48 Ga. App. 540 | Ga. Ct. App. | 1934
Lead Opinion
1. There being no conflict in the evidence as to the physical facts connected with the death of the insured, and these facts, with all reasonable deductions and inferences therefrom, when taken in connection with his expressed purpose and intent to commit suicide, overcoming the presumption of law that he did not kill himself, or that his death was accidental, and demanding a finding that he came to his death by his own hand and intentionally, and the life-insurance contract sued . upon containing the special provision that it should be void in the event of the death of the insured by his own intentional act, sane or insane, within two years from the date of its issue, and it affirmatively appearing that the contract was issued within two years of his death, a verdict was demanded for the defendant. N. Y. Life Ins. Co. v. King, 28 Ga. App. 607 (112 S. E. 383). See also Gem City Life Ins. Co. v. Stripling, 176 Ga. 288 (168 S. E. 20).
2. In the instant case the facts and circumstances surrounding the death, independent of the expressed intent to commit suicide, most strongly indicate, in and of themselves, that the deceased laid his neck upon the railroad-track, holding the rail by his hand, in order that his head might be severed by the approaching train. Whether or not the testi
Judgment reversed.
Dissenting Opinion
dissenting. It is necessary to resort to circumstantial evidence to establish the proposition, the burden of establishing which is upon the insurance company, that the deceased committed suicide. The rule is well established, even in civil actions, that in order to establish a proposition by circumstantial evidence the facts relied upon must be of such a nature that it is the only conclusion that can reasonably be drawn therefrom; and where the facts relied upon equally sustain either of two conflicting propositions, they establish neither. See authorities collected in Taylor v. State, 44 Ga. App. 387, 417-418 (161 S. E. 793).
The evidence relied upon to establish the proposition that the insured committed suicide consists in certain acts, declarations, and statements of his, indicating despondence and dissatisfaction with life, and that, by inference, he intended to kill himself, and also the physical facts respecting the condition of the body when found, its relation to the track, and the inference drawn therefrom as to the suicidal character of the insured’s death. An intention on the part of the insured to kill himself is found, not in any express intention by him to do so, but only in inferences from his conduct and declarations and statements made by him. An inference of such intention may not be conclusively demanded, and may have been an issuable matter for the jury. But assuming, however, that
One of the witnesses, a police officer, who observed the body and the head as they lay beside the track in the condition they were in when they were found, testified that, from the position of the body, it appeared that the deceased could have been sitting and had turned around to rest and went to sleep, that he could have have been drunk and gone to sleep, that, from the “looks” of the body, “the indication was just as strong that way as any other way.” While this is merely opinion evidence of the witness, it is nevertheless the inference drawn by him, who is presumably a man of ordinary intelligence, from the physical facts. It at least indicates the inference that a man of average intelligence, as jurors are supposed to be, might draw from these facts. There is evidence that the insured had indulged in intoxicating liquors, and had done so while in. the state of despondency referred to. There is evidence that an empty bottle, which belonged to him and had been in his room and had contained liquor while there, was found near his body by the side of the track. While there is an issue whether this bottle was the one which had been in his room, the evidence is sufficient to authorize the inference that it was the same bottle.
The physical facts with respect to the condition of the body and its relation to the track and the drinking of liquor by the insured, and other circumstances, are as indicative of the accidental death of the insured by being run over by a train after he had fallen on the track while asleep or in a drunken stupor, as that he consciously, either while in a state of sobriety or while under the influence of liquor, and with the intention of ending his life, placed his neck upon the rail, and, while lying there, faded into unconsciousness either from the effects of liquor or from sleep, or lay there in a conscious condition, with the intention of ending his life, and awaited the arrival of the train which ran over him and killed him.
The evidence is silent and contains no facts or circumstances which authorize a finding as to how long the insured had been upon
Were I a juror I would be much inclined to infer, from the evidence, that the insured committed suicide, but, as a reviewing judge passing upon the sufficiency of the evidence to authorize a jury to arrive at a contrary conclusion, I can not conclude that the evidence is insufficient to authorize the verdict which the jury found, and which is necessarily predicated upon the theory that the jury did not conclude, from the evidence, that the insured committed suicide. The evidence does not demand the inference that the insured committed suicide.
The verdict found for the plaintiff, the beneficiary under the policy, against the defendant insurance company, was authorized.
Rehearing
ON MOTION FOR REHEARING.
The defendant in error in his motion for rehearing stresses the contention that the petition merely sets forth that the deceased died on a named date, and does not show that he met his death by being run over by the train. Apparently the chief argument and contention in the motion is that the deceased “ could have been and possibly was killed and put upon the track.” In the original brief of counsel representing the plaintiff in the court below, the burden of the argument seems to have been based upon the other and different theory. The following excerpts are taken from their original brief: “The physical facts exclude the idea of any deliberation on his part which could have resulted in such plan as would have been necessary for him to take his life as it was taken. On the other hand, the fact of the finding of the empty whisky
The original syllabus has been very slightly augmented in the effort to make plainer the meaning of the ruling as originally stated. The theory of the plaintiff which was specifically dealt with by the syllabus was that which we understood to have been put forward as his main and controlling contention. As we see it, there is nothing in the evidence to remotely suggest the surmise that the deceased had been murdered and his body thereafter placed upon the railroad-track. On the contrary, a small amount of change was found in his pockets, and the evidence, so far as it goes, indicates that there was no previous wound upon his person.
It is not an easy thing for us to feel impelled, as we have felt, to adjudicate the fact of suicide. What glimpses we obtain of this unfortunate youth indicate that he was of high purpose, right-minded, but acting under extreme stress and nervous tension.
Rehearing denied.