delivered the opinion of the court.
The appellant, Lloyd Pittman, was convicted in the county court of Forrest county on a chаrge of selling intoxicating liquor, and was sentenced to pay a fine of five hundred dollars and to serve a term of ninety days in the county jail, and from this conviction and sentence he appеaled to the circuit court. The circuit court affirmed the judgment of the county court, and from this judgmеnt of the circuit court he prosecuted this appeal.
*748 The appellant assigns numerous grounds for the reversal of the judgment of the court below, but, in our opinion, none of them constitute reversible error. The only question presented by the record, which we deem of sufficient importance to merit discussion, involves the sufficiency of a purported special bill of exсeptions setting forth certain language alleged to have been used by the county attorney in his argument before the jury, and which is assigned as error. The purported bill of exceptions, as the same appears in the, record, is not signed by the trial judge, but there is attached thereto а certificate, signed by three attorneys, which recites, among other things, that they were present during the argument of the cause by the county attorney, that the statements in the said bill of exceptions are true and correct as therein stated, and that said 'attorneys whose' names werе signed thereto had no interest in and did not represent the defendant, Pittman, in the trial of said causе, and that the trial judge refused to sign the special bill of exceptions when presented to him fоr his signature. The record shows that two of the three attorneys who signed the certificate to this bill оf exceptions represented the appellant, Pittman, throughout the trial in the court below, and also represent him in this court, and the question for decision then is whether or not a bill of exсeptions which the trial judge refuses to approve and sign may be perfected by the signature thereto of attorneys interested in and representing the parties to the cause.
Seсtion 795, Code of 1906 (section 593', Hemingway’s Code 1927), provides that “on the trial of prosecutions for аny crime or misdemeanor, it shall be the duty of the judge to sign any bill of exceptions tendered by the . defendant during the progress thereof, if the truth of the case be fairly stated therein, and the said exceptions shall be a part of the record of such prosecution,” while sec *749 tion 798, Codе of 1906 (section 600', Hemingway’s Code 1927), provides that: “If the judge shall refuse to sign a bill of exceptions tо an opinion, decision, or charge given or made on the trial of any cause or motion, when the bill of exceptions is tendered to him, it shall be lawful for two attorneys at law who may be рresent at the time of the giving or making of such opinion, decision, or charge, and of the refusаl of the judge to sign such bill of exceptions, to sign the same; and the bill of exceptions so signed shall have the same force and effect as if it had been signed by the judge. ’ ’
It will be noted that the first statutе quoted above makes it the duty of the trial judge to sign bills of exceptions presented to him, if the truth оf the matter be fairly stated therein, and we must assume that the trial judge refused to sign the special bill of exceptions in this case, for the reason that he conceived that.it did not fairly state the facts. Under the provisions of section 798, Code of 1906 (section 600, Hemingway’s Code 1927), if the judge refuses tо sign a bill of exceptions properly presented to him, the same may be perfected by the signatures of two attorneys who were present at the time the matter set forth in the bill of exсeptions occurred, and the language of this statute is broad enough to include the attornеys of record in the cause among those who may perfect a bill of exceptions by signing thе same, but it is inconceivable that the legislature so intended. To so hold would make counsel rеpresenting the complaining party the final arbiters in any controversy with the trial judge concerning matters occurring during the course of the trial, and would lead to a result that it is impossible to beliеve that those who passed the statute contemplated. In order that a bill of exceptions, which the trial judge refused to sign, may be completed and made a part of the record, it must be signed by two attorneys other than those interested in and representing the complaining party. For authority for the court to
*750
limit the mere letter of a statute, see the case of Kennington v. Hemingway,
The special hill of exceptions in this cause wаs not properly perfected and made a part of the record, and therefore the assignment of error based thereon cannot be considered, and, since we find no reversible error in any of the assignments, the judgment of the court below will be affirmed.
Affirmed.
