49 Ind. App. 595 | Ind. Ct. App. | 1912
Action by appellee against appellant to recover on a township warrant for $1,000, dated January 30, 1903, given by D. C. Harrold, as trustee of appellant to appellee, payable out of the special school fund five years after date, with interest at the rate of six per cent per annum, payable semiannually, and with attorneys’ fees. This order was duly audited by the advisory board on January 30, 1903, and the interest is shown to have been paid thereon semiannually up to July, 1906.
The payee of the warrant sued on, at the time it was issued and audited, was a member of the advisory board of Pipecreek Township. The meeting of the township advisory board on the day the warrant was issued was a special one, at which only an emergency loan could be authorized. Whether such a loan was authorized by the board must be determined from the record of the meeting, which is as follows:
“Elwood, Indiana, January 31, 1903.
Board met at call of trustee to make refunding orders given by old trustee, and audit orders. One order given J. F. Alvey as renewal for $601.03. Special due July 1, 1903. One to W. R. Hawkins for the sum of $1,000, due January 30, 1908. One for refunding $1,000 paid to Mr. Rosenthal, and due January 30, 1907.
John Alvey,
Wm. R. Hawkins.”
No emergency is found and shown by the record, and there was no “special order entered and signed upon the record,” authorizing the trustee to borrow money for any purpose.
In the ease of First Nat. Bank v. Van Buren School Tp. (1911), 47 Ind. App. 79, this court said: “It is evident that the right to borrow money as provided in this section is dependent upon the finding of the board that an emergency exists; but it is urged by counsel for appellant that a finding of such emergency is not required to be set out in the record of the advisory board, for the reason that §9595 Burns 1908, Acts 1901 p. 415, only directs that the special order authorizing the loan be entered and signed upon the
Persons who deal with a township trustee are charged with notice of the extent of his authority, and this authority will not be enlarged by intendment or by any strained construction of the statute. A void contract cannot be en
The judgment is therefore reversed, with instructions to the trial court to sustain appellant’s motion for a new trial, and for further proceedings in accordance with this opinion.