Pinkston v. McLemorePinkston v. McLemore
- Reporters:
- Before:
- Walker
— The complainant claims to have made a contract, in 1839 or 1840, with her husband, whereby she was to have a separate estate in the earnings of herself and four domestic servants, and out of them defray the family expenses. The earnings of a married woman belong to the husband. He may, by contract with her for a consideration, or by gift, invest her with a separate estate in her earnings, which will be maintained in equity against the husband and his representatives; but such separate estate, created by gift, can not be valid against existing creditors, for the same reason which avoids other voluntary conveyances as to such creditors. — 2 Eq. Cas. Abr. 155; 11 Viner’s Abr. 180-181; 2 Story’s Eq. § 1375; 2 Roper on H. & W. 137; 2 Bright on H. & W. 302; McLean v. Longlands, 5 Vesey, 78; Pinney y. Follows, 15 Verm. 525; Baron v. Baron, 24 Verm. 375; Neufville v. Thompson, 3 Edw. Ch. 92.
The wagon and harness levied on is shown by the proof to have been purchased by Mrs. Pinkston long after the contract with her husband that she might have her earnings as a separate estate; and this property could not be liable to any creditor of the husband, whose debt was of date subsequent to that contract.
Mrs. Pinkston, in 1851, bought and paid for a sorrel horse, which was conveyed by the seller to her separate use. We think the evidence authorizes the conclusion, that this was the same sorrel horse levied on by virtue of the execution in favor of Moses McLemore. In 1850, *313Mrs. Pinkston obtained a decree in the chancery court, under the act of 31st January, 1846, securing to her sole and separate use her earnings and accumulations. The ’ sorrel horse was purchased after that decree. The wagon and harness were also purchased after the same decree. There are two negroes, Phil and Bella, which the bill alleges, and the answer of McLemore admits, were about to be levied on by virtue of McLemore’s executions when the bill was filed. The other property, besides that levied upon and about to be levied upon, it does not appear either from the bill or proof that the defendants intended to disturb; and as to it there is, therefore, no case made out requiring redress in a court of justice, and we do not on that account consider the question of the complainant’s title to it. It does not appear, either from the bill or in the testimony, how Mrs. Pinkston obtained the slaves Bella and Phil. The proof shows that she obtained them one year before the deposition of the witness was given, in October, 1852. It follows, that those slaves were procured by her after the chancery decree securing to her sole and separate use her sole and separate earnings. These slaves she controlled and treated and claimed as her own. It does not appear that they ever belonged to, or were in the possession of, Mrs. Pinkston’s husband. It is also proved with satisfactory certainty, that for a long time before those negroes were possessed by the complainant, her husband had neither owned nor claimed any property, nor had any means to procure it. It further appears that Mrs. Pinkston had, by the use of extraordinary industry, economy, and skill in the management of her affairs, been in the receipt of an income sufficient to have enabled her to make purchase of these slaves.
Tbe decree of tbe court below is reversed, and we proceed to render tbe decree wbicb we think is tbe proper one in the case. It is ordered, adjudged, and decreed, that tbe complainant’s bill stand dismissed, and tbe injunction be dissolved, as to tbe defendant Smith; that tbe defendant McLemore, as executor of Joseph Harper, be perpetually enjoined from tbe sale of tbe property levied upon by virtue of tbe executions described in complainant’s bill, and from tbe levy by virtue of said executions, or any other executions upon tbe same judgment, upon tbe slaves Phil and Bella; that tbe complainant be denied any decree as to tbe other property mentioned in tbe bill, upon the ground that her separate right to tbe same has not been attacked or threatened; that tbe complainant pay one half, and tbe defendant McLemore the other half, of tbe costs in tbe court below; and that tbe complainant and defendant McLemore pay each one half tbe costs of this appeal.