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Planned Parenthood Southeast Ohio Region v. DeWine
696 F.3d 490
6th Cir.
2012
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Docket

*1 рrecedent Supreme Court application PARENTHOOD PLANNED SOUTH standard. The Ohio AEDPA

under the REGION; Planned Par WEST OHIO to cite a appear did Appeals Court of Ohio; enthood of Central unfair” standard for the “fundamentally Ohio; of Northeast Timo Parenthood Supreme Court prejudice prong, Kress; Sogor; Preterm, thy Laszlo in Williams stated was an unreasonable Plaintiffs-Appellants, precedent. See of its application (holding that to v. must the defendant prejudice establish Attorney DeWINE, Mike General probabili- there is reasonable show “that Ohio; Joseph Deters, that, unprofessional ty for counsel’s but Defendants-Appellees. errors, would proceeding the result No. 11-4062. different”). But the error was have been First, because Ohio Court harmless. of Appeals, States Court United Appeals cited Ohio Sixth Circuit. correctly itself case for this assertion that Strickland, Argued: June it is not clear that cited in- court of intended to state the appeals Decided Filed: Oct. Jones, See correct 2000 WL standard. Combs, (citing State *7 90, 652 N.E.2d 211-12 App.3d

Ohio (1994)). Second, ap- even if the court of standard, wrong this peals simply used novo means that Jones entitled de claim, Strickland review of his substantive and, review, novo after de hold attorney’s his prejudiced Jones was not investigate failure incidence of crime Embassy at the Suites.

IV. reasons, foregoing For the we AFFIRM judgment court. district *3 OH,

land, Appellants. Jeannine R. Lesperance, Office of the Ohio Attorney General, OH, Columbus, for Appellees. Hill, BRIEF: B. ON Jessie Case Western Law, University Reserve School Cleve- land, OH, Krasnoff, Helene T. Planned America, Parenthood Federation of Wash- D.C., ington, Evans, Roger K. America, *4 Parenthood Federation of New York, NY, Gerhardstein, Alрhonse A. Ger- LPA, Cincinnati, hardstein & Branch Co. OH, Davis, L. Appellants. Carrie for Je- Lesperance, Gale, R. annine Erick D. Of- General, Attorney fice of the Ohio Colum- OH, bus, for Appellees. Smith, Mailee R. Life, Americans United For Washington, D.C., Amici for Curiae. MOORE, ROGERS,

Before: McKEAGUE, Judges. Circuit MOORE, J., opinion delivered the of the which, court in ROGERS and McKEAGUE, JJ., joined in Parts I-V. MOORE, (pp. 507-13), J. delivered a VI, separate Part in part which dissents separate majority opinion from the McKEAGUE, by (pp. 513-18), delivered J. which, ROGERS, J., with concurs.

OPINION MOORE,

KAREN NELSON Circuit Judge.

In passed Ohio a law criminalizing mifepristone, distribution of also RU-486, known as unless distribution certain protocols gestational mirrored limits by time identified FDA when approved was first in 2000. (the “Act”). § Ohio Rev.Code 2919.123 in Mifepristone, combination miso- prostol, was the of medical form abor- by tion offered Planned Parenthood in regional Ohio. Planned Ohio Parenthood’s Hill, two (collectively, ARGUED: B. Jessie Case Western clinics and of its doctors Parenthood”) Law, University brought Reserve School of Cleve- “Planned suit short- court is therefore the district judgment of challenging its passage the Act’s ly after AFFIRMED. Al- grounds. on several constitutionality place in injunction is

though preliminary I. BACKGROUND an ex- to make failure the Act’s to cover involving the circumstances ception Background A. Factual mother, Act has health and life abor- most first-trimester Before February force since been otherwise pro- performed surgical, tions were aspi- commonly vacuum known as cedure curettage. Planned ration or suction appeal is whether this issue on Taft, Region v. Cincinnati Parenthood summary granting court erred district (6th Cir.2006) 502, {“Taft the defendants judgment favor ”). agree that parties II claims constitutional four three are ex- in the first trimester facially Parenthood brоught and, healthy wom- tremely for most safe resolu- Following the Act. challenging the *5 to ten minutes en, less than five can take by the questions certified tion of certain clinic, only usually with outpatient at an Court, court the district Ohio and sedation. often local anesthesia (1) longer uncon- Act was no the held performed abortion is Briefly, a (2) Act did not the stitutionally vague, the speculum into woman’s by inserting bodily integrity right violate a woman’s cervix, in- the and then vagina, dilating (3) Amendment, and under the Fourteenth emp- into her serting a tube uterus impose an undue burden not the Act did effects by suction. Side ties the contents Fourteenth Amendment a woman’s on cramping. Surgical bleeding and include The fourth abortion. choose performed been for dec- have unduly burdens a claim, the Act whether ades, mortality extremely is the rate and the and life under right to health woman’s 100,000. R. 144-1 per .1 roughly low at Amendment, being is held for Fourteenth ¶¶ (Paul 14-20), as cited R. 139-1 Deck appeal. at issue on is not this trial and 1) (Defs.’ Ap- at 3 n. and to Strike Mot. Br. at 5.1 pellee review, unanimously AFFIRM Upon summary judg- of grant the district court’s Drug the Food and Administra- In vagueness Parenthood’s ment on Planned (“FDA”) the distribu- approved first tion Judge claims. bodily-integrity and in the United mifepristone use of tion and AF- by Judge McKeague joined Rogers RU-486, also called Mifepristone, States. in full. judgment FIRM the court’s district preg- the “terminates is medication remand would reverse and Judge Moore sac detaching gestational the nancy by regarding II, claim on the undue-burden uterine wall.” from the Taft Thus, is the opinion this right to 24 to 48 hours Approximately choose. at 505 n. respect to all medi- later, court with takes second

opinion of the woman VI, opinion cation, prostaglan- which is the “a except misoprostol, Part parts neces- dissenting and induces the contractions Judge part, din which of Moore products other expel the fetus and opinion sary constitutes the Judge McKeague’s Id.2 Side from the uterus.” conception for Part majority of the VI. opinion evidentiary We her state- matter. cite admissibility of the objects to the 1. The State undisputed by the State. that are ments Paul. The district Dr. Maureen declaration of admissibility yet has not ruled on court regulate or explicitly ban 2. The does position this testimony, and we take no her misoprostol, which has not prescription of bleeding sixty-three II, procedure up days’ gestation.” effects of the include Taft days average for an nine to sixteen and at protocol, F.3d 505-06. This new fever, may diar- cramping (1) and also include protocol, changed called the Schaff rhea, nausea, vomiting. Appendix Joint dosage drugs, amounts of the lowering the (FDA (“J.A.”) at 255 Patient Information of mifepristone mg amount from to 200 l).3 parties agree at Sheet mg increasing and the amount of miso- mortality mifepristone rate of abortions is (2) from .4 prostol mg mg; to .8 the num- 100,000, than 1 but debate per they less days drugs, ber of between the from two significance of this number. R. 144-1 (3) three; days to between one and ¶ (Paul 23), by Appellee Decl. as cited Br. administering misoprostol, method at 5. orally from at vaginally the clinic to at (4) home; days’ the number of gesta-

