67 Wash. 109 | Wash. | 1912
The plaintiff, a taxpayer of the city of Everett seeks to have the city and its officers enjoined from paying certain warrants, alleged to have been issued for indebtedness of the city which was incurred at a time when its indebtedness was in excess of five per cent of the assessed value of the taxable property within the city. A trial upon the merits resulted in a denial of the relief sought and a dismissal of the action. From this disposition of the cause, the plaintiff has appealed.
After issues were made by the pleadings, an agreed statement of facts was signed and filed by the attorneys for the respective parties, upon which the trial court evidently dis
“That- the warrants set forth in plaintiff’s complaint were each for mandatory expenses of said city, and that the election was duly held validating said warrants at a time when' the city of Everett was within its five per centum limit of indebtedness, and that said warrants are legal and valid warrants and obligations against said city of Everett.”
Exception was duly taken by counsel for appellant to the recitals in the judgment which in effect find that the warrants were issued for mandatory expenses of said city and are valid obligations against the city.
The principal contention of counsel for appellant is that the court erred in holding that the indebtedness evidenced by these warrants was for “mandatory expenses of said city.” It is conceded that by the use of these words, the learned
The only evidence we have touching the nature of the various items of indebtedness for which these warrants were issued is that contained in a list of the warrants set forth in the agreed statement of facts, and the very general statement contained in the ordinance providing for the election. The list of warrants contains evidence of a very brief and limited character touching the nature of the several items of indebtedness. After the number of each warrant, its date, its amount, and the name of the payee, there follows a very brief statement of the nature of the service rendered or property furnished the city for which the particular warrant was issued. There is, however, enough there stated to warrant the conclusion, in the absence of other evidence, that the warrants were all issued in payment of the salaries of the officers of the city, the salaries and wages of other employees of the city for services rendered by them in the necessary conduct of the city’s ordinary affairs, or for material and supplies furnished the city which were necessary for its use in the conduct of its ordinary affairs, with the exception of some items, which we will notice later. This being true, it seems unnecessary to discuss the effect of the validating election upon the validity of these items of indebtedness, as, under the decisions above cited, they would be valid in any event.
The other items of indebtedness here involved we think were rendered valid by the vote of the people at the time the city was within its five per cent debt limit, even though that limit was unlawfully exceeded when such debts were originally attempted to be incurred. It appears that the city con
All of the other items of indebtedness involved which required validation by vote of the people were rendered valid by- the election because the record warrants the conclusion that they were incurred for property then comparatively new, and in the possession and use of the city, as the bridge then was. We are of the opinion that the debts evidenced by the warrants involved in this case are rendered valid; either by the fact that they were for such necessary expenses as fall within the previous- holdings of this court above cited, and were valid even though they exceed the constitutional debt limit, or fall within that class to which the bridge belongs, which were validated — or we might better say — recreated by the validating election at a time when their crea
We express no opinion upon the power of the people to validate a debt attempted to be incurred in excess of the five per cent limit, by an election held at a time when the city’s debt exceeds that limit, and for something that the city could not receive any benefit from after such election. In such a case, it might be argued that the city would receive no lawful consideration for its promise to pay such a debt. This is quite a different question from the validation of this bridge debt and others of the same class.
We conclude that the judgment must be affirmed. It is so ordered.
Dunbar, C. J., Crow, Chadwick, and Gose, JJ., concur.