Russell Pinto et al., Appellants, v Moshe Tenenbaum et al., Respondents.
Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Second Department, New York
[963 NYS2d 699]
Balkin, J.P., Lott, Austin and Sgroi, JJ.
Ordered that the order is affirmed insofar as appealed from, with one bill of costs to the defendants appearing separately and filing separate briefs.
The plaintiff Russell Pinto (hereinafter the injured plaintiff) allegedly was injured when he was struck by a vehicle operated by the defendant Moshe Tenenbaum. At the time of the accident Tenenbaum was employed by the defendants Horizon Care Center and Ocean Garden Nursing Facility, Inc. (hereinafter together the Horizon defendants). The injured plaintiff, and his wife suing derivatively, commenced this action against
The Supreme Court properly denied the plaintiffs’ cross motion to strike the answers of Tenenbaum and the Horizon defendants. The determination of whether to strike an answer pursuant to
The Supreme Court properly granted the Horizon defendants’ motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint insofar as asserted against them. An act is considered to be within the scope of employment if it is performed while the employee is engaged generally in the business of the employer, or if the act may be reasonably said to be necessary or incidental to such employment (see Holmes v Gary Goldberg & Co., Inc., 40 AD3d 1033 [2007]; Davis v Larhette, 39 AD3d 693 [2007]). “An employee‘s actions fall within the scope of employment where the purpose in performing such actions is to further the employer‘s interest, or to carry out duties incumbent upon the employee in furthering the employer‘s business. Conversely, where an employee‘s actions are taken for wholly personal reasons, which are not job related, his or her conduct cannot be said to fall within the scope of employment” (Beauchamp v City of New York, 3 AD3d 465, 466 [2004] [internal quotation marks and citations omitted]; see Danner-Cantalino v City of New York, 85 AD3d 709 [2011]).
The Horizon defendants established, prima facie, that they could not be held vicariously liable for Tenenbaum‘s alleged negligence under the theory of respondeat superior, since he was not acting within the scope of his employment when the ac
Balkin, J.P., Lott, Austin and Sgroi, JJ., concur.
