56 Iowa 573 | Iowa | 1881
Lead Opinion
The power to make contracts employing teachers is vested in the subdirector of the subdistrict, and all such contracts made in accordance .with the provisions of the law shall b$ approved by the president of the board. Code, § 1753. It becomes, the duty, then, of the president of the. board to determine whether the contract conforms to the provisions of
Among other instructions given by the court to the jury we find the following:
“ 10. If you find that the plaintiff entered into the contract with the subdirector, and you further find that she performed her contract, that there was no legal objection to her teaching, she is entitled to her pay, and you should so find and return your verdict for her for the amount of the value of her services under the contract.”
In the twelfth paragraph of the charge the jury were instructed in substance that if the president of the board neglects to approve the contract, and the person employed performs the same, the teacher should not be deprived of compensation for services rendered.
These instructions are independent propositions, and are in no manner qualified by any other instructions in the case. The facts were that the president refused to approve the contract because of certain objections made to the plaintiff as a teacher. Before the plaintiff commenced to teach the president of the board gave her notice that he would not approve
II. The amount in controversy.as shown by the pleadings was less than $100. Some question is made by counsel for appellee as to whether or not the certificate authorizing the appeal is sufficient to confer jurisdiction upon this court. 'It appears to us to be sufficient. It especially refers to the case as contained in the instructions above discussed. •
Eevebsed.
Dissenting Opinion
dissenting. — The defendant school district, after it has had the benefit of the plaintiff’s services as a teacher, seeks to avoid paying her upon the technical ground that she taught without a written contract. But I am unable to conclude that under the statute, and the decisions of this court made thereon, the defense can be sustained. It is true, if there was only an oral contract no right of action would
The objection made; by' the majority of'the; court to the instructions’ that the rule held by them would enable a sub-director to employ a teacher against the consent of the patrons of the school, and against the protest of the board of directors, is not to my mind valid. The law does not give the power to. employ a teacher to the patrons of the school nor to the board of directors, nor does it make their consent necessary.
When he has employed a teacher it is to be presumed that his judgment has been properly exercised; and when a written contract has been drawn and signed by both subdirector and teacher it becomes the imperative duty of the president to approve and file it, if it conforms to the law and rules of the board. Thompson v. Linn, above cited. It is not for the president to exercise the slightest judgment in regard to the person employed, nor take any one’s opinion in regard to the person. The difficulty in this matter commenced by the president’s listening to objections made against the plaintiff by certain persons who were opposed to her, and by his wrongfully and unlawfully making such objections the ground of his refusal to approve the written contract.
The majority opinion seems to proceed upon the theory, that he is vested with a discretion, in order to protect the school district against the employment of an unsuitable person. But that is evidently not the theory of the law. His approval pertains to a different subject. If the president had performed the duty in this matter imperatively devolved upon him by the law he would have approved the contract. There were no legal objections to it so far as I can discover. If he had approved it as he should have done there would not have been any additional guaranty to the plaintiff’s qualifications. But the law afforded ample protection against a want of qualifications. There is no ground for complaint in this respect. «
My view of this case is that certain disaffected individuals sought by an irregular and unauthorized way to defeat the
The harmony of school districts, the prosperity of the schools, the feeling of good neighborhood, all require that school officers should be kept strictly within the line of their duty, and that no one should be allowed to make any unlawful interference therewith.
I think that the plaintiff was entitled to recover, and I see no prejudicial error in any ruling by which recovery was had’.