2 Morr. St. Cas. 1655 | Miss. | 1871
At the October term, 1868, of the circuit court of Copiah
The main question presented by the record in this case for our consideration is, wap the corpus delicti sufficiently established by the evidence on the trial in the court below, to justify the conviction of the accused. In order to arrive at a correct conclusion it is necessary to understand in the first instance, what is meant by the terms corpus delicti, or in other words, the body of the offense charged. The corpus delicti is made up of two things: first, certain facts forming its basis; and secondly, the existence of criminal agency as the cause of them. In a case of felonious homicide, it consists of two substantial fundamental facts: 1st. The fact of the death of the decased; and 2d. The fact of the existence of criminal agency as the cause of the death. The first of these constituents is always required to be proved either by direct testimony, or by presumptive evidence of the strongest kind. And the second of these constituents becomes a proper subject of presumptive reasoning upon all the facts and circumstances of the case. A dead body or its remains, having been discovered and identified as that of the person charged to have been killed, and the basis of the corpus delicti being thus fully established, the next step in the process, and the one which serves to complete the proof of that indispensable preliminary fact, is to show that the death has been occasioned by the criminal act or agency of another person. This may always be done by means of circumstantial evidence. All the facts and circumstances of the case may be taken into consideration.
Prominent among the testimony necessarily made use of at this stage of investigation, is that of medical and scientific persons, surgeons, physicians, and chemists, by whom the body or its remains have been inspected and examined, either at the time of their discovery or shortly after. The testimony of these witnesses, as to the appearances observed on such-
In the important case of Stringfellow v. the State, 26 Miss., 157 and 165, the authorities upon this subject have been reviewed at considerable length by the court, who came to the conclusion, after great deliberation, that the doctrine which holds that in capital felonies, the prisoner’s confession, when the corpus delicti is not proved by independent testimony, is insufficient for his conviction, best accords with the solid principles of reason, and the caution which should be applied in the admission and estimate of this species of evidence ; and that the extrajudicial confession of a prisoner, without proof aliunde of the commission of a felony, was insufficient to warrant his conviction.
Greenleaf, in the 1st volume, section 217, of his very valuable treatise on evidence, says: “Whether extrajudicial confessions, uncorroborated by other proof of the corpus delicti are of themselves sufficient to found a conviction of the prisoner, has recently been gravely doubted in England. But in the United States the prisoner’s confession, when the corpus delicti is not otherwise proved, has been held insufficient for his conviction, and this opinion best accords with the humanity of the criminal code, and with the great degree of caution applied in receiving and weighing the evidence
We think the well considered case above cited, of String-fellow v. the State, announces the correct doctrine upon the subject of the extrajudicial confessions o,f the accused in capital felonies. We think the doctrine of that case, which holds that in capital felonies the prisoner’s extrajudicial confession when the corpus delicti is not proved by independent testimony, is insufficient to warrant his conviction, is sustained by authority and best accords with the principles of reason, justice, and policy.
In the case at bar, the jury must have founded their verdict upon the confessions of the accused, for independently of those confessions there was no evidence to establish the existence of any criminal agency of the accused in the production of the death of the deceased. Dr, Peets, the only witness who testified that the deceased came to his death by poison, does not implicate the accused in the supposed poisoning of the deceased, nor is there any testimony in the record, aliunde his confessions, that tends to show that the accused had any agency in procuring the death of the deceased; and the prosecution having thus wholly failed to prove the corpus delicti by evidence other than the confessions, the verdict was unsupported by evidence, and the conviction was therefore wrong, and cannot be sustained.
Dr. Peets, who was the first physician called to the deceased, testified that he thought that he had congestion, either of the brain or stomach, and actually treated the case as one of congestion, but afterward came to the conclusion that he was poisoned, and died from the effects of the narcotic poison of the Jamestown weed or stramonium; stated that similar symptoms in the disease of the heart, and congestion of the brain or stomach would be produced as he found in the case of the deceased, such as cold sweat, cold extremities, loss of the use of the limbs, headache, vomiting and slow, full and intermittent pulse. He further testified that a person in apparent good health, is liable to attacks of disease of the heart and congestion of the brain or stomach as other persons; and that persons dancing in a warm room, or from any uncommon exercise, are liable to such attacks. Many cases reported in which persons were stricken suddenly, as above stated, when dancing; that dilation of the pupil of the eye would occur from congestion or disease of the heart as well as from the effects of narcotic poison. Witness could not state from his professional knowledge that the deceased came to his death from the effects of poison; thought, however, that he was poisoned; said that lelirium and spasms would follow from the effects of narcotic poison, such as Jamestown weed or stamonium.
Pomp Newell testified, on the part of the State, that on the night before James Magee’s death, he had a party and dancing at his house; saw the deceased dance two or three times; the room they danced in was a log house, about sixteen by eighteen feet in size. The house was well lighted by a large pine-knot fire in the fire place, and had no other light; there was a crowd in the room; that the deceased, after he was taken sick, did not seem convulsed or delirious in any way, but lay quiet on the bed as though he was asleep.
Dr. Durr testified that he saw the body of the deceased some nine or ten days after it had been buried, when it was disinterred; that he opened the body and took out the stomach, but made no analysis of its contents; saw no evidence of poison in or about the body or stomach.
The symptoms produced by stramonium are intoxication, delirium, loss of sense, drowsiness, a sort of madness and fury; loss of memory, convulsions, paralysis of the limbs, cold sweats, and excessive thirst and trembling. 2 Beck’s Medical Jurisprudence, 867. And Dr. Peets testifies that delirium and spasms would follow from the effects of narcotic poison, such as Jamestown weed or stramonium.
There is no evidence that the deceased had any of the prominent characteristic symptoms produced by stramonium, such as delirium, spasms, and convulsions. He had, however, other symptoms, which are common to both congestion and narcotic poison. He had been dancing some time in a small,
From the evidence of the medical witnesses, it was just as reasonable to suppose that the deceased came to his death from natural causes as from the effect of poison. As we have seen, he had all the symptoms, and may have died of congestion of the brain or stomach. And if so, the conviction even upon this ground, is of more than doubtful propriety, and cannot be sustained upon any principle of humanity or of sound law. For it is the exclusion of every other reasonable hypothesis than that of the guilt of the accused, that invests mere circumstances with the force of proof.
For the reasons herein stated, the judgment of the court below must be reversed and the cause remanded.