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Pitts v. Dallas County Bail Bond Board
23 S.W.3d 407
Tex. App.
2000
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*1 nothing received question, Diversified purchaser an for sified not innocent id; See see more a chance at title. notice. than value without 75, Ortiz, Tex. v. also Woodward judgment record contains summary The (1951). purchaser As the S.W.2d following the documents: the Condras deed, cannot en- quitclaim a Diversified of deed, conveying the divorce original decree a fide bona joy protections the afforded Condra, the property to Jessie deed grantee quit- a purchaser, because Halls, Bell to the from Jessie Condra purchaser claim is not an innocent deed Louis judgment against of Con- abstract Woodward, 237 without notice. See dra, and deеd to Diversi- the constable’s (stating purchaser quit- S.W.2d at 291 presented fied. The Halls the trial court of a enjoy protection could not claim deed responses discovery with Diversified’s v. Smith Morris purchaser); bona fide show, original that other than the $200 Co., (Tex.App. sale, at constable’s Diversified did paid n.r.e.) (stat ref 'd —Corpus writ Christi or on pay any not taxes other assessment quitclaim in a deed takes with ing grantee any im- property, pay nor did it title). grantor’s in the notice of all defects property. It is undis- provements to that, at time puted constable’s established, as We conclude Halls sale, any did Louis Condra not own inter- law, an that Diversified was not matter of Nonеtheless, est in the Diversi- property. for value without no- purchaser innocent fied claims to own undivided one-half tice. property. interest in the single We Diversified’s issue. overrule title, Having chain of established their judgment. We the trial court’s affirm Halls argued the trial not a purchaser Diversified was bona fide They argued

without notice. Diversi- any

fied could not have received interest in property

their because Louis Condra did any Upon

not have interest in it. examin-

ing deed constable’s received Diver-

sified, we When agree. paid Diversified sale, at the constable’s it received

$200 PITTS, Appellant, J. Terrance estate, conveyed right, deed that “all of the D. title interest which the said Louis property.

Condra had” deed BAIL COUNTY DALLAS BOND any warranty. did not contain covenant BOARD, Appellee. hold the constable’s deed to We No. 07-99-0222-CV. Rog quitclaim Diversified is a deеd. See ers, (explaining at 769 the na Texas, Appeals Court deed). quitclaim A quitclaim ture of a Amarillo. title, interest, or conveys any deed claim March 2000. profess it grantor, but does 8,May any Opinion Rehearing

the title valid nor does it contain It of title. See id. warrant or covenants 7, 2000. Rehearing Overruled ‍​‌‌‌‌‌‌​‌‌​‌​​​‌​​‌‌‌​‌​‌​​​‌‌​‌​​​​​‌‌‌​​‌‌‌‌‌‌‍June person title in the hold does establish deed, ing merely passes but whatever property.

interest has in the grantor Thus, only whatev

Id. Diversified received title, interest,

er or claims Louis Condra

had, Because Louis nothing. which was property in no title to the

Condra had

4H Long, Hill, Atty., Dist. John Clark Bill Dallas, appellee. IV, Atty., Dist. Asst. C.J., BOYD, REAVIS Before JOHNSON, JJ. BOYD, T. Chief Justice.

JOHN challenge to an involves a This pursuant award Act Attorneys’ Award Rights Fees Civil 1988) (42 claims arising § out of U.S.C. County Bail Bond against the Dallas made Title 1983 of under Sеction Board Terrance J. Appellant States Code. United (Pitts), assert- presents points of five challenging adequacy error ed Finding award. no reversible trial court judgment, trial we error *5 it. affirm is appeal from which this

