188 A. 130 | Pa. | 1936
Argued October 2, 1936. Plaintiff, alleging that he suffered with an occupational disease resulting from defendant's violation of the Act of May 2, 1905, P. L. 352, sections 11, 13, 43 PS sections 5, 6, regulating employment in industrial establishments, obtained a verdict. On defendant's motion, the court granted a new trial; from that order the plaintiff appeals. The defendant appeals from the refusal of its motion for judgment n. o. v.
Plaintiff declared on violation of sections 11 and 13. Section 11 required that "Exhaust fans of sufficient power, or other sufficient devices, shall be provided for the purpose of carrying off poisonous fumes and gases, and dust from emery-wheels, grind-stones and other machinery creating dust. . . ." Section 13 required the employer to provide "not less than two hundred and fifty cubic feet of air-space for each and every person in every work-room . . . and shall provide that all work-rooms . . . be kept in a clean and sanitary condition. . . ." The verdict establishes that defendant did not supply a reasonably safe place to work measured by the statutory requirement. The effect of such violation was considered inStehle v. Jaeger Automatic Machine Co.,
Plaintiff operated a grinding machine (as he alleges) "breathing fine particles of dust arising from the grinding of steel with abrasive wheels."1 The employment at this work began in 1926 and, with the exception of an intermission of 6 weeks in 1928, ended, according to plaintiff's evidence, April 5, 1930, when he became ill and was required to stop without being able to complete the day's work. The disease disabled him from work thereafter. It was diagnosed as silicosis2 sometime after April 11, 1930. Defendant's contention is that plaintiff quit work March 18, 1930, and not on April 5th. The suit was brought March 28, 1932. It will be observed that if plaintiff's date, April 5th, be accepted as the termination of the employment, his suit was brought within 2 years, but if defendant's date be accepted, the action was not brought within two years of the termination of the employment.
The statute of limitations provides "Every suit hereafter brought to recover damages for injury wrongfully done to the person . . . must be brought within two *426 years from the time when the injury was done and not afterwards. . . .": Act of 1895, P. L. 236, 12 PS section 34.
The learned trial judge submitted a special interrogatory asking the jury to ascertain the date on which the employment terminated and the jury reported April 5th, 1930, as the last working day. In the opinion granting the new trial, the learned trial judge stated that he was not satisfied with the conclusion of the jury on that point; he said the finding "that plaintiff last worked within the two-year period is against the weight of the evidence on that issue. Since the verdict is necessarily premised upon that finding, the verdict cannot stand and the entire case must be retried." There may have been other reasons.3
When the determination of a fact is controlling and a court has granted a new trial because in its opinion the jury reached a result that cannot be sustained by the evidence, this court will not substitute its judgment for that of the trial judge who saw and heard the witnesses and was therefore in better position to pass on the question. The learned trial judge did not certify that, but for the single point referred to, the new trial would not have been granted: Andrzejewski v. PrudentialInsurance Co.,
Defendant's appeal is based on the refusal of its point for binding instructions: Fornelli v. R. R. Co.,
The verdict establishes that plaintiff is afflicted with silicosis, a disease caused by inhaling deleterious dust incident to his occupation and resulting from defendant's violation of the statute; it also establishes that plaintiff was suffering from this disease on or prior to April 5th, when he ceased working, assuming his evidence to be true. As "for injury wrongfully done to the person" the action "must be brought within two years from the time when the injury was done" our inquiry must be, when was the "injury wrongfully done"? There was breach of defendant's statutory duty to furnish a reasonably safe place to work during each and every day, from the time in 1928 when he resumed working on the grinding machine, to the time when he ceased. That period was continuous; the breach of statutory duty was continuous; it operated from the first working day to the last and, in dealing with the effect said to have resulted, must be treated as one tort, as one invasion of plaintiff's legally protected interest in bodily security. Similar breach of the employer's duty has been so regarded: Fritz v. Elk Tanning Co.,
The parties differ in their interpretation of the statute of limitations. The plaintiff refers to decisions made in other jurisdictions construing Workmen's Compensation Acts for the proposition, as we understand it, that for occupational disease,5 the time does not begin to run until *429
the plaintiff knows or should know that he has the disease either during the period of employment or at any time after the employment ended.6 That construction, where it prevails, is doubtless required by the terms of the compensation acts involved, but it cannot change or affect the settled construction for many years given to our act of limitations. There is a recognized distinction between common law litigation and the administration of Workmen's Compensation laws, which is not considered litigation in any technical sense: Gairt v.Curry Coal Mining Co.,
For the same reason we must reject defendant's8 contention that, assuming plaintiff's employment terminated April 5, 1930, the effect of defendant's breach of duty prior to March 28th must be eliminated from the jury's consideration.
The conclusion we have reached as to the operation of the statute of limitations is in accord with that generally prevailing in tort actions to recover for occupational disease: see Schmidt v. Merchants Despatch,
Another matter may be referred to. In his brief in reply to defendant's appeal, plaintiff makes a point which cannot be dealt with adequately on the information before us. It is thus stated: "Plaintiff attempted to show [the evidence was stricken out] that sometime prior to April 5, 1930, he complained to his foreman, Bennie Gates, about being ill. The foreman directed him to return to work, that the dust was 'doing him no harm.' These misleading and concededly erroneous instructions caused plaintiff to continue in his employment until such time as he was unable to labor further. We contend that the expression and action of the foreman constituted fraud and concealment which, in any view of the case, would toll the statute of limitations until such time as the plaintiff learned that the advice of this foreman was erroneous."
The general rule is that the bar of the statute may be tolled by the fraud or concealment of a party. We have not been furnished with and therefore cannot consider the effect of the evidence stricken out. Generally such assurance by an employer rebuts the charge of the contributory negligence, as the cases cited by plaintiff show (Fritz v. Elk Tanning Co.,
Judgment affirmed.