A U.S. manufacturer first filed New to which up tion the protocol could be Drug Application mifepristone successfully performed, days from to 63 (FDA Approval J.A. at Letter after the woman’s menstrual period last Consistent the three clinical trials (“LMP”). The protocol Schaff was the support applicаtion, submitted in protocol (FDA primary implemented at Planned Labeling Approved see J.A. at 192 following Parenthood’s Ohio clinics ap- 3), labeling “FDA let- approval proval of in 2000. appropriate ter indicated that ’treat- regimen mg ment was to administer 600 In Planned Parenthood’s Ohio clin- *6 orally mifepristone by mg followed 0.4 of to a ics shifted variation of the Schaff days misoprostol orally administered two protocol called for self-administration not to later and that was be i.e., misoprostol buccally, of the via gum forty-nine days’ gesta- administered after absorption. Because first clinical the trials II, at FDA tion.” 444 F.3d 505. The Taft initially for buccal administration approved under mifepristone’s application days LMP, went to 56 up Planned Parent- H, imposed § Subpart C.F.R. and protocol hood limited this new to that time eight heightened post- restrictions the on period. By additional trials had approval of drug distribution the “as- safety efficacy the and demonstrated of (FDA sure safe See J.A. at use.” LMP, absorption up days buccal to 63 2); Approval Letter 21 C.F.R. the prior to enforcement of the Act in ' § 314.520. began again Parenthood of- Following approval, FDA clin- additional the of a fering patients option medical development ical trials led to the of new See, up to days e.g., R. LMP. protocols drugs, for one administering the (S.E. 1Ex. Ohio Medical Abortion of mg mifepristone which called for “200 of 385-86) #2131-32). Protocol at ID (Page orally administered to three followed one days by mg of admin- Once a been misoprostol drug approved, later 0.8 has “employed vaginally” istered and could be the FDA does not ban the sort of “off-label by approved prior appeal. the been FDA for use abor- The were resubmitted exhibits tions, although approved it has been FDA parties for to the court for the district consid- the treatment of ulcers. motions; summary-judgment on eration reference, of to cite ease we continue for. 3. The main FDA documents were filed before Appendix prior extent that Joint to the plaintiffs’ on district court motion for parties support relied on the same exhibits in permanent injunction, then sub- which were summary judgment. of panel Appendix mitted as a in the to this Joint (mi- of govern law that the use RU-486 uses in its use” that fepristone) inducing for abortions. drug for uses clinics, i.e., prescribing approved not identified 2919.123(A) inor doses § (emphasis Ohio Rev.Code II, at 505. The 444 F.3d added). labels.4 physicians also bans Taft is dispute “[i]t stan- not State does “knowingly failfing] comply from in the United States practice any dard medical requirements of federal applicable prescribe FDA-approved physicians to follow-up for examinations pertain law that medical indica- and for drugs dosages or persons or for to whom for whom care approved— specifically (mifepristone) provided tions that were is for RU-486 FDA, par- abortion,” contemplated by inducing or even and re- purpose — sup- use the alternative ticularly quires prescribing mifepristone where physicians study.” R. adequate 133-1 ported by reports to submit under certain conditions. ¶ 12) (State’s 2919.123(B),(C). (Page § Physicians to Pis.’ Facts Id. who fail Resp. comply “guilty ID # with these terms will be an abortion-in- of unlawful distribution of States, however, may limit off-label drug, felony of the fourth de- ducing II, at 505. And use. Taft gree,” subject and also to administrative several members of March including penalties, profes- revocation Representatives just Ohio House of did 2919.123(E). § sional licenses. Id. that, introducing regu Bill 126 to House rule, “any law, Act defines “federal law” as late of RU-486 and to the distribution any regulation or United States or physician’s failure to criminalize follow drug approval drug letter of the food and regulations. approved by The Act was administration the United States into law the signed both chambers governs regulates use RU-486 24, 2004, stating on June in rele Governor inducing (mifepristone) purpose part: vant 2919.123(F)(1). §Id. abortions.” *7 ... person knowingly prescribe No shall affidavits Planned Parenthood submitted (mifepristone) to another for RU-486 averring employees from clinic that from inducing an ... purpose of mifepristone the introduction of physician, ... person unless the 2010, regardless until of United States physician criteria all the estab- in place, which variation was all of its satisfies physician law that a lished patients chose one dos- alternative federal satisfy in provide must order to RU-486 age protocol.5 over FDA R. regimens ¶ 5) abortions, (Brenner inducing for (mifepristone) at ID (Page 134-3 Decl. ¶ (Clawson 5) physician provides 2114); and the # R. RU-486 134-4 Decl. at #2150); person (mifepristone) (Page (Harrington the other ID R. 134-5 ¶ 5) 2180); (Page Decl. # purpose inducing abortion in ID R. 134-6 ¶ 2186).6 (Lonn 5) (Page all Decl. at ID # provisions accordance with offederal regulates marketing days using protocol 4. The LMP would be a non-FDA FDA and distri- manufacturers, drugs gestational bution of not the regarding pre- limits time and practices physicians treating patients. dosages sumably the would also mirror a non- However, apply can manufacturers protocol as a FDA result. drug's update approval FDA letter based on new studies. That has not been done in responds 6.The State that Plаnned Parent- this case. very may have recommended that hood well regimen. patients its choose an alternative protocol stops days 5. Because the FDA LMP, all of women between ¶ 12) 2151) (medical Planned Parenthood’s Ohio clinics offer ID (Page # abortions $410);7 through medical abortions the admin- cost R. 134-5 (Harrington Decl. at ¶ 8) (medical mifepristone 2180) misoprostol. (Page istration -with ID # clinic, $360); (Lonn ¶ Depending on the Planned 9) Parent- cost R. 134-6 Decl. at (medical #2186) reported percentage (Page hood of wom- ID abortions cost $450). choosing up en medical abortions to 63 plan Because the FDA does not days anywhere LMP in permit 2009 was between the self-administration of the miso- fifty-five fourteen percent pa- of its prostol, the FDA plan involves the extra (Bren- time, stress, tients who eligible. were R. 134-3 and expense of a third doc- ¶ 13) (four- 2115) ner Decl. at ID # (Page tor’s office parties visit. The dispute (Clawson percent); teen R. 134-4 Decl. at whether the medical community accepts ¶ 16) 2152) (Page (fifty-five ID # percent); protocols the alternative cause fewer ¶ 12) R. (Harrington 134-5 Decl. at (Page side effects or have a higher success rate 2181) ID # (twenty-two percent); R. 134-6 than the FDA-approved regimes. ¶ (Lonn 14) 2187) Decl. at (Page ID # points Parenthood also out sev- (twenty-three percent). When the total why eral reasons a woman may prefer a combined, numbers are Planned Parent- medical abortion surgical abortion, over a performed

hood a total of 6641 abortions aside from women particular health up days to 63 LMP in of which 2067 conditions that make one option medically medical, thirty-one percent. were preferable over another. See R. 144-1 ¶¶ (Paul 49-55) Planned Parenthood offers 2390-92) evidence that Decl. (Page ID # (Defs.’ protocols the newer have several advan- but see R. 139-1 Mot. to Strike at 11) 2337) tages FDA-approved over the protocol, (Page ID # (objecting to testimo- both in terms of ny women’s health and ac- subject this because Paul is not a FDA plan cess abortions. The does psychologist). We consider Paul’s testimo- permit the use 49 ny subject after on this only to the extent that it LMP, days many but women do not detect personal reflects experiences Paul’s in pro- pregnancy their until days after 49 viding LMP. abortions and the common sense ¶ (Paul 57) R. 144-1 (Page Decl. at ID observation that “women know their own # The FDA plan requires higher needs and desires and choose the abortion dosage of mifepristone, which Planned method that is best for them.” R. 144-1 ¶ (Paul 50) medically #2390). Parenthood asserts is not neces- Decl. (Page ID *8 sary (although it concedes the amount is argue State does not that such statements ¶ safe). Id. at Requiring higher Indeed, 58. the factually are false. one need not (three dosage mifepristone of pills instead be a psychologist to observe that medical one) of also raises the overall cost to the abortions ingesting involve medication patient by about for the two extra $150 rather than the insertion of instruments alone, mifepristone pills depending into the body woman’s and that medical in question on the clinic can amount to an abortions terminate the pregnancy in the in twenty-eight increase cost of forty- privacy to of a woman’s home through pro- (Brenner percent. two R. 134-3 Decl. at bleeding cess of in opposed to a clinical ¶ 9) 2114) (medical (Pagе ID # setting. abortions why We need not conclude wom- $545); (Clawson cost R. 134-4 might Decl. at en prefer procedure one over the ¶ (Clawson 12) 7. Clawson estimated an increase in cost (Page from ered. R. 134-4 Decl. ID $410 $700 to when #2151). the extra medication as well as the extra clinic visit are both consid- infections fol- from serious eight deaths of the differences acknowledge that to other to terminate of lowing are substan- the use procedures two the between vaginal may exist. of whom used seven preferences pregnancy, that such tial and R. 128- misoprostol. of the administration sta- competing its own The State offers A) (2/24/2010 Q (Page Mifeprex FDA & medical frequency of regarding tistics 1918).10 could not state The FDA ID # requires mandato- Ohio in Ohio. abortions mifepristone was the use of whether abortions, and the induced of ry reporting these deaths. Id. cause of reported of Health Department Ohio in were Ohio of abortions 17.7% surgi- were and 80% medical/non-surgical History B. Procedural ¶¶ 6-7) (Paulson Decl. cal. R. 128-16 it signed but before the Act was After common The most ID # (Page effect, sued the took medical/non-surgical abortion of method General, Governor, Attorney the Ohio Ohio mi- mifepristone and a combination was in 2004 prosecutors a class of local ¶ not State does at The Id. soprostol.8 enjoin to the enforcement seeking many medical abortions on how have data Par- beginning, Act. From an protocol or FDA-approved follow the Act is maintained that has enthood public In the version protocol. alternative independent rea- for four unconstitutional statis- of Health’s Ohio Department (1) unconstitutionally Act sons: that medical observed report, tical Ohio (2) right Act a woman’s vague; violates common” the “second most were abortions (3) an imposes bodily integrity; in Ohio and of abortion method burden on woman’s undue mifepristone] was ex- approval [of “[FDA] (4) abortion; the Act fails choose early many of the abortions pected to shift health protect a woman’s adequately non-surgical methods.” from at 3. To our Appellant Br. and life. Department Health, See Induoed Ohio chal- this is the first federal knowledge, (2008), available online AboRtions Ohio restricting the use of to state laws lenge http://www.odh.ohio.gov/healthstats/ Ap- reach the Court of mifepristone to vitalstats/abortionmainpage.aspx.9 22, 2004, September the district peals. On using medical abortions argues that State preliminary injunction en- court issued than are FDA-approved protocol safer entire Act on enforcement of the joining protocols. off-label Since those that use with plaintiffs’ likelihood of the success reports the FDA received implementation, did not to be a fact the State may mined this performed also be 8.Medical II, 444 F.3d at 512. misoprostol, contest. high using just a dose of Taft using drug methotrexate combination report, also same parties 2010 version misoprostol. The debate http://www.odh. efficacy publicly available online alter- safety, prevalence, and these abortions, dispute ohio.gov/healthstats/vitalstats/abortion but do medical native *9 percentage that the mainpage.aspx, indicates has misoprostol nor methotrexate that neither medical/non-surgical increased abortions in abor- approved the FDA for use been Parenthood has nationwide 20%. tions. Plannеd offering with policy medical abortions of not rejects the State’s ar- Parenthood medical 10. of the lack of methotrexate because safer, plan is gument that this shows the FDA safety. preliminary At the evidence on its explained by noting that the statistic is also plaintiffs' expert injunction hearing, the testi- regi- prevalence of the alternative the overall poses greater health fied that methotrexate Appellant protocols. Br. the FDA men over mifepristone when used for medi- than risks abortions, at & n. 8. previously deter- 15 we have cal and

