This case is brought here upon a writ of certiorari to review the proceedings of the State court of mediation and arbitration in a matter submitted to that court by the firm of Pingree & Smith and some of that firm’s employés. During the summer of 1899 serious differences arose as to the question of wages between the firm and its employés, which resulted in strikes and lockouts.' It was finаlly agreed to submit the differences to the respondent, and in the meantime the employés returned to their work. The submission was a written instrument, in words and figures as follows:
“Detroit, Dec. 16, 1899.
“ State Board oe Arbitration :
“ Gentlemen: Being unable to agree on prices of the following work, we hereby jointly request an arbitration of same by your honorable board, agreеing to abide by your decision. Prices to remain in force until May 1st, 1900.
“ 1st. For pulling over uppers and operating consolidated lasting machine on women’s, misses’, and children’s McKay sewed work.
“ 2nd. For pulling over uppers on women’s welt work, and operating the ideal lasting machine on same.
“ 3rd. For turning and seсond lasting women’s turned' work by new method now in use in our factory, styled ‘ string work.’
“ 4th. For trimming spring heels.
“5th. For automatic leveling.
“6th. For cleaning, ironing, and dressing.
“ 7th. For trimming bead-edge turns.
“ Frank C. Pingree,
‘ ‘ For Pingree and Smith. “Timothy O’Connor,
“Ernest A. Allen,
“ For Employés.
“In signing this agreement, we, the employés, do not relinquish any rights that we may have in any other matters not specified therein.”
March 9, 1900, the questions in dispute had been fully heard. March 31, 1900, the court rendered its decision, and served a copy on the сounsel for the parties. It did
Pingree & Smith insist that, as a matter of law, the finding of the State court of mediation and arbitration was erroneous, because said court did not confine itself to the terms of said written submission. It is said by counsel:
“ In the cаse at bar the award departs from the submission, in that the arbitrators, in fixing prices for the work mentioned in the third, fourth, fifth, and sixth counts or paragraphs of said submission, treated that work as if it were piece-work, and fixed piece-work prices; thus, in effect, calling upon Pingree & Smith to change their method оf doing the work embraced in those counts.”
“The decision of this court of mediation and arbitration makes a new contract between employers and employés, and substitutes it for the one existing at the time the submission was made.* Without any authority under the submission or elsewhere so to do, the court of аrbitration said to the firm that the men who were engaged to work and who were working by the day or week must be considered or treated as if they had been engaged to work and were working by the piece. To permit the decision to stand would be to place a new and heavier burden upon the employers without their assent, and without any knowledge on their part that an attempt to do this was to be made.”
It is, of course, well settled that when arbitrators go beyond the submission, they exceed their jurisdiction, and the award may be set aside. The record discloses that, when this submission was made, some оf the men claimed, under the system adopted by their employers, that, where they had formerly been able to earn $12 to $15 a week, they were able to earn less than $10 a week. It also shows that an attempt had been made to have the prices fixed by the piece, instead of having the wоrk done by the day or week, and that upon the hearing, without objection, testimony was given upon both sides, not only by local experts, but by witnesses from a distance, in relation to the scale of wages by the piece as well as by the day.
In its decision the court fixed a time when the scale of prices should take effect. Counsel sаy of this:
“ The court of mediation and arbitration departed from the submission, also, when it decided that this decision, under the agreement of submission to this court, is ‘to take effect from the 26th day of July, A. D. 1899, and be paid from that date.’ An examination of the submission will show that the court is not asked or expected to fix the date from which the prices it may determine shall be paid. It might be said that the prices are to be paid from the date of the submission, December 16, 1899, — five months later than the date set by the court of mediation and arbitration. It seems to us that it might just as reasonably be said that these prices were to be paid from the date of the award. But, however this may be, there is nothing in the submission which authorizes the court of mediation and arbitration to fix a time antedating the submission itself. ”
It is difficult to justify this claim in view of what is disclosed by the record. It is shown that on the 26th of July, 1899, a machine was put. in the factory upon which the work was done which is mentioned in count 1 of the submission. Upon the trial Mr. Oakman was giving testimony in relation to the prices which should be paid to the employés, when the following occurred:
‘ ‘ Q. At the time this matter was submitted to arbitration for this board to decide on what prices should be paid, that price would then bе paid and operate back to the time the work began ?
