*1 TOWNSHIP, A PUBLIC OF EDUCATION OF PISCATAWAY BOARD JERSEY, PLAINTIFF-RE OF THE STATE OF NEW BODY CAFFIERO, SPONDENT, CAF v. MR. MRS. JOSEPH JOSEPH O’DONNELL, FIERO, WIFE, CAFFIERO, JAY MR. DANIEL HIS O’DONNELL, WIFE, HIS AND FRANCIS O’DON MRS. DANIEL DEFENDANTS-APPELLANTS, NELL, AND MR. DEAN MAR MARTONE, WIFE, TONE, DEAN MAR DEAN AND MRS. HIS TONE, DEFENDANTS. ROSELLE, THE OF OF OF BOROUGH BOARD EDUCATION MONAGAS, (FIRST PLAINTIFF, MONAGAS, “JANE” v. TULIO MONAGAS, FICTITIOUS) ANGEL DE BEING AND NAME FENDANTS-APPELLANTS, AND AMERICAN GREAT INSUR COMPANY, ANCE INTERVENOR. February Argued June 1981. 1981 Decided *4 Martin, Joseph Jr., appellants for argued cause James D. Mannion, & Martin and Caffiero, (Lynch, Lewandowski et al. Rappa, attorneys). Monico & argued appellants the cause Daniel D’Amico for
A. Herbert O’Donnell, et al. for Tulio Mona- argued appellants Muscio the cause
Michael al. gas, et for Great Ameri- argued the cause intervenor
Joel N. Werbel Werbel, attorneys). (Methfessel Company & can Insurance curiae Associ- argued Hochman the cause for amicus Fredrica Jersey. for Children of New ation (Rubin, respondent cause argued Rubin for David B. Rubin, attorneys). Lemer & General, Jr., argued Ramey, Deputy Attorney
Alfred E. (John of Education J. for amicus curiae Commissioner cause attorney; Stephen Attorney Jersey, of New Degnan, General General, counsel). Skillman, Attorney Assistant Counsel, Weger, upon the brief D. Associate relied Christine Division on of amicus curiae Appellate to the behalf submitted (David Carroll, Gener- Jersey Boards Association W. New School Counsel, attorney). al was delivered opinion the Court
PASHMAN, J. constitutionality of
In these cases we must determine the lBA^-S,1 liability without imposes which who guardian any pupil or fault on general from the property. This statute distinct Jersey, parent, in New which holds parental statute liable person legal custody with of a child guardian or other against only when any property acts of vandalism the child’s supervision exercise neglect is failure or reasonable there 1N.J.S.A. 18A:37-3 provides:
control of the child’s conduct. N.J.S.A. 2A:53A-15.2 In con- trast, as we today, hold liability vicarious applica- statute is ble to the of school pupils. Consequently, challenge defendants its validity on process due and equal protection grounds. We hold that N.J.S.A. 18A:37-3 is constitu- tional.
