129 So. 552 | La. | 1930
On July 12, 1916, L.A. Pires made his will, by the terms of which, after making other bequests and legacies, he gave and bequeathed to Mrs. Bettie Scott Youree certain real estate in Shreveport, La., in trust, with the request that the net income thereof "shall be used by her in charitable work in Shreveport, Louisiana, as she in her wisdom may determine wise and prudent," with the right in her to name her successor; and in case of her failure to do so, then such successor should be named by one of the district judges of Caddo parish "to the end that this trust shall be perpetuated."
Pires died on July 3, 1922, and his will was duly probated.
Plaintiffs are the blood relatives and nearest of kin of said Pires, and attack said legacy on the ground that it contains a fidei commissum and prohibited substitution, contrary to the provisions of Rev. Civ. Code, art.
The defendant filed an exception of no cause of action, which was sustained by the trial judge; and plaintiffs appeal. *989
That act provides: "That it shall be lawful for anyone to make a donation inter vivos or mortis causa of any description of property to a trustee or trustees for educational, charitable or literary purposes generally, without designating the particular purpose to be fostered or aided, and in such cases to permit the trustee or trustees to appoint, create or change, from time to time and as often as they may deem wise, the beneficiary of such trust estate or any part thereof. * * *" Section 1.
In interpreting this act in Succession of Marion,
That is precisely what the testator has done in this case. He has created a perpetual trust for charitable purposes; he has appointed Mrs. Youree the trustee for this estate; he has left to her to select the beneficiaries of the charity intended by him.
And the act expressly provides (section 7) that the provisions of the Revised Civil Code relative to substitutions, fidei commissa, or trust dispositions shall not apply to, or in any manner affect, donations made in accordance with the act.
It is further argued that Act No. 72 of 1918, has more than one object. We do not think so. The only object of the statute is to permit the creation of trust estates for educational, charitable, or literary purposes. The rest of the statute merely provides the manner in which this object may be carried out. "The requirement that a statute shall have only one object does not forbid the Legislature to deal with several branches of the subject stated in the title of the act, or to provide in one act all of the means necessary for carrying out its object." State v. Craig,
O'NIELL, C.J., concurs in the result, but is of the opinion that the effect of the bequest was to make Mrs. Youree virtually the owner of the property.