Pinehaven Planning Board v. Brooks
70 P.3d 664
Idaho
2003
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*1 BOARD, PLANNING PINEHAVEN

Plaintiff-Respondent, Thomas J. BROOKS Jennifer Brooks, Defendants-

Appellants. 27751.

No. Idaho, Supreme Term. September Feb. Rehearing May Denied

TROUT, Chief Justice. Appellants, Thomas and Jennifer Brooks J. (the “Brooks”), appeal an of sum- from order (1) declaring mary judgment the short-term rental of their cabin the Pinehaven Subdi- (“Subdivision”) Park, vision Island Idaho a violation of the restrictive cove- Subdivision’s (“Covenants”) (2) permanently nants en- listing joining the Brooks from for short-term the residence use.

I. AND

FACTUAL PROCEDURAL HISTORY May purchased the Brooks resi- single-family awith dwell- Park, ing in Island Idaho. This located in the Pinehaven Subdivision subject to the Pinehaven Covenants. The apply properties Pinehaven Covenants all Subdivision, within the Pinehaven run with land, binding subsequent and are on all purchasers. Respondent, (“Pinehaven”), Planning part Board homeowner’s association for the Pinehaven Subdivision, is authorized to enforce Cov- Covenants, prop- enants. addition to the erty within the Pinehaven subdivision is also (“Ordinances”) subject to certain ordinances governing activities within the subdivision. Both the Covenants and Ordinances are in- protect tended to the residential nature of the Pinehaven Subdivision and the mutual enjoyment property. of the residential

The central issue this case is whether prohibit the Covenants the short-term rental of residential Three Covenants first, speak to the issue. The Section provides “[n]o commercial or industrial ven- any type may tures or business be main- upon any tained or constructed” second, provides lot. The Section further (1) single family dwelling “no more than one may upon any be constructed” residential lot. Covenant, 27, provides A third for PLLC, Boise, Lopez Kelly, Howard & interpreting of certain terms appellants. Kelly argued. Michael E. Building “The document: Uniform Offices, Hinman Law for re- shall be used to define term not defined spondent. Further, Margaret argued. B. Hinman herein.” if a term is that is used rentals, prohibited then the Cove- not defined the Covenants or the Uniform Code, Dictionary Building subject interpre- shall “Webster’s nants are to two reasonable and, thus, ambiguous; the source used for definition of terms.” tations Pinehaven’s allowance of other rentals In the summer of the Brooks listed grounds equi- subdivision constituted subject property with a local real estate *3 estoppel. table defenses of waiver and weekly agent, Realty, daily a Rainbow as vacation rental. There is no evidence that 4, 2001, Following hearing the a on June the Brooks reside or have ever resided granted judge trial Pinehaven’s motion and Through the residence at issue. Rainbow ambigu- were not determined the Covenants Realty, on the Brooks rented the residence clearly prohibited rentals. ous and short-term renters, at least two occasions. The first a whole, given Reviewing the Covenants as a family awaiting completion the of their own terms, plain the trial Pinehaven, stayed approximately home for court determined “residential” and “dwell- renters, group three weeks. The second a ing” only single family were meant to include recreationists, stayed approximately four for dwellings, dwellings, permanent days. neigh- five At one Pinehaven to least any place dwellings, and other to reside as stating an felt bor submitted affidavit he opposed a mere rental cabin for transient to short-term rental situations disturbed these explained The court vacationers. enjoyment of his residential his use, rentals, effectively prevent as a business enjoying the other owners from 1, 2000, advised the On June Pinehaven Ordinances, and benefits of the Covenants by Brooks letter that Pinehaven considered which, together, establish the residential daily weekly rental of the residential neighborhood. Transient character use, property to be short-term rental a com- neigh- lodgers, lacking an investment lodging activity prohibited on resi- mercial borhood, likely of the existence unaware property by the Pinehaven Cove- Ordinances, and there of the Covenants and letter, nants. Pinehaven admitted it this against them in is no effective enforcement permitted the to rent a different had Brooks case of breach. a residence the Pinehaven Subdivision on basis; however, explained yearly the Board it

interpreted restricting resi- the Covenants II. rentals, long-term dential use to allow STANDARD OF REVIEW