The action which brought was severed from suit between Eddie Dees and originated (the County Bail Board Dallas Bond Board). claims asserting Pitts intervened 42, Board Title Section against the under Code, alleged for 1983 of the United States his including his civil deprivation rights, seeking injunctive right process to due and 42, attorney’s under Title relief and fees suit, the As a 1988. result of Section August judgment trial court rendered 1993, $570,123.81 awarding Pitts in actual him ordering Board to issue damages, card, ID and employee a bail bondsman’s сoncerning the making certain declarations practices Pitts. The of business legality Board also awarded judgment $570,123.81 Pitts owed for forfeiture debts recovery and the Board offset That against that Board. Pitts’s claim for also severed § under 42 U.S.C. 1988. fees fees claim Pitts’s severed for 8, February to the court was tried testimony his attor- presented the He Price, expended Carolyn that she ney, in the civil representing hours Pitts 1098 Price, hourly Findley Arlington, ap- and that a reasonable Carolyn rights action The Board rate for her services was pellant. $175. 412

presented evidence that gard 125 hours was a all evidence and inferences to the reasonable amount of timе work on the contrary. Lewelling Lewelling, case hourly (Tex.1990). and a reasonable 164, rate for a S.W.2d If there person experience of Price’s was between more than a scintilla of support evidence to The trial $100 court rendered $135. finding, challenge the no-evidence 5, 1999, judgment March awarding Pitts must fail. Id. In considering a factual $30,000in attorney’s in pros- fees incurred sufficiency point, we review all the evi ecuting his Section 1983 judg- suit. The dence and if only challenged reverse $5,000 ment also awarded for an finding against is so great weight $2,500 the Court of Appeals, event preponderance of the evidence as to be petition filed, for discretionary review was manifestly unjust. Pool v. Ford Motor $1,500 and an additional in the event the Co., 629, (Tex.1986). We petition granted. requested are not ‍​‌‌‌‌‌‌​‌‌​‌​​​‌​​‌‌‌​‌​‌​​​‌‌​‌​​​​​‌‌‌​​‌‌‌‌‌‌‍so bound by the trial court’s con findings of fact and conclusions of law on law, clusions of and review those conclu March 10. He then filed motion for new sions de novo in order to determine their trial and past notice of due findings of fact Bludworth, correctness. Mercer v. April conclusions of law on 5. April On (Tex.App S.W.2d [1st . —Houston signed the trial court findings of fact n.r.e.), writ Dist.] ref'd reversed on and conclusions of law proposed by the grounds, Shumway other v. Horizon Cred Board. challenges Pitts now the trial (Tex.1991). it Corp., 801 court’s award of five parties agree thаt the determination points of asserted error. fees in a case of type Pitts’s first assignment broadly of error must be made in accordance with the alleges the trial court failed to analyze his factors set out Fifth Circuit attorney’s fee application in accordance Georgia Highway Johnson v. Express, with applicable presents law. He three *6 Inc., (5th Cir.1974). They F.2d arguments in support point. of this The 1) 2) are: the and required; time labor the argument first challenges legal the and novelty difficulty questions and of the in- sufficiency factual of the support- evidence 3) volved; the skill required perform to ing findings certain of fact and errors 4) legal the service рroperly; preclu- the the court’s conclusions of law. The second of employment sion other due to accep- assigns error to the court’s failure to make 5) case; 6) fee; tance of the customary the particular findings, argument and the third 7) whether the fee is fixed or contingent; challenge is a to the trial court’s failure to imposed by time limitations the client or award fees and other costs to 8) circumstances; the amount involved and Pitts incurred in the Section 1988 action. 9) obtained; experience, the results the reputation, ability attorneys; and of the Findings of fact entered a case 10) 11) case; undesirability the of the the tried to the bench have the same and force length nature and of the rela- professional dignity as a jury’s jury ques answers to 12) client; tionship with the and awards in P.R., In re tions. 994 S.W.2d similar cases. (Tex.App. pet. Worth dism’d — Fort w.o.j.). A findings trial court’s of fact are findings The trial court’s of fact were for legal sufficiency specifically renewable and factual to directed these factors. Ad- applied turn, the same standards dressing review each factor in findings those 1) ing sufficiency support the of the evidence were: The time required: and labor ing jury’s finding. City Anderson v. The trial court found attorney Price of Points, (Tex. Seven keep contemporaneous did not time rec- 1991). In reviewing point, working а no-evidence on the ords while Section 1983 only we consider the evidence favorable case but reconstructed those records about the decision of the trier of fact and disre December almost two and one half 2) the severed 1983 suit or to the Section judgment the in that ease. years after 3) fees; an award difficulty questions and novelty claim for The in- $30,000 The court the issue fees was found “to Price” for involved: of an to a bail right employee reasonable, volved when award not char- card. It did directly bond identification actually to Pitts and not was 3) that issue as or difficult. 