I According to allegations complaint the civil filed by plaintiff Board of Education of Piscataway Township, defend- Caffiero, Jay ants Francis O’Donnell and Dean Martone broke High 9,1976. into Piscataway School on May time, At the these defendants were pupils enrolled as in the Piscataway school system. damage Extensive was allegedly caused building to the and property by inside acts of the three defendants. separate In complaint, counts of the the defendants’ acts are described as negligent either and careless or willful and malicious. complaint The also named as defendants the parents of each of the three pupils, seeking recovery grounds on the of either negligent supervision of the children under N.J.S.A. 2A:53A-15 or under N.J.S.A. 18A:37-3. The Caffieros and the O’Donnells answered the complaint, denying essentially allegations all the raising separate including defenses unconstitutionality of the vicarious liability Following statute. guardian any pupil injure any or who shall
property injury shall be liable for for the amount of the to be by any collected the board of education of the district court of competent jurisdiction, together with costs of suit. provides: 2The current version of N.J.S.A. 2A:53A-15 parent, guardian person having legal custody A or other of an infant years age neglects under 18 who fails or to exercise reasonable supervision infant, and control of the conduct of such shall be liable in a any willful, injury civil action for malicious or unlawful or destruction personal property such infant of the real or of another. suits, giving placed At the time of the acts rise to $250 these this statute parents’ liability. limit on the *6 judgment in the proofs by plaintiff, a default presentation of the $28,540 against the Mariones for was entered amount of costs, and administrative damages, including investigatory young of the three defendants.3 by caused the acts issue, of Educa- plaintiff Board To resolve the constitutional for judgment against parents all the summary for tion moved sons. The motion was submitted any damages by caused their parties. of the arguments briefs and oral pleadings, on the parents made certain admissions Although appears it the motion, clearly does not indicate purposes of the the record for effect, trial court con- were. In the what those admissions parents the for the questions unfavorably all factual sidered they be liable to the determining whether would purpose of It held the statute school under N.J.S.A. 18A:37-3. board process, and therefore void. unconstitutional as violative of due Div.1978). (Law N.J.Super. Appellate to the The of Education made a motion Board interlocutory court’s appeal Division for leave to from the trial and, granted the motion before Appellate order. The Division of Education of argument, appeal the with Board consolidated Monagas. Roselle v. Piscataway. On Roselle are similar to those of
The facts of 14,1975, building by at a owned December a fire occurred Subsequently, the Board plaintiff the Board of Education. Monagas, who was against Angel an defendant instituted action fire, of the his pupil system at the time and a in the school solely on parents. against parents The was based claim denying filed an answer 18A:37-3. The defendants allegations complaint raising separate as a defense of the unconstitutionality of the statute. The then moved The trial court dismissing against for an order the claim them. trial court granted expressed by for the reasons the motion of Education Piscataway in the earlier decision. The Board Caffieros, too, originally against judgment but 3The was entered default pursuant judgment order. this was later vacated to consent moved Appellate before the Division for leave to appeal. The granted motion was and the case consolidated with Piscataway. A Appellate divided Division panel reversed both trial court orders. It held that the statute is constitutional and therefore the parents by could found vicariously liable under the statute their, to school property by caused sons. 173 N.J.Super. dissenting judge agreed with the that the statute
is arbitrary and unreasonable and therefore violative of due process of law. He believed that vicarious liability without fault imposed could be only where a risk of harm has been created person act or omission of the held liable. He reasoned that imposition solely based on the status of the defend- *7 parents ants as logically was no different imposition from of liability based on some more tenuous relationship between the wrongdoer, defendant and grandparent, uncle, such as or wit- ness to the unlawful acts. Id. at 214 (dissenting opinion).
After the
disposition by
Division,
adverse
Appellate
the
de-
fendants filed a motion before this
appeal,
Court for leave to
granted,
which we
II N.J.S.A. 18A:37-3 provides: guardian injure The or of who shall school any pupil any property damages injury
shall be liable for for the amount of the to be collected the by jurisdiction, together board of education of the district in court of any competent with costs of suit. predecessor The of this statute was in part enacted 1867 as of an establishing public 1867, act system. school L. c. 179. The parental provision was included in concerning a section the discipline pupils public of in the schools. Id. at 47. § amici, According to the statute was upon by not relied school during Nevertheless, boards much of its existence. Legisla- 1903, (2d 1, ture reenacted the Sp.Sess.), statute in L. 1903 e. 271. c. by Title 18A L. part it as of and codified § deter statute to recently turned to the boards have School costs.4 burgeoning its cope with and to vandalism our education chapter of the of part the statute Because schools, its pupils public discipline of regulating the laws for their school districts compensating to is not limited purpose delinquent behav- purpose is to deter important losses. Another in the schools. maintaining discipline to aid in by pupils and ior mind. purposes in keep must these reading of the statute Any questions raised turning constitutional to the Before concerning scope issues resolve several appeal, we must this not limit the First, although language its does of the statute. clear pupils, it is public strictly to the statute among statutory other of 18A:37-3 position from the “pupil” that the word concerning public school children sections to applicable is not meaning. statute has that limited whether by their children caused parents generally school or not.5 attending to Second, purpose of the statute is aid one because “parents or that the words pupils, we believe disciplining person persons or only to refer guardian” were intended the word child. The inclusion of responsible for a who are not intend to Legislature did “guardian” indicates relationship. The parental liability solely on the basis impose legal custody and persons who have applies statute *8 basis charged can be on that a child and therefore control of for the child’s conduct. responsibility with include itself does not Finally, although the statute restriction, pupil must have damages by caused the a such damage property report to be of intentional to school 4The amici the costs per year. of dollars millions applies express where a school whether the statute no view here about 5We pupil parents in a different of a enrolled to recover from the board seeks system. public school
317
from willful or malicious acts. This construction fol-
resulted
aiding
of
purpose
disciplining
lows from the statute’s
of
against
property.