499 (1) exception lack of an for the were: respect to the “Does mandate [the Act] Par in physicians perform health and life of woman. Planned Ohio who Region Taft, using mifepristone v. 337 do in compliance enthood Cincinnati so 2004) (S.D.Ohio (“Taft forty-nine day 1040 with the F.Supp.2d gestational limit /”).11 approval described the FDA letter?” (2) and “Does phy [the mandate that Act] injunction, appeal preliminary On of the perform sicians in Ohio who abortions us the district court erred in we held ing mifepristone compliance do so treating exception a health and life as a protocols the treatment dosage indica regula for an per requirement se drug’s tions described in the final printed constitutional, tion to be but nonetheless labeling?” Planned Parenthood Cincin in preliminary affirmed the issuance of a Strickland, Region 406, nati v. necessity of a junction excep on the health (6th Cir.2008) (“Strickland ”). 412 I II, tion in case. 444 F.3d 502. this Taft light Supreme In Court’s then-re Supreme Ohio Court accepted the Ayotte cent decision in v. Planned Parent certified questions and answered both in England, hood Northern New Cordray affirmative. v. Planned Par 961, 320, (2006), 163 L.Ed.2d 812 Region, enthood Cincinnati 122 Ohio St.3d however, 361, (2009). wе remanded consideration of 911 N.E.2d 871 On August injunction whether the could be narrowed permanent injunction we vacated the prohibit enforcement of the uncon and remanded the case to the district court portions plain stitutional or whether the Cordray instance, consider in the first arguments tiffs’ other constitutional leaving previously war intact the pre affirmed liminary injunction ranted broad relief. “per previous our opin ion.” Planned Parenthood Sw. Ohio Re remand, On the district court granted Strickland, (6th gion v. Fed.Appx. 331 387 plaintiffs’ summary motion for judg Cir.2009) (“Strickland II”) (unpublished vagueness ment on the first issue of order). permanently enjoined the Act in its entire remand, ty separate ground. on this Planned Par parties On cross-moved for Region Taft, enthood Cincinnati v. summary judgment, the plaintiffs again on (S.D.Ohio 2006) F.Supp.2d (“Taft their first claim of vagueness and the de- ”). III court district held the Act fendants on all four claims.12 The district ambiguous compliance ‍‌‌‌​‌​​‌​‌​‌‌‌‌‌​​‌‌​‌​​‌‌‌‌​​​​‌‌​​‌​‌‌‌​​​‌​​​‍was on whether court plaintiffs’ denied the motion and FDA-approved protocol granted with the was re the defendants’ motion with re- quired or whether per spect plaintiffs’ vagueness off-label use was to the challenge, appealed, bodily integrity missible. Defendants and we challenge, and undue bur- sponte questions sua certified two law den on the to choose challenge. R. (D. Order). questions the Ohio Court. The Ct. The district 5/23/11 'necessary, appropriate 11. Bob Taft was the Governor of Ohio at the that are medical time, par- succeeded Ted Strickland. The judgment, preservation for the of the life or ” stipulated have ties since to the dismissal of health of the mother.' Appellant the Governor. Br. at 3 n. 2. The Dewine, Region Cincinnati No. 1:04-CV- Attorney lead defendаnt is now Ohio’s Gener- (S.D.Ohio WL at *1 Feb. al, Mike DeWine. 2011) II, (quoting F.3d Pur- Taft prelimi- suant to the district court’s revised remand, 12. On the district court also clarified *10 nary injunction, may the Act now be enforced scope preliminary injunction the in all other circumstances. prohibit “only enforcement of the Act insofar prohibits as it off-label 500 just there is no genuine expressly determine that remained

court held there delay appellate review.” Gen. plain reason regarding material fact issues Inc., v. F.3d GenCorp, Inc. 23 Acquisition, to a respect undue burden claim tiffs’ (6th Cir.1994) (internal 1022, quota- 1026 at 26-27. exception. Id. woman’s health omitted). tion marks and alterations We the dis request, At Planned Parenthood’s novo review to the district court’s apply de judgment final under trict court entered 54(b) and review inquiry on conclusions on first Rule of Civil Procedure Federal court’s abuse of discretion the district summary judg for claims for which the three delay. no just reason for granted and determination was ment for defendants pending Id. at proceedings stayed remaining Southwest appeal. Planned Parenthood inquiry the district The first —whether 1:04-CV-493, DeWine, Region v. No. Ohio judgment to one or more court entered as (S.D.Ohio 4063999, Sept.

2011 WL at *3 than all of Planned Parenthood’s but fewer 2011) (“DeWine ”). 13, appeal This fol parties a difficult question. claims—is lowed. letter asked to submit additional were issue, review, on this on de novo briefs II. JURISDICTION remaining agree with them that we The district had federal sub court are in fact from the one separate claims Par jurisdiction over Planned ject matter remaining claim below. claims under 28 enthood’s constitutional tests to apply many Courts different however, § jurisdiction, 1331. Our U.S.C. whether claims exist multiple determine jurisdic have straightforward. is less Wе 54(b), purposes of Rule and we for final § 28 1291 to review tion under U.S.C. no previously recognized have that there is Typically, orders of the district court. “ ” accepted for determin ‘generally test’ summary grants when a district court ing separate what claim. constitutes claims, the on some not all judgment but Acquisition, (quoting 23 F.3d at 1028 Gen. for appellate is not final order decision R. Mil 10 Charles Wright, Alan Arthur However, Rule purposes. under Federal Mary Kay Kane, ler & Practice Federal 54(b), Procedure the district court of Civil (3d ed.1998)); § see 2657 and Procedure summary may certify partial grant Wetzel, 424 Liberty Mut. v. also Ins. Co. “if the judgment appeal for immediate 737, 1202, 4, n. 47 U.S. 743 no expressly court determines that there is (1976) adopt a (declining L.Ed.2d 435 54(b).

just delay.” reason for Fed.R.Civ.P. test). definitive Our circuit has tradition 54(b) improper, If Rule certification is test, ally applied “operative facts” jurisdiction be no lack because there would 54(b) Rule “[a] which defines ‘claim’under from could parties final order which the facts which aggregate operative ‘[as] appeal. Express take an Fed. Lowery v. to a give rise enforceable (6th Cir.2005); 817, Corp., 426 F.3d see 820 if party courts’ even has raised differ Apart also Justice Pendleton Place Inc. v. GenCorp, ent theories of relief.” (6th Cir.1994). ments, 40 F.3d (6th Corp., 390 Cir. Olin F.3d 2004) Proper (quoting under Rule Acquisition, certification Gen.

54(b) “First, 1028), denied, cert. two-step process. (2005); expressly

district court must direct 163 L.Ed.2d 320 McIn Cincinnati, entry judgment tyre of final to one or more v. First Nat’l Bank (6th Cir.1978). than all have parties but fewer the claims or in F.2d We Second, held, brings only example, party a case. district court must that a *11 54(b) one “claim” under Rule when he (holding vagueness facial and First raises both a Title VII retaliation claim Amendment overbreadth challenge to claim, сlaim); and state-law breach-of-contract same statute were one Samaad v. Dallas, alleged 925, (5th for the breach City where basis 940 F.2d 930-32 Cir.1991) the Title VII claim was the same retaliato (holding equal-protection and ry act employer. Lowery, takings-clause 426 F.3d challenges separate were at 821. reached a similar claims), We result abrogated grounds on other as Acquisition, where General the “claims”— recognized by Missionary Rosedale Bap fraud, fiduciary duty, breach of negli tist Church v. New City, Orleans 641 F.3d gence required proof (5th of the same facts 86, Cir.2011). Jordan, 88-89 In —all leading up to the same hostile takeover example, the Tenth Circuit heavily relied functionally separate and were theories for on the overlap traditional between facial recovering injury. for the same Gen. Ac vagueness and overbreadth challenges. quisition, 23 F.3d at 1029. The court arguments treated the part the same claim because both “involve[d] apply “opera-

We are mindful not to facts, the same nucleus of ... requirefd] tive broadly, facts” test too however. In analysis similar of the terms and reach of Sears, Mackey, Roebuck & Co. v. the challenged provision[,]” and if raised (1956), 100 L.Ed. 1297 on separate appeals, require would the Supreme appellate ju- Court sustained go court “to over ground the same that it risdiction over a dismissed Sherman Act Jordan, had covered in the appeal.” first claim though part even it “rest[ed] (internal 425 F.3d at 827-28 quotation some of the facts that involved in” [we]re omitted). marks claims, pending state-law including a claim for unlawful destruction of one the same We view these cases as informative and businesses that served the basis of the largely consistent with our approach today, Sherman Act claim. Id. at 437 n. 76 but we adopt decline to a new test for applied S.Ct. 895. We principle this same analyzing multiple challenges facial to the GenCorp, where we concluded same Statutory statute. challenges will aggregate set of operative support facts to certainly all contain at least one common a claim of liability CERCLA contribution operative' fact—the passage of the chal- ’ wholly was distinct from the facts neces- lenged law. But aggregate of opera- sary to support the claim of breach tive facts will necessarily just include contract, despite insurance the relationship challenged rather, existence; law’s of both claims to the same improper toxic must also relating' consider the facts to the disposal. waste GenCorp, 390 F.3d impact law’s on similar or distinct constitu- We'have not addressed the application rights. tional A single law that causes 54(b) multiple Rule injuries constitutional distinct to distinct constitutional claims against the same statute rights before. is not so easily analogized to a sin- have, Other circuits although gle sometimes retaliatory employment causing action See, applying different tests. e.g., injury Jordan one that can be through vindicated (10th Cir.2005) Pugh, v. 425 F.3d multiple channels of Lowery, relief.13 See Indeed, judicata ity”-and in the context of res broadly not consider them too or too inquiry regarding “operative where a narrowly identifying similar when individual transac- made, tions, frequently single facts” is the Seventh operative Circuit defined as “a core of has give remedy.” advised that “courts should examine the facts which rise to a Andersen (7th specific- Chrysler Corp., 'facts’ of a case at a sufficient level of 852-53 *12 502 a that make medical abortion the- conditions (considering plaintiffs F.3d at 821