4) acterize novel Price; misstated findings legal skill required to perform Pitts, The between relationship business prior Price The court found properly: service 5) BailAmerica; charac- Price, ” case, other handled one Section had com- BailAmerica as “Pitts’ terization 4) employ- pro preclusion The of other se. supported by the record. was not pany acceptance Price ment due to of the case: “nature of concludes Pitts corporate counsel for BailAmerica was trial court did show errors to 1993 identified from 1990 and had not them, findings prior signing read the to her work she had refused due any other underlying did not know facts 5) customary of Pitts. The representation case, to' applicable did not know the law or only noted finding fee: The applications.” § 1988fee hour, per although she sought Price $175 6) client. any had never billed rate to Pitts’s conclusion notwithstand contingent: the fee or any Whether is fixed fails to how ing, explain his brief fixed in that The court found fee was in the findings factual caused error these full Pitts’ employee Price was a time “for judgment. fundamental trial court’s It is BailAmerica” she had company and that may not be reversed judgment that a 7) agreement fee Pitts. no written with caused probably unless the error imposed by Time limitations the client or judgment or improper the rendition of The circumstances: court found there from appellant probably prevented the 8) no time The amount were limitations. case to this court. properly presenting the The involved and results obtained: 44.1(a). with Assuming, Civ.App. Tex.R. prevailing party found Pitts was the and the deciding, that is correct out 9) experi- the Section lawsuit. supported are not challenged statements ence, reputation, ability of the attor- evidence, by legally factually or sufficient neys separately addressed probably failed to the errors he has show fact, but is findings arguably covered pre in an or improper resulted finding only had the court’s that Price presentation appeal. of this vented *7 prosecuted one other сlaim. Section 1983 10) undesirability case: The The of the in argument sup Pitts’s second there that the court found was no evidence court point first that the trial port of his 11) nature and case was undesirable. The number failing specific in erred state relationship with length professional of the which hourly and the rate for of hours the client: The court found Price was argu was awarded. In that compensation years of Pitts for almost nine employee Butler, ment, v. 916 Pitts cites Von Clark corporate the rate and had been counsel at (5th Cir.1990). 255, 258 Von Clark F.2d 12) $2,500 month. in simi- per Awards urged rule support inflexible does There lar cases: was no evidence appropri Pitts. Clark recited by Von in similar cases. awards determining an award process ate involves the process fees. That findings conclu- specific of fact and “1) nature ascertaining] trial court challenged as incor- by sions of law by the 1) supplied the services and extent of a solo “plaintiff’ are that: rect 2) of the attorney, determine the value for a actually when he worked practitioner customary fee BailAmerica; according to the services bonding company named bail 3) work,” and 2) of the quality legal “by” Pitts’s the Section action was two Price, in the first party adjust when the fee determined attorney she was not steps, based on the other ently factors set out in designation found this unacceptable, Clark, Johnson. Von 916 F.2d. at 258. thus leading designation to a second filed The “nature and 29, 1999, extent of the July services” is seeking inclusion of 32 items typically expressed in terms of the action, number from the Section 1983 26 items of hours worked and the action, “value of the from the Section “any services” an hourly Opinions as rate. dis- other required by items law to be includ- cussing this issue often refer prod- to the pleadings ed.” The specifically were not uct of multiplying the number of hours listed for inclusion the clerk’s record worked appropriate hourly rate as and were not included. Rule 34.5 of the See, Clark, the “lodestar.” e.g., Von Apрellate Rules of provides Procedure at F.2d. that the record copies must include of the live pleadings, addition to the items In explication process designated by parties, par- “ unless the wrote, ‘to avoid the risk of remand ties designate the record by agreement the district court explain should with a pursuant to Rule 34.2. provides Rule 34.2 degree reasonable of specificity the find the parties may agree on the contents of ings and upon reasons which the award is appellate record written stipulation based,’ including an indication of how the filed with the trial court clerk. The result- Johnson applied.” factors were Von ing recоrd presumed will be to contain all Clark, 916 (quoting F.2d at 258 Copper filings appeal. evidence relevant to the Liquor Co., Adolph Inc. v. Coors 684 F.2d Tex.R.App. P. 34.2. (5th Cir.1982)). commenting After Here, parties filed a document enti- that the trial court did not follow a rigid “Agreed Stipulation tled Regarding Rec- step-by-step analysis of the Johnson fac However, ord.” this document was filed tors, the Von Clark court affirmed the trial 2, 1999, with this court August rather judgment. court’s at F.2d 260. It is than with the trial clerk required by as Clark, Johnson, clear from Von and Cop Rule 34.2. This document 11 pages lists per Liquor that trial court must make parties agreed items the have are “unnec- some determination of the extent of the essary” tо the resolution appeal. of this services and the value of those services. agreements Because parties between the However, they do not establish Pitts’s con given should be effect possible, whenever clusion that those determinations must be Swain, (Tex. Johnson expressed empirically the court’s find 1989), we treat the parties’ stipulation as ings of fact. The fact that the fees award to the record as in spite effective ed were within range supported by filing defect. Consequently, presume we evidence leads us to the conclusion petition support would an award of trial court did not abuse its discretion. attorney’s fees and costs in the Section argument support Pitts’s third of his (re 1988 action. See Tex.R. Civ. P. 301 point assigns first error to trial alia, to, quiring judgment to conform inter failure to award him prevail- costs to as “a *8 object the pleadings). Pitts did to the ing party” in the Section 1988 suit. Be- attorneys failure to court’s award fees and cause the directly record does not show in costs a motion for new in trial filed the petition that Pitts’s sought recovery of at- Section 1988 action. torney’s fees and costs in prose- incurred suit, cuting the Section addressing 1988 It wording is clear from the of the point requires this a brief discussion of the trial court’s in the Section 1988 $30,000 state of the record. original desig- Pitts’s case that the аward of was “for nation of the sought prosecution record inclusion of of in his claims Pitts v. Dallas Board, “the entire contents of the court’s file” in County Bail Bond trial court No. (the action) both the Section 1983 action and the Sec- 90-10765-F” Section 1983 and appar- tion 1988 action. The district clerk the of that cause. None of the trial

