71 Ala. 91 | Ala. | 1881
The general rule relied upon by the appellants, in support of the exception to the admission of evidence showing the precise consideration of the conveyance from Partin to Arendale, and of the exception to the refusal of the second instruction requested, is unquestioned. The consideration clause of a deed can not be varied by parol evidence in a contest between the grantee and the creditors of the grantor. If the deed recited only a valuable consideration, it can not be supported by evidence of a good consideration. Or, if it recited only a good consideration, it can not be supported by evidence of a valuable consideration. . But the rule is not that the precise consideration must be proved, as it may be recited. Any
If the evidence had shown or tended to show a different consideration from that expressed in the deed, it would not only have been regarded with suspicion, but would have been inadmissible. Or if there had been a gross exaggeration of the consideration, attended with other badges of fraud, the exaggeration would have been a suspicious circumstance. But it is not true, as the second instruction requested, when construed in connection with the evidence, must be regarded as asserting, that the expression of the consideration of money paid, and proof that the actual consideration was the payment of a debt, or the promise to pay money, is regarded with suspicion. It is too frequent to express money paid as the consideration, with much of indifference as to the sum, whenever a valuable consideration of any species is the actual, consideration, for suspicions of unfairness or jealousy of the transaction to be indulged, in the absence of all badges of fraud.
The statute pronounces void, as to purchasers for a valuable consideration, mortgagees and judgment creditors, without notice, all conveyances of unconditional estates in lands, or mortgages or instruments in the nature of a mortgage, conveying real property to secure a debt created at the date thereof, unless recorded within three months from their date. — Code of 1876, § 2166. Notice of the conveyance, by the terms of the statute, equally with registration, preserves its validity. Before the appellants obtained judgment against Partin, before they were in relation to claim the protection of the statute as against the
"We find no error in the record, and the judgment must be affirmed.