426 abortion, or an alter- for the than a “seek[ing] to recover safer all ories as proto- injury.”). safer than the FDA underlying protocol native same challenge based asserting col. Count mind, turn to the claims in we that With choose, right to the burden on on Here, poten- there are four in this case. and in- whether the added costs considers disqualify the all seek to tial claims FDA-protocol, of the conveniences admittedly and unconstitutional Act as entirely in certain option lack of a medical declaratory injunctive and the same seek contexts, prevent large fraction of will However, aggregate opera- of relief. exercising from their constitutional women rise to each give facts that tive inju- alleged right to choose abortion. sufficiently sep- are rights to be vindicated entirely separate affect classes ries despite the jurisdiction arate to confer may placed those whose lives be women: alleges 1 overlap. some Count presence of (Count 3) by the Act and those at risk vague. unconstitutionally Act is to choose abortion will be whose decision right physicians is the right at issue by the extra im- unduly burdened hurdles criminal of what behavior is to have notice (Count 4). by the Act posed Whether Because they prosecuted. can be before with health issues are burdened women inqui- the relevant legal question, this is the Act bears no .relation to whether the would physician a reasonable ry is whether with access issues will be bur- women performing an certain acts when know that dened; a сonstitutional violation proof of 2 or not. Count are criminal will, rights of the former de- against the right to the Act violates the alleges that entirely separate facts from those pend on obtaining the women bodily integrity of necessary prove against a violation necessary to estab- The facts abortions. latter. proving include that the this violation lish intru- physical forcible Act will result operative facts nec- reviewing After body into a woman’s sions the state claim, essary give rise to relief in each the state their will and whether against sufficiently that their differences we hold for an invasion. compelling has a need such outweigh they have in common. Be- what no relation to whether Count bears count involves distinct facts cause each notice gives physicians

Act constitutional relating separate injuries, each count is criminal conduct. Rule separate purposes claim for and 4 are the most similar Counts 3 54(b). they allege violations of the both inquiry The second is also satisfied imposed an undue not to have burden independently re here. The district court although But the abortion decision. 54(b) request for Rule certifica viewed analyze apply legal the same framework deter (and expressly tion and issued order claims, injuries both constitu- vindicated) mining just was no reason for there rights to are distinct tional be directing entry delay expressly from other and from Counts each or more but fewer judgment final as to one argument, the health and life Count DeWine, than all claims this case. an un- imposes considers whether the 4063999, *3; GenCorp, see burden on certain women with medical WL due Wright, Cir.1996); judicata (discussing "claims” res see also 18 Charles Alan pur- Arthur R. Miller & Edward H. Cоoper, Federal poses). 2002) (2d § ed. Practice and Procedure explicitly bility determinations, at 442. The district court the weighing of the *13 weighed evidence, the non-exhaustive list of factors drawing and the of legitimate provided determining we have for whether inferences jury from the facts are func tions, just delay. not judge.” to find reason Those fac- those of a Anderson v. Inc., 242, Liberty Lobby, 255, tors include: 477 U.S. 106 2505, (1986). S.Ct. 91 202 L.Ed.2d (1) Sum relationship adjudi- the between the mary judgment is appropriate only if (2) “the claims; unadjudicated and the cated movant shows genuine that there is no possibility the that the need for review dispute as to any material fact and the might might or not be mooted future judgment movant is entitled to as a matter (3) court; developments in the district 56(a). of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. possibility the reviewing court might obliged to be consider the same (4) time; presence

issue second IV. VAGUENESS CLAIM absence of claim or counterclaim Parenthood’s first against which could result in set-off challenge is well-suited for summary judg (5) final; judgment sought to be made ment because it involves question delay, miscellaneous factors such as eco- of statutory interpretation. An Act crimi considerations, solvency nomic and shor- nalizing certain procedures will trial, tening frivolity the time of of com- not be unconstitutionally vague if it “pro claims, peting expense, and the like. vides ordinary doctors of intelligence a Corrosioneering, Thyssen Inc. v. Envtl. reasonable opportunity to know what Inc., 1279, (6th Sys., 807 F.2d 1283 Cir. prohibited[,] ... sets forth relatively clear guidelines prohibited conduet[,] as to sepa- The district court considered the provides objective criteria to evaluate claims, of rateness the unlikelihood whether a performed doctor a prohib has that the need for appellate review would Carhart, procedure.” ited Gonzales v. 550 be mooted future developments, the 124, 149, 1610, U.S. 127 S.Ct. 167 L.Ed.2d duplicate unlikelihood of of review related (2007) (internal quotation 480 marks omit issues, claims, off-setting the lack of and ted). Given the English constraints possibility appeal immediate language, law need not contain “meticu infirmity. expense would shorten the time and specificity” lous to avoid constitutional trial. The district court’s balancing of yned City Rockford, v. 408 Gra these issues was not an abuse discre- 104, 110, 2294, U.S. 92 S.Ct. 33 L.Ed.2d Therefore, tion. agree that certifica- (1972). 222 It reasonably must “define[ ] 54(b) tion under Rule was proper this the line between potentially criminal con case, jurisdiction and we have to entertain duct on the one hand and lawful abortion appeal. other,” Gonzales, 149, on the U.S. 127 S.Ct. 1610. The statute also must be

III. STANDARD OF REVIEW “precisely highest read court of the We review de novo a district interpreted Wainwright State has it.” v. Stone, grant summary 21, court’s judgment. Int’l 414 U.S. Cummins, Inc., (1973) (internal

Union 483 L.Ed.2d quotation (6th Cir.2006). omitted). so, In doing we highest review the marks A state’s court is evidence and draw all inferences “the final arbiter of what is state law.” Co., light most favorable to Planned Parent West v. Am. Tel. & Tel. (1940). nonmoving party.