pupils
deterring
and
acts
vandalism
school
said,
Legislature
solely
was concerned not
with
As we have
damage
property
school
for
to
but also
compensating
boards
delinquent
Permitting
behavior.
the school
deterring
with
to
from the
where a child has caused
board
recover
damages negligently or without fault would not further
purpose
any way.
of deterrence in
A statute should not be read
reading is
Valer-
literally
contrary
purposes.
where such a
its
Newark,
(1980);
City
ius v.
84 N.J.
Restaurant
Co.,
(1968);
Enterprises, Inc. v.
Mutual Ins.
Ill statute, scope we Having defined the intended of the process it violates due of law as must now consider whether statute, 6Although “inventing” criticizes the a new the dissent Court say interpretation departs attempt from the nowhere does it how our consonantly legislative ordinary judicial interpreting statutes with function of See, Angelo Foundry, (1979), g., v. San 81 N.J. intent. e. Suter J., (Clifford, concurring). simply function id. at 203-04 We do not decline this because the statute is old. *9 318 legislation. We note first that the stat-
arbitrary
capricious
or
constitutional, Male v. Ernest Renda
presumed
ute is
to be
cert,
199,
denied,
839,
Co.,
419
95
Contracting
64 N.J.
U.S.
S.Ct.
69,
(1974);
Jersey Sports
Defendants the statute violates due be- relationship purpose cause no rational exists between deterring delinquent imposition and the of liability behavior on parents. They parental liability believe that a statute makes parents’ wrongdoing, sense if it is based on the own such as They argue 2A:53A-15. further that since there is necessary relationship delinquent no between a child’s behavior parents’ wrongdoing, the statute irrationally imposes liability solely without fault on the basis of status as parents. concept.
Vicarious
without fault
is not a new
against
upheld
process challenges
If has been
due
in a number
*10
Newark,
v.
of
City
A.
B. Auto
of other situations.
&
Stores
property owner for
(municipality liable without fault
to
supra
rioting mob);
Quality Bakery,
Adler’s
Inc. v.
by
caused
damages
Gaseteria, Inc.,
(1960) (owner
with
of aircraft
liable
32 N.J.
aircraft);
by operation
caused
of
ground
out fault for
White,
37 S.Ct.
R.R. Co.
U.S.
New York Central
injuries
for
to
(1917) (employer liable without fault
Under the circumstances obviously public Spreading itself. of costs injured party is the toway since the easiest 18A:37-3 purpose not the N.J.S.A. liability impose no purpose would have been to accomplish that losses pay for the compel public to on the decision is Manifestly, policy a different through tax dollars. through 18A:37- vicarious imposition of behind impor- that it was more apparently believed Legislature 3. The delinquent behavior and to deter compensate tant to purposes are say We that such spread to costs. cannot than imposition therefore an invalid basis unreasonable and Legisla- long the means chosen liability. As as obtaining ture have a rational relation objective sought, to the statute will not be in process violation of due of law as an capricious arbitrary or enactment. parent-child
The existence of the
relationship provides a
imposing liability
rational basis for
and is a reasonable
means
accomplish
purposes
compensation
and deterrence. The
Supreme
recognized
“parents
United States
Court has
have
important
‘guiding
an
role’
play
upbringing
in the
of their
Matheson, -
-,
-,
children.” H.L. v.
U.S.
101 S.Ct.
1164, 1172,
388, 399 (1981);
Baird,
67 L.Ed.2d
Bellotti v.
