Theresa PLATT, Plaintiff, v. DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, Defendant.
Civil Action No. 14-1173 (CKK-AK)
United States District Court, District of Columbia.
Signed March 7, 2016
253
Aaron Josiah Finkhousen, Veronica A. Porter, Office of the Attorney General for the District of Columbia, Laura George, Office of Attorney General, Washington, DC, for Defendant.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
COLLEEN KOLLAR-KOTELLY, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Plaintiff Theresa Platt brought this action under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (the “IDEA“),
Presently before the Court are Plaintiff‘s [21] Amended Motion for Summary Judgment and Defendant‘s [22] Cross Motion for Summary Judgment. On November 30, 2015, Magistrate Judge Alan Kay issued a Report and Recommendation (hereinafter “Magistrate Judge Kay‘s Report“), recommending that both Plaintiff‘s Amended Motion for Summary Judgment and Defendant‘s Cross Motion for Summary Judgment be granted in part and denied in part. Specifically, Magistrate Judge Kay recommended that Plaintiff be awarded $46,498.23 in fees and $122.75 in costs, for a total amount of $46,620.98. Report & Recomm. (“R&R“), ECF No. [29], at 16.
Accordingly, the Court shall ADOPT Magistrate Judge Kay‘s well-reasoned and thorough Report and Recommendation in its entirety. The Court shall GRANT-IN-PART and DENY-IN-PART Plaintiff‘s [21] Motion for Summary Judgment and shall GRANT-IN-PART and DENY-IN-PART Defendant‘s [22] Cross Motion for Summary Judgment. The Court shall award Plaintiff $46,620.98 in attorney‘s fees and costs.
I. BACKGROUND
Plaintiff is the parent of M.P. (“Student“), a minor child found eligible to receive special education and related services under the IDEA as a student with a disability. See
A. The Administrative Due Process Complaint
On March 11, 2013, Plaintiff filed an administrative due process complaint on behalf of M.P. against the District of Columbia Public Schools (“DCPS“), alleging that DCPS had failed to meet its obligations to provide Student with a FAPE under the IDEA. See Hearing Officer Determination (“HOD“), ECF No. [21-2], at 4. At the time the administrative complaint was filed, Student was seventeen years old and was repeating the 9th grade at Eastern Senior High School (“Eastern“). Id. at 1, n.2; 9. Also, at that time, Student was receiving special education and related services under the IDEA, pursuant to an individualized education plan (“IEP“) issued on October 11, 2012. Id. at 9.
Student‘s IEP for the 2012-2013 school year required a weekly 5 hours of specialized instruction in the general education setting and 10 hours of specialized instruction outside the general education setting, with a monthly total of 120 minutes of behavioral support services outside general education. Id. at 10.
Student‘s first referral for determination of special education eligibility occurred in 2005. Id. at 9. However, Student was found ineligible. Id. There was no additional referral for evaluation until Student‘s attorney sent a letter referring Student for special education eligibility determination on May 18, 2012. Id. Subsequent to that letter, DCPS personnel held several eligibility meetings, and Student began receiving special education and related services on October 11, 2012 pursuant to the aforementioned IEP issued on the same day. Id.
Plaintiff‘s administrative complaint asserted that Student was entitled to relief under the IDEA on several grounds: (1) Plaintiff alleged that Student had also received IDEA services during the 2009-2010 school year pursuant to an IEP purportedly issued in October 2009, but those services had been improperly stopped without notification; and (2) DCPS had denied Student a FAPE by failing to meet certain obligations under the IDEA in the 2010-2011, 2011-2012, and 2012-2013 school years. See id. at 3, 4.
The Hearing Officer held pretrial conferences on April 15, 2013 and April 25, 2013, as well as a status conference on May 1, 2013. Id. at 2. The Hearing Officer then conducted an evidentiary hearing on May 15, 2013 regarding Plaintiff‘s claim that Student had received IDEA services as a 7th grader in 2009-2010 pursuant to an IEP allegedly issued in October 2009. Id. at 2. At the evidentiary hearing, Plaintiff argued that a Data Evaluation Review dated February 5, 2013 indicated that Student had received an IEP in October 2009. See Order re Evidentiary Hearing of May 15, 2013 (“Order re Evidentiary Hearing“); ECF No. [30-1], at 4. However, the author of the Data Evaluation Review testified at the hearing she had inadvertently included information about another student with a similar name, and that she subsequently had corrected the Data Evaluation Review to clarify that Student actually had not received the October 2009 IEP in question. Id. at 5.