415 however, the before us. of concerned issue findings court’s fact or conclusions of rights right attorney’s plaintiffs addressed claim for Most a civil law Pitts’s involved attorney’s while in 1988 action. to fees incurred fees and costs the Section recover claim, on fact their civil not places great emphasis prosecuting rights the proceeding Board not contest the evi- fees incurred in a under Sec- ‍​‌‌‌‌‌‌​‌‌​‌​​​‌​​‌‌‌​‌​‌​​​‌‌​‌​​​​​‌‌‌​​‌‌‌‌‌‌‍that the did in to the concerning prose- fees incurred tion 1988. Pitts has failed show dence claim; however, attorney’s in not cuting awarding the Section 1988 an trial court erred opposing party’s challenge failure to an fees and other costs incurred Sec- of fees and costs not award other does tion 1988 action. party’s recovery to a right establish of and he points, In second third Pitts’s type.

that It is burden to show the Pitts’s to alleges by failing the trial erred by the obligated trial court law and reasonable of hours determine the number facts to award costs. This such he has 2) rate (point аnd the reasonable market failed do. 3). attorney’s (point for services support Pitts’s in of his second argument analysis begins Our with the of point contains an extensive discussion attorney’s a court may rule that not award attorney performed the services his and specific statutory fees and costs without attorney’s of the documenta- adequacy El authority. Paso Elec. Co. Texas challenges of expended. tion the hours He Ins., (Tex. 432, 443 Dept. of finding the trial court’s that Price’s time 1996). requires Federal a party law also contemporane- records not were created seeking specify fees to “the stat ously services when the were rendered ute, rule, or other grounds” showing their cites a in Board Edu- footnote Webb v. to attorney’s entitlement fees. See Fed. Co., 234, 6, n. Dyer cation U.S. 54(b). may R.Civ.P. Pitts’s claim be based (1985), for 105 S.Ct. 85 L.Ed.2d 233 that itself pro the belief Section 1988 proposition use of reconstruct- authority. necessary plain vides the dis- prohibited.” ed are “not That records reading compel statute does subject of cussion is not relevant to the provides: result. Section 1988 the trial which whether point, In or any proceeding action to enforce a failing specif- court erred determine 1981, 1981a, 1982, provision sections ic reasonable. number of hours that was title, this 1986 of [ ] 1681 et seq. [ ]42 U.S.C. U.S.C.2000bb conflicting ev The record contains seq. seq., ] et et or [ U.S.C.2000d idence trial court have consid could title, court, 13981 of section determining ered nature extent discretion, may its allow the prevailing First, performed of the Price. services States, party, other than the United a significant dispute reflects record part reasonable fee as reliability of time records. over the Price’s costs,.... as Although they admitted were not she until Price testi 1988. The omission of sembled into a bill U.S.C. Section contempo had some 1988 from the list of statutes which fied that she form may supporting recovered raneous about suggests be documentation abrogate percent of the time claimed. The this statute does general reliability Board of these challenged rule. Pitts cites several cases1 he fact, his the finder of it was argues show entitlement recover records. As to de prerogative fees and costs within the trial other Sec- cases, reliability this evidence. 1988 action. None of these termine the tion *9 1230, Cir.1985); Hauck, (5th Flight Zipes, 1. Pitts cites: v. 491 762 F.2d 1233 Attendants Justice, 754, 758, 2732, Department 691 F.2d U.S. 105 L.Ed.2d Jordan v. U.S. 109 S.Ct. Miller, (D.C.Cir.1982); (1989); City 620 Cunningham v. 514 Williams v. McKees Cir.1980). Cir.1986); (8th (3rd port F.2d 807 F.2d v. Cruz Medlin, 353, Medlin v. 354-55 In his point, fourth Pitts a advances denied); (Tex.App.—Amarillo writ general challenge to the amount of attor- ISD, see also LULAC Roscoe 119 F.3d ney’s Citing fees awarded. Justice Rehn- (5th Cir.1997) (holding court quist’s dissenting opinion in Riverside v. may reduce or eliminate Rivera, hоurs for which 477 U.S. 106 S.Ct. documentation vague or incomplete). (1986), L.Ed.2d 466 that the most critical The trial court also found some of the factor in the determination of fee awards is clerical, performed work obtained, which was the success places great Pitts compensation not entitled to at the rate for emphasis portion on that judgment Moreover, an attorney. the Board pre- in the Section 1983 awarding action him testimony sented a reasonable num- “more than half a million dollars.” His spend ber of hours to an action of this argument then recites that Pitts obtained type Dividing was 125. by total award for each hour Price worked on $519 range hourly suppоrted by rates case and describes his for an request addi- ($100—$175) evidence $191,000 leads