416 Pa. 379 | Pa. | 1965
Opinion by
This is an appeal from the lower court’s dismissal of a petition to dissolve an injunction entered in 1956 restraining the collection of taxes.
In 1948, appellee, Pinebrook Foundation, Inc. (Pinebrook), requested appellants, the Commissioners of Monroe County (Commissioners), to exempt its real estate from taxation under “The Fourth to Eighth Class County Assessment Law,” Act of May 21, .1943,
In 1963, Commissioners filed a motion to dissolve the injunction on the grounds that (1) under the rule of Y.M.C.A. v. Reading, 402 Pa. 592, 167 A. 2d 469 (1961) where we held “that, absent a challenge to the constitutionality of a statute or of official action thereunder, equity has no jurisdiction to restrain the collection of taxes,” the court of equity in this case no longer had jurisdiction over the matter, (2) under the facts found by the lower court to have existed at the time of the decree Pinebrook had not met the burden of showing that it was within the exemption, and (3) additional improvements had been added to the property of Pinebrook encompassed in the perma
In our view of the case the jurisdictional question is dispositive.
First, although in 1956 — before the Y.M.C.A. case—equity might properly have exercised its jurisdiction to restrain the collection of taxes for the years preceding the decree, it exceeded its power when it framed its decree so as to extend its jurisdiction over the question into the future
There is a second reason why it was improper for the lower court to refuse to terminate its jurisdiction over this matter. In Y.M.C.A. v. Reading, supra, we held
Because of the general principles which have always guided the relationship between equity courts and legislatively prescribed administrative processes and because of the rule of the Y.M.C.A. case, which, in fact, is based on these same principles, the tax authorities should now be free to proceed with respect to Pinebrook according to the statute and without equity’s interference. The statute sufficiently protects Pinebrook.
Each party to bear own costs.
It must be noted at the outset that Commissioners had no practical alternative to going into equity in 1963 to ask that the 1956 injunction be lifted. The only other course raised the threat of contempt. If Commissioners had simply followed the governing tax assessment statute, supra, and had decided that the property in question was taxable, tax collection would have been initiated whether or not Pinebrook appealed the decision of Commissioners under the statute. Act of May 21, 1943, P. L. 571, as amended, January 18, 1952, P. L. (1951) 2138, §7, 72 P.S. §5453.704. In that event, the defendants under the 1956 injunction might have been found in contempt.
We are aware that in the past we have affirmed decrees restraining tax collection which were very similar in scope to the one here in question. Barnes Foundation v. Keely, 314 Pa. 112,
There is some suggestion in the lower court’s opinion and appellee’s brief that this statement was dicta because in the particular case of Y.M.C.A. we affirmed in part and reversed in part the lower court’s equity decrees, thereby recognizing equity’s jurisdiction. The disposition of the Y.M.C.A. ease was made upon the decrees of the lower court rather than forcing the parties to relitigate the matter under the statutory procedure because we
It is true that technically speaking, Commissioners sought dissolution of the decree rather than amendment. But this does not make an amendment rather than dissolution inappropriate. Under Rule 1531(e) of our Buies of Civil Procedure, a motion to dissolve necessarily includes a motion for modification. 2 Goodrich-Amram §1531 (c)-1. Moreover, our amendment would have the same effect as dissolution, i.e., removal of the question from the jurisdiction of equity.