670 N.E.2d 518 | Ohio Ct. App. | 1995
[EDITORS' NOTE: THIS PAGE CONTAINS HEADNOTES. HEADNOTES ARE NOT AN OFFICIAL PRODUCT OF THE COURT, THEREFORE THEY ARE NOT DISPLAYED.] *220 Defendants-appellants, the police chief of the village of Lockland, Donald Blum, and two of his patrol officers, Mark Reiber and Scott Witsken, appeal the trial court's order denying them summary judgment on qualified-immunity grounds in this civil rights action brought by plaintiffs-appellees under Section 1983, Title 42, U.S.Code.,1 and under state tort claims. In a single assignment of error, appellants claim that by applying an incorrect test to determine whether the affirmative defense of qualified immunity was available, the trial court erred in denying them summary judgment.2 Because the affirmative defense of qualified immunity is a bar only to actions for damages, and because appellees' surviving Section 1983 claims against appellants seek only declaratory and injunctive relief, we overrule the assignment of error and affirm the judgment of *221 the trial court, albeit on grounds completely different from those advanced by the trial court.
In March, April, and May 1993, the appellees were each stopped by the various defendants and defendants-appellants for minor traffic violations. Once they were lawfully stopped, appellees allege, the appellants violated their constitutional rights by arresting them for failure to possess a driver's license and then conducting a warrantless search of their persons and vehicles pursuant to the arrest. Only after completing the search did the appellants run a computer check from the mobile data terminal in their patrol cars to determine if the appellees were, in fact, licensed drivers.
The appellees are all African-American citizens. They alleged that it is the policy and custom of the Lockland police force to stop African-Americans routinely for minor traffic violations as a pretext to conduct in-depth searches of their persons and vehicles for drugs. On July 12, 1993, appellees brought this complaint. Pursuant to Section 1983, appellees alleged that the appellant police officers, government officials acting under color of law, deprived the appellees of federally protected constitutional rights. See Gomez v. Toledo (1980),
The trial court denied appellants qualified immunity because it found a genuine issue of material fact remained as "to whether officers of reasonable competence could disagree" that the arrests of appellees were lawful. Appellees were *222
arrested for failure to have a driver's license in their physical possession while operating a motor vehicle in violation of R.C.
The rationale for granting qualified immunity to government officials in Section 1983 cases is stated in Harlow v.Fitzgerald (1982),
Appellants argue, on appeal, that at the time the appellees were arrested and searched, it was not clearly established that appellees had a constitutionally protected right to be free from arrest for a violation of R.C.
The specific allegations and causes of action stated in the complaint are critical to the resolution of this appeal. We will provide a detailed description of the counts that appellees raised.
Appellees, seeking only declaratory and injunctive relief, asserted in count one of their complaint that the "pretextual and illegal stop, search and arrest policy of the Lockland Police Department and its enforcement by [appellants] acting only in their official capacity" is "unconstitutional on its face" because it deprived them of their right to be free from illegal searches and seizures and of their right to the equal protection of the laws guaranteed by the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to the federal Constitution.
In count two, appellees, again seeking "injunctive relief only against all [appellants] sued in their official capacities," alleged that appellants' arrest and search policy, "as applied, violates the [appellees'] right to equal protection" because it is disproportionately applied to African-American citizens.
Appellees, seeking both injunctive relief and damages against the appellants in count three, claimed that appellants' unconstitutional actions had inflicted emotional distress on the appellees by subjecting them to cruel and unusual punishment.
In count four, appellees alleged the appellants intentionally caused them serious emotional distress. Appellees sought damages against the appellants in their individual capacities. In their fifth count, appellees sought punitive damages in an amount not less than compensatory damages, and claimed the appellants' conduct was intentional and outrageous.
In counts one, two, and three, appellees urged the court to declare the arrest and search policy unconstitutional and to enjoin permanently the enforcement of the policy. In counts three, four, and five, appellees sought monetary damages.
Specifically, employing its flawed test for qualified immunity, the court denied summary judgment for all appellants on the claims of illegal arrest and search raised in count one. This denial is the main focus of appellants' appeal. The court also denied summary judgment on the claims for intentional infliction of emotional distress raised in count four. *224
In resolving the equal protection claim, raised in count two, the trial court determined that no genuine issue of material fact remained as to evidence of the discriminatory intent of appellants Blum and Witsken. The court, therefore, granted summary judgment to appellants Blum and Witsken. Finding some material facts at issue as to his intent, the court denied summary judgment to appellant Reiber. The qualified immunity defense was not employed in the resolution of this claim.
On grounds unrelated to qualified immunity, the court granted summary judgment for all the appellants, on count three, the claim for cruel and unusual punishment.
The trial court thus granted summary judgment on the only claims that sought monetary damages for deprivation of a constitutional right — count three. The only Section 1983 claims to survive summary judgment are count one (illegal arrest and search) as to all appellants and count two (equal protection) as to appellant Reiber. Both these remaining counts seek only declaratory and injunctive relief against appellants in their official capacity.
We note that appellees have not filed a cross-appeal, nor have they assigned as error the trial court's resolution of any portion of the motion for summary judgment.
The essential rationale for granting qualified immunity is that officials should not be punished for the vigorous performance of their duties by being held liable for actions that a reasonable person would not have known violated the rights of another. Harrill v. Blount Cty. (C.A.6, 1995),
The doctrine of qualified immunity also reflects a concern about subjecting public officials to the burdens, costs, risks, and distractions of litigation itself. See Mitchell v. Forsyth
(1985),
Therefore, the single assignment of error advanced is overruled. The trial court's denial of the appellants' motion for summary judgment based on the defense of qualified immunity is affirmed.
Judgment affirmed.
MARIANNA BROWN BETTMAN and SUNDERMANN, JJ., concur.