84 W. Va. 449 | W. Va. | 1919
Plaintiffs are the successors in title to the lessee in two oil and gas leases executed by the owners of separate tracts of land lying in Monongalia county. These leases are indefinite in their term, and are what is commonly called “no term leases.” They provide for the drilling of a well within a certain time, or for the payment of a certain sum of money quarterly in lieu of drilling. Por a number of years the plaintiffs and their predecessors paid the commutation money in lieu of drilling and kept the leases alive in that way. At the end of one of the quarterly periods for which this commutation money had been paid the landowners notified the holders of the leases that the same were •cancelled, and refused to receive the rental monies for the next quarter. This contention of the landowners was disput■ed by the holders of the leases. Shortly thereafter the owners of the land made other leases to the defendants, or their predecessors, covering the same tracts of land, and both plaintiffs and defendants thereupon made locations upon each of the tracts of land with a view to drilling for oil or gas thereon. In the one instance the landowner, and in the •other the defendant,. Pentress Gas Company, filed their bills in the circuit court of Monongalia county setting up. the facts as aforesaid, and asking that the plaintiffs here be enjoined from drilling upon said land under the old leases, contending that the same were cancelled, and also be enjoined from interfering with the holders of the junior leases in their operations upon said' lands. This injunction was granted, and while it was in force the defendants, claiming under the júnior leases, drilled a well on each of the tracts
Having reached this conclusion, what then are the plaintiffs entitled to recover in these cases? In case of a trespass to real property by removing timber or mineral therefrom, it seems that the injured party may sue for damages done to the estate, or he may bring his suit in the nature of trover and conversion for the thing severed from the estate, and recover it, or its value. In case he sues for the injury to the estate, the measure of his damages is the depreciation in the value thereof by reason of the trespass, but in case-he elects to waive any consequential injury by reason of the trespass and sue only for the material severed, or its value, then the measure of his damages is arrived at in another way. By severing a part of the freehold and converting it into personalty the trespasser does not thereby become vested with title. The title still remains in him to whom the real estate belonged at the time the trespass was committed, and he can follow the article so long as he can find it and recover it for his own benefit without any deduction for the cost of making the severance. Gaskins v. Davis (N. C.) 25 L. R. A. 813, 44 Am. St. Rep., 439, and note. In this case the plaintiffs do not seek to recover damages for the injury .inflicted upon their estate. They seek to recover the value of the oil taken from the property by the defendants as a result of the trespass committed upon their rights. They do not attempt to recover the oil itself, for the very good
But the defendants claim that these cases are controlled by the decisions of this Court in the cases of Williamson v. Jones, 43 W. Va. 562, McNeely v. South Penn Oil Co., 58 W. Va. 438, and South Penn Oil Co. v. Haught, 71 W. Va. 720, in. each of which cases it was held that a joint tenant who had committed waste upon the common property, by producing and selling the oil therefrom, should be given credit in an accounting for the amount expended by him in such production. In all of those cases the party committing the waste did so with knowledge or means of knowledge of the facts affecting his title. In the Williamson and Jones case Jones claimed to be the owner of the whole of the land, and believed himself to be such owner, having bought the same at a judicial sale, but the court held that he was chargeable with the knowledge that an inspection of the record would disclose. To this extent this decision is stronger against the trespasser than that of Guffey against Smith, above cited, for in that case the Supreme Court held that even though the senior lease was recorded, the junior lessee would not be charged with notice of it from that fact alone. Believing
The plaintiffs claim that they are entitled, not only to the oil received by the ’defendants and sold by them, but also to-the one-eighth thereof delivered to the owners of the land. They argue that while it is true the landowners are entitled to receive one-eighth of the oil produced, yet this delivery of the one-eighth to the landowners by the defendants did not fulfill their contract with the landowners. TMs may be quite true, but it must be borne in mind that the plaintiffs are only under obligation to deliver to the landowners one-eighth of the' oil produced by them. They are under no obligation to deliver one-eighth of the oil produced by a trespasser, especially when such trespasser is put upon the land by the landowners themselves. We do not think, therefore, that the plaintiffs’ contention in this regard has merit.
Plaintiffs also contend that they are entitled to receive, not only the price at which the oil was sold, but to have interest thereon as a part of the damages, from the time the defendants received the money until it is paid to them, and they further contend that they are entitled to receive the highest ' market price of the oil between the time that it was produced and the institution of these suits. Both of these contentions cannot stand. Their bills in these cases pray that they be decreed the amount received by the defendants for the oil produced and sold from the premises. This is inconsistent with the demand for the Mghest market price of such oil between the date of its production and the bringing of the suits. Plaintiffs were, however, entitled to have this money at the time the oil was converted into money. The oil was theirs and they elected by their suits to take what defendants actually received for it, but contend that as part of their damages interest should be added to this amount until the sanfe
In these cases we are of opinion that the plaintiffs are entitled to decrees in their favor for the amounts actually received by the defendants for the oil sold by them from the premises, with interest on each of these aifiounts from the time the same was so received until the entry of such decrees, without any deduction therefrom for money expended by the defendants for producing and marketing such oil. The decrees appealed from will be reversed and the cases remanded for the entry of such decrees.
Reversed and cause remanded.