*1 Mich 468 702 v PITTSFIELD CHARTERTOWNSHIP WASHTENAWCOUNTY Argued (Calendar 7). 119590. Docket No. November No. Decided July 9, 2003. Township brought an Pittsfield Charter action in the Washtenaw Cir- County city against Arbor, cuit Court Washtenaw and of Ann the declaratory seeking injunctive support relief of the town- ship’s prevent ordinance and to the from construct- court, a homeless shelter in a limited industrial district. The Swartz, J., summary granted disposition county, David Scott for the township’s summary disposition and denied the motion and its Appeals, motion for reconsideration. Court of The Holbrook, Jr., P.J., JX, and McDonald reversed and remanded the case Saad, court, holding broad, powers circuit nonexclusive development buildings over the of conferred on by statutory comprehensive boards MCL 46.11 do not override the incorporates county’s township’s scheme both the and the authority regulating within land use their borders. 246 Mich App 'county appealed. The opinion joined by In an Justice Chief Justice Corrigan, Taylor, Supreme and Justices Cavanagh, Kelly, Young, Markman, Court held-. comply township’s zoning The does not need to with the locating county’s proposed ordinance in homeless shelter. purpose case, county’s authority supersedes For the of this township’s zoning authority for several The has reasons. buildings, siting one on limitation its that it cannot violate legal requirement county seat, that certain be in the indi- county’s cating jurisdiction siting buildings. broad over township’s zoning authority enumerated exclusions to the not do township powers, define the on limits are but intended engage Giving in coordination with other statutes. zoning authority priority over the commissioner’s 46.11(b), grants county siting would cause MCL which author- ity, surplusage. interpreted giving pri- to be If each statute were ority other, priority over the the rule of of last enacted would weigh county siting authority having priority. in favor Co v Washtenaw Opinion ti-ie Court result, concurring stated that the use of in the Justice Weaver, unnecessary arriving statutory-construction at the con- tools is clearly grant boards intended that the clusion jurisdiction for and over site selection exclusive of commissioners Zoning Act, Township county buildings. construction *2 act, 46.11, 125.271, conflict. commissioners by Legislature specific powers for the enumerated express to author- intent of the the clear commissioners county buildings, the site of commissions to determine ize prescribe erecting county buildings, and prescribe the time of county buildings. erecting manner of Reversed; reinstated. circuit court order Zoning — — Townships. Counties commissioners, exercising its when A board of buildings, is not determine the site of 46.11, 125.271). (MCL zoning regulations Etter) L. for the (by Etter & Lillich John
Reading, plaintiff-appellee. Lax) LLP Jerold Dahling (by &
Bodman, Longley Curtis N. (by Counsel Corporation and Office defendant-appellant. Hedger) for Amici Curiae: A. Cohl and Toskey, (by & PC. Peter
Cohl, Stoker Association McNulty), Michigan D. for the Richard Counties. P.C. Thall, &
Bauckham, Sparks, Rolfe, Lohrstorfer Thall), Robert E. H. Bauckham and John (by Association. Townships Michigan whether defen- question' presented is J. Taylor, plaintiff County comply must dant. Washtenaw in the ordinance Township’s zoning Pittsfield Charter homeless shelter. county’s proposed of the locating comply not need to does We hold that therefore, and, ordinance township’s zoning with the MICH judgment Appeals reverse the of the Court of reinstate the summary-disposition order entered the trial court.
i County property Washtenaw owns in Pittsfield Township township’s zoning Charter ordi- nance designated (limited industrial). has as i-l With city participation the financial of Ann Arbor, advertised a proposal to construct new shelter, own, homeless which it would prop- on the erty. The i-l expressly district ordinance neither nor conditionally permits such a use. Township position took the the pro-
posed use violated its ordinance and thus was impermissible Township because Zoning Act et seq., specifically MCL 125.271 (tza), *3 125.271(1),1 gives priority its zoning that the 125.271(1) MCL reads: township organized township may The an board of in this state provide by zoning regulation development ordinance for the of land portions township and the establishment of districts in the villages regulate outside the limits of cities and which the use of structures; land and meet to the needs of the state’s citizens for food, fiber, energy, resources, places and other natural of resi- dence, recreation, industry, service, trade, land; and other of uses appropriate to insure use that of the land shall be in situated loca- relationships; inappropriate overcrowding tions and to limit the of congestion population, transportation systems, land and of and public facilities; adequate provision other to facilitate and efficient systems, transportation disposal, water, sewage energy, for educa- tion, recreation, public facility requirements; and other and service promote public health, safety, pur- and to and welfare. For these poses, may township township the board the divide into districts of nmnber, shape, carry such area and as it considers suited best to township organized township may out this act The board of-an use provide by regulation develop- act to ordinance the for of land apply only ment and the establishment of to districts which land Co v Washtenaw that, asserted county, however, ignore.