“A. Yes; but this shoe we are talking about now was not made this way, and consequently could not be put down until possibly a month or so after.
“ The Court: Is the witness referring to a past arbitration ?
“ Q. No, to the time this consolidated machine came over there, and Mr. Pingree said he would pay them а cer*233 tain amount, and the amount due should be in abeyance. I ask the witness the date.
“Mr. Whiting: July 26, 1899.
“Mr. Pingree: I don’t think there is any question in regard to that, Mr. Oakman, and the men all fully understand that whatever price is set today is to go back to the time the machine was put in.”
Another witness was also testifying that he was being paid four cеnts a pair for lasting shoes, when counsel stated, “We do not claim we have paid anybody in full, because we expected some day it would be settled by this court.” In view of these statements made during the progress of the trial, we do not think the relators can be heard to say the court erred in fixing thе date it did when its decision should take effect.
It is also said the court erred in failing to fix a limit to the time when the prices fixed by them should be in effect. As the articles of submission themselves fixed the limit, we cannot see what would be accomplished by naming the time in the decision.
It is said:
“ The State court of mediation and arbitration was act; ing under the terms of the act under which it was created, and it must therefore act, if it act at all, in the manner pointed out by the statute. Section 563, 1 Comp. Laws, says:
“ ‘After the matter has been fully heard, the said board, or a majority of its members, shall, within ten days, render a decision therеon in writing, signed by them or a majority of them, stating such details as will clearly show the nature of the decision and the points disposed of by them. The decision shall be in triplicate, one copy of which shall be filed by the clerk of the court in the clerk’s office of the county where the controversy arose, and one copy shall be served on each of the parties to the controversy.’
“The matter had been fully heard by and on March 9, 1900, but the decision was not rendered until March 31, 1900, and was not filed in the clerk’s office of Wayne county, where the controversy arose, until April 19, 1900. As there was nо waiver of this requirement of the statute, it was obligatory upon the court to render its decision*234 within the time limited, and its failure to do so rendered its award void.”
In the case of Renaud v. State Court of Mediation and Arbitration,
“ Upon the trial of a question of fact by the court without a jury, the decision of the court shall be given оn or before the first day of the term succeeding that in which the cause was submitted.”
In Rawson v. Parsons,
“We are all of opinion that this provision, as relates to the time within which the decision shall be given and filed, is directory merely. It imposes a duty upon the judge; but, as the parties have no control over his action, it would be a harsh construction which should deprive them of the fruits of the litigation because the judge fails to decide by a particular day. ” ’
No case could exemplify such a hardship more than the one at bar. The testimony taken makes more than 500 pages of printed record. Several complicated scales of prices were introduced, and, if the testimony was to be intelligently considered and passed upon, some time would necessarily elapse. What little delay there was is not to be charged against the parties to the litigation, if to anybody ; and the law ought not tо be given such a construction as is contended for by the relators.
The other questions raised by counsel have been considered, but we do not deem it necessary to discuss them.
The case is affirmed.
This cause is before us upon certiorari.
This proceeding arose under chapter 30 of the Compiled Laws, which is entitled:
“An áct to provide for the amicable adjustment of grievances and disputes that may arise between employers and employes, and to authorize the creation of a State court of mediation and arbitration.”
The act is a recent one, and is apparently designed to afford a means of adjusting matters relating to wages, hours of labor, and perhaps other matters entering into the relation of employer and employés. The act has been before us but once, and that was in this same cause. On that occasion the present relators attacked the law upon the ground that it was unconstitutional. The law was sustained under article 6, § 23, of the Constitution, as a court of conciliation, and it was held that such court has not the power to grant rehearings.
The term “court of conciliation,” as used in the Constitution, has not been judicially defined. If it should be held to mean a tribunal which might interest itself in controversies with a view to inducing the parties to compromise, or otherwise harmonize and adjust their differences, without power to bind the parties by its own opinions or conclusions, it would certainly be a court of conciliation; and such we understand to be the limit of the power of some such courts. Whether the term used in the Consti
As no one is here trying to enforce this award, we need
We have purposely left many questions pertaining to this statute undecided, because they have not been djscussed by counsel, and it is unnecessary to pass upon them. The writ was improvidently issued, because it is not an appropriate or proper remedy in the premises. It should, therefore, be dismissed, with costs.