In an order issued on May 16, 2013, the Hearing Officer denied Plaintiff‘s requested relief in connection with the IEP purportedly issued in October 2009. Specifically, the Hearing Officer concluded that an IEP for Student did not exist in October 2009, and that Plaintiff had not put forward sufficient evidence to conclude that Student was receiving special education and related services under the IDEA at that time. Id. at 4. The Hearing Officer based her decision on her determination that the author of the Data Evaluation Review was a credible witness and on her consideration of additional documentary evidence provided by DCPS. Id. at 5-6.
In that same order, the Hearing Officer also denied Plaintiff‘s “Motion for Missing Records Presumption,” in which Plaintiff argued in the alternative that Student was an eligible student in 2009 on the basis that DCPS had failed to provide Plaintiff the opportunity to inspect and review educational records under applicable regulations. Id. at 6. The Hearing Officer further held that Plaintiff had not established a basis for extending IDEA‘s two-year statute of limitations, and that the Hearing Officer would limit her inquiry to actions that were alleged to have occurred between March 11, 2011 and March 11, 2013—the two-year window immediately preceding the filing of the administrative due process complaint. Id. at 8.2
C. The Due Process Hearing and the Administrative Decision
On May 21, 2013 and May 22, 2013, the Hearing Officer held a due process hearing to determine whether Student was entitled to compensatory education on the basis that DCPS had denied Student a FAPE by failing to meet certain obligations under the IDEA between March 11, 2011 and March 11, 2013. Specifically, the due process hearing addressed four issues:
Whether DCPS denied Student a FAPE by failing to provide timely evaluations and re-evaluations in all areas of suspected disability (“Ground 1“); - Whether DCPS denied Student a FAPE by failing to timely identify Student as having an emotional disability, a specific learning disability, and an intellectual disability (this allegation was in part an assertion that DCPS did not meet its “Child Find” responsibilities to Student) (“Ground 2“);
- Whether DCPS denied Student a FAPE by failing to provide an adequate IEP (“Ground 3“);
- Whether Student was entitled to compensatory education.
Id. at 4.
The Hearing Officer admitted 45 exhibits on behalf of Plaintiff, 26 exhibits on behalf of DCPS, and 35 exhibits related to the procedural posture of the administrative proceeding. Id. at 6-8. At the hearing, Plaintiff testified and presented 8 witnesses, including two experts in the areas of psychology and speech-language evaluation. Id. at 8-9. DCPS presented 2 witnesses, a case manager / special education teacher and a special education coordinator from Eastern. Id. at 8-9.
On June 4, 2013, the Hearing Officer issued an administrative decision, concluding that Student was entitled to certain compensatory education. See id. at 26-30. With respect to Plaintiff‘s asserted grounds for relief, the Hearing Officer issued the following findings:
- With respect to Ground 1: DCPS did not deny Student a FAPE by failing to provide timely evaluations and re-evaluations in all areas of suspected disability.
- With respect to Ground 2: DCPS failed to meet its Child Find obligation by failing to identify Student as a child with an emotional disability and/or a specific learning. However, DCPS did not fail to meet its Child Find obligation by failing to identify Student as a child with an intellectual disability. Also, DCPS did not deny Student a FAPE by failing to identify Student as a student with a specific learning disability, an emotional disability, and an intellectual disability.
- With respect to Ground 3: DCPS denied Student a FAPE by failing to provide him an appropriate IEP.
Id. at 30.
In finding that Student was entitled compensatory relief, the Hearing Officer ordered DCPS to hold a multidisciplinary team (“MDT“) meeting to develop a compensatory education plan that would include (1) 15 hours of tutoring each week during the summer of 2013; (2) 5 hours of tutoring per week during the 2013-2014 school year; and (3) the option of a full-time non-public placement for the 2013-2014 school year. Id. at 31-32. The Hearing Officer, however, declined to award the additional relief requested by Plaintiff, which included Student‘s placement in a full-time therapeutic day school and certain “wrap around services,” such as therapeutic transport, individual and family counseling, medication management, and therapeutic recreation separate and apart from the services provided in the full-time day school placement. Id. at 4, 30.
