Opinion
The plaintiff, Eileen C. Pirolo, appeals from the judgment of the trial court, rendered following a jury trial, in favor of the defendant, Yolanda DeJesus. On appeal, the plaintiff claims that the court improperly admitted into evidence a diagram attached to a police accident report. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.
The following facts and procedural history are relevant to the plaintiffs appeal. On August 10, 2001, the plaintiff and the defendant were involved in a mоtor vehicle accident at the intersection of Defco Park Road and Washington Avenue in North Haven. At trial, the plaintiff and the defendant provided confliсting accounts as to how the accident occurred. The plaintiff testified that the vehicle she was driving was stopped at a red traffic signal in the right lane of Dеfco Park Road when her vehicle was struck from behind by the defendant’s vehicle. The defendant testified, in contrast, that the plaintiffs vehicle struck the defendant’s vehicle when the plaintiff backed up after unsuccessfully attempting to turn right turn onto Washington Avenue. Officer Jason R. Janosko of the North Haven police departmеnt, who investigated the accident, also testified.
During Janosko’s testimony, the defendant offered as evidence an accident diagram prepared by Janosko and included in his police report. The plaintiff objected on the ground of hearsay. The court sustained
The juiy ultimately returned a verdict in favor of the defendant. On June 3, 2005, the plaintiff filed a motion to set aside the verdict and fоr a new trial. The court denied the motion and rendered judgment in favor of the defendant. This appeal followed. Additional facts will be set forth as necessary.
The plaintiff claims that the court improperly admitted into evidence the diagram attached to the police accident report. Specificаlly, the plaintiff argues that the diagram constituted inadmissible hearsay because it was not based on the officer’s observations of the accident scene but rather on the parties’ out-of-court statements concerning the accident. Additionally, the plaintiff argues that the admission of the diagram was harmful to her casе because it showed her vehicle turned slightly to the right at the comer of the intersection, which supports the defendant’s version of the accident. We agreе that the diagram was improperly admitted into evidence but conclude that its admission was harmless error.
As we have often stated, “[i]t is a well established principle of law that the trial court may exercise its discretion with regard to evidentiary mlings, and [those] rulings will not be disturbed on appellate review absent [an] abuse of that discretion.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) DeMarkey v. Fratturo,
“An out-of-court statement used to prove the truth of the matter asserted is hearsay and is generally inadmissible unless an exception applies.” DeMarkey v. Fratturo, supra,
In the present case, the officеr responded negatively when questioned at trial as to whether the diagram was intended to show the position of the vehicles when he arrived at the scene. He testified that the purpose of the diagram was to show “how [the vehicles] collided” and “where [the vehicles] were at the time of the accident,” which he dеtermined “based on what the drivers and . . . witnesses [said].” He further testified that he did not take measurements or photographs at the scene from which he could have drawn the diagram. As a result, we conclude that the diagram rested on inadmissible hearsay to the extent that it depicted the scene of the accident beforе the officer’s arrival and was based on the parties’ accounts of the accident. It was therefore improperly admitted.
Nevertheless, “before a party is entitled to a new trial because of an erroneous evidentiary ruling, he or she has the burden of demonstrating that the error was harmful. . . . When determining that issue in a сivil case, the standard to be used is whether the erroneous ruling ‘would likely affect the result.’ ” (Citations omitted.) Swenson v. Sawoska,
We conclude that the plaintiff has not met her burden of demоnstrating harmful error. “The determination of [harmful error] lies in the record.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 153. The improperly admitted diagram was merely cumulative of the other evidence presented at trial. See id., 155 (“[i]t is well established that if erroneously admitted evidence is merely cumulative of other evidence presentеd in the case, its admission does not constitute reversible error”). The jury heard testimony from both parties as to how the accident happened and was in a position to weigh their credibility in reaching its verdict. Furthermore, there was nothing so inflammatory about this evidence that its admission created a risk of distorting the jury’s percеption of the remaining evidence. See DeMarkey v. Fratturo, supra,
We conclude that the improper admission of the poliсe diagram was not likely to have affected the jury’s decision and, as a result, its admission was harmless error.
The judgment is affirmed.
In this opinion the other judges concurred.
Notes
The business records exception is codified in Generаl Statutes § 52-180, which provides in relevant part: “(a) Any writing or record, whether in the form of an entry in a book or otherwise, made as a memorandum or record of any act, transaction, occurrence or event, shall be admissible as evidence of the act, transaction, occurrence or event, if the trial judge finds that it was made in the regular course of any business, and that it was the regular course of the business to make the writing or record at the time of the act, transaction, оccurrence or event or within a reasonable time thereafter . . . ." See also Conn. Code Evid. § 8-4.
Statements of witnesses contained within a police report add another level of hearsay. These statements, therefore, must fall within an exception to the hearsay rule to be properly admitted. Hutchinson v. Plante,