Plasticrete Block & Supply Corp. v. Commissioner of Revenue ServicesPlasticrete Block & Supply Corp. v. Commissioner of Revenue Services
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- Before:
- Borden
The dispositive issue in this appeal is whether the trial court properly allocated to the plaintiff taxpayer the burden of overcoming a presumption of taxability, as “gross receipts” under General Stat*19utes § 12-407 (9),1 of certain delivery charges collected by the plaintiff. The defendant commissioner levied a deficiency assessment against the plaintiff for delivery charges collected in conjunction with the sale of the plaintiffs custom-made concrete blocks for the period October 1,1980, to September 30, 1983. The plaintiff appealed to the Superior Court. Thereafter, the plaintiff *20brought a declaratory judgment action against the com-missioner challenging his declaratory ruling that certain language that the plaintiff added to its invoices and delivery forms in July, 1984, did not operate to exclude those charges from future taxes.2 The trial court dismissed the appeal, and rendered a declaratory judgment that the delivery charges were subject to taxation. The plaintiff filed a consolidated appeal to the Appellate Court, and we transferred the case to ourselves pursuant to
The facts are either stipulated or undisputed. The plaintiff, a Connecticut corporation with its principal place of business in North Haven, engages in the manufacture and sale of custom masonry products for construction, including the production of blocks specially manufactured according to customer order. Once the plaintiff begins production of custom orders, a purchaser is responsible for payment, and may not cancel an order or return a portion for credit. Additionally, as soon as an order is completed, the plaintiff stacks the blocks in its yard on individual pallets labeled by customer name until pick-up or delivery. As part of its business practice, the plaintiff maintains nine trucks to transport the blocks to customers who want delivery for an additional price calculated separately from the cost of the blocks. This separate delivery charge is specified on the plaintiff’s quotation/acceptance form and order form, and, since 1984, language on invoices and delivery tickets states that “purchase and sales of goods shall be deemed to have taken place at time of *21loading upon the carrier; purchaser shall thereafter have the sole responsibility for payment thereof and the risk of any loss thereof.” The quotation/acceptance form also quotes prices for the blocks “F.O.B. North Haven yard.” Approximately 75 percent of purchasers of custom-made blocks request that the plaintiff deliver the blocks, while the remaining 25 percent transport the blocks themselves.3 The sales tax in issue in this case is applicable, if at all, only to the charges for delivery of custom-made concrete blocks by the plaintiff to its customers.
In order to clarify the controversy, some background to the sales tax statutes is required. A tax is imposed upon a taxpayer for the sale of goods or services at retail.
*22“Gross receipts,” as defined in
The legal issue presented to the trial court, therefore, was whether the plaintiff’s delivery charges represented fees for transportation prior to its sale under
The trial court resolved this factual issue in the defendant’s favor. The court, in determining the question of whether title to the blocks passed prior or subsequent to delivery, followed the test set forth in the Uniform Commercial Code, which provides that title *23passes from the seller to the buyer “in any manner and on any conditions explicitly agreed on by the parties.”
The plaintiff claims that: (1) the trial court incorrectly imposed upon it the presumption of taxability applica*24ble under
In reviewing trial court proceedings, we may reverse or modify the decision of the trial court only if we determine that “the factual findings are clearly erroneous in view of the evidence and pleadings in the whole record, or that the decision is otherwise erroneous in law.”
The plaintiff first claims that the court, in determining whether the plaintiff’s delivery charges were taxable as gross receipts, incorrectly imposed upon it the presumption of taxability under
The amount of sales tax required to be paid by a taxpayer may be reduced by exemptions to the tax statutes set forth in
Section
The plaintiff was entitled, therefore, to have the evidence evaluated in accordance with the rule that where the claim involves “the imposition of a tax rather than a claimed right to an exemption or a deduction, the issue must be resolved by strictly construing the statute against the taxing authority and in favor of the taxpayer.” Texaco, Inc. v. Groppo, supra, 137; Texaco Refining & Marketing Co. v. Commissioner, supra, 588; Schlumberger Technology Corporation v. Dubno, supra, 421; The B.F. Goodrich Co. v. Dubno, 196 Conn. 1, 8-9, 490 A.2d 991 (1985). By applying to the evidence concerning the passage of title to the blocks the rule of construction regarding tax exemptions, the court applied an erroneous principle of law. Velsmid v. Nelson, supra, 224.
