5 Conn. App. 219 | Conn. App. Ct. | 1985
This is an appeal from the judgment of the trial court dismissing the plaintiff’s petition for review of the decision of the defendant commissioner of transportation. The commissioner’s decision had denied the plaintiff certain payments which the plaintiff had claimed under the Uniform Relocation Assistance Act (URAA). General Statutes §§ 8-266 through 8-282.
The administrative record, as reviewed by the trial court, revealed the following facts: The plaintiff was a wholesale distributor of household items. It conducted its business from a site in Hartford and had two feeder warehouses. The defendant instituted eminent domain proceedings against the Hartford site in connection with a highway project, forcing the plaintiff to relocate to a new facility in East Windsor. At the time of the move, the plaintiff’s inventory, consisting of thousands of items, was contained in over 200,000 separate corrugated cartons. Various other property, such as desks, chairs, typewriters and other business machines, also had to be relocated.
The plaintiff’s business, which involved the acceptance of goods from manufacturers, the storage of those goods, the assembling of orders and the delivery of
When it relocated to the East Windsor facility, the plaintiff consolidated all three of its warehouses into one. It also installed a new computer system and reorganized its inventory. The plaintiff implemented the move itself so that its employees, who knew the operation of the business, could move the inventory. The move took place between April 14, 1980, and May 30, 1980, and the plaintiffs business was completely closed for business due to the move from May 9,1980, through May 30, 1980.
The plaintiff applied for reimbursement under the URAA; General Statutes § 8-268 (a);
The plaintiff thereupon appealed to the court, which determined that the basis of “the decision of the Appeals Board . . . concerning the utility and rental expenses was vague, ambiguous and confusing,” and remanded the action to the appeals board for clarification. After a hearing, the appeals board issued a “Response to Order for Remand,” adopted by the commissioner, which stated summarily that the claim for reimbursement of the rental and utility expenses was denied. It cited § 8-273-11 (a) of the agency’s regulations,
The plaintiff again appealed to the court. This appeal involved only the claim for the rent and utility expenses, which the parties stipulated were in the amounts of $20,000 and $3556, respectively. The court upheld the decision of the commissioner and the appeals board on the basis that the claimed expenses were living expenses under § 8-273-11 (a) of the regulations and were, therefore, not reimbursable. The court also offered two alternative bases on which the claims could have been denied, although neither basis was mentioned in either of the board’s decisions. The court stated that the record showed that these expenses were related to improvements made to the East Windsor site and to modifications to property moved to that site, both of which are excluded from reimbursement under the agency’s regulations. Regs., Conn. State Agencies § 8-273-11 (c), (j).
We treat initially the claim of error that the trial court erred by addressing alternative grounds for upholding the appeal. The trial court was acting in an appellate posture when this case came before it. As such, the court was limited to the administrative record before it and could not try the case de novo. Connecticut Natural Gas Corporation v. PUCA, 183 Conn. 128, 133-34, 439 A.2d 282 (1981); Pelletier v. White, 33 Conn. Sup. 769, 770, 371 A.2d 1068 (1976). The two alternative grounds found by the trial court to uphold the decision were § 8-273-11 (c) and § 8-273-11 (j) of the regulations. These regulations exclude reimbursement for the costs of improvements to the replacement site and modification of personal property to adapt it to the replacement site, respectively. Both were alluded to at the administrative hearings but neither the original decision by the board nor the decision currently being appealed mentions these exclusions. The board clearly did not rely on these exclusions when it denied the plaintiff’s claim and the court’s reliance on them is improper. The court, in effect, adjudicated facts and issues on its own and therefore, “engagefd] in surmise and conjecture” to uphold the decision. Lee v. Board of Education, 181 Conn. 69, 82, 434 A.2d 333 (1980); see Kaplan v. Administrator, 4 Conn. App. 152, 493 A.2d 248 (1985).
Moreover, we note that the plaintiff excised from its claim the expenditures it made for improvements to the replacement site and for modifications which it deemed necessary to make its equipment efficient in
Turning now to the plaintiff’s principal claim, namely, that the court erred by not finding the rent and utilities reimbursable as actual reasonable moving expenses under the URAA, we first address the issue of our scope of review. The plaintiff circumscribes our scope of review to that of determining whether the board’s decision was arbitrary, capricious or characterized by an abuse of discretion, or whether the decision was clearly erroneous in view of the reliable, probative and substantial evidence on the whole record. See General Statutes § 4-183 (g) (5), (6). The defendant seemingly concurs in this enunciation of our scope of review in its brief.
The parties are correct in grounding our scope of review on the provisions of General Statutes § 4-183 of the Uniform Administrative Procedure Act (UAPA), under which judicial review of the commissioner’s decision is authorized. That act, however, provides four other bases on which a reviewing court may reverse or modify an agency decision. General Statutes § 4-183 (g).
The question of whether a particular statute or regulation applies to a given state of facts is a question of statutory interpretation, which, upon review under the UAPA, ordinarily presents a question of law. See Connecticut Life & Health Ins. Guaranty Assn. v. Jackson, 173 Conn. 352, 356-57, 377 A.2d 1099 (1977). Thus, whether General Statutes § 8-268 (a) or § 8-273-11 (a) of the regulations apply to these facts is a question of law. Our review of this question leads us to conclude that the commissioner, and the trial court in affirming the commissioner’s decision, made an error of law and exceeded the statutory provisions governing relocation assistance when they determined that the expenses claimed by the plaintiff were nonreimbursable living expenses.
