of these state.1 ITW allocated the income from sale domicile,” in and the Chicago assets to its “commercial capital income tax laws. income was taxed under the Illinois corporate six in two manufactur- ITW’s assets stock capital Japanese conceded UDITPA. We note that there were that income from the sale of originally preferred seven stock assets in was “nonbusiness income” under dispute, but the appellant NIFCO; ing NISCO stock in companies, Computer Prod- ucts, Inc.; real located undeveloped near ITW’s property head- Chicago; U.S. Notes and quarters Treasury foreign currency transactions.

The Arkansas of Finance Ad- appellant, Department ministration, income, disagreed ITW’s classification of this the income constituted asserting “business income” for of Arkansas’s UDITPA. purposes Accordingly, as- appellant $45,164 sessed ITW additional taxes of for the approximately 1981-1983. After an years losing appeal an administrative hearing, ITW additional taxes under paid protest appealed chancery court. court,

The five chancery relying on United States Supreme 1980’s, Court cases decided in the held the “unitary business must be utilized in determining whether or not intangible income of multistate or multinational tax- corporate be payer is to classified as “business income” “nonbusiness income” for UDITPA In applying the in this purposes. principle case, the chancellor further concluded that ITW’s aforemen- tioned income from the sale of its six was capital assets not taxable by the state because the income in no was connected with way ITW’s Arkansas business activities. appellant appeals from the lower holding, court’s arguing that the chancellor misapplied *4 the law made and erroneous of fact. find findings We no error and therefore affirm. UDITPA,

Under the “business is income” defined follows:

Income from arising transactions and activity in course of the regular trade or business taxpayer’s includes tangible income from intangible if property management, and of the acquisition, disposition property regular constitute of the integral parts taxpayer’s trade business operations.

Ark. Code Ann. (a) 26-51-701 As we noted (Supp. § all “business is previously, income” this state apportioned using an established formula. Ark. Code Ann. 26-51-709 § Also, Act, (1987). under the “nonbusiness is defined as income” income,” all income other than (e), “business 26-51-701 § nexus having logical the most to the state specifically allocated income” its (usually the “nonbusiness producing with the asset among than domicile”) being apportioned rather “commercial conducts its business. where the corporation the states mid-1970’s, of the Arkansas the Revenue Division In the certain Finance and Administration adopted of Department tax regulations implement provisions income corporate member of the Multistate Arkansas is a Arkansas’s UDITPA. (and states) it other regulations adopted Tax Compact (MTC). were the Multistate Tax Commission suggested by “full referred to as regulations generally apportion- These because construed the regulations they broadly concept ment” construed the very narrowly concept “business income” and “nonbusiness income” for UDITPA purposes. 207, Ward & v. Qualls Montgomery Company, this court the “full (1979),

585 S.W.2d 18 adopted apportion- Ward received interest Qualls, Montgomery ment” rationale. In from made to and related none of subsidiary corporations loans did in Arkansas. Because there which were located or loans, was no in Arkansas in relation to the activity Montgomery Ward contended that the interest was “nonbusiness income” taxable in its “commercial domicile” in Illinois. This court disagreed and held that Ward’s interest income was Montgomery income,” income,” “business not “nonbusiness based upon fact that the commingled interest income was with the company’s other general general funds to be used for corporate purposes, which included its business activities in Arkansas. decision,

After the the U.S. Qualls the “full rationale the follow changed by adding apportionment” ing two under the Due Process Clause of the requirements 1) fourteenth amendment: a minimal connection or nexus be state; 2) tween the interstate activities and the taxing rational between the income attributed to the state relationship and the intrastate values of the Mobile Oil enterprise. Taxes, Commissioner 445 U.S. 425 The first nexus *5 is met if requirement avails itself of substan corporation tial of on business within the state. The privilege carrying Court labeled the second due Supreme process requirement, business as “unitary principle,” explained application

139 follows:

(T)he in the linchpin apportionability field state income taxation is the business In accord principle. with show, what principle, (taxpayer) must appellant in order to establish that its dividend income is subject Vermont, to an tax is that the income apportioned was earned in the course of activities unrelated to the sale of state. petroleum products following The cases Mobil all cited the above language and utilized the business Exxon “unitary principle” analysis. Revenue, v. 447 U.S. (1980); Wisconsin 207 Corp. Dept. of ASARCO, Comm’n, v. Inc. Idaho State Tax 307 U.S. (1982); F.W. Woolworth Co. v. Taxation & Revenue Dept., Board, (1982); U.S. 354 Container Franchise Tax rationale, U.S. 159 Under the business” “unitary decisions, in these for expressed general determining test whether a diversified group “unitary businesses had busi ness” was to whether relationship determine the income that the state was from integration, tax resulted functional attempting centralization of management, and economies scale utilized by the corporate group. above,

In to the response Court cases cited Supreme 1984-2, Arkansas Revenue Regulation Department adopted recognized which Court’s due limitation but Supreme process applied “unitary to dividend income. principle” only In this appeal, appellant regulation argue relies on this income, since ITW’s gains were not derived from dividend the income is still taxable. We do not agree the appellant’s reading of these Court limiting cases as the “unitary to dividend income. principle” analysis only ASARCO,

In Court argu- addressed Idaho’s ment that dividend income received by ASARCO should be considered a of a if the “unitary intangible business” property acquired, managed or of for disposed purposes relating or to the contributing business. The taxpayers’ rejected Idaho’s “full and held that apportionment” argument the dividend income of ASARCO was not taxable Idaho. so holding, the Court stated the following: *6 destroy business would of definition

This that it earn requires The business a corporation concept. a return on its and to provide continue operations to money of its in- operations, all capital. Consequently, invested made, said to in some sense can be investment cluding any contributing [corpora- related to or to purposes be “for limit, to its logical When pressed business.” tion’s] no limitation becomes business” “unitary conception at all. limitation dividend concerned the main ASARCO

Although dispute interest income, to tax certain ASARCO Idaho also attempted However, Idaho and from stock sales. gains and capital derived gains interest and agreed ASARCO had that manner as the be treated in the same from these sales should Court concurred with the parties’ dividend income. The Supreme at must look principally that “One agreement, stating to determine not at the form of investment underlying activity, Court then of apportionability.” Supreme the propriety this other income Idaho’s to tax attempt to hold that proceeded violated the due clauses. process also ASARCO, court did not from reading Supreme

Clearly to dividend “unitary principle” apply intend for the the chancellor here was we hold that Accordingly, income only. analysis “unitary correct applying sum, reading of the facts of this case. In we believe the appellant’s narrow, cases much too and those cases Court constitutionality no can be construed to way uphold Regulation 1984-2. appellant’s suggestion

We note the appellant’s case, in its most recent holding backed off of its ASARCO Board, Tax 463 U.S. 159 Container v. Franchise Container, was a requirement the Court stated that there business” be “unitary out-of-state activities of the purported activities. The Court in some concrete to the in-state way related is that meaning that the functional of this requirement explained exchange capable precise there be some of value sharing — of funds the mere flow beyond identification or measurement business operation out of a investment or a distinct arising passive — method of which formula a reasonable renders apportionment taxation. of this

Again, disagree reading we appellant’s *7 value” Court case. We do not see how “flow of Supreme in Container benefits the case here. It analysis appellant’s appears be a set in the earlier cases. just rewording to out principles Further, we do not read the as Court’s limiting Container case in To holding ASARCO. ASARCO is cited with contrary, throughout the Container case. approval sum, that, agree

In we with the in complying chancellor cases, holdings with the he foregoing Court was obliged “unitary to utilize the business in this case. Those also us to v. holdings require Qualls overrule case of Ward, 207, Montgomery (1979), 585 SW.2d 18 and to declare 1984-2 Regulation to be unconstitutional. As appellant’s comment, we a side note that Arkansas is the first to have not state reevaluate its taxation of multistate after the corporations See, above cases decided. James v. e.g., Intern. Tel. & Tel. S.W.2d (Mo. 1983); banc Corp, Limbach, American Homes Products 49 Ohio St. 3d 158, 551 201 (1990); N.E.2d Glass Works v. Va. Corning Dept. Tax, 402 S.E.2d 35 (Va. Now that we have affirmed the of chancellor’s case, of the law in we application this must address appellant’s challenge that chancellor’s of fact in findings regard to ITW’s assets are clearly erroneous.

