| Pa. | Jan 3, 1870
The opinion of the court was delivered, January 3d 1870, by
As the rule is well expressed'by an approved elementary writer, — “ the quality of the alleged libel as it stands on the record, either simply or as explained by averments and innuendoes, is purely a question of law for the consideration of the court:” 2 Starkie on Slander and Libel 281. That this was the law in England, both1 in civil and criminal proceedings, up to 1792, was maintained so rigidly that nothing was submitted to the jury in such cases but the fact of publication and the truth of the innuendos: Rex v. Woodfall, 5 Burr. 2661; The King v. The Dean of St. Asaph, 3 T. R. 428, note; The King v. Withers, 3
In England the courts have recently disregarded, to some extent, this plain distinction between criminal and civil proceedings. It appears to be put upon the ground that Mr. Fox’s Act, though limited in terms to indictments and informations, was declaratory of the law in all cases of libel; upon what principle of construction, however, it is not very easy to understand. It is there the approved practice for the judge in civil actions, after explaining to the jury the legal definition of a libel, to leave to them the
Yet it is clearly held that a verdict for the defendant upon that issue will be set aside and a new trial granted: Hakewell v. Ingram, 28 Eng. Law & Eq. Rep. 413. “ Though in criminal proceedings for libel,” said Jervis, C. J., “there may be no review, in civil matters there are cases in which verdicts for the defendant are set aside upon the ground that the matter was a libel, though the jury found it was not.” This must be conceded to be an anomaly; and it will be best to avoid a practice which leads to such a result. The law, indeed, may be considered as settled in this state by long practice, never questioned, but incidentally confirmed in McCorkle v. Binns, 5 Binn. 340" court="Pa." date_filed="1812-12-28" href="https://app.midpage.ai/document/mcorkle-v-binns-6313670?utm_source=webapp" opinion_id="6313670">5 Binn. 340, and Hays v. Brierly, 4 Watts 392" court="Pa." date_filed="1835-09-15" href="https://app.midpage.ai/document/hays-v-brierly-6311493?utm_source=webapp" opinion_id="6311493">4 Watts 392. It was held in the case last cited that where words of a dubious import are used the plaintiff has a right to aver their meaning by innuendo, and the truth of such innuendo is for the jury. In New York, since the recent English cases, the question has been ably discussed and fully considered in Snyder «. Andrews, 6 Barb. 43" court="N.Y. Sup. Ct." date_filed="1849-03-05" href="https://app.midpage.ai/document/snyder-v-andrews-5457615?utm_source=webapp" opinion_id="5457615">6 Barb. 43; Green v. Telfair, 20 Barb. 11" court="N.Y. Sup. Ct." date_filed="1854-09-04" href="https://app.midpage.ai/document/green-v-telfair-5458862?utm_source=webapp" opinion_id="5458862">20 Barb. 11; Hunt v. Bennett, 19 N.Y. 173" court="NY" date_filed="1859-03-05" href="https://app.midpage.ai/document/hunt-v--bennett-3622744?utm_source=webapp" opinion_id="3622744">19 N. Y. 173, and the law established on its old foundations.
A libel may be defined to be any malicious publication,’written, printed or painted, which, by word or signs, tends to expose a man to ridicule, contempt, hatred or degradation of character: 1 Am. Lead. Cases 109; McCorkle v. Binns, 5 Binn. 340. The publication set forth in the declaration in this case, and given in evidence, was unquestionably a gross libel. Its language is clear and unambiguous, and it may be doubted whether, taken altogether, it needed any innuendo to point it to the plaintiff. Such innuendoes are given, however, and we must consider their truth to have been found by the jury. Its avowed purpose was to hold up the plaintiff below to public scorn and condemnation, as guilty of a crime carrying in its train household ruin and the wreck of domestic happiness. It denounced the act imputed to him as one characterized by the most shameless treachery and hypocrisy. No words could have been used more directly calculated to excite against him public hatred, or to degrade his character. Had the publication been confined to the petition filed in the Court of Common Pleas for a divorce, it might have been considered as privileged, and the plaintiff held bound to prove express malice: Curry v. Walter, 1 Bos. & Pul. 523; McLaughlin v. McMakin, Bright. Rep. 132; Nuff v. Bennett, 4 Sanf. 120. But the comments which accompanied it deprived it of its privilege. It has
These considerations dispose of the third and fourth assignments of error, and the first and second not being secundum regulam, must be treated as none.
Judgment affirmed.