to the conclu- tional in attorney’s fees as sion that the trial court has determined “roughly 33% of the damages actual the number of hours reasonably expended awarded to Pitts.” was between 171 and 300. This entire Nowhere in argument Pitts’s range is within the range supported by the support of point does he mention the Moreover, evidence. the trial court’s find- fact that in his favor was addressed, ings of fact specifically however offset, entirely penny, by judg to the briefly, factors discussed in John- ment in favor of the Board. It is clear son. The trial court’s failure to expressly from the record that the trial court deter state the number of hours it found reason- appropriate mined an sanction for the ably necessary does not establish that no Board’s conduct in denying Pitts’s license such determination was made. We over- wipe was to out Pitts’s debts to the Board. rale Pitts’s point. second This record suggests there was little to no point assigns third error to evidence of economic damages to Pitts. It the trial court’s “fail[ure] determine a supports also the conclusion that reasonable market rate.” argument His against Board’s claims signifi Pitts had support point of this contains extensive cantly $570,000 less value than because discussion of the conсerning evidence the Pitts’s were pay assets insufficient to hourly reasonableness rate. How judgment of that amount. We find these ever, as with point, argu his second these significant facts in weighing the success support point ments do not his of error. obtained it Pitts. While is clear that Pitts has not shown that the trial court Pitts repre obtained a benefit from Price’s applicable hourly failed to determine the sentation, we must also consider the entire sendees, rate for only Price’s that it did viewed, judgment in context. So we can express that determination. As men say the trial court’s award was so previously, tioned the fees awarded are against weight of the evidence as to consistent with determination the tri amount to an abuse of discretion. We al court of a hourly reasonable rate for point. overrule Pitts’s fourth Price’s services within range supported ($100/hr—$175/hr). by the evidence point challenges Pitts’s fifth has failed to establish that the trial court adequacy of the trial court’s award of at did not determine torney’s the reasonable market fees for of the Section 1983 rate for the performed argument services or that the action. The three-sentence express failure to the rate support point determined was of this is that it was error error. We point overrule his third of er for the trial court to award than the less ror. amount stated in the uncontroverted testi- *10 applicable, Rule 131 but agree We that is Pitts’s Ruth Kollman. mony expert, of scope position Pitts’s on the disagree testified that a reasonable fee with expert This defending appeal or an to for of costs. prosecuting $20,000, appeals of would be for support his claim In of $10,000 responding to a preparing for or costs, an affida original brief cited Pitts’s petition Supreme for review the Texas in a list of attorney, which included vit of his $5,000 if peti- an Court and additional recovery. he sought “costs” which for granted. tion were list, $2,163.80, This totals includes which support does Pitts’s as- The record photo and postage, parking, items such as testimony that his con- expert’s sertion Costs, expenses. meaning within the copy un- cerning appeal fees on was Rules of through of Rules 125 149 of the The controverted. record also contains Procedure, in are those items Civil testimony of Richman on the Marc to a response clerk’s of costs. In bill Richman issue of fees. testified costs, of request for an award a time that 50 hours would be reasonable parties which or party role is to determine appeal to on an of the Section 1983 spend court, adjudi to of to is bear the costs with testimony, together case. This Rich- specific Op cate the of items. correctness testimony hourly a reasonable man’s Par eration v. Planned Rescue-National range rate for Price’s services would from Texas, and enthood Houston Southeast of hour, per supports to the award $100 $135 Inc., (Tex.App 937 S.W.2d . —Hous court, $2,500 $5,000 of for to this in 1996), Opera ton in [14th Dist.] modified petition a is in the event for review filed Rescue, (Tex.1998); tion 975 S.W.2d 546 Supreme the Texas and an addition- Court Co., Reaugh Exploration v. McCollum $1,500 petition granted. al if such is We (1943). Tex. 167 S.W.2d point. overrule Pitts’s fifth specific inclusion taxed as costs is of items Finding ‍​‌‌‌‌‌‌​‌‌​‌​​​‌​​‌‌‌​‌​‌​​​‌‌​‌​​​​​‌‌‌​​‌‌‌‌‌‌‍judg- no reversible error duty by the performed clerk. ministerial below, the court affirm ment of we Reaugh, 167 at Correction of judgment. sought errors in items costs is specific by a motion to retax costs. Id.

