63 W. Va. 660 | W. Va. | 1908
Cecil Aldredge, an infant, was the owner of some land in Arracoma in Logan county. His guardian, James R. Henderson, instituted in the circuit court a proceeding for the sale of some of the infant’s land, and a decree was rendered authorizing the sale, and sale was made and confirmed. The court authorized the guardian to use some of the money coming from the sale in building a house, on the real estate not sold, as a residence and for the benefit of the infant. He did build the house under a contract with W. E. Castle. In the construction of the house The Logan Planing Mill Company furnished Castle lumber and other materials which entered into the construction of the house and it recorded a mechanic’s lien against the house and lot, and brought this chancery suit to enforce the lien against the same, and upon the hearing of the suit the court refused to enforce the mechanic’s lien and dismissed the bill without prejudice to any right of The Planing Mill Company against Henderson as guardian or as individual. The Planing Mill Company has brought the case to this Court by appeal.
It is very clear that by our law a guardian has not power to sell or mortgage the land of his ward, unless authorized by statute. Hoback v. Miller, 44 W. Va. 635; Rhea v. Shields, 103 Va. 305. A court of chancery has no inherent power to do so. I do not understand that a guardian may build houses on his ward’s land, merely under his power as such, with the money of the ward. He may reasonably repair existing houses to prevent destruction until the infant shall come to full age; but this does not say that he can build new houses, to go to decay or to be destroyed by fire. Woerner on Guardianship, section 175; 21 Cyc. 98. The common law gives guardians very limited power. Our Code, chapter 82, section 7, gives him the custody of his ward and
We think the circuit court was right in dismissing the bill, if for no other reason than the want of a valid lien. Of course, there must be a valid lien for equity to enforce. ‘ ‘Ho equitable lien exists either on behalf of the guardian or party who hascontractedwith him for the improvements of the ward’s lands. Neither party has a right, under the circumstrnces, to the mechanic’s' lien, unless specifically authorized by statute. As where a probate court had no power to authorize the erection of buildings upon real estate of minors upon credit, nor did it undertake to exercise such power, and the guardian nevertheless erected a building for which there were no sufficient funds to pay, the mechanic has no lien on it, for, if a person deal with a party having by law but a limited authority, he can have no right beyond what the authority rightfully exercised would confer. So, if a probate court grant to guardian permission ‘to erect, out of the funds of his wards, a building upon their lot, of such dimensions and quality as may suit their interest,’ the authority does not authorize the guardian to erect a building upon credit, and thereby destroy the interest of his wards. Again, where a law gave ‘a lien against the owner to the extent of his interest, upon a house, and upon the land on which it stands, for labor done, etc., no lien could be acquired by the builder of a house upon a lot of land owned by the minor daughter of the defendant, although the defendant, in his contract for such
We hardly deem it necessary, in response to the claim that though the mechanic’s lien is not good,yet as the lumber went into the house the infant must pay for it. This would be doing indirectly what he could not do directly and enable an infant to destroy his estate. But, if even this were so, it would be a personal demand, and where any lien for jurisdiction in equity ? McCarty v. Carter, just cited, will sustain this proposition. The use of a building built under an unauthorized contract on an infant’s land “will not ratify the contract so as to subject the land to liens. ” 20 Am. & Eng. Ency. L. (2d ed.) 329.
Decree affirmed.
Affirined.