First, in applying business “unitary principle,” chancellor found that ITW’s income sale capital gains from the NISCO, NIFCO, its stock interest and CPI was “nonbusiness income” for Arkansas UDITPA We no time purposes. agree. At did ITW hold the of the stock in these majority companies, boards, while ITW had two or three directors on the companies’ there is showing no that ITW had a or controlling interest part. potential operate a as of a company “unitary business” is not when in fact there is a discrete dispositive, F.W. Woolworth Co. v. Taxation & Revenue enterprise. Dept., 458 U.S. 354 (1982). There were no common employees officers, and ITW did not administrative services to provide any While NISCO and did some of companies. NIFCO utilize ITW’s for patented a to ITW the technology, they paid royalty use of that ITW technology income was taxed royalty sum, these shows that the record income.” “business businesses separate as discrete and were operated

companies business.” “unitary of a as a part the chancel Further, also clearly supports the record of U.S. redemption from the gains ITW’s capital finding lor’s transactions, and the install Notes, foreign currency Treasury were not an Chicago land located undeveloped ment sale of busi leasing manufacturing regular of ITW’s integral part Instead, we agree at the Pine Bluff plant. carried on nesses assets as normal or passive of these classification the chancellor’s ARCO, the in AS clearly out so of ITW. As pointed investments to continue that it earn money requires of a corporation but return on its invested capital and to provide its operations not fit the “unitary the business does for money the use of *8 test. business principle” reasons, we affirm the chancellor’s foregoing

For the the “unitary of law applying of fact and conclusions findings conclusion, we the facts of this case. to business the chancellor erred ITW’s argument mention briefly unable to fees. We are attorneys’ simply its for denying request cross to file a notice of a this issue because ITW failed reach See 3(d). Independence under ARAP Rule as appeal required Davis, 387, 646 S.W.2d 336 Fed’l S&L Ass’n v. Affirmed.

Hays, J., dissents. Hays, Justice, disagree I dissenting. respectfully Steele to in an area judgment I believe it has rushed majority, as state, at the our and is that will have substantial impact upon all, and, See P. time, above abstruse. same transitional complex, Hartman, Taxation on State and Local Federal Limitations § 9:30 (Supp. work on begun

While States Court has Supreme the United discussed, the majority as the unitary principle, much generated has and of that application impact principle just As evidenced litigation by and little Id. at 396. very harmony. issue, answers are of the discussion of this complexities few have been provided ascertainable and easily Hartman, on See P. Federal Limitations e.g., decisions. (1981 1990); State and Local Taxation J. Supp. § Hellerstein, Taxation, State Income and Franchise Corporate (1983 Taxes 8 and 9 1989); Constitutional Law 96 Supp. §§ L. (1982); Harv. Rev. 62 C. The Unitary Business inState Floyd, Court?, Taxation: at the Y. 1982 B. U. L. Confusion 465. Rev. It has even been suggested that because of its complexi- ties, the issue is one the courts are not to handle: equipped

Given the within which court must operate, limitations it is entirely that it would be for possible infeasible court to examine all of the of intricacies the unitary formula in order apportionment to determine whether a business is fairly subjected to taxation aby standardized formula. apportionment Fair divers apportionment kinds business in- formula of of volves a knowledge substantial a operations great of of taxed, variety industries that are as well as technical problems Courts are accounting. hardly equipped satisfactorily problems. handle such Perhaps com- plexities broad problem legislative some suggest guidance, to the states and the taxpayers, fair solution. emphasis.] [Our Hartman, Taxation, P. Federal Limitations Local on State and 9:29 (1981). § mind, decide,

With that I think it as the improvident does, the majority of a Su constitutionality question *9 on, yet Court itself has and which stands preme passed not still as good law. The argument presented the state in this case is by closely related to the Qualls issue Montgomery, 207, 585 S.W.2d (1979), 18 and not yet by has been addressed the Court, overruled, United States Supreme much less as pro nounced the by majority.