ON MOTION FOR REHEARING Appellant Terrence Pitts moves for J. Although allocation rehearing original challenging disposi- our dis costs is a matter the trial court’s points tion in five These points of error. cretion, ap be on and cannot overturned 1) to our failure to him assign error award trial its dis peal unless the court abused 2) costs, affirming of attorney’s the denial cretion, is shown an abuse discretion 3) suit, in holding his section 1988 according when are not allocated to costs the trial court need not state specific it provisions of Rule unless makes hourly number of hours and rate on which University good cause. finding 4) based, awаrd of fees is Marsh, Lake v. Houston-Clear in trial refusing to find error court’s 912, (Tex.App. [1st Dist.] — Houston 5) fading and to his judgment, address 1998, no Because Pitts was success pet.). arguments on “reasonableness.” We sus- ful claim for fees incurred his first points tain Pitts’s two overrule suit, bringing the Section 1983 remaining points. finding any trial court not make relat did cause, point assigns ing good first error he entitled to recov to our under sustain failure to award him costs er court costs Rule 131. We section modify first point rehearing He cites Rule 131 of the his 1988 action. now trial court to award costs arguing that an Rules Civil Procedure him, him the trial court’s mandatory as determined award of costs as suit. bill of party” “successful the Sectiоn 1988 costs.

418

In point, argues his second Pitts rehearing, On Pitts cites additional cases erred in failing we to reverse the trial proposition for the that to the failure court’s denial of in attorney’s fees the Sec attorney’s spent award fees for time in 1988 tion suit. He we contends did so or obtaining defending a fee is er- award requiring without from evidence They ror. are Johnson v. State Missis- Board, (5th without citing any authority and Cir.1979); F.2d sippi, 606 635 Ustrak Hauck, addressing Fairman, (7th without Cir.1988); Cruz v. 762 v. 851 F.2d 983 (5th Cir.1985). 1230 F.2d An examination v. City Angeles, Clark Los 803 F.2d (9th Cir.1986). original opinion of our will reveal that we 987 suggests Pitts that our accepted Pitts’s uncontested evidence of application of section 1988 is inconsistent attorney’s true, fees in the 1988 aсtion as “every with other court” that has consid- found he Clark, but had failed to the law show issue. Citing ered the F.2d at 803 required the trial court award to those 992. relied on Clark case bankruptcy specifically fees. We each Inc., found of the Nucorp Energy, of In re 764 F.2d 655 Pitts, (9th cited by Cir.1985), cases listed in footnote 1 of relied, turn, which in on opinion, distinguishable. several federal district court and circuit opinions applying section These 1988. Pitts, each In case by plaintiffs cited cases do discuss the relied distinction to recover sought attorney’s expended fees original They on in disposition. our do right attorney’s to establish their to in fees show federal courts’ construction of section prosecuting rights a civil claim enumerated placed greater emphasis giv- 1988 has on by 1988. That same Section is the recov- ing underlying to its than to purpose effect ery Pitts seeks here. The distinction was language by strict adherence to the chosen cases, each of those authority congress. This is clear from the failure they upon, relied Piggie like Newman v. to explain why “may” these cases the word Inc., 400, Enterprises, Park 390 U.S. 88 given section 1988 is not permissive, its 964, (1968), 19 S.Ct. L.Ed.2d 1263 mandatory, rather than construction. (5th Feenstra, Kirchberg v. 708 F.2d 991 Cir.1983), was that to request establish Although construing we are presented fees was the un- statute, by federal we are not bound claim, civil derlying rights sepa- not as a of lower decisions federal courts. South original cause of In opin- rate action. our Lines, Greyhound western Inc. v. Rail ion, we plain language examined the Texas, 560, road Tex. Commission 128 1988 and it Section found that did not 263, (1936); S.W.2d Woodard authorize an in a award of fees Resources, Dept. Texas Human brought independently suit under that sec- 596, 598 (Tex.Civ.App. S.W.2d — Amarillo tion. State, n.r.e.); ref'd writ Barstow v. Although Pitts’s claim for 510 (Tex.App. S.W.2d — Austin separately, was tried the record shows denied). obligated writ We are claim originally asserted follow Su decisions United States by section 1983 suit and the trial severed on law. preme ‍​‌‌‌‌‌‌​‌‌​‌​​​‌​​‌‌‌​‌​‌​​​‌‌​‌​​​​​‌‌‌​​‌‌‌‌‌‌‍questions Court of federal court. It is not the record аpparent from at Greyhound, Southwestern whether one of the or the trial parties sought the severance. Because the statute, claim asserted in construing fees was Texas When original suit, long section 1983 and subse- courts have adhered to the distinction severed, quently “may” the case is more similar permissive between terms such as Cruz, See, Newman, mandatory and other eases cited and terms such as “shall.” Ass’n, e.g., than action filed Homeowners Inc. v. relied Inwood Meier, solely granted by (Tex.App to vindicate the rights . — writ). 