168 A.D.2d 863 | N.Y. App. Div. | 1990
Appeal from an order of the Supreme Court (Brown, J.), entered January 25, 1990 in Saratoga County, which denied petitioner’s motion for, inter alia, temporary alimony.
Petitioner and respondent were married on June 25, 1961. In 1974 petitioner filed a petition in Family Court seeking support and alimony, together with a complaint of harassment. The matter was ultimately resolved and the parties entered into a stipulation which was incorporated in a Family
Thereafter, in 1976 petitioner moved back to the marital residence and resumed living with respondent. In August 1989, petitioner left the residence and, by order to show cause, initiated this proceeding in Supreme Court seeking to restrain respondent from harassing her, temporary alimony, moving costs, counsel fees and an order directing respondent to maintain health, medical, dental and eyeglass insurance for her.
Supreme Court held that petitioner’s property interests were decided by the stipulation of separation entered into by the parties, the Family Court order implementing it and the foreign divorce judgment, and the divorce rendered the parties with "very limited rights to the property of each other”. The court further found that living together per se did not create any additional rights and that the stipulation was not modified. Finally, Supreme Court found that the record did not support an increase in the stipulated alimony amount.
Since the stipulation at issue here was executed prior to July 19, 1980, it is governed by Domestic Relations Law § 236 (A). Where the stipulation has been incorporated but has not merged in a judgment of divorce, a court is precluded from subsequently modifying its terms, unless the support is inadequate and the recipient is in danger of becoming a public charge (McMains v McMains, 15 NY2d 283, 285). Here, the undisputed facts reveal that petitioner has substantial assets, she is being paid $115 per week alimony by respondent and she has employable skills, all of which indicate that she is not in danger of becoming a public charge. Petitioner has failed to meet the strict standard required for a court to modify the terms of the separation agreement.
Petitioner contends that the parties modified the stipulation by "mutual consent”. We note that petitioner’s affidavits fail to allege any modification of the stipulation. It is only petitioner’s counsel’s arguments which urge that the parties
Order affirmed, with costs. Kane, J. P., Mikoll, Yesawich, Jr., Levine and Mercure, JJ., concur.