At all times relevant to the administrative proceedings, Plaintiff was represented by Mr. Pierre Bergeron, Esq. Id. at 3.
D. The Instant Proceeding
On July 11, 2014, Plaintiff filed a Complaint in the instant case, seeking reimbursement of attorney‘s fees and costs incurred by Plaintiff in the above-described administrative action, on the ground that Plaintiff is a “prevailing party” under
On November 17, 2014, Plaintiff filed her First Motion for Summary Judgment on her claim for attorney‘s fees and costs. On December 17, 2014, the Court issued an Order staying Plaintiff‘s summary judgment motion, pending the resolution of an appeal involving similar issues in Price v. District of Columbia, 792 F.3d 112 (D.C. Cir. 2015).3 After the D.C. Circuit issued its decision in Price, both parties filed and fully briefed cross motions for summary judgment. See ECF Nos. [21], [22], [23], [24], [25], and [28]. On August 24, 2015, the Court referred the case to Magistrate Judge Alan Kay for (1) full case management up to but excluding trial and (2) a report and recommendation on the cross motions for summary judgment. See Minute Order (Aug. 24, 2015). On November 30, 2015, Magistrate Judge Alan Kay issued his Report and Recommendation, recommending that both motions be denied in part and granted in part. See R&R, ECF No. [29]. Magistrate Judge Kay‘s Report recommended the following:
In this case, [Plaintiff‘s counsel] documented a total of 170.5 hours, less 3.4 hours of travel time (totaling $647.63), leaving 167.1 hours which should be reduced by 24.8 hours for work on unsuccessful issues, leaving 142.3 hours .... Applying rates equivalent to 75% of Laffey Matrix rates result in fees of $53,941.88. Reducing this total by 15% (to account for Plaintiff‘s partial prevailing party status) results in fees of $45,850.60, but adding travel time at a rate of $647.63 results in total fees of $46,498.23. Costs amount to $122.75. Accordingly, the undersigned recommends that Plaintiff be awarded fees and costs of $46,620.98.
R&R at 15-16.
On December 14, 2015, Plaintiff filed her objections to Magistrate Judge Kay‘s Report. On January 14, 2016, Defendant filed its opposition to Plaintiff‘s objections, and on January 21, 2016, Plaintiff filed her reply. Accordingly, Plaintiff‘s objections are ripe for the Court‘s review.
Under Local Civil Rule 72.3(b), “[a]ny party may file for consideration by the district judge written objections to the magistrate judge‘s proposed findings and recommendations issued under [Local Civil Rule 72.3(a)] within 14 days[.]” Local Civ. R. 72.3(b). Local Civil Rule 72.3(b) further provides that “[t]he objections shall specifically identify the portions of the proposed findings and recommendations to which objection is made and the basis for the objection.” Id. Pursuant to Local Civil Rule 72.3(c), “a district judge shall make a de novo determination of those portions of a magistrate judge‘s findings and recommendations to which objection is made ....” Id. See also Means v. District of Columbia, 999 F.Supp.2d 128, 132 (D.D.C. 2013) (“District courts must apply a de novo standard of review when considering objections to, or adoption of, a magistrate judge‘s Report and Recommendation.“). The district judge “may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings and recommendations of the magistrate judge, or may recommit the matter to the magistrate judge with instructions.” Local Civ. R. 72.3(c).
Plaintiff raises three objections to Magistrate Judge Kay‘s Report. First, Plaintiff contends that Magistrate Judge Kay failed to apply the correct summary judgment standard. Pl.‘s Objections at 1-3. Second, Plaintiff contends that Magistrate Judge Kay erred by declining to award full attorney‘s fees to Plaintiff because Plaintiff “substantially prevailed” in the underlying administrative action. Id. at 3-5. And third, Plaintiff contends that Magistrate Judge Kay erred by awarding attorney‘s fees at a rate not based on the record evidence. Id. at 5-7.
The Court shall begin by discussing the applicable legal framework regarding the award of attorney‘s fees and costs in an IDEA action, and then shall address each of Plaintiff‘s objections.
A. Legal Framework
Under the IDEA, this Court has discretion to “award reasonable attorney‘s fees as part of the costs ... to a prevailing party who is the parent of a child with a disability” in an administrative proceeding.