cannot MCL act county commissioners pursuant to (CCA), of county boards 46.11, specifically seq., et 46.1 township zoning subject are not commissioners of, prescrib- or the site determining when ordinances county buildings. erecting, manner of time and ing the (d).2 46.11(b), program special to involved in a which are areas and activities objectives management specific and avert or solve achieve land regulation problems, including land devel- specific of land use dam- opment in areas of districts and the establishment may erosion, purpose age flooding beach and for from or number, shape, township and area con- of a into districts divide objectives. reg- accomplish Ordinances those sidered best suited ulating adopted designating development may or limit- also be land stories, location, height, and size of dwell- number of altered, may buildings, or ings, be erected and structures coaches, specific which including uses for and trailer and tents structures, including buildings, and trailer dwellings, tents and courts, altered; yards, may coaches, or the area be erected protective sanitary, safety, open spaces, mea- and the other buildings, required dwellings, and struc- sures that shall be for coaches; tures, including and the maximum num- tents and trailer may buildings, dwellings, and in families which be housed ber of structures, including coaches, erected or altered. tents and trailer buildings, provisions for each class of land or shall be uniform coaches, structures, dwellings, including tents and trailer may provisions district, throughout in 1 district differ each but the regulate not in districts. A board shall from those other wells, completion, operation gas drilling, of oil or or or control purposes gas exploration and shall or other wells drilled for oil permits jurisdiction with reference to the issuance not have location, drilling, completion, operation, or abandonment of jurisdiction to wells shall be vested exclu- wells. The relative those sively part state, provided supervisor of wells of this wells) (Supervisor and environmen- of the natural resources act, protection tal 324.61501 324.61527.] [MCL parts provides pertinerit that a board of commis MCL46.11 may: sioners *4 of, remove, designate (b) a new site for a the site Determine authority granted county building. this sub- The exercise of the building any requirement be of law that the division is to county
located at the seat. 706 468 702 Mich Opinion the Court complaint township a the The filed in Washtenaw seeking Circuit Court a declaration the comply township’s zoning ordinance, must the with enjoin seeking disregarding and to the from proceeding the ordinance and with con the proposed struction homeless shelter. The com plaint city also named the of Ann Arbor as a codefendant. summary disposition a
The filed motion for 2.116(C)(8), asserting under MCR as a that, matter of requirements law, was it immune from the township.4 township the filed a similar motion asserting priority gave converse, the that the tza it accordingly, that, and was not immune. township’s denying court, The circuit while granted county’s motion, motion on the basis that granted plenary authority MCL 46.11 to buildings choose sites for and that the was exempt Township’szoning from Pittsfield ordinances. appeal, Appeals
On the Court of reversed.5 The exemp- determining Court outlined that the for tests requirements township zoning tions from the of a
[*] n n ! -
[*]
necessary
(d)
jails,
offices,.
Erect
clerks’
prescribe
buildings,
other
the time and manner of erect-
ing them.
time,
why
same
At the
obtained an
to
order
show cause
preliminary injunction
16, 1998,
stipulation
a
should not issue. On June
whereby
parties agreed
preliminary injunc
was
order
entered
required.
subsequent
tive relief was not
Two
orders extended
defen
respond
complaint.
dants’
time
city
county’s
of Ann
Arbor concurred
motion to the
requested
county’s authority
prop
extent it
confirmation of the
to use the
erty
question
Accordingly,
for a homeless shelter.
we refer
County
Washtenaw
as defendant
in our discussion.
App 356;
Opinion of the Court Detroit, v 403 set out in Dearden ordinance were Twp Dep’t (1978), 139 Burt v Mich 269 NW2d 257; 669; NW2d 534 Resources, 659, 459 Mich 593 Natural Byrne Michigan, (1999), 652; v 463 Mich 624 and (2001). law It then characterized this case NW2d 906 exempt zoning holding to be from ordi- that, county authority granting to nances, the statute explicitly supersedes that it site must state Court described it: ordinance. As the say county’s power to Legislature If meant to that property plenary (not subject to, but site use its is and exempt from, legal restrictions), could not, easily expressly have and so. It did and we con- said permissible appropriate clude it is neither nor for us to statutory provision. graft plenary gloss this such on [246 App Mich 362.] granted appeal.