In we Qualls, addressed the of interest from loans question made to by Ward relative subsidiaries and corporations and and, hence, whether that should as “business income” qualify Our the apportionable. current statute same definition provides relevant in Qualls-. (a)

26-51-701 “Business income” means income arising of the activity regular transactions and in the course from and trade business and includes income taxpayer’s or man- acquisition, if the intangible and property tangible integral of the constitue property and agement disposition regular trade or taxpayer’s of the parts operations. income, not, as the the interest was

We that held states, but commingled, funds were because simply majority in the course “regular transactions the loans constituted because business,” statutory definition. pursuant of Ward’s rela- Ward’s contention that corporate We addressed business, and responded, of a part unitary were tives if not be answered the income essence, that need question in the course regular that were came from activities Or, terms the business. it in United put trade or taxpayer’s fact that the loan would now employ, States business, was regular were of Ward’s course transactions part unitary find of a part sufficient to these transactions is what the state is here—that essentially arguing business. This of ITW’s trade or business part the investment income make ITW’s part regular because the investment activities up trade and business. by in those cases cited Court’s discussions unity involved whether there was between only

majority and the income source on basis the extent taxpayer and the of interconnectedness of the taxpayer questioned quality did not of an income The court address the operation. question business, on the solely source of the being part taxpayer’s unitary of an as was the regularity activity, basis of the frequency state, here, argued situation in as Qualls, specifically business. of its regular integral investments were part or the Qualls This is not novel either approach Hartman, fact, out P. Federal appellant. pointed on 9:30 at 437-439 Limitations State Local Taxation § Comm’n, 1990), in Tax (Supp. AS ARCO v. Idaho State (1982), U.S. cited ASARCO’s own counsel by majority, case, be agreed that while not in its investments could an present business,” “adjunct to the own actual conduct of taxpayer’s business, and and could be to be of a unitary found Court has And while the States *10 apportionable. United not courts have and the addressed this several lower question, e.g., is to in those cases. See inclination allow apportionment 145 Tax., (N.J. Bendix v. Director Corp. Div. 568 A.2d 59 Super of 1989); A.D. NCR v. Corp. Comptroller Treasury, 313 Md. of 118, A.2d (1988); 544 764 Welded Tube Co. v. America of Comm., (Pa. 1986); A.2d 911 Star 515 Comwlth Lone Steel Co. Dolan, v. (Colo. 669 P.2d 916

The other factor which the fails to important majority mention is the burden of cases. It proof these is not incumbent the state to show sufficient between upon nexus the apportioned Rather, income and the there is no but taxpayer. question on burden is The state’s is of taxpayer. taxation course constitutional, Perroni, 227, Fisher v. 299 Ark. presumptively 96, Hill, (1989); 771 S.W.2d 766 v. Love 759 S.W.2d 550 this (1988), to overcome has presumption, taxpayer evidence,” showing “distinct burden clear by cogent that the scheme statutory being “results extraterritorial values Bd., taxes.” Container America v. Franchise Tax 463 Corp. of (1983); Revenue, U.S. Exxon Wisconsin Dept. of then, U.S. in this case boils question down whether showed by ITW clear evidence that cogent taxation on the investment income was unconstitutional. evidence,

There was as noted to show by a lack majority, of interconnectedness between ITW and or the companies invested, sources in which it had did that is to ITW not a say, have share interest, in its and had had majority holdings controlling no no common officers or and did not employees provide any administrative services to the companies.

While this may have been clear and may cogent interconnectedness, evidence such a is not finding controlling Rather, here. we look at the evidence of the light state’s argument that investing was regular the business so as to part make the investing operations part of ITW’s business. There is no discussion of such in either the evidence appellee’s brief or the majority opinion, yet glance a mere at the record substantiates the state’s claim. The critical evidence most on given treasurer, point was ITW’s vice president David Smith, Byron who testified that all management invest- office; ments was it through significant handled his that was a of the treasurer’s an he would hour or so operations; spend investments, each working on and that such day investments *11 146 He further testified the priorities company. four

one working capital, was used as from investments received money but investment was used for working purposes, this In the on face ultimately point. inconclusive testimony was least, clear, that ITW has failed to is to me at testimony, it burden. its meet of the States the direction United

As unsettled, join I cannot reaching, far consequences and the area, where the record has in this particularly, venture majority’s the appellee’s on this sufficiently developed question been lacking. was consequently of proof burden v. T. GATLIN Gary G. GATLIN Angela S.W.2d 91-133 Court of Arkansas 24, delivered June Opinion

Case Details

Case Name: Pledger v. Illinois Tool Works, Inc.
Court Name: Supreme Court of Arkansas
Date Published: Jun 24, 1991
Citation: 812 S.W.2d 101
Docket Number: 90-242
Court Abbreviation: Ark.
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