Platt v. Philadelphia & R. R.

65 F. 872 | U.S. Circuit Court for the District of Eastern Pennsylvania | 1894

DALLAS, Circuit Judge.

At the time which had been appointed for hearing this petition, several counsel appeared on behalf of parties interested, but, owing to a change which the court had been constrained to make in the order of its general business, the discussion of this particular matter, though commenced, could not then be concluded. To avoid delay, and in supposed relief of counsel, some of whom were not residents of Philadelphia, I suggested to them that the petition might be referred to the special master, and that their arguments in the master’s office could be stenographically reported; and I added that, if this course were adopted, those arguments would be considered on the coming in of the master’s report, as if they had been made in court. This suggestion was accepted by all the counsel present, and thereupon the order of reference was made, and the master’s report, including the arguments at length, has now been filed. Under these circumstances, I do not feel at liberty to comply with the request for a further hearing, which has been made in a letter addressed to me by one of the counsel who was a party to the arrangement I have mentioned. The case presented by the petition, and the contentions of those who . oppose the granting of its prayer, must now be decided.

I have considered this application with more than ordinary care, for, with regard to some of the principles which counsel have invoked against it, as well as to the magnitude of the interests to be affected, it is one of especial importance; but full investigation and mature reflection leave me in no doubt as to the correctness of the conclusion reached by the master. To what he has submitted in support of that conclusion nothing need be added, but with respect to one subject, which has been urgently pressed upon my attention, a few words will be said to avoid all possibility of misunderstanding. The order now to be made does not approve the proposed plan of reorganization, nor is either approval or disapproval thereof to be implied from it. The question of the wisdom and expediency of adopting any such scheme is for solution and determination by the persons interested, and no attempt to coerce their judgment or control their action should be made, either by the court or the receivers. But nothing of that sort is involved in the authority now asked and given. It imposes no constraint, but leaves those who have the right to accept or to reject the plan referred to, wholly free to do the one or the other as they may see fit. It sanctions the raising of money by rightful means, upon reasonable terms, and for proper objects; and it is not a valid ground of objection to it that it also renders feasible, in case of its due acceptance, the only reorganization project which is known to exist. The receivers should not enlist, on either side, in conflicts among those interested in the property they have in charge, but the neuI ralUy which it is their duty to observe is not departed from by facilitating any plan which may be proposed for the general benefit, provided that to all alike, and with regard to every plan advanced in good faith, the same facilities be indifferently accorded; and the court., while it will not pass upon the comparative merits of rival schemes of reorganization, will regard wilh satisfaction any and every legitimate effort to terminate this receivership. Tt has now continued for nearly two years, and it will not he allowed to continue indefinitely. The appointment of receivers is an extraordinary remedy, and should be a temporary one. It is a beneficent one in many cases, but any unnecessary and futile protraction oí the period of legal custody is, in any case, a grave abuse and a great evil. This is not said with reference to any particular plan of reorganization, but because I deem (.lie present occasion a proper one for making it distinctly understood that if the parties in interest do not, within a reasonable time, devise some means for ending this receivership, the court will seriously consider whether it should not he dissolved. The order recommended by the master will be entered as the decree of the court.

(October 29, 1894.)

Since the foregoing was written and delivered to the clerk of the court, my attention has been called to certain exceptions on behalf of Henry H. Whitney, which I am informed had been filed about 30 minutes earlier. The points they present have been, in my opinion, sufficiently considered, and rightly disposed of; and it is to be ■ noted that the learned counsel by whom they are interposed appeared and were heard before the master under the arrangement I have already fully stated, and all the arguments returned with the report have been carefully read and considered. Therefore these exceptions are dismissed.

Forty-Third Report of the Master.

And now, to wit, October 29, 1894, it is ordered that the Philadelphia & Reading Railroad Company and the receivers be, and they are hereby, authorized to enter into the agreements annexed to their petition filed September 25, 1894, respecting the plan for the partial readjustment of the company’s affairs, and, in case the plan be carried into effect, to make the payments therein stipulated for.