“The IDEA provides no further guidance for determining an appropriate fee award.” Eley, 793 F.3d at 100. In Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886 (1984), however, the United States Supreme Court laid the foundation for a three-part analysis used in this Circuit. Eley, 793 F.3d at 100 (citing Blum, 465 U.S. at 895 n. 11). First, the Court must determine the “number of hours reasonably expended in litigation.” Id. (citing Save Our Cumberland Mountains, Inc. v. Hodel, 857 F.2d 1516, 1517 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (en banc)). Second, it must set the “reasonable hourly rate.” Id. Finally, the Court must determine whether use of a multiplier is warranted. Id.
Plaintiff, as the fee applicant, “bears the burden of establishing entitlement to an award, documenting the appropriate hours, and justifying the reasonableness of the rates” and the opposing party remains “free to rebut a fee claim.” Covington v. Dist. of Columbia, 57 F.3d 1101, 1107-08 (D.C. Cir. 1995). To meet her burden of persuasion, Plaintiff must “produce satisfactory evidence—in addition to [her] attorney‘s own affidavits—that [her] requested rates are in line with those prevailing in the community for similar services by lawyers of reasonably comparable skill, experience, and reputation.” Eley, 793 F.3d at 104 ((quoting Covington, 57 F.3d at 1109) (quoting Blum, 465 U.S. at 895 n. 11)) (emphasis in Eley). If Plaintiff provides such information, then a presumption would arise that the hours billed are reasonable and the burden would shift to Defendant to rebut Plaintiff‘s showing. See Covington, 57 F.3d at 1109-10. However, if both parties fail to present satisfactory evidence demonstrating that the hourly rates are reasonable, then the Court may determine the reasonable rate by reference to the Laffey Matrix.4 See, e.g., Brown v. D.C., 80 F.Supp.3d 90, 96 (D.D.C. 2015) (citing McAllister v. D.C., 21 F.Supp.3d 94, 100 (D.D.C.) on reconsideration in part, 53 F.Supp.3d 55 (D.D.C. 2014) aff‘d, 794 F.3d 15 (D.C. Cir. 2015)).
A. Summary Judgment Standard
Plaintiff‘s first objection is that Magistrate Judge Kay applied an incorrect summary judgment standard, and in so doing, erred in allocating the burden of production. Pl.‘s Objections at 2. Plaintiff asserts that the Court may grant summary judgment to Defendant on the issue of Plaintiff‘s claim for attorney‘s fees only if Defendant “present[s] specific facts that would enable a reasonable jury to find in its favor.” Pl.‘s Objections at 2.
As a preliminary matter, the Court reviews de novo those portions of Magistrate Judge Kay‘s findings and recommendations to which Plaintiff has objected. See Local Civ. R. 72.3(c). Accordingly, it is not necessary for the Court to critique the standard of review set forth in Magistrate Judge Kay‘s Report. Nonetheless, because Plaintiff‘s description of the summary judgment standard is erroneous, the Court shall address Plaintiff‘s objection and set forth the proper standard, which the Court shall apply in the instant case.
Pursuant to
Here, Plaintiff, as the party moving for summary judgment on legal fees, bears the burden of demonstrating the reasonableness of the fees requested, both in terms of hours spent and hourly rate. See Eley, 793 F.3d at 99-100. Accordingly, Defendant‘s burden is merely to point out to the Court that Plaintiff cannot prove the reasonableness of the fees requested. See, e.g., Blum, 465 U.S. at 897 (noting that the fee petitioner bears the burden of establishing all elements of the fees petition).5
Plaintiff‘s second objection is that Magistrate Judge Kay erred by reducing the amount of fees awarded on the basis that Plaintiff was a partially prevailing party in the administrative proceeding. See Pl.‘s Objections at 3.
1. 24.8 HOUR REDUCTION REGARDING PLAINTIFF‘S UNSUCCESSFUL EFFORTS TO OBTAIN RELIEF RELATED TO THE ALLEGED 2009 IEP.