We leave to 466 Mich (2002).
n
statutory
This
is before us on a matter of
case
interpretation.
law,
Because
is a matter
our
DaimlerChrysler
novo.
v
review is de
Robertson
The which the states at MCL 46.II8 that counties can determine site selection
6 The statute is set out in n 1.
7 MCL 125.273reads: upon plan designed ordinance shall be based to promote public health, safety, general welfare; and to encourage the use of lands in with accordance their character and adaptability, improper land; to limit and of use to conserve nat- energy; ural resources and to meet the needs of the state’s food, fiber, resources, places residents for and other natural of resi- dence, recreation, industry, trade, service, land; and other uses of appropriate to insure of that uses the land shall be in situated loca- relationships; overcrowding population; and tions to avoid of provide adequate light air; congestion public and to lessen on the streets; property; and roads reduce hazards to life and to facili- adequate provision system transportation, sewage
tate posal, for a of dis- adequate supply, education, recreation, safe and water and public requirements; expenditure other and conserve the of public improvements funds for and services to conform land, advantageous resources, properties. most uses of and consideration, ordinance shall be made with reasonable among things, district; peculiar other to the character of each its suitability particular uses; property of conservation values resources; general appropriate and natural and the trend and land, population building, development. character of out, part, in The statute is set n 2. Twp v Washtenaw Co county buildings. erecting and the time and manner of power. on this It is is one limitation However, there 46.11(b) of MCL and it in the second sentence found authority by directing limits the site-selection any requirement disregard of law hold- cannot county building ing at the that a be located provisions potentially in are, course, seat. These authority. grants in their It tension with each other proper priority undertaking is to establish our between them.
IV Appeals adjudicating In matter, the Court authority given to the found a conflict between the townships tza and the and the counties under the CCA. by construing It then resolved this conflict our hold- Twp, Byrne ings Dearden, Burt to mean that express grant- there must be indications in the statute county immunity township’s zoning from the power before the could be immune. supra Dearden,
This Court articulated in resolving govern- a conflict between units of *7 legislative ment the intent “where it can be discerned” question governmental controls the whether a unit is provisions of another’s ordinances. Twp, supra
In Burt we this at reiterated approach are no and cautioned that there “talismanic convey Legislature’s words” that intent to create immunity zoning. Rather, from local convey “need use terms that its clear intention jurisdiction grant given is, fact, that the exclu- sive.” Id. 468 Mich discerning
This Court has also conceded that legislative regarding government intent whether a unit provisions is immune from the ordi- local “proven apply.” nances n has difficult to Id. at 664 3. apparent insight The of this observation is made when one looks at the difficulties the Court of Appeals discussed here9 and which eventuated in what is best described as an almost mechanistic approach determining priority. panel essen- tially county’s authority held if is not explicitly by Legislature, addressed prevail. attempted past ordinances As we have in the explain, simple. analysis the test is not this requires merely searching more than for words of Recently gave guidance exclusion. in Burt we searching stating Legis- courts for this intent, that the any particular lature need not “use talismanic words may to indicate its intent.” Id. at not, 669. This as we hoped had would, it easier, but, make the task special least, it must mean that there words, are no engenders specific the absence of which a outcome. easy question Nevertheless, whether not, remains: Where do we look to find the intent? The guidance answer is that we must look for to the stat- utes themselves to if see there are textual indica- convey Legislature’s tions that would intent on priority. the issue of closely that,
We believe read, the statutes here at higher priority issue indicate that the is with the Appeals obviously The Court of has mellowed bit on the difficulties discerning opinion topic, this intent. In an earlier on this it described undertaking engaging Hegelian Capital as akin to in “a dialectic.” Region Aiiport Twp, App 576, 583; Auth v DeWitt Charter NW2d 141 *8 v Washtenaw Co Opinion Court
county.