443 U.S.
622, 637-39,
3035, 3045-46,
S.Ct.
We note that courts in other
that have considered
process
due
challenges
parental
liability statutes have also
Gradzik,
sustained the statutes.
7,
Watson v.
Conn.Supp.
34
373
(Ct.Com.P1.1977);
A.2d 191
Burge,
Vanthournout
Ill.App.
v.
69
193,
685,
3d
25 Ill.Dec.
387
(1979);
Sorrell,
N.E.2d 341
In re
20
179,
Md.App.
(1974);
315 A.2d110
General Ins. Co. of America v.
Faulkner,
317,
(1963);
259 N.C.
The dissent’s that the statute will have its poor than a is the impact on the is no more hunch. Not any us evidence to a conclu- support record before bare of such claims Jersey but amicus New School Boards Association sion problem is as much a in affluent school that vandalism schools poorer as in ones. districts that fully agree Appellate we with the Division
Finally,
Trenton,
N.J.Super.
(App.Div.
holding
City
of Doe
b.,
(1977),
here.
In
1976),
applicable
aff’d o.
N.J. 137
respon-
Doe,
city
presumption
parental
a
ordinance created
delinquent
imposed
child
criminal
sibility for
acts of a
developed by the
parents. Applying
on the
the rule
prosecutions,
in criminal
Supreme
presumptions
Court
that it
not be said with “substantial assurance”
court held
could
likely
to flow from
presumed
fact is “more
than not”
*12
statutorily imposed
holding
of some courts that the
8We note also
by regular
liability
liability
parents
insurance
of the
homeowners’
covered
parents
would not come
these circumstances the
themselves
since under
provision excluding
liability
policy
torts.
the carrier’s
for intentional
a
within
Co.,
(1955);
Ins.
45
We conclude that N.J.S.A. 18A:37-3 holding parents guardian public or of a process of law vicariously pupil’s liable for the willful or malicious pupil school injury property. of school
IV equal protection challenge The defendants’ is based on differing parents public pupils treatment of school parents “pupil” of other children. If a child who is not a within meaning proper 18A:37-3 N.J.S.A. ty, recovery by the statute is unavailable as a basis of the school Consequently, board. the school board can recover from the parents only stringent if it can meet the more standards of parental or liability common law N.J.S.A. 2A:53A-15. Under statute, law, as well as common are this latter liable they neglected supervi if failed or to exercise reasonable 2; supra, of the child’s conduct. See at 313 sion and control n. Prosser, words, supra, pp. W. 123 at 871-73. In other § they must be at fault themselves before can be held subject parent liable. This standard makes it difficult to a contrast, damage. child causes In liability when his the stan applicable dard of vicarious without fault under the scope narrower 18A:37-3 is much easier for plaintiff school boards to meet. equal protection analysis,
Under
a statute must satis
fy
scrutiny
operates
the standard of strict
if it
to the disadvan
tage
impinges
“suspect
upon
of a
class” or
a fundamental
right.
constitutional
Antonio Ind.
San
School Dist. v. Rodri
1, 16-17,
1278, 1287-88,
guez, 411
93 S.Ct.
323
153,
84 N.J.
City,
interest. Matthews v. Atlantic
governmental
(1980). It
clear in this case that the statute does
167
is
classification,
suggest two'
suspect
but defendants
implicate a
rights
burdened N.J.S.A. 18A:37-3.
fundamental
This
right
these is the
to bear children.
The first of
discussion. The effect of the vicarious
assertion merits little
beget
decision of individuals to bear or
liability statute on the
impose
at
laws
financial
speculative,
best. Other
children
children.
they
given
have
birth to
burdens on
because
9:2-6;
9:6-1,
2C:24-5, 2C:62-1,
Grotsky v.
See N.J.S.A.
Slate, 12
426
(1971); Greenspan v.
N.J.