Plaintiff disputes Magistrate Judge Kay‘s recommendation that Plaintiff not be reimbursed for specific charges relating to issues related to the purported 2009 IEP—missing evidence, statute of limitations, and striking testimony. See R&R at 7. The Hearing Officer ruled against Plaintiff on each of these issues in a separate evidentiary hearing held before the due process hearing. See R&R at 7. As noted by Magistrate Judge Kay, time billed on these issues, which totals 24.8 hours, is easily identifiable on the Billing Statement prepared by Plaintiff‘s counsel. See R&R at 7, n.5; see also Billing Statement, ECF No. [21-3]. Plaintiff contends that the Court should award attorney‘s fees for time spent on these issues—issues on which plaintiff was completely unsuccessful—because Plaintiff “substantially prevailed in the underlying administrative action.” Pl.‘s Objections at 3. The Court finds Plaintiff‘s argument unavailing and contrary to controlling case law.
In Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424 (1983), the Supreme Court outlined the appropriate inquiry when, as here, a fee applicant prevailed on many, but not all, of the claims in the underlying proceeding. See id. at 436-47. First, the district court must consider whether “the plaintiff fail[ed] to prevail on claims that were unrelated to the claims on which he succeeded.” Id. at 434. If the unsuccessful claims were in fact unrelated to the successful ones, “a court must confine fee awards to work done on the successful claims” by “weeding out work done on unrelated unsuccessful claims from any award.” George Hyman Constr. Co. v. Brooks, 963 F.2d 1532, 1535 (D.C. Cir. 1992); see also Goos v. Nat‘l Ass‘n of Realtors, 997 F.2d 1565, 1569 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (“In such cases, the fact finder is to ‘prevent claimant from piggybacking fees incurred for work done on losing claims onto unrelated winning issues.‘“). The district court may do so by “attempt[ing] to identify specific hours that should be eliminated, or it may simply reduce the award to account for the limited success.” Hensley, 461 U.S. at 436-37. Claims are distinct and sufficiently unrelated where they do not involve a common core of facts and are not based on related legal theories. Goos, 997 F.2d at 1569. Ultimately, “[t]here is no precise rule or formula for making these determinations,” and the district court “necessarily has discretion in making this equitable judgment.” Hensley, 461 U.S. at 436-47.
Here, the record indicates that Plaintiff was unsuccessful in obtaining any relief based on Plaintiff‘s assertions that Student had received IDEA services in 7th grade pursuant to an IEP allegedly issued in October 2009 and that those services had been improperly stopped without notification to Plaintiff. See HOD at 3. The Hearing Officer described Plaintiff‘s contention regarding the purported 2009 IEP as a “core element in the complaint.” Id.
In light of the foregoing, the Court finds that the 24.8 hours billed by plaintiff‘s counsel on unrelated, unsuccessful claims are “specific hours that should be eliminated” under Hensley, 461 U.S. at 436. Accordingly, the Court shall adopt Magistrate Judge Kay‘s recommendation to remove these 24.8 hours from plaintiff‘s recovery of attorney‘s fees.7
2. 15% FEE REDUCTION REGARDING PLAINTIFF‘S EFFORTS TO OBTAIN RELIEF RELATED TO THE GOVERNMENT‘S DENIAL OF A FAPE IN 2011-2013.
Plaintiff also disputes Magistrate Judge Kay‘s recommendation that Plaintiff‘s overall fee award be reduced by 15%. See R&R at 7-8. In making his recommendation, Magistrate Judge Kay found that “while Plaintiff did prevail in terms of demonstrating denial of FAPE and entitlement to compensatory education, Plaintiff did not prevail regarding the issue of assessments or in her proffer of Village Academy as a possible school for Student.” Id. Therefore, because “charges relating to these issues cannot be easily separated from charges for issues on which Plaintiff did prevail,” Magistrate Judge Kay recommended “that Plaintiff‘s fee award be reduced by 15% to account for the time spent on these issues.” Id.
Plaintiff contends that the 15% fee reduction is unfounded because she “obtained the degree of success which warrants no reductions in attorneys’ fees.” Pl.‘s Objections at 4. Plaintiff believes that Magistrate Judge Kay‘s Report ignores Hensley‘s direction not to reduce attorneys’ fees “simply because the plaintiff failed to prevail on every contention raised in the lawsuit.” Hensley, 461 U.S. at 435. Again, the Court finds Plaintiff‘s arguments unavailing.8
Here, the Court agrees with Plaintiff that she obtained significant relief in the administrative action. See Pl.‘s Objections at 3. The Hearing Officer awarded Student hundreds of hours of compensatory education as well as the option of a full-time non-public placement. HOD at 30. However, as noted above, the Court‘s inquiry is not simply whether Plaintiff obtained “significant relief,” but rather, whether the relief, however significant, is limited in comparison to the scope of the proceeding as a whole. Hensley, 461 U.S. at 440. As noted by Magistrate Judge Kay, Plaintiff did not prevail with respect to a number of issues before the Hearing Officer. See R&R at 7. In fact, five of the eight “Conclusions of Law” made by the Hearing Officer were rulings against Plaintiff:
- DCPS did not deny Student a FAPE by failing to provide a comprehensive psychological, speech-language or adaptive behavior assessment as part of the evaluation process (Conclusion of Law # 1).