We draw this first from the fact that
the CCA
only
expressly
Legislature
stated
one limitation on
county
buildings.
of the
to site
That lim-
power
itation is that the
cannot use the
given
buildings
in MCL 46.11
site
if
was
to
there is
requirement
other
of law that
be
language
part
located at the
seat. This
became
of the act in
when the
amended the
by
Legislature,
CCA.10 We believe this shows that the
explicitly turning
its attention to limits on the
siting power
deciding
limitation,
on
one
must have considered the issue of limits and intended
analogous
no other limitation. This conclusion is
the discernment of intent undertaken
this Court in
authority given
Dearden. There we held that the
prisons
priority
gave
the state to site
ing
over local zon-
authorizing
ordinances on the basis of the
statute,
department
which said that “the
shall
791.204,
jurisdiction
penal
have exclusive
over . . .
institutions
supra
. . Dearden,
.
.”
at 265. From this we found the
Legislature, stating
intent of the
that we read
lan-
guage
expression
Legislature’s
“a
clear
department
complete jurisdic-
intent to vest the
penal
subject only
institutions,
tion over the state’s
46.11,
(c)
building.
Determine the site of a
[*]
:I:
[**]
(e)
designate
building
Remove or
a new
for a
site
required
county seat,
to be at the
if the new site is not
outside
village
city
situated,
limits of the
or
in which the
seat is
county infirmary
designate
a new
remove
site for a
or medical
facility.
replaced by
46.11(b),
care
These
were
subsections
set
n
out in
2.
Legislature’s at least in can be discerned expressly stated in from the fact that the 1995PA the latest substantive amendment of tza, 35,14that unless the Electric Transmission Line Certi- fication Act was enacted that the amendment to the tza would not be effective. expressio if
Further, even unius est exclusio alter- applied equally party’s arguments, áis to benefit each township’s argument, giv- that each has a statute priority yield other, over the would doc- Bay trine of last enactment. Old Orchard Co, 244, 257; Assoc v Hamilton Mut Ins presumes Leg- NW2d73 That doctrine that the is aware islature existence of the law effect recognizes that, the time its enactments and *10 power since one cannot bind the of its statutory existing language successor, cannot be a bar exceptions subsequent, to further set forth in substan- Detroit, tive enactments. See Malcolm v East 437 (1991). 132, 139; Mich 468 479 In NW2d relation to substantively this case, 1998, the CCA was amended in substantively whereas the tza has not been regarding amended any Therefore, this issue time since then. priority, the effort to establish as the most CCA, prevails Legislature, recent statement of the over the TZA. perhaps compellingly, Further, and most the town- ship’s argument, equally that it also has an valid claim application expressio of the doctrine of unius est approach alteráis, exclusio is flawed because this 46.11(b) surplusage. would cause MCL to be mere 14 recently amended, nonsubstantively, by The tza was most albeit 47, merely updated PA which statute number Natural Resources and Environmental Protection Act. 468 Mich township, argued that, The reason is as give 46.11 would to the to site long placement buildings as it desired as as the was harmony township’s plan. existing zoning with the very power county, Yet this was one the as well as already user, other land had before the enactment simply 46.11(b). 46.11(b) of MCL To aver that MCL power already possessed reiterates a is to rob it of any meaning, surplusage. is, that to make it This vio- [statutory] lates “the fundamental rule of construction every given meaning word of a statute be should surplusage and no word should be or ren- treated possible.” nugatory dered if all Feld v Robert & Beauty Charles Salon, 364; 459 NW2d county’sposition has no defect of this argument portion Its sort. causes no of the tza to be surplusage. Accordingly, we decline for these reasons adopt township’s analysis also to of these statutes. significant language
Moreover, it is to us that the township specific relied, on which the is less tza, particular matter than at hand was the lan- guage Twp, relied on in Burt which we determined Department of Natural Resources’ boat- zoning. Twp, launch sites were to local Burt supra Twp, In at 671. Burt we noted that the tza regulate development authorized a land zoning plans to facilitate “recreation” and that were designed to be to “conserve natural resources.” Id. at *11 township plan- 665. Further, we noted that under the ning seq., township plan act, 125.321et was “ to include ways for, alia, recommendations inter ‘water- ” developments.’ quot- and waterfront Id. topics 125.327(2)(b). recreation, These nat- — Twp v Washtenaw Co waterways, develop-
ural resources, and waterfront suggested inus Burt that there had ment— legislative priority been consideration of issue in usage the area of recreational water access accordingly led us to the conclusion that the town- authority ship priority. pres- was meant to In have case, ent however, when one reviews the mandates of siting buildings, as relevant to the tza tza, yields highly generalized “places references to public residence,” “other land,” uses of and “other requirements sug- . . . .” MCL 125.273. These seem to gest Legislature no conclusion that the loca- county buildings tion of kind should be con- by township zoning. trolled Therefore, when these tza provisions alongside are viewed the structure of the county power in MCL 46.11, the lack of focus on county buildings in the tza reinforces our view that pri- in this circumstance intended that ority given siting buildings. be to the its Appeals
We note also that the Court made refer- County Zoning seq., ence to the Act, MCL 125.201 ei attempted, by dovetailing specifi- it with tza, cally analysis. MCL 125.298, to buttress its This approach helpful thought, is less than the Court how- fully ever, because it failed to consider that we are dealing pursuant not here with a decision taken county’s and thus the effort to ana- lyze implicating comprehensive this matter as “a stat- utory unpersuasive. App scheme” is 246 Mich 367.