Grotsky,
Since equal protection rationally if “it satisfy requirement the of will there purpose articulated state and legitimate, some furthers ” an invidious discrimination.... San does not constitute fore at 93 Rodriguez, supra, Dist. v. U.S. Antonio Ind. School recently by the has been described at 1288. This standard S.Ct. Supreme Court: passing
Legislatures
the inevitable effect
wide discretion in
laws that have
have
legislative
treating
from
and
classifications
others,
of
some people differently
objec-
to a
state
valid unless
bear no rational relationship
permissible
are
they
tive.
varying
legislative
“unless the
treatment of
will be
classification]
upheld
[A
groups
combina
is so unrelated to the achievement of any
different
or persons
legislature’s
legitimate
can
conclude that
tion of
that we
purposes
Hughes,
441 U.S.
S.Ct.
347, 351-52,
actions were irrational.”
[Parham
(1979)
quoting
(plurality opinion),
Vance v.
The fact that
deterring delinquent
by
behavior
non
problem
address the
of
school
problem
compensating
or the
of
public school children
deprive the statute of
for all acts of vandalism does not
districts
problems
resolution of
may
its rational basis. A state
undertake
time,
problem
step
addressing
part
itself to the
of
one
at a
Oklahoma,
Optical
Lee
that seems most acute. Williamson v.
461, 465,
483, 489,
Since N.J.S.A. parents based on against an action cases can maintain these however, that prove, will have to liability. They Thus, given construction we have it. applies under the statute show that the defendant boards here must the school they the time pupils control of the at legal custody and had maliciously damaged property. willfully and admissions, which are parents made certain Piscataway, In procedural us. In the from the record before not ascertainable must reconsider present, the trial court of the case at posture board judgment motion of the school summary whether Roselle, the trial opinion. In granted light in of this should be count must against parents. That the count court dismissed reinstated. now be with proceedings consistent the trial courts for remand to
We Division is af- Appellate of the judgment opinion. this jurisdiction. not retain firmed. We do CLIFFORD, J., dissenting. entirely to me what Disraeli had in mind when
It is not clear things public he observed that there are two should never I being sausage see made: and the law.1 But venture the aptly process fits the in notion that the remark which the Court engaged today. has relic, N.J.S.A. statutory
We have before us in 18A:37-3 a War, years prior created but a few short after the Civil even to Amendment, adoption “spare-the- of the Fourteenth in the There is not the rod” era. faintest hint of what moved the legislature up curiosity, come with vague to this other than some discipline pupils idea of in the schools. It has until lie, unused, recently permitted unrecognized, been and un- wanted, in the mercifully state of desuetude to which it had consigned. modern-day legislature sought been When a problem address the of malicious acts of by young vandalism people, wisely right sorry it ran over this reminder past of times Ill, codified in N.J.S.A. currently and enacted L. c. 1970, 246, supplemented 2A:53-14 and and it L. c. found N.J.S.A. 2A:53-16 17. represent These statutes a bal- “paren- anced treatment of the nexus between “vandalism” and neglect tal of child-supervision.” See 2A:53A-14. In the meantime their forebearer remains on the books in *16 N.J.S.A. 18A:37-3. Rather than deliver to it sockdolager it deserves, richly encourages so the Court its resurrection. It by interpreting does so not that enactment but inventing a new thereby only gives blessing one. It its to unsound will, policy suspect, impact largely poor statute I on the —the liability upon and can be used to visit of children who parents’ have remained immune to their best efforts at the job, parenting world’s most perpetuates difficult also an —but Shields, 139, 604, 605, (1978) 1 SeeMatter of Estate of 224 Kan. 584 P.2d J., (McFarland, dissenting). epigram is sometimes attributed to Bis marck, though even it does not sound much like the Iron Chancellor. See In Graham, 16, (Fla.1958). re Petition of 104 So.2d enactment riddled with constitutional defects. Those defects spelled are Judge out in Crane’s perceptive below, dissent N.J.Super. agree at 212. I with him respects in all and vote to reverse. WILENTZ,
For affirmance —Chief Justice and Justices SUL- LIVAN, PASHMAN, SCHREIBER, HANDLER and POLLOCK —6.
For reversal —Justice CLIFFORD —1.
IN THE MATTER OF THE BOARD OF EDUCATION OF THE TRENTON, CITY OF MERCER COUNTY.
Argued May 1981 Decided June 1981.