hood as the Id. “Credi- 85 L.Ed. 139 initially agree that the the State Ohio Su- court held The district unconstitutionally vague interpretation preme explicit because Court’s Act was was defined law” Cordray any vague- “federal Act in resolved facial term certainty provide notice with sufficient have might ness concerns we had. III, 459 prohibited. of what the primary to four points Taft agreed We that each at 637. F.Supp.2d Cordray argues opinion areas it “contrary, yet plausi- party presented had leaves unresolved. The district court re- *14 blе, in language of the the interpretations,” jected unsup- all of issues as either these prescribing mi- that doctors requiring scienter, by ported by Cordray or cured ” with ‘federal law.’ fepristone “comply (D. agree. and we See R. 161 Ct. 5/23/11 I, at 411. The Strickland 13-21). at Order language requiring the as State viewed First, argues Planned Parenthood FDA-approved compliance proto- the with Cordray holding by reached its because in print- limits the final gestational col and printed final incorporating parts of the viewed labeling; ed (“FPL”) letter, labeling approval into the only requiring compliance language the as ninety all in plus documents submitted H Subpart restrictions ad- eight the support approval of the letter must simi- qualifications pre- to dressing physician larly including incorporated, be documents at 411. drug. Id. We therefore scribe the same meaning. with unclear This dilemma Supreme clarify, Court asked the Ohio to presented Supreme was to the Ohio Court Supreme and Court held the Ohio however, Cordray, rejected. in and The Act, “a physician may provide under the Supreme explicitly Ohio Court discussed purpose inducing the of requirements FDA-approval what the let- patient’s only through 49th abortion incorporated why; ter from the FPL and day pregnancy by using of and FDA of dosage protocols approval mifepri- indications and treatment “the based its by the in expressly approved FDA stone on use as recommended in the its drug’s labeling incorporat- final printed labeling text, thereby incorporating that drug approval Cordray, ed letter.” approval.” Cordray, text into its of letter light at In of clarifi- N.E.2d 879.14 this 911 N.E.2d at The 878. recommended use cation, held the district court that the Act “gestational in the FPL consisted longer unconstitutionally vague was no be- limit, indications, or dosage pro- treatment person cause a reasonable would know approved by tocols” the FDA. Id. at 877. (D. prohibited. what conduct was R. 161 that, any ambiguity Lest there be Ct. Order at 5/23/11 Supreme specifically Ohio Court stated that “[a]dministering mifepristone to in- simple Supreme fact that the Ohio beyond day duce an the 49th of adopted the State’s of interpretation pregnancy,” “[ujsing any or other dosage the Act not mean that Act is not does However, unconstitutionally vague. protocol” we indication treatment other Cordray opinion only plu plurality opinion 14. A offers The lead well. still useful however, majority justices joined guidance likely rality; a state court is on how statute, and, syllabus judgment, clearly interpret as a and the which a state federal law, printed obligated are incorporated labeling's gesta interpreting the final court state we West, limits, respect protocols, dosage guidance. U.S. tional treatment Cf. (counseling approval indications into the FDA letter. Cor 61 S.Ct. 179 federal dray, accepted parties additionally courts consider rules 911 N.E.2d both opinion elucidating cite plurality opinion as the of inferior courts when state state Court, law). Supreme rely Ohio and will on it as FDA-approved protocol, than the “would unconstitutionally make the Act vague on drug approv- not be accordance with the its face when the Act is otherwise clear. al letter” would be violation of the This argument presented was also and ad Act. Id. at 878.15 Planned Parenthood’s dressed the Ohio Court. Cor ability point to other documents on dray that despite noted two subsequent may ‍‌‌‌​‌​​‌​‌​‌‌‌‌‌​​‌‌​‌​​‌‌‌‌​​​​‌‌​​‌​‌‌‌​​​‌​​​‍the FDA have also which “based its revisions, none had gestational altered the approval mifepristone” phrase lifts one limits, indications, dosage or treatment Cordray opinion from the out of its other- protocols “originally approved by the wise unmistakable context. A reasonable FDA.” 911 N.E.2d at If and when physician would not think that he had to the FDA makes revisions to approved ninety scour the other documents cited in regimen in FPL render Cor- letter, approval mostly consisted dray interpretation ’s vague, the Act of studies and evidence in support ap- challenge future will be better suited to *15 proving the drug, to determine whether reviewing changes such rather than our planned mifepristone his use of would be engaging speculative guesses today. legal. Fourth, Planned points Parenthood to Second, Planned Parenthood ar supposedly other vague present terms still gues that even if only incorpo the FPL is Act, such as “criteria” “provi- rated, the Act vague is still because the sions,” claiming that these terms make it documents, FPL itself consisted of four impossible to ascertain what is prohibited. which contain internal contradictions that Appellant Br. at 36. But Cordray made might physicians. confuse For example, physician clear what a must to do comply Planned Parenthood that *16 1826, 16 757, 771-72, (1990) (“This L.Ed.2d 86 S.Ct. 2841, U.S. 111 L.Ed.2d 224 S.Ct. (forcible (1966) test con blood-alcohol 908 bodily integrity of has been embod notion individual’s risk specific stitutional because informed con requirement that ied injury low and state’s interest of trauma or for medical generally required sent is high). treatment,” evidence also has interest but state akin to a consent). that the Act in this case is arguеs life and informed intrusion because women physical forcible why Planned Although we understand a medical between 50 who desire approach requiring this Parenthood took — undergo days LMP are “forced” to and 63 state government compelling to show a mifep unavailability of surgery due to for the Act would relieve interest days. Appellant during those See ristone obligation Parenthood of its show (arguing Br. at 44 to choose an right undue burden on the “forced,” being performed despite are unconvincing. argument abortion —this consent, the woman would patient because course, scrutiny, longer ap of no “Strict for its had a medical abortion but have legislation.” Women’s plies to abortion unavailability). 436, 444 Corp. Taft, v. Med. Prof'l Cir.2003). (6th has Supreme Court Amendment The Fourteenth even regulations, clear that abortion undoubtedly liberty as a interest made protects to a certain kind of limiting intru those access against physical forcible right analyzed under the undue- are body by government. procedure, Ro sions of the the classic 165, framework and not burden California, chin v. 342 U.S. (1952) (state discussed 205, framework physical-intrusion 72 S.Ct. 96 L.Ed. 183 say just easily as above. We could forcibly pump detainee’s stomach cannot of occasionally scrutiny a claim that release Bodily integrity with strict claims have strict-scrutiny lower given private review the threatened individual’s been information Columbus, City 136 integrity). courts. v. security bodily Kallstrom personal 1055, (6th Cir.1998) (reviewing 1064 F.3d examining abortion ban “forces” a cases for partial-birth bodily-integrity claims In light D E she the abortion context. woman to have a & abortion when these (the banned) abortion, abortion-specific applying D X cases the undue- may prefer & framewоrk, burden there is little constitu- negate that does not the consent the but support tional for Planned Parenthood’s give physi- must in order for her woman attempt to return balancing to the stricter If perform procedure. cian standard used in bodily-integri- traditional abortion method is so undesirable available Thus, ty argument claims. to make the woman choose to have no unduly impact Ohio restrictions a woman’s all, undue-burden frame- abortion at right bodily claim, integrity is a viable appropriate remedy work remains the but, purely from a legal perspective, the addressing that concern. analysis map will the undue-burden frame- however, emphasize, policies We re work set out in Planned Parenthood’s third stricting impact a method of abortion do claim infirmity. of constitutional bodily right integrity. woman’s “As far 1891, recog back as VI. UNDUE-BURDEN CLAIM sacred, right nized that no is held more Dissent) (Judge Moore’s Partial carefully guarded[,] is more than the “ every possession individual to the law designed ‘[A] to further the State’s person, control of his own free from all interest in fetal life imposes an un others, restraint or interference of unless due burden on the woman’s decision before unquestionable authority clear and viability’ fetal is unconstitutional.” Sten Columbus, City law.” Kallstrom v. Carhart, berg (6th (internal Cir.1998) F.3d (2000) 147 L.Ed.2d (quot omitted); quotation marks and alterations ing Casey, 505 U.S. at Hoben, *17 845, Soper see also v. 852 ... “[U]ndue burden is shorthand for the (6th Cir.1999), denied, 1262, cert. 530 U.S. conclusion that a regulation state has the (2000). 2719, 120 147 S.Ct. L.Ed.2d 984 purpose placing or effect of a substantial Government restrictions on abortions are a path obstacle in the seeking of a woman an form of interference with the to bodi abortion of a Casey, nonviable fetus.” ly integrity and contrоl over an individual’s 877, at summary U.S. S.Ct. 2791. On person. Planned Parenthood Pa. v. Se. judgment, we review the evidence in the of 833, 896, Casey, 505 U.S. 112 S.Ct. light most favorable to Planned Parent (1992) (“The 120 L.Ed.2d 674 effect of evidence, viewing hood. When thus I regulation a protected state on woman’s would hold that the State has failed to liberty doubly deserving scrutiny is of in genuine demonstrate absence of a dis case, such a as the State has touched not pute of material fact regarding whether only upon private sphere family of the imposes the Act a substantial in obstacle upon very bodily integrity but of path seeking Ohio women to obtain woman.”) Cruzan, pregnant (citing 497 an a abortion of nonviable fetus. Sum 281, 110 at U.S. mary judgment for the State was therefore inappropriate as to this claim. By making bodily-integrity a claim part claim, A parcel right-to-privacy and with a number of adverse effects17 of the Act (1) Casey progeny proper undisputed. requires and its serve as the are The Act addi- Although Casey "purpose attempt argue discusses the Parenthood does not that challenged legislation, purpose passing effect” Ohio had an illicit the Act regulation pro- argues any hood visits, increasing potentially clinical tional of abor- (2) “commonly a used method” inconvenience; hibits the Act re- costs and obstacle and therefore tion is a substantial dosage mifepristone, quires higher The State ar- imposes an undue burden. (3) costs; the Act and increasing also banning particular gues regulations to women unavailable makes only if method are a substantial obstacle LMP, functioning days and 63 between 50 majority” of they to inhibit the “vast serve medical abortions for as a total ban “most by banning such аs surgery as the leaving women and these obtaining for those procedure common” terminating pregnan- their only option abortions. 27-28) (D. Order cies. R. 161 Ct. 5/23/11 #2654-55). first two ef- (Page ID first addressed dosage and treatment particular fects relate to the on a method complete bans outright constitute an Missouri and do not Central protocols method. The dis- any particular Danforth, v. 96 S.Ct. ban on (1976). “may in- struck that these L.Ed.2d 788 trict court concluded Danforth un- procedure,” banning but down a law “the use of method the cost of the crease making the record shows is the one most “the incidental effect which Casey, der commonly nationally physicians used expensive pro- more it more difficult or safer, and is in- after the first trimester which enough cannot be cure an abortion mortality, to maternal than respect with Id. at 28. The third validate” the law. pregnancy until limit, even continuation effect, to a gestational amounts normal childbirth.” Id. abortions for women total ban on medical Danforth, Casey did not overrule days 50 and 63 LMP. The dis- between interpreted Casey clarify have not an trict court concluded this was viability, question is ing that before undisputed “it is undue burden because large ‘in a fraction of the cases “whether ability impact Act does not the[ ] that the relevant, operate it will [the ban] safe, commonly method of to choose a used to a woman’s as a substantial obstacle abortion,” i.e., abortion. Id. The ” undergo choice to an abortion.’ Women’s meaning of “substantial parties debate Voinovich, 130 F.3d Corp. Med. obstacle,” proscriptions I discuss Prof'l (6th Cir.1997) (quoting Casey, 505 turn, meth- starting each in total *18 2791), denied, 895, at 112 cert. U.S. S.Ct. days LMP. past od ban for women 49 1347, 1036, 140 523 118 S.Ct. L.Ed.2d U.S. Outright (1998).18 A. Ban on Medical Abortions 496 Days

During LMP 50 to 63 method bans only previability The other explicitly has not involve Supreme Supreme Court reviewed Court partial-birth techniques a total method ban consti- abortion defined when Stenberg, similarly In tutes a obstacle” to woman’s second trimester. “substantial Danforth, Supreme held that rights. Planned Parent- Court exercise of her 18. Casey case and solely the Act’s effects. The itself was not a method-ban and focuses solely analyzed that the Act focuses on abortions as fact whether certain restrictions such (and mifepristone) off-label uses of not other spousal-notification informed-consent eyebrows, certainly but we will raises some Casey, laws constituted an undue burden. purpose presume a harmful without evi not 895, at 112 S.Ct. 2791. 505 U.S. an illicit motive. v. Arm dence of Mazurek 968, 972, strong, 138 520 U.S. 117 S.Ct. (1997). L.Ed.2d 162

509 procedures only was the available method in because dilation evacuation Ken E”) (“D commonly tucky, making prohibition were “the most used thus & its ‘almost performing previability second a prohibition post-first method tantamount’ to abortions,” Missouri’s ban im trimester trimester abortions.” Id. 526-27. In at Voinovich, upon “an undue burden a woman’s posed we struck down Ohio statute if right to make an abortion decision” it banning partial-birth impos abortions as Stenberg, covered D & E abortions. 530 ing an undue burden because the statute’s 945-46, at 120 S.Ct. 2597. The U.S. method, plain meaning included the D & E scope issue in the case was the “the most common method of abortion in if statute —the state conceded that Voinovich, the second trimester.” 130 D E statute banned & abortions and not 201; F.3d at see also Family Northland just the smaller subclass of dilation and Clinic, Cox, Planning Inc. v. 487 F.3d (“D X”) abortions, extraction & before via (6th Cir.2007) (striking Michigan down imposed an bility, the statute undue bur law because unclear if statute D banned & den on the to choose abortion. Id. at abortions, E prohibit “would several 938, 120 S.Ct. 2597. pre-viability of the most common abortion methods”), denied, cert. 552 U.S. Gonzales, upheld In (2008). 872, 873, 169 L.Ed.2d S.Ct. In a federal abortion ban because the statute Medical, validity Women’s we affirmed the (called only D & X prohibited abortions of a statute after determining that the ban opinion), “intact D & E” abortions in the D X applied to & abortions. “[B]ecause plaintiffs and the had failed to show “that the Act does not restrict the most com the Act would be unconstitutional monly procedure used for second trimes large fraction of relevant cases.” Gon ter ... we conclude that it does zales, S.Ct. 1610. impose an undue burden on a woman’s Again, Attorney General conceded that right to abort a non-viable fetus.” Wom impose “the Act would an undue if burden Med., en’s 453. it covered standard D & E.” Id. at Danforth, Unlike “the that, What these cases tell us is at the allows, [Partial-Birth Ban] Abortion least, banning statutes the most common means, among commonly other used and of an impose method an unconsti- method,” generally accepted a method that tutional rights. burden on a woman’s was almost identical from the patient’s engage cases do not in a strict mathemati- method, perspective to the it banned “so inquiry percentages identify cal does not construct a substantial obstacle to nor, frequence of a facial procedure, right.” the abortion Id. at challenges, they do demand affidavits from *19 indicating they women would not ob- tain an abortion via some other lawful This court has also addressed method method if D & E abortions were made in Danforth, bans similar to the ones Sten safely presume unavailable. can that a We berg, and In Gonzales. Schroer Wolfe (6th banning Cir.1976), statute the most common method ing, 541 F.2d 526 we group abortions for certain of women Kentucky invalidated a statute that was “virtually imposes a substantial obstacle on the abili- ‍‌‌‌​‌​​‌​‌​‌‌‌‌‌​​‌‌​‌​​‌‌‌‌​​​​‌‌​​‌​‌‌‌​​​‌​​​‍identical” to the one struck ty in of a woman to obtain an abortion. But down because the “instant Danforth method, any record reflects that the saline at that does not tell us whether a ban on statutory prohibition, the enactment of the common method could not also constitute a 510 at forceps, evacuating the fetus. Id. Casey.19 fraction” under

“large 135-36, 127 S.Ct. 1610. The decision heavily the use of The State relies D a D & X abortion or perform whether majority” Supreme in phrase “vast appears largely up E to the & abortion describing when jurisprudence Court patient. at suggest any physician and not Id. common method to most long so method can be banned primary common difference 127 S.Ct. 1610. The In method remains. the most common of the fetus—D related to the destruction Gonzales, Supreme Court stated X abortions resemble a live birth be- & D & X abortions “cannot be the ban on entirely removed almost cause the fetus is the re invalid on its face” because held and terminated outside the womb rather “prohibit the vast quirement would not (or before) during even than termination Gonzales, majority of D & E abortions.” itself. procedure But at 1610. we 550 U.S. S.Ct. method, D frequency of the & X of the factual distinctions must be mindful statistically any between such cases and ours. Neither unclear with cer although have addressed a Supreme nor the Court tainty, very infrequent also relative to was demonstrably preferred ban on a method Supreme D & E abortions. The standard similarly by, example, for a third of situat opinion the district court Court referenced women, when that method particularly ed facts, many for of its which noted that remaining highly dissimilar from the D X reported most doctors & abortions may a method not be the methods. Such percent in all D occurring five to fifteen common,” easily could clas “most but one E D E as a procedures; & & abortions sify “large a third as a fraction” or decline whole, depending gestational age, on the remaining to label the method a “vast ma eighty-five ninety- constituted between to the jority.” points When Gonzales exis percent five of second-trimester abortions. “commonly generally tence of a used and Am. v. See Planned Parenthood Fed’n of accepted a reason for sustain method” as (N.D.Cal. Ashcroft, F.Supp.2d ban, in ing language we must read this 2004), Gonzales, as cited 550 U.S. being dis the context of the methods proce S.Ct. The banned 165, 127 cussed. Id. at S.Ct. (at most) dure therefore affected four Gonzales, Supreme high- In Court percent gestational teen of women in those D E lighted the similarities between & infrequency pro ranges. Given the abortions, D X abortions and & being analyzed in cedure Gonzales and E” opinion even calls “intact D & abortions cases, subsequent language Gon they “D E because are a & variation.” suggest zales does not that the Gonzales, would reach the same result for a 1610. Both D X and D & E abortions & thirty-one per ban of method chosen “general steps”: dilating involve same abortions, particu cent of first-trimester cervix, inserting instruments larly where the differences the available woman, into the the woman under placing sedation, make it to as- general inserting procedures anesthesia or difficult us large 19. The State the fact that wе later & X abortions constituted a fraction seizes on *20 (because just repeated language had held that it did common[]” the "most Gonzales Voinovich, not). proce- discussing when on D & X See also 130 F.3d at 201 a state ban dures, Med., ("[I]t F.3d at but follows that a statute which bans a see Women’s procedure engaged solely the task of common abortion would constitute were in statuto- construction, burden."). ry determining not in whether D an undue

5H them, interchangea- anxiety pain the are extra it caused sume that methods as of female. perspective conclusively from the a establishing ble as matter of law that the method ban in this case does not mind, in I turn to the facts of With that a impose large substantial obstacle in a in light this case. When viewed most fraction of women. But women deterred Parenthood, favorable to Planned the evi- by any the ban who decided not to obtain that medical abortions suggests dence unlikely abortion at all would be to return abortions on surgical were elected over to Planned Parenthood’s clinics volun- average by thirty-one percent about give testimony. teer their names or patients in 2009. Planned Parenthood’s that Parent- The State reminds us importantly, majority points More provider in hood is not the no case either from our court or the Su- number, Ohio, but even the State’s that requiring affirmative testimo- preme cases in 2008 were 17.7% of medical/non- ny they from individual women that would And, percentage. surgical, is a non-trivial not have obtained an abortion but for the very study by cited the State for its ban to establish that a total method ban statistic, Department of Health the Ohio a imposes substantial obstacle. See Sten- approval mifepri- that FDA observed (not berg, 530 U.S. expected many to shift stone “was сonsidering’whether just women could as early surgical non-surgi- abortions from easily using obtain an abortion alternative Department cal methods.” Ohio banned); if D E method & method were (2008), Health, Induced Abortions in Ohio Danforth, 428 U.S. at 96 S.Ct. 2831 http://www.odh.ohio. available online at (same method).20 for saline amniocentesis gov/healthstats/vitalstats/abortion challenge Planned Parenthood’s facial Indeed, mainpage.aspx. Act, which in was first filed 2004 be- category percent. had increased to 20 same enforced, Act fore the was ever does not expect Planned Parent- We should rely as-applied testimony on the sort of present specific hood to numbers of women the dissent seeks. As discussed surgical who would not have obtained above, imagine it is hard to how Planned abortion at all had the medical abortion gather Parenthood would even such data. matter, an initial been unavailable. As difficulty present many That will be Act was not enforced Ohio until Febru- cases and cannot be a reasoned basis for ary 2011 when the district court clarified ignoring potential burdens of the injunction. scope preliminary rights. on a woman’s constitutional suspended provi- Nor has the Court defined of medical at its clinics sion Ohio requiring “substantial obstacle” as (2d See, January e.g., R. 153-1 showing ¶ 3) total obstacle. Just ex- ID # (Page Brenner Decl. at amining physical differences between then, Planned Parenthood had to Since methods, our common tells sense us deny medical abortions to between 50 and (Pis.’ proce- the differences between the Inj. 100 women. R. 153 Mem. Prelim. 4) #2516). perspective from the of the woman (Page majority ID dures abortions, Surgical are substantial. fixates on the 'affidavits of nine of those they suggests, require surgery, the name women who testified that thereafter abortion, physically procedure, including invasive despite obtained a reject position deterred’’ in order to I therefore the State's the number of women explicitly “quantify Appellee make its case. Br. at 47 n. 7. Planned Parenthood must *21 Dosage B. Restrictions on and Treat- general even an- potentially sedation esthesia, in the sterile procedure and a ment Protocols outpatient clinic. Med- of an environment that brings That us to the restrictions hand, abortions, the other consist ical on imposes on medical abortions dur pills and terminat- primarily ingesting days every ing “[N]ot the first 49 LMP. privacy ing pregnancy law which makes a more difficult years ago, almost woman’s home. Three is, ipso facto, infringement exercise women chose this second meth- a third of 873, 112 right.” Casey, 505 U.S. at that not as a simply We should conclude od. agree parties generally 2791. The S.Ct. every woman who matter of law that Parenthood must show that that Planned abortion would be prefer would a medical in the restrictions the Act must have more likely surgical to obtain a abortion equally just making than incidental effect of it “the are the basis of nine affidavits. These on expensive pro more difficult or more of fact ill-suited for resolution questions 874, 112 cure an abortion.” Id. at summary judgment. (upholding waiting period 24-hour least, very frequency At of medi- burden); Wolfe, a substantial F.2d among prevents women us cal abortions (same “significant at 526 because does not concluding as a matter of law that from ly process.”). the abortion Ca burden[] abortions do not constitute a medical sey reporting also affirmed additional re among fraction” women within the “large they quirements, might because most “[a]t gestational by time frame banned specific the cost of increase some abortions days LMP. the Act—50 to 68 The sheer in slight point amount. While at some that Par- roughly fact third creased could become a cost substantial patients enthood’s have elected a medical obstacle, showing there is no such on the surgical over a suggests abortion may eliminating Casey, medical abortions record before us.” large forego cause a fraction of women to (rejecting 112 S.Ct. 2791 district court having altogether. an abortion finding that added costs of travel time and suggest own in State’s statistics rise 24- potentially lodging requiring from popularity procedure, of this and the Su- waiting period hour were a substantial ob preme acknowledged Court itself has stacle); see also procedure change the most common can Mo., City, Ass’n Kansas Inc. v. Ash Stenberg, over time. 580 U.S. at 476, 486, 490, croft, 462 U.S. parties permit- S.Ct. 2597. The should be (1983) (holding 76 L.Ed.2d 733 no present expert testimony ted to on the in requiring undue burden law tissue sam subject order to understand better ple during be taken abortion because cost really whether this case is similar to the by only twenty increased dollars state ban method affirmed Gonzales or is a imposed requirement surgeries in all entirely. different creature We therefore safety). ensure cannot conclude as a matter of law that the cases, light agree In of these ‍‌‌‌​‌​​‌​‌​‌‌‌‌‌​​‌‌​‌​​‌‌‌‌​​​​‌‌​​‌​‌‌‌​​​‌​​​‍I -withthe existence of abortions for women court a third requiring district doc- days between and 63 LMP makes tor’s visit adds an insubstantial cost to during Ohio’s ban on all medical abortions procuring a medical abortion. The extra time frаme constitutional. For all appears no from the extra reasons, visit different majority these I dissent from the waiting period, visit caused a 24-hour expressed Judge McKeague’s opin- view explicitly ion. has *22 attempting quantify without say I cannot fraction” regulation. valid a deemed dosage by provi re of minors affected for the the number is true the same sion; The district court obstacle” as the treating “substantial however. quirements, is little evidence that there of such obstruction —or even “possibility concluded days before 49 any women not a suggest guaran obstruction” and attempted an obtaining from abortion), be deterred LMP will inability to obtain cert. teed and treat dosage abortion because denied, a medical abortion. on

ment restrictions (1996); Casey, see also L.Ed.2d 679 29) (D. (Page Order R. 161 Ct. 5/23/11 (striking 112 S.Ct. 2791 U.S. summary judgment, But on ID # law because spousal-notification down light in most view the record we must women, which was of affected group within Parenthood. favorable whole, “large a percent one testimony offered Planned Parenthood be deterred the notifi fraction” would mg usage of 600 FDA-protocol’s specific based not on affidavits cation laws the cost of would increase but on evidence of the percentages $150, significant increase an abortion why “persisting explaining conditions” over patients, it costs over what otherwise deterred). might be such women no in clinics. have forty some We percent on The extent of the Act’s burden if are the knowing these women way of rights, as it relates woman’s constitutional rule, the resolu or the because exception gestational dosage to the limits and the usually done questions is tion of these issue requirements, genuinely disputed is a testimony and after the consideration summary judg- ripe of material fact not Servs., Women’s See Cincinnati evidence. Therefore, I in this case. dissent ment (6th 361, 369 Cir. Taft, 468 F.3d Inc. v. Judge in contrary expressed view from the 2006) to examine close need (emphasizing majority opinion. McKeague’s record). ly factual re- feels comfortable majority again VII. CONCLUSION summary on questions these fact solving due judgment against in I expressed Parts For the reasons between difference price to the McKeague’s opin- through Judge andV But abortions. and medical abortions ion, of the district court is judgment very fact that majority ignores the AFFIRMED. ex- are now less surgical abortions reason requires the Act is because pensive McKEAGUE, Judge, concurring Circuit to use more medicine. medical Part writing majority as to part has never obstacle” Again, a “substantial VI. inAnd as a total obstacle. been defined Judge opin Moore’s agree I with restrictions, rare- evaluating impact separately I write parts I-V. ion as exclusively percent- rely ly do courts un Planned Parenthood’s regard to (“[T]he ‘large term at 374 ages. See id. because, Judge Dlott’s claim due burden fraction,’ which, way, concep- is more “Even view opinion stated: well-reasoned mathematical, envisions some- than tual favor light most ing the evidence of 100 women than the out thing more Parenthood], it is clear Parenthood, able to [Planned here.”); Planned identified create a triable does not Miller, that the record Clinic v. Sioux Falls Cir.1995) fact as to whether of material (8th issue (holding parental 1459-63 creating a substantial has the effect “large unduly laws burdened notification *23 (2007), right. There is no obstacle to the abortion L.Ed.2d 480 instruсted that state likely an action is an impose evidence that would constitute undue bur den where the most common abortion ability undue burden on ‘a woman’s ” technique particular to a available subset make decision to have abortion.’ th[e] Likewise, (Order prohibited. of women is our Granting in Part Mot. Sum. J. case law indicates a statute that “re 28, Page (quoting ID # 2655 Planned Par commonly the most 833, proce strict[s] used Casey, enthood Se. Penn. v. 505 U.S. likely dure” is (1992) problematic. to be 2791, 120 Wom 874, 112 S.Ct. L.Ed.2d 674 Corp. Taft, 436, en’s Med. v. 353 F.3d (second original))). alteration Prof. (6th Cir.2003). 453 So if this case involved Judge opinion correctly As Moore’s abortion, a method ban on which notes, we must view the inferences to be is procedure the most common at 50-63 underlying drawn from the facts in the LMP, days but open option left light most favorable to Planned Parent- abortion, medical Gonzales would dictate Co., hood. See Matsushita Elec. Indus. the result. 574, Corp., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio 475 U.S. here, But viewing the evidence in the (1986). 1348, 106 S.Ct. 89 L.Ed.2d 538 light most favorable to Planned Parent parts The two of the Act that Planned hood, we examine a preferred by method Parenthood claims create an undue burden approximately 31% of women to whom it (1) is discussed here are: ban medical available. jurisprudence Because from the LMP, between 50 and days Supreme Court and this (2) Circuit does not dosage requirements., the increased clearly comparable address method ban Review of the evidence shows that one, to the instant apply we áre left to correctly district court concluded that the general more undue-burden standard. simply give record does not rise ato rea- Thus, for Planned Parenthood to survive sonable inference that impоses the Act summary judgment, genu there must be a substantial obstacle for Ohio women decid- ine dispute of material fact as to whether ing whether to abort a pregnancy. There- “ ‘in a large fraction of the cases in fore, these claims summary cannot survive relevant, operate [the Act] it will as a judgment.1 substantial obstacle to a woman’s choice to ” A. Method Ban on Medical Abortions undergo an abortion.’ Women’s Med. days 50-63 LMP Voinovich, Corp. v. Prof. (6th Cir.1997) (quoting Casey, 505 U.S. at It governing is true that case law ana- 895, 112 S.Ct.