“The power of an administrative agency to prescribe rules and regulations under a statute is not the power to make law, but only the power to adopt regulations to carry into effect the will of the legislature as expressed by the statute.” Salmon Brook Convalescent Home v. Commission on Hospitals & Health Care, 177 Conn. 356, 363, 417 A.2d 358 (1979). The department of transportation promulgated regulations pursuant to
There is no dispute that the plaintiff was required to move due to displacement by a state agency. The circumstances of this case, given the type and extent of the inventory and the need to move it in an organized fashion, however, required that the plaintiffs move from the taken site be done in an unusual manner.
Furthermore, we do not believe that § 8-273-11 (a) of the regulations was intended to exclude the types of expenses at issue here. That regulation states that a displaced person is not entitled to payment for “additional expenses incurred because of living in a new location.” We construe this language, in its commonly approved usage; Citerella v. United Illuminating Co., 158 Conn. 600, 608, 266 A.2d 382 (1969); as embracing extra costs incurred due to a higher level of living in the area to which one has relocated, but not extending to the costs of moving to that area.
The plaintiff’s claim seeks reimbursement only for the rent for the six weeks during which it was in the process of transferring goods from the Hartford facility to the East Windsor facility, and for the utilities for the three weeks during which it had to shut down business to accomplish the move. No claim was made here for increased rent or an increase in the average monthly utility bill. The plaintiff did not make a claim for the costs of modifying its equipment to the new property or of making needed improvements. In sum, no expenses incurred due to “living” in the new location were claimed, even if we equate “living” to doing business. The plaintiffs only claimed expenses incurred incident to the move which they were required to make.
Although the commissioner was given broad authority to establish regulations to implement the URAA; General Statutes § 8-273; the regulations cannot be given a tortured construction which would prevent the plaintiff from being reimbursed for these expenses, and which would contravene the purposes of the act. See Roy v. Centennial Ins. Co., 171 Conn. 463, 476, 370 A.2d 1011 (1976). The regulations, like the statute, must be construed with common sense and to reach a rational result. Citerella v. United Illuminating Co., supra, 609. The defendant’s construction would render without meaning in this case the statutory mandate of paying a displaced person for actual reasonable moving expenses and would give too broad a scope to the living expenses exclusion of § 8-273-11 (a) of the
Although in some circumstances we grant deference to an agency’s interpretation of its own regulations; Roy v. Centennial Ins. Co., supra, 473; the deference which we give to the board’s decision in this case is limited. First, as previously mentioned, the agency’s interpretation of the regulation runs contrary to the purpose of the act under which it was promulgated.
Second, the reasons underlying our policy of granting deference to an agency’s interpretations of regulations are not present here. Where an agency has expertise in a given area and a history of determining factual and legal questions similar to those at issue, its interpretation is granted deference by the courts. See Anderson v. Ludgin, 175 Conn. 545, 555-56, 400 A.2d 712 (1978); New Haven v. United Illuminating Co., 168 Conn. 478, 493, 362 A.2d 785 (1975); Breen v. Department of Liquor Control, 2 Conn. App. 628, 634, 481 A.2d 755, cert. granted, 194 Conn. 808, 483 A.2d 1098 (1984). This case involves a novel and apparently unprecedented question of whether rent and utilities at both the taken site and the replacement site are moving expenses reimbursable under the URAA where, due to the nature of its inventory, the claimant moves itself, requires six weeks to move during which rent and utilities are incurred at both sites and closes down its business for three of those six weeks solely to complete the move. There is no administrative history showing that this agency has determined this type of question under the regulation in issue here. It, therefore, has no special expertise in determining if that regulation applies to these facts. We therefore do not consider it inappropriate, in a case such as this, to limit our deference to the agency’s decision.
There is error, the judgment is set aside and the case is remanded with direction to render judgment in accordance with this opinion.
In this opinion the other judges concurred.
General Statutes § 8-268 (a) provides in pertinent part: “Whenever a program or project undertaken by a state agency or under the supervision of a state agency will result in the displacement of any person on or after July 6,1971, the head of such state agency shall make payment to any displaced person, upon proper application as approved by such agency head, for (1) actual reasonable expenses in moving himself, his family, business, farm operation or other personal property; (2) actual direct losses of tangible personal property as a result of moving or discontinuing a business or farm operation, but not to exceed an amount equal to the reasonable expenses that would have been required to relocate such property, as determined by the state agency, and (3) actual reasonable expenses in searching for a replacement business or farm . . . .”
Section 8-273-11 of the Regulations of Connecticut State Agencies provides in pertinent part: “A displaced person is not entitled to be paid for— (a) Additional expenses incurred because of living in a new location . . . .”
General Statutes § 4-183 (g) provides: “The court shall not substitute its judgment for that of the agency as to the weight of the evidence on questions of fact. The court may affirm the decision of the agency or remand the case for further proceedings. The court may reverse or modify the decision if substantial rights of the appellant have been prejudiced because the administrative findings, inferences, conclusions, or decisions are: (1) In violation of constitutional or statutory provisions; (2) in excess of the statutory authority of the agency; (3) made upon unlawful procedure; (4) affected by other error of law; (5) clearly erroneous in view of the reliable, probative, and substantial evidence on the whole record; or (6) arbitrary or capricious or characterized by abuse of discretion or clearly unwarranted exercise of discretion.”
It should be noted that no one argues that the move was done in an unreasonable manner.
This regulation, for example, would exclude reimbursement for the difference between the higher rent in the replacement location, which in general has higher costs of living, and the lower rent in the taken location.
Because the board did not specifically find that it was necessary for the plaintiff to store its inventory for the purposes of this move, we do not address this regulation as a basis for payment. We note, however, that it would be anomalous for a displaced person to be reimbursed for moving