448 Pa. 466 | Pa. | 1972
Lead Opinion
Opinion by
Appellants, the Insurance Commissioner of Pennsylvania and intervenor Blue Cross of Western Pennsylvania,
Blue Cross filed a request on April 3, 1969, with the Insurance Commissioner for approval of an increase of rates charged to its subscribers in twenty-nine counties in Western Pennsylvania. The Insurance Commissioner then announced that a public informational hearing would be held to disclose the basis for the rate filing to interested persons and organizations and to provide such persons and organizations an opportunity to submit relevant information for consideration by the Insurance Department concerning the proposed rate filing.
At the hearing held on May 28 and May 29, 1969, the Insurance Commissioner announced that cross-examination of witnesses could be conducted only by the members of the Insurance Department. The City of Pittsburgh and the County of Allegheny objected to this limitation.
The Nonprofit Hospital Plan Act under which Blue Cross filed its application provides: “The rates charged to subscribers by nonprofit corporations, subject to the provisions of this act . . . shall, at all times, be subject to the prior approval of the Insurance Department. . . . If any such application is not approved by the department, notice thereof shall forthwith be served on
The statute in no way requires the Insurance Commissioner to hold a trial type hearing before approving or rejecting the proposed rate filing. Nevertheless it was clearly within the powers of the Insurance Commissioner to hold a public informational hearing. It follows that the Insurance Commissioner was fully authorized to refrain from conducting an adversary trial type hearing by limiting the right of cross-examination to members of the Insurance Department. Furthermore, the Legislature has expressly limited participation in the procedures provided for the approval of rates to the “applicant” for the rate filing (here Blue Cross).
The Legislature provided that only applicants for rate approvals participate in the proceedings before the Insurance Department and only applicants can secure judicial review of the Insurance Department’s rejection of the rate filing in the Commonwealth Court. Act of June 21, 1937, P. L. 1948, §4, 40 P.S. §1404.
The City of Pittsburgh and the County of Allegheny nevertheless contend that as consumers and representatives of consumers
We are satisfied that the Nonprofit Hospital Plan Act does not accord appellees the rights Avhich they sought to exercise at the informational hearing conducted by the Insurance Department. Accordingly, the order of the Commonwealth Court is reversed.
Hereinafter referred to as Blue Cross.
Pittsburgh v. Insurance Commissioner, 4 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 262, 286 A. 2d 475 (1971).
Act of June 4, 1945, P. C. 1388, §§1 et seq., 71 P.S. §§1710.1 et seq.
The rate filing consisted of a request for a rate increase of roughly 12.2% for 21-90 and standards subscription hospital agreements.
Because appellees did not request a supersedeas from the Commonwealth Court, the rates approved by the Commissioner have been in effect since November 1, 1970. The Commonwealth Court therefore ordered that the rates remain in effect pending the rehearing ordered by that court, Pittsburgh v. Commissioner, 4 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 262, 286 A. 2d 475 (1971).
Act of June 21, 1937, P. B. 1948, §§1 et seq., 40 P.S. §§1401 et seq.
Act of June 4, 1945, P. B. 1388, §§31-36, 71 P.S. §§1710.31-36.
The objections were based both on the grounds that this proceeding, was an “adjudication” for purposes of the Administrative Agency Law requiring a trial type hearing and in the alternative that due process required a trial type hearing in these circumstances.
See note 5, supra.
The portion of section 1404 which provides for judicial review of the Insurance Commissioner’s determination in the Court of Common Pleas of Dauphin County has been repealed by the Appellate Court Jurisdiction Act, Act of July 31, 1970, P. L. 673, §508(a)(59), 17 P.S. §211.508(a) (59) which transfers the jurisdiction in question to the Commonwealth Court.
Appellees base their claims of standing both on the fact, that they represent individual subscribers to Blue Cross and that the
Concurrence Opinion
Concueeing Opinion by
While I agree completely Avith the result reached by the Court, my approach to the problem differs slightly, and I add this word of explanation.
The Administrative Agency Law, Act of June 4, 1945, P. L. 1388, §1 et seq., 71 P.S. §1710.1 et seq., de
The Administrative Agency Law grants to “parties” certain procedural rights before agencies which are subject to that statute, including the right to reasonable notice and an opportunity to be heard, the right to cross-examine, the right to submit and argue briefs. Appellants here, however, were not “parties” and, as indicated above, were not entitled to be “parties”. Therefore, none of these procedural requirements can be claimed by them, and for that reason the decision by the Commonwealth Court here appealed was in error. I would not, however, as does the majority, state this conclusion in terms of lack of “standing”. In my view it can be more clearly stated as follows: appellants have no right to the procedural due process provisions of the Administrative Agency Law because they have no right to be parties in the proceedings questioned.