- DCPS did not deny Student a FAPE by failing to provide a comprehensive psychological, speech-language or adaptive behavior assessment as part of the re-evaluation process (Conclusion of Law # 2).
- DCPS did not fail to meet its Child Find obligation by failing to identify Student as a child with an intellectual disability for the two years preceding the filing of this complaint (Conclusion of Law # 4).
- Student was not denied a FAPE by DCPS’ failure to identify Student as a student with a specific learning disability, an emotional disability and an intellectual disability (Conclusion of Law # 5).
Village Academy is not an appropriate placement for Student (Conclusion of Law # 8).
HOD at 30.
Moreover, Plaintiff was also unsuccessful in obtaining certain relief sought, such as placement at Village Academy and “wrap around” services, including therapeutic transport, individual and family counseling, medication management, and therapeutic recreation separate and apart from the services provided in the full-time day school placement. See id. at 30-32.
In light of the foregoing, the Court finds that full compensation for all of the work performed by Plaintiff‘s counsel with respect to the issues before the Hearing Officer would be disproportionate to the degree of success achieved, thereby rendering the amount of fees requested by Plaintiff as unreasonable. See Hensley, 461 U.S. at 440. The Court further finds that a reduction in the amount of 15% is reasonable in light of the factors discussed above. Accordingly, the Court shall adopt Magistrate Judge Kay‘s recommendation to reduce the fee award by 15%.9
C. Establishing a Reasonable Fee.
Finally, Plaintiff objects to Magistrate Judge Kay‘s recommendation that the Court issue a fee award compensating Plaintiff‘s counsel at a rate equivalent to 75% of Laffey rates, that is, $378.75 / hour for work prior to June 1, 2013 and $382.50/ hour for work on or after June 1, 2013. See R&R at 5.
Plaintiff contends that the record evidence in this case establishes that the rate requested by Plaintiff‘s counsel—that is equivalent to the USAO Laffey Rate—is in line with the prevailing rates in the community for similar services by lawyers of reasonably comparable skills, experience, and reputation. See Pl.‘s Objections at 5. Plaintiff contends that she has demonstrated the prevailing market rate of IDEA litigators by her submission of the following evidence: (1) an affidavit from Plaintiff‘s counsel in the underlying administrative action, (2) the USAO Laffey Matrix, and (3) declarations from seven lawyers with experience in IDEA litigation who practice in the District of Columbia. See ECF Nos. [21-4]-[21-12].
Defendant disagrees with Plaintiff‘s assessment of the record evidence, and contends that Plaintiff has failed to carry her burden to establish the prevailing market rate. See Def.‘s Opp‘n to Pl.‘s Objections at 7; Def.‘s Mot. for S.J., ECF No. [22], at 8-15. Defendant contends that the reasonable rate of compensation in this case is instead the rate frequently awarded by judges of this district court—75% of the Laffey rate. See Def.‘s Mot. for S.J., ECF No. [22], at 15-22.
Upon close review of the record evidence, the Court finds that Plaintiff has not met her burden of establishing “that the requested rates are in line with those prevailing in the community for similar services by lawyers of reasonably comparable skills, experience, and reputation.” Eley, 793 F.3d at 100 (quoting Blum, 465 U.S. at 895 n. 11).
As a preliminary matter, because the Laffey Matrix was created for complex federal litigation and it contains presumptive maximum rates, Laffey rates are not presumptively reasonable in the context of IDEA actions. Id. at 105. For this reason, Plaintiff must justify the reasonableness of her counsel‘s rates by introducing other evidence into the record, such as “surveys []; affidavits reciting the precise fees that attorneys with similar qualifications have received from fee-paying clients in comparable cases; and evidence of recent fees awarded by the courts or through settlement to attorneys with comparable qualifications handling similar cases.” Id. at 101 (quoting Covington, 57 F.3d at 1109).