lyzing method “par- bans the context of techniques tial-birth” provide does not Importantly, con- Supreme Court has not trolling guidance most, for this case. At any articulated rule that suggest would Carhart, v. Gonzales right to choose abortion encom- 124, 150-54, 550 U.S. passes particular choose a Judge Moore refers to genuine question this conclusion of fact. For an issue of "resolving questions,” these fact genuine, and "conclu- fact to be the nonmovant must do sively establishing as a matter simply of law that the more than show that there is some method ban in impose this case does metaphysical doubt as to the material facts. ¶¶ Co., substantial obstacle....” See ante at Matsushita Elec.. Indus. Ltd. Zenith Instead, 574, 586-587, 63. Not at all. Corp., on the record before Radio us and summary judgment (1986). under the stan- 89 L.Ed.2d 538 Planned Par dard, Planned Parenthood did not sustain its enthood has not carried its burden in this adducing enough burden of evidence to create case. 2073.) specific reasons that # dissenting opin Some In one method. says choose “[w]omen a wom Planned Parenthood suggested that ion, Justice Stevens liberty higher degree person- in medication” are a constitutionally protected аn’s control, feeling choose an abortion that a medical right to al abor- in the terest ter natural, decision to ability and the components tion is more has “two —her decision and her pregnancy privacy minate a medical abortion *24 execute Ben doing (Id.) so.” the method of concerning Finally, home. of the woman’s 1084, 1085, Kessler, U.S. ten v. states “for victims of Planned Parenthood (1992) (per 120 L.Ed.2d have experienced or for women who rape, curiam) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (holding— molestation, medication sexual abuse Casey after than one month less traumatic ... [and] is often less —that abortion pills confis had woman who fear invasive sur- many simply women drug approved the FDA cated before (Id.) gery....” her agency to return compel not could also offered the af- not demonstrated she had dose because women, some of whom fidavits of nine had success on the likelihood of substantial abortion can- their scheduled medication the undue- declining to reach merits but Act. For example, because of the celled issue, no view stating express “we burden upset woman stated she was and sad one assertion”). But the merits of this on the she felt a medical abortion was because ap expressly endorsed has natural, she had scheduled a more but protect right that would proach (Dawn anyway. abortion Doe surgical abortion. method of particular choose a 2574-75.) Aff., ID # Another wom- Page 874, 112 S.Ct. 2791 U.S. at Casey, See daughter that her “wanted her an said (“ protects the woman ‘the [abortion] to be the least invasive experience abortion interference with unduly burdensome from and wanted to have the abortion possible, whether to termi freedom to decide her (Leslie ” home.” Doe privacy of our Maher v. (quoting pregnancy.’ nate her 2558.) Aff., ID # When the medical Page Roe, cancelled, daughter her went was abortion (1977))). 53 L.Ed.2d 484 surgical procedure with the on the forward a list of Parenthood submitted Planned (Id. #2559.) ID day. Page scheduled opposi- fact in of material disputed issues daughter was “nervous She added her Assuming the summary judgment. tion to surgical procedure], scared [about admissible, organi- evidence therein relieved that she was and at the same time surgical that “first trimester alleges zation (Id.) pregnancy.” to terminate the going procedure is an invasive abortion that' she woman said was Another and that abor- seek to avoid” many women about by the news and scared” “shocked and there procedure tion is an emotional go but decided surgical procedure, particular that affect the many factors are (Ma- day. scheduled ahead with it on the (Plaintiffs may a woman elect. procedure #2653.) Aff., ID Another Page ria Doe Facts, Prop. Undisputed Resp. to Ohio’s “very frustrated and said she felt woman #2072.) also organization ID Page but “decid- with the situation” exasperated are counseled women “[o]nce submits surgical procedure with the go ed to ahead surgical abor- medication about both (Doreen Aff., Page ID day.” Doe tion, strong demonstrate most women 2555.) # proce- type for the preference and clear give rise to the All of these statements and are satisfied they] choose dure [that (Id. prefer a medi- that some women ID inference Page that method.” abortion, over a but B. Dosage cal abortion Increased they support the conclusion that the do not The district court properly also unavailability of a medical abortion would found that Planned Parenthood failed to large create a obstacle for a substantial allege sufficient evidence survive sum deciding whether to fraction of women mary judgment on its claim that the added Indeed, Judge Dlott have an abortion. cost associated dosage with increased un out, pointed the evidence shows that all of der the Act creates an undue burden. gave women who statements affected a surgical to obtain proceeded alleges “signifi- Parenthood preference for a regardless of their medi cant” increase in the cost of a medical record, cal Based on this procedure. abortion due to dosage the increased *25 cannot that Planned 'Parenthood assume (Plain- mifepristone required by the Act. produce will evidence at trial different that Resp. Prop. tiffs to Ohio’s Undisputed support could this material- fact. Such an 2072.) Facts, Page ID # concretely, More assumption overstep would the reasonable organization submitted affidavits from inferences we are meant to draw in the clinic indicating directors an increase of Matsushita, organization’s favor. See ¶ (See, e.g., 8, Aff. Harrington Page $150. . 587, 106 U.S. at S.Ct. 1348 ¶ 2180; 9, ID # Page Brenner Aff. ID #2114.) Viewing the evidence submitted agree I with the common-sense infer- light most organiza- favorable to the ence that because “the differences between tion, that would an constitute increase of procedures perspective from the more than 40% over what medical abortion substantial,” are maybe woman some— (See currently Harrington, Page costs. ID prefer even most—women will medical 2180.) Act, # Notably, surgical before the surgical abortion over abortion. See ante abortion price was offered at the same ¶ However, at our consideration can- medical abortion all of the clinics that not end there. The abortion as it (See (both submitted affidavits. proce- id. Supreme has been described Court $360); currently Brenner, dures Page cost protects the “freedom to decide whether to (both ID # 2114 procedures currently cost terminate” a pregnancy. Casey, 505 U.S. ¶ $545); 12, Page Clawson Aff. ID # 2151 874, at 112 S.Ct. 2791. The Court has not (both $410); procedures currently cost protection extended constitutional to a ¶ (both Lonn Aff. ID # Page proce- method, preferred woman’s or her “deci- $450)). currently So, dures cost unless the sion concerning the method” of terminat- surgical cost of independently abortion is Benten, ing pregnancy. a 505 U.S. at raised, the alleged increased cost of medi- (Stevens, J., 112 S.Ct. 2929 dissent- cal abortion would make Therefore, ing). any without evidence that a less-expensive option. Planned Parent- the Act is a substantial obstacle to the hood also submitted the a affidavit of wom- decision, ultimate abortion our own com- an who stated: “If a medication abortion mon-sense conclusions what women about price were offered at a that was $100-$200 may prefer do not genuine dispute create a abortion, higher than a surgical it would be of material fact. really difficult for me. I am not certain I Accordingly, the properly medication, district court would be able to still choose granted summary judgment regard to I though try money, would to raise more days the method ban for women 50-63 becausе it be worth a would lot to me.” 2565.) Aff., LMP. (Emily Poe ID Page # disputed closing of a in that case indi clinic Court has Although at least 55 require would women travel “at increased cost point, that some cated at obstacle,” miles reach an abortion clinic. Id. Ca become substantial could noting binding After sey, 505 U.S. authority “firmly persuasive did not estab- In Casey, the “point” remains undefined. lish when becomes an undue bur- distance disputed showed evidence found no undue burden “might in den” this Court recordkeeping requirement closing “may the clinic be though even the cost of some crease potential patients. burdensome” for some Id. The Court declined slight amount.” This reasoned that there was no Casey Id. Court Court an undue burden. find undue because “there is no indica- burden in-person informed-con considered also closing tion of the clinic would twenty-four hour requirement sent Dayton- create a substantial obstacle for Casey, requirement. notification ” seeking area an abortion.... Id. women require These 112 S.Ct. 2791. at 606. trips to make more caused women ments stated facts clinic. here, Similarly Planned Parenthood has as follows: on the record placed any on the record evidence *26 findings of fact ... indicate that that the added cost of a medi- suggesting many women distances

because unduly cal abortion would burden provid- travel to reach an abortion must a large to abortion for fraction choose a er, will often be practical effect Moreover, affected the evidence women. day much than a because delay of more Planned Parenthood shows submitted period requires that a wom- waiting remains available at surgical abortion an make at least seeking fact, In woman price. a lower many to the in- [I]n two visits doctor. cost her who mentioned increased exposure this will increase the stances specifically said that this would statement seeking to “the harass- women make it for her choose medical difficult pro- of anti-abortion hostility ment and abortion, it not that be a burden but would a demonstrating outside clinic.” testors pregnancy. on her choice to abort her result, ... women a for those who As give to a rea- This does not rise evidence resources, financial have fewest increase dosage sonable inference distances, long who must travel those choice to is a obstacle to the substantial difficulty explaining and those who have undergo abortion. husbands, employ- their whereabouts to anal- than the method-ban Even more others, ers, waiting peri- 24-hour ysis, we cannot infer a substantial obstacle “particularly be burdensome.” od will regarding from submitted the evidence S.Ct. 2791. Casey, dosage requirement. The rec- increased Still, the Court found that even these oner- supports an inference that arguably ord un- impediments did not constitute an

ous would women’s the increased cost burden based record. due burden on the abortion, ability choose medical which However, Baird, may preferred be method. Corp. their In Women’s Med. Prof. (6th Cir.2006), infer- permit this that does not reasonable clinic, undue burden on the constitu- ence that an the closure of addressed tionally “freedom to decide protected farther for an required women to travel a pregnancy terminate” would increased cost. whether to giving rise to abortion — 874, 112 Casey, 505 U.S. at by result. increased travel distance caused because, assuming 2791. That is even presents

increased cost a substantial ob- abortion, choosing stacle to medical lower-priced still have the women would abortion available option them. evidence that the cost in- Without

crease would create substantial obstacle undergo ultimate choice to an abor- tion, summary- this claim cannot survive judgment.

Thus, properly granted the district court summary judgment on this claim as well. America,

UNITED STATES ex rel. WILLIAMS, Julie Plaintiffs-

Appellees, Martinez, M.D., Plaintiff, John *27 GROUP, INC.; RENAL CARE Renal Group Supply Company; Care Fresen Holdings, Inc., ius Medical Care De fendants-Appellants.

No. 11-5779. United States Appeals, Court of

Sixth Circuit. Argued: July Decided and Filed: Oct. notes the Medi Any with the Act. risk of uncertainty recognizes cation physicians Guide hidden, regarding requirements extra is prescribe drugs “off-label.” But no rea provisions, cured the scienter physician sonable would view this refer penalty forbid under the Act unless a doc- ence as permitting prescription off-label knowingly tor violates one of require- mifepristone Cordray when makes clear A physician ments. a good-faith with be- physicians must stick to the FDA lief that a certain comply action would with protocol. highest When a state’s court physician the Act accidentally .or who statute, interprets a its construction is con takes an action not in compliance with the part sidered of the statute itself. Wain Gonzales, penalized. Act would not be 550 22-23, 414 wright, U.S. at 94 S.Ct. 190. 149-50, U.S. at 127 S.Ct. 1610. The same certainty Mathematical required. is not exception apply would physicians who Grayned, 110, 408 U.S. 92 S.Ct. 2294. intend that patients their return for the Third, argues visit, requisite follow-up pa- but whose subject revision, FPL frequent tients decide on their own not to come. 155, with no clear physicians instruction to on See id. at 127 S.Ct. happen what would in the event of a revi- Parenthood’s remaining vagueness argu- However, sion. Appellant Br. at 32. relating specific hypothetical the ments sce- possible risk of ‍‌‌‌​‌​​‌​‌​‌‌‌‌‌​​‌‌​‌​​‌‌‌‌​​​​‌‌​​‌​‌‌‌​​​‌​​​‍revision enough future, is not to narios that are best left to as- ("[TJreatment opinion 15. The also references "three office requires visits,” defeating argu- Planned Parenthood's patient.... three day office visits On regarding ment that the Act is unclear wheth- three, patient provider returns to the misoprostol er the can be administered at |xg misoprostol.”). án oral dose 400 home; Cordray, it cannot. 911 N.E.2d at 874 506 evidence). Although Su obtain an individual be challenges should applied formally to label has declined preme obscure reference under an prosecuted in this context as “strict scruti interpreted review As its documents. one of those Nevada, Court, 504 U.S. Riggins Act is not v. ny,” see by the Ohio 479 118 L.Ed.2d 112 S.Ct. vague. gov (1992), ask whether the the cases still CLAIM BODILY-INTEGRITY V. demonstrated adequately has ernment intrusion, a lack of for the pro compelling need due the substantive Under alternatives, Amendment, proce as well reasonable the Fourteenth cess clause of safeguards, see id. at right to and medical a constitutional dural possess individuals See also Wash physical intrusions 112 S.Ct. 1810.16 free from forcible be 210, 229, will, 110 Harper, their absent against ington v. their bodies (1990) (“The v. interest. See Winston 108 L.Ed.2d 178 compelling state 753, 766, Lee, into a non- injection of medication U.S. forcible (1985) (state surgically cannot body represents consenting person’s L.Ed.2d suspect’s evidence from a potential person’s remove interference with substantial severity of given the body without consent important legiti liberty” requiring compelling Dir., and lack of state interest); the intrusion v. Mo. mate state Cruzan interest); California, 384 Health, 261, 269, 281, Schmerber Dep’t U.S.

Case Details

Case Name: Planned Parenthood Southeast Ohio Region v. DeWine
Court Name: Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
Date Published: Oct 2, 2012
Citation: 696 F.3d 490
Docket Number: 11-4062
Court Abbreviation: 6th Cir.
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