Finally, we also are mindful of the Dearden Court’s policy analysis, undoubtedly impli- which, while less here, cated still has relevance. The Dearden Court said: *12 468 Mich 702
Opinion by Weaver, J. zoning enabling act not indicate whether or does [T]he subject department intended to not expression zoning leg- of a local ordinances. We can find no subject language islative intent in the of that act to department’s jurisdiction penal state’s exclusive over the duty adjust institutions, and its to coordinate and those part unified, integral general correc- institutions as an of a many municipal system, tional and varied department throughout ordinances the state. If the were subject ordinances, underlying policies to those system effectively general correctional could be thwarted by community community placement prohibiting after penal appropriate of certain institutions in locations. A reading department establishing of careful the statute contrary legislative evidences a intent. [Id. 266-267.] reasons, For these we reverse the decision of the Appeals Court of and reinstate the circuit court’s summary disposition. order of Cavanagh, Kelly, Young, Corrigan, C.J., Markman, Taylor, JJ., concurred J. majority’s I result, J. concur with the but
Weaver, statutory-construc- find its reliance on a small of host unhelpful unnecessary. majority’s tion tools use of tools to search these for “textual indications” to resolve the conflict between the statutes at issue is analyze remarkable in its failure to the text of the my view, plain statutes. In text com- clearly conveys missioners act the Legislature’s (cca) intent to boards grant of commissioners exclu- jurisdiction sive over site selection for and construc- tion of buildings.1 Detroit, 264; As this Court held Dearden v 269 NW2d (1978), intent, discerned,” legislative “where it can be controls the
question provisions governmental whether unit is Twp Dep’t Resources, Burt v Natural In another’s ordinances. v Washtenaw Co Opinion Weaver, J. 46.11 of the CCA part that pertinent provides may: of commissioners boards remove, designate of, a new site site
(b) Determine the county building. for a
[*] [*] [*] *13 necessary jails, offices, buildings clerks’ (d) Erect the county prescribe buildings, the time and and other erecting them. manner of Township Zoning Act hand, the On the other (tza), townships with broad 125.271 et vests seq.,
authority
regulate
land
to enact
ordinances to
development
of land
and “to insure that the use
shall
relationships
appropriate
locations
be situated
____”
Anticipated
125.271(1), MCL
cf.
125.273.
county-commission
by
Legislature,
not
the
and manner of
for,
site selection
and the time
over
by
erecting,
as stated
MCL 46.11
statutory authority
township’s
over
with the
conflicts
township
process
zoning.
both the
and substance of
by
powers
Legislature Three
vested
through MCL 46.11 are relevant to and
commissions
provides decisive of this case. MCL46.11
may
“prescribe
of,”
“determine the site
boards
“prescribe
erecting,”
. . . manner
... of
time
erecting”
buildings. Because
com-
of
statutory authority
express
missions have had this
the time and manner of erect-
over site selection and
county buildings
the CCA was first enacted
since
659, 669;
(1999), we held that
“Determine” and county-commission authority development over the county buildings (i.e., site selection and the time and construction). manner of To “determine” is “set (a dispute, ques- to; bound; limits define” or to “settle conclusively; etc.) tion, decide.” Webster’sNew World Dictionary (3d ed). “prescribe” College To is “to write ... beforehand to set down as a rule or direc- tion; order; ordain; direct.” Id. While CCA does not jurisdiction” include the words “exclusive in refer- county-commission authority ence site over selec- county buildings, tion for and construction of emphasized Court has that such “talismanic words” unnecessary convey Legislature’s are intent to immunity zoning. supra create from local Burt, 669.