The remaining four declarations do little else than show that several attorneys practicing IDEA administrative proceedings in Washington, D.C. charge the Laffey rate. See ECF Nos. [21-8], [21-9], [21-11], [21-12]. None of those declarations assist the Court by “reciting the precise fees that attorneys with similar qualifications have received from fee-paying clients in comparable cases.” Eley, at 101, (quoting Covington, 57 F.3d at 1109). At most, one declaration provides a general, unsubstantiated statement that his firm “has had several clients who pay the [Laffey rate] directly, regardless of whether reimbursement is ever obtained.” ECF No. [21-11], at 2 (Decl. of Douglas Tyrka). In sum, the Court agrees with Magistrate Judge Kay‘s assessment that the proffered declarations “lack the specificity that would be helpful in determining the prevailing market for IDEA litigation.” See R&R at 11-12.10
The Court also notes that there is nothing in the record to suggest that the underlying administrative IDEA matter was unusually complex. The underlying action presented no “novel questions of law,” burdensome discovery issues, or other unusual complexities. See Blackman, 56 F.Supp.3d at 19. Instead, the underlying action is similar to a plethora of other, fairly routine IDEA administrative actions, which have warranted attorney fee awards at rates below Laffey rates. See, e.g., McClam v. D.C., 808 F.Supp.2d 184, 189 (D.D.C.2011) (awarding 75% of the Laffey Rate after finding that the IDEA action was not “complex” where it involved a three-day due process hearing, 41 exhibits, 11 witnesses, and closing arguments).11 Accordingly, the Court finds that the full Laffey rate is not a “reasonable rate” in the context of the underlying IDEA proceeding.
Having found that the full Laffey rate is not a “reasonable rate” in this context of the underlying IDEA proceeding, the Court must determine the appropriate rate for the type of legal services provided by Plaintiff‘s counsel in the underlying IDEA action. Here, Defendant proposes an award of 75% USAO Laffey Matrix levels and an overwhelming number of district courts have found such a rate to approximate the prevailing rate for IDEA administrative proceedings. See, e.g., Snead v. D.C., 139 F.Supp.3d 375, at 380-81, No. 1:15-CV-00376, 2015 WL 5921901, at *5 (D.D.C. Oct. 7, 2015); Reed v. District of Columbia, 134 F.Supp.3d 122, at No. 14-1887, 2015 WL 5692871, at *13 (D.D.C. Sept. 18, 2015); Tillman v. D.C., 123 F.Supp.3d 49, at 57, No. 14-1542, 2015 WL 5011656, at *6 (D.D.C. Aug. 24, 2015); Jones v. D.C., No. 15-155, 2015 WL 5093559, at *5-6 (D.D.C. Aug. 18, 2015); D.C. v. Kirksey-Harrington, 125 F.Supp.3d 4, at 15-16, No. 14-180, 2015 WL 5014144, at *8 (D.D.C. Aug. 18, 2015); Brown v. District of Columbia, 80 F.Supp.3d 90, 98 (D.D.C. 2015). The Court agrees with the District, as well as those members of this Court who have addressed the issue since the D.C. Circuit‘s Eley decision: three-quarters of USAO Laffey rates is an appropriate metric for a routine IDEA administrative representation. See, e.g., Snead, 139 F.Supp.3d at 380-81, 2015 WL 6921901, at *5. Accordingly, the Court shall adopt Magistrate Judge Kay‘s recommendation and issue a fee award compensating Plaintiff‘s counsel at a rate equivalent to 75% of Laffey rates, that is, $378.75 per hour for work prior to June 1, 2013 and $382.50 per hour for work on or after June 1, 2013. See R&R at 5.
For the foregoing reasons, the Court adopts Magistrate Judge Kay‘s Report and Recommendation in its entirety. The Court shall GRANT-IN-PART and DENY-IN-PART Plaintiff‘s [21] Motion for Summary Judgment and shall GRANT-IN-PART and DENY-IN-PART Defendant‘s [22] Cross Motion for Summary Judgment. The Court shall award Plaintiff $46,620.98 in attorney‘s fees and costs.
An appropriate Order accompanies this Memorandum Opinion.
COLLEEN KOLLAR-KOTELLY
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE