433 S.E.2d 96 | Ga. Ct. App. | 1993
Joanne M. Pitts and Jacob Mitchell entered into a motor vehicle installment sales contract with a car dealership. The contract was assigned to Bank South Corporation. Pitts defaulted on the installment payments, and the bank repossessed the vehicle. The vehicle was sold, and the bank filed this lawsuit against Pitts and Mitchell to recover a deficiency balance. The bank moved for summary judgment, which the trial court granted in part. Pitts appeals, contending that a genuine issue of fact remains regarding whether she received legal notice under OCGA § 10-1-36.
OCGA § 10-1-36 provides: “When any motor vehicle has been re
The statute does not require that the debtor actually receive notice. See Calcote v. C & S Nat. Bank, 179 Ga. App. 132, 133 (2) (345 SE2d 616) (1986). Therefore, Pitts’ contention that a genuine issue of material fact remains regarding whether she received notice is without merit.
Pitts also argues, however, that a question of fact remains regarding whether the notice was actually sent. We therefore turn to consider whether the evidence in the record was sufficiently conclusive to resolve this issue against Pitts.
In support of its motion for summary judgment, the bank attached a copy of a notice of repossession sent to Pitts and the affidavit of its legal adjuster who testified that the notice was sent to Pitts via certified mail within ten days of the date of repossession. Such notice was mailed to the same address shown on the contract.
“On summary judgment, movant has the burden of showing the nonexistence of any material fact and that [it] is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. In ruling on a motion for summary judgment, the opposing party should be given the benefit of all reasonable doubt, and the court should construe the evidence and all inferences
The evidence as it stands in this record does not authorize the trial court’s decision granting suminary judgment to the bank, and we must reverse.
Judgment reversed.
We note that there is no evidence in the record indicating that Pitts had changed her address from that listed on the contract.