it felt were consistent with the residential subdivision, prohibit- character of the while a This Court’s review of district rentals, ing short-term which it felt threat- summary judg ruling on a motion for court’s ' ened the residential character of Subdivi- required the trial ment is the same as that sion. ruling motion. Val court when on the Sun Tucker, Rosholt, 2000, Ida 7, ley v. Robertson & 133 July Pinehaven filed an action On (1999). (1) 1, 3, 236, Summary ho P.2d 238 seeking of contract a declara- 981 breach pleadings, deposi activity judgment proper “if the rental violated is tion that the Brooks’ tions, file, (2) together injunc- on -with an and admission the Pinehaven Covenants affidavits, genu activity. any, if that there is no enjoining such Pinehaven sub- show tion fact and that the to material sequently complaint on October ine issue as amended judgment as a 26, 2000, moving party is entitled to filed an answer on and the Brooks 56(c). 24, of law.” I.R.C.P. Where parties pursued Both matter November undisputed trial evidentiary facts are and the discovery for sum- and both filed motions fact, “summary will be the trier of mary judgment. argued that the court despite possibil judgment appropriate, unambiguous clearly pro- is Covenants conflicting the court ity of inferences because rental of residential hibit the short-term resolving the responsible for argued possible alone will be property. The Brooks three (1) Aber those inferences.” conflict between theories: the Covenants are rentals; Idaho Peiper, v. 133 clearly deen-Springfield Canal allow short-term (1999). 86, 917, 82, 921 judge 982 the trial found Rather, 201, case, P.2d at a 127 Idaho at both filed motions capable of summary judgment substantially on the same covenant is when it is issues, theories, a than one reasonable facts and and the district more Therefore, given Murphy, v. Idaho at court was the trier of fact. issue. Post 475, (citing v. district court was free to draw the most 873 P.2d at 120 Rutter 292, probable construing McLaughlin, inferences in P.2d 135 Cove- (1980)). Ambiguity question affirm a of law sub- nants and this Court should those Perkins, reasonably ject supported plenary inferences if review. Brown v. Peacock, 192, record. Davis 133 Idaho 129 Idaho at 923 P.2d at 437. To deter- ambigu- 991 P.2d mine or not a covenant is whether

ous, agreement the court must view the as III. whole. Id. at 923 P.2d at 437. *4 DISCUSSION step in The second contract determines, law, depends This as a matter of covenant construction on whether clearly ambiguity the Covenants are If the not an has been found. property unambiguous, allow the rental of residential the court covenants are then Further, profit. apply City even if deter- a matter of this Court must them as law. of Pocatello, ambiguous, mined the City Covenants were the Chubbuck v. 127 Idaho at of 201, ambiguity would still be resolved in the P.2d at 414. there no 899 “Where construction; Brooks’ ambiguity, favor. there is no room for plain governs.” the Post v. Mur recognizes validity of 475, phy, 125 Idaho at 873 P.2d at 120. private that covenants restrict the use of Conversely, ambiguity there is an Guindon, property. Nordstrom v. 135 Idaho covenants, question then is a 343, 345, 287, (2000)(citing 17 P.3d 290 fact, of Court must determine Perkins, 189, 192, Brown v. 129 Idaho 923 intent of the at the time the instru 434, (1996)). interpreting P.2d 437 When Perkins, ment was drafted. Brown v. 129 covenants, generally such applies the Court 193, Idaho at 923 P.2d at 438. To determine the rules of contract Id. construction. How intent, the drafters’ looks to “the ever, because restrictive covenants are in covenants, language existing of the cir derogation right of the common to law use cumstances at the time of the formulation of purposes, land for all lawful the Court will covenants, par and the conduct of the by implication any not extend restriction not ties.” Id. clearly expressed. v. Murphy, Post 125 Idaho 473, 475, 118, (citing 873 120 P.2d Thomas v. A. The Pinehaven Covenants Are Unam- 398, 404, Campbell, 107 Idaho 690 P.2d biguous and Allow Rental of Residen- (1984)). Further, all doubts are to be Property tial resolved in favor of the free use of land. Id. are not The Pinehaven Covenants applying In the rules of contract and, according plain to their construction, analyzes the court the docu meaning, clearly allow rental of residen steps. Beginning plain