The defendant argues that the court properly placed the burden of rebutting the presumption of taxability on the plaintiff because the first sentence of
The first sentence of
The defendant’s argument demonstrates a strained reading of an unambiguous statute. Where “the legislation itself contains a specific definition, the courts are bound to accept that definition.” Greenwich v. Liquor Control Commission, 191 Conn. 528, 536-37, 469 A.2d 382 (1983); Danbury v. Corbett, 139 Conn. 379, 384, 94 A.2d 6 (1953). The term “gross receipts” is specifically set forth under the “Definitions” section of the sales and use tax provisions;
The plaintiff also claims that the trial court should have concluded as a matter of law, based upon the evidence presented, that its manner of conducting business and the language added to its forms in 1984 were sufficient to pass title prior to delivery, thereby removing these charges from the definition of “gross receipts” and rendering them not subject to tax. We are not persuaded.
In determining whether title has passed, the court should examine the entire contractual transaction between the parties for their objective factual intent. New England Petroleum Corporation v. Groppo, supra; New England Yacht Sales, Inc. v. Commissioner, supra, 632. “The intention of the parties is, in turn, a question of fact.” A. Dubreuil & Sons, Inc. v. Lisbon, 215 Conn. 604, 1609, 577 A.2d 709 (1990); Thompson & Peck, Inc. v. Harbor Marine Contracting Corporation, 203 Conn. 123, 130, 523 A.2d 1266 (1987); Finley v. Aetna Life & Casualty Co., 202 Conn. 190, 199, 520 A.2d 508 (1987). It is therefore a question of fact in this instance whether the plaintiffs manner of conducting business and the terms added to the plaintiffs forms in 1984 were sufficient to transfer title of the blocks prior to delivery.
*29We do not mean to suggest, however, that an inference concerning the passage of title in favor of the plaintiff must be drawn on rehearing. In this case, there was evidence that supported both the plaintiffs assertion that title passed prior to delivery and the defendant’s assertion that title passed after delivery. The inference of when title passed is one of fact to be drawn by the trial court pursuant to the appropriate rules and unburdened by inapplicable presumptions.
The judgments are reversed and the case is remanded to the trial court for a new trial.
In this opinion the other justices concurred.
Notes
The court consolidated the two actions for trial. In the first action, the plaintiff appealed the deficiency tax assessment of the then present tax commissioner, Orest T. Dubno. In the second action, the plaintiff requested a declaratory judgment reversing the adverse declaratory ruling of the subsequent tax commissioner, Timothy F. Bannon.
Although the trial court stated that the plaintiff “usually delivers the finished bricks” and “[occasionally . . . uses a common carrier for delivery and occasionally the customer picks them up,” the undisputed testimony at trial indicated that, in fact, one quarter of all custom-made blocks were typically picked up by customers, and three quarters were typically delivered.
In a motion to reargue, the plaintiff claimed, inter alia, that the trial court incorrectly relied upon preprinted paragraphs in the plaintiff’s forms that applied to noncustomized blocks, and that the trial court incorrectly failed to conclude that the F.O.B. language in its forms required a finding that title passed at the plaintiff’s yard. Although the court amended its decision to exclude the references to the preprinted paragraphs dealing with the noncustomized blocks, it reaffirmed its conclusion that title did not pass prior to delivery and that the F.O.B. language was “by no means conclusively determinative” of passage of title.
The defendant also claims the benefit of the second sentence of