1981, no Tex. section 1988. Houston See also 1998). (Vernon the trial court must simply § are factors Ann. 311.016 GovtCode at determining are the statutes “reasonаble We not free rewrite consider gov § legislative created branch of fee.” 42 U.S.C. 1988. We torney’s *12 Utility Texas point. Public Com’n ernment. overrule Pitts’s third of (Tex.1988). Cofer, merely urges we point Pitts’s fourth cited, and not Pitts has not we have challenges his properly to consider failed found, an of the States opinion United findings of fact and the trial court’s to directly Supreme addressing Court disagree over- of law. We and conclusions seeking fees right attorney’s to fees for point. fourth rule his opinion That under section 1988. court’s we point Pitts’s final contends Newman, concerning right in a plaintiffs his by failing “arguments to address erred attorney’s under 2000a- to fees U.S.C. 3(b) argues He that this on reasonаbleness.” very helpful. is That statute was failed to address the reasonableness in to of language similar section in of light the fees awarded the result of provided “may” that it a court award attor- Pitts, According misrep to we to obtained. ney’s fees and committed such award of his in the trial Id. The resented extent success the discretion of the court. stating the trial court’s ordinarily court held that a section 1983 suit party should unless in that action also awarded the special judgment recover such fees there are $570,123.81 deny the Id. at and offset that award circumstances to award. Board fed- 402. Several of the cases from lower award in of Pitts. He now with an favоr courts in eral have cited Newman constru- the Board’s represents judgment that ing similarity section Because predated judgment 1988. him against that language any between construed we section 1983 suit. While believe Newman that agree and section we arose to even confusion from failure applicable. the eases cited Pitts are acknowledge the existence of the Board’s brief, also that agree original We record does or the in his judgment offset any special supporting show circumstances no consequence it is of whether judgment the denial. We sustain Pitts’s second obtained in the sec Board’s point. suit preexisting. tion 1983 or was judgment wаs record shows the Board’s In point, challenges his third Pitts than its significantly less face value worth trial holding our court did have assets because Pitts did not sufficient reversibly failing to specific err state a satisfy it. It clear the trial court to is hourly number of hours and rate on which specific purpose amount for the chose attorney’s the award of fees was based. offsetting judgment and not of Board’s Industries, Magal He cites Cherne Inc. v. actual compensate damages. to Pitts for lanes, (Tex.1989), for judgment significant was of val While trial re proposition that court “was Pitts, to his contention that it had the ue these quired findings.” make Cheme $570,- money judgment value as for same actuаlly held that a trial court’s refusal offset, disingenuous. of any free any findings make of fact or conclusions point fifth overrule Pitts’s rehear We at request law after is error. Id. proper ing. Here, findings the trial court filed law, conformity disposition our of his just not the In with fact conclusions appellant’s mo- reject points, grant Pitts Pitts’s claim two we ones wanted. We first we rehearing for to the extent that by implication that we found tion improperly portion trial of the reasonable hours reverse “elements” costs recovery ex hourly reasonably judgment denying The hours rate. fees denying recovery are pended hourly and the rate defense, they establishing right not elements of a claim or his under section 1988. We remand that por-

tion to the trial court for a determination those fees The remainder of trial court’s is affirmed. *13 CLARK, Appellant,

Robert L. UNIT; Brock;

J.W. Estelle Milton Mi Velasquez;

chael Prause; Melanie Doe, Co, III;

John and The Texas De

partment Of Criminal Justice-Institu Division, Appellees.

tional

No. 01-99-00862-CV. Texas,

Court of Appeals of (1st Dist.).

Houston

March 2000.

Rehearing Overruled June

Case Details

Case Name: Pitts v. Dallas County Bail Bond Board
Court Name: Court of Appeals of Texas
Date Published: Jun 7, 2000
Citation: 23 S.W.3d 407
Docket Number: 07-99-0222-CV
Court Abbreviation: Tex. App.
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