ment two with the tial The at issue to covenant, language step the first is to gether property restrict the use of residential determine whether or not there is an ambi single-family to the construction of resi Perkins, guity. Brown v. 129 Idaho at dence, may be for commer which used (citing City 923 P.2d at 438 v. Chubbuck of cial, industrial, purposes. or business Sec Pocatello, 198, 201, City 127 Idaho of provides: tion (1995)). phrases ‘Words or (1) lots, Upon that have established definitions in common no more than one legal meanings single family dwelling may use or settled are not ren be constructed: ambiguous merely they multiple family dwelling dered because no shall be con- structed; ancillary they not defined in the document no more than one where Pocatello, house, garage, guest City City building used.” such as a Chubbuck of boathouse, building property, al whether such rent- or combination of that of residential lot, long upon built each wheth- al is short or term. nature shall be single family incorporated er or not arguments contrary Pinehaven’s to the fail. building. expressly Pinehaven contends the Covenants forbid the short-term rental of residential 10 of the Covenants further states: property. Focusing Brooks’ use No commercial or industrial ventures or residence, solely pur which is for the any type may maintained or business of generation, poses of revenue rather than the lot, upon except constructed on the residence, renter’s use of the Pinehaven con property designat- ... ... has been rental is a commercial cludes previ- property” ed as “commercial activity. support interpretation, of this ously adopted and recorded Protective cites two cases: Munson v. Mil plats. Covenants or Subdivision 1997) ton, (Ct.App.Texas 948 S.W.2d 813 Renting property pur- for residential Builders, Inc., O’Connor v. Resort Custom poses, long-term, whether short or does not How 459 Mich. 591 N.W.2d only prohibitions. fit within these build- ever, exceedingly provide these cases narrow ing single- on the Brooks’ remains a based, part, definitions of “residential use” family dwelling dwelling on covenants that limit residential purposes eating, people who use it for the contrast, Pineha to residential use. *5 sleeping, purposes does and other residential do limit the use of resi ven Covenants not prohibition on not violate the commercial purposes. residential activity commonly business as such terms did, However, they by even Covenants understood. incorporate their own terms the definitions and, Building provided in the Code Uniform by supported further This above, Building as discussed the Uniform Covenants, pro- 27 of the which the Section adopts a rather broad definition of Building vides the Uniform Code shall be residential, including apartment houses and provide for terms not consulted to definitions reasons, need hotels. For these this Court defined in the covenants themselves. The adopt reasoning narrow not nor the defi Building occupancy Code classifies Uniform provided of in the cases nitions “residential” categories, including into ten business occu- cited Pinehaven. occupancy. pancy residential Interna- Officials, Building tional Conference of if this Determined the B. Even Court (1997). Building Code Business Uniform They Ambiguous, Covenants Were use, Occupancies,” “Group B referred to as A Be As Matter Would Still Construed structures, “buildings, portions includes of the Brooks and the of Law Favor thereof, office, professional or service- Free Use of Land transactions, are not classified as type occupancies].” at 1-15. Ex- Even if this Court determined Id. [hazardous ambiguous, because hospi- include animal Covenants at issue were amples of business uses tals, showrooms, banks, subject they are to more than one reasonable motor vehicle barber washes, laboratories, interpretation, they still be construed shops, car radio and would land, stations, use of as a matter of offices. Id. favor of the free television and medical contrast, interpretations of residential law. Given two reasonable at 1-15 and 1-16. use” the use, “Group Occupancies,” constitutes “commercial R what referred to as houses, ambiguity hotels, prevail, apartment dwellings, Brooks still because include of free use of must be resolved favor lodging houses. Id. at 1-26. These use, applied Oregon Supreme in- land. The examples of business and residential Covenants, holding reasoning Yogman v. Parrott corporated in the demonstrate such permissible a use. 325 Or. property for residen- short-term rental the rental of residential covenant at 937 P.2d 1019 The appropriately deemed purposes tial is more provided proper Yogman residential opposed to business use. issue residential as “exclusively residential Thus, ty must be used prohibit not the rent- do Covenants SCHROEDER, dissenting. enterprise shall Justice purposes and no commercial any said permitted on of be constructed of from the decision respectfully I dissent constructing property.” Id. at 1020. I read the anomaly is that Court. covenant, Yogman a court conducted unambiguous, find them same words and first, inquiry: determining the three-part property. of the clearly prohibiting the rental were terms “commercial” and “residential” that “no commercial or provides second, finding ambiguous; re- any type ventures or business industrial despite general inquiry mained any upon may maintained or constructed be third, drafters; and into the intent of the clearly us- lot.” The Brooks are residential by relying ultimately resolving the matter venture ing property for a commercial the maxim of strict construction of restrictive maintaining upon a residential a business covenants.” They lot. Reference to the manner as a motel. same Thus, are deemed whether subtract Building Code does not Uniform unambiguous, ambiguous or the Brook’s use provides from the fact that Section family dwelling single for short-term venture or “business “no commercial” permitted. Be- vacation rental should be type” may “maintained” on the cause this has determined the Cove- venture, a business. is a commercial This clearly prohibit nants do not the rental purposes, property for residential arguments relating to waiver and the Brooks’

estoppel need be addressed. Attorney’s Fees

C. requested While both have attorney appeal pursuant to Idaho fees on *6 SAGEWILLOW, INC., Plaintiff- 12-121, § party neither is entitled to Appellant, fees, appeal brought, pursued as this was not frivolously unreasonably. or defended RE DEPARTMENT OF WATER

IDAHO SOURCES, Mays, Mays Land and James IV. County Compa Livestock, Blaine Canal ny, Defendants-Respondents. CONCLUSION No. 27534. Idaho, recog- restrictive covenants Idaho, Supreme reason, this nized but disfavored. For this Term. September 2002 by implication any will not extend clearly expressed in restriction not the Cove- April ambiguities and all must be nants themselves Rehearing Denied June in favor of free use of land. resolved Therefore, whether the Pinehaven Covenants ambiguous,

are deemed dispute in favor of the Court resolves this law, a matter of the Pinehaven Brooks. As clearly prohibit the Brooks’ Covenants do not short- the residential as a use of costs, rental. We award but term vacation fees, Appellants. WALTERS, KIDWELL Justices concur. EISMANN