Where,
here,
board seeks to site a
building
in a
district where
building
the commission’s intended use for the
is not
*14
permitted.,
power
the commission’s
to “determine the
county building
site of” a
conflicts with the town-
ship’s authority
to create
districts that exclude
125.271(1).
defined
46.11,
land uses. MCL
Moreover,
authority
“prescribe
erecting”
to
...
the time
majority suggests
“substantively
The
that MCL 46.11 was
amended in
1998,”
explain
ante at
but fails to
how the 1998 amendments were rel
powers county
Further,
evant to the
commissions have held since 1851.
resolving
the doctrine of last enactment seems an odd
choice
this case
argued
support
implied repeal
because the doctrine is most often
to
county argues
one law
a later enacted law. Not even the
that the CCA
repealed any portion
Perhaps
repeals by impli
of the tza.
that is because
Comm,
cation are not favored. Washtenaw Co Rd Comm’rs v Pub Service
663, 680;
county
township’s process
buildings affects the
for
reviewing
plans.
critically, my view,
site
More
authority
“prescribe
erecting”
to
. . .
manner of
county
township’s
buildings overrides a
control
through
physical
the enactment of ordinances of the
erecting buildings.3
details of
presented,
In circumstances such as those
county
authority
commission’s site-selection
and its
authority
prescribe
the time and manner of erect-
buildings
is diminished if the
board
comply
township’s zoning
just
must
with a
districts
as
township’s authority
to establish
districts
is
if
diminished the
commission need not com-
ply
township zoning
determining
districts when
county building.
light
a site
a
In
of the conflict,
relinquish
either the
or the
must
statutory authority.4
dispute,
some
In this
I would
power
hold that the combined effect of the
to “deter-
powers
“prescribe
mine the site” and the
the time
erecting” county
conveys
and manner of
convey
legislative
jurisdic-
clear
intent to
exclusive
siting
tion over the
and construction of
build-
ings
commissions.5
125.271(1) provides
regulating
develop
land
“[o]rdinances
may
adopted designating
limiting
location, height,
ment
also be
stories,
dwellings, buildings,
number of
may
and size of
and structures
[that]
altered;
yards, courts,
open
be erected or
the area of
and other
spaces,
sanitary,
safety,
protective
measures
shall be
required
dwellings, buildings,
for the
and structures
. .
. erected or
altered.”
4 Therefore,
surplusage argument
majority
compel
that the
finds so
ling
party prevails.
determining
is of small assistance in
which
authority
pursuant
distinguisha
boards
to MCL 46.11 is
Department
expressed
ble from that of the
of Natural Resources
(dnr)
the Natural
Resources
Environmental Protection Act
(nrepa),
seq.
324.101 et
nrepa
vests the dnr with the
to construct
Twp, supra,
public
Burt
boat
In
launches.
this Court concluded that while
*15
Opinion Weaver, J. majority justi- Further, reads more than can be regard- fied into the 1998 amendments of 46.11 county-commission authority ing a limitation of over by county Any required buildings law to be at a seat. county-seat county modification of the limitation on a authority suggested not, board’s site-selection by majority, does Legislature show that the “must have [on considered the issue of limits commission author- ity county buildings] over and intended no other limi- specula- reasoning tation.” Ante at 711. Such is sheer especially unconvincing county- tion and because a county seat limitation on site selection for certain appears consistently buildings to have been included in the CCA.6 Appeals panel suggested
The Court of
this conclu-
interpretation
impermis-
sion and
sibly
of MCL46.11 would
plenary
“graft
gloss
statutory provi-
. . .
on this
App
sion,”
356,
I
362;
Mich
institutions ....’” MCL 791.204. expressly Moreover, the authorized “ department provide develop- for the ‘unified ” “ penal ment’ of institutions ‘so that each shall form ” integral part system.’ general quot- an of a Id. at ing MCL791.202. I reasons,
For these concur the result of the majority opinion. noting that, contrary majority’s It suggestion, is worth majority’s construction of the seat site selection limitation is in no way “analogous to the discernment of intent undertaken this Court in
Dearden.” Ante Dearden focused on the text of the 711. dis statute to intent; Legislature’s majority cern the fails to consider text of the statute.