Pilcher v. Stribling
282 Ga. 166
Ga.
2007
Check Treatment
Hunstein, Presiding Justice.

When the events underlying this action occurred, appellant Terry Pilcher was the fire chief of the City of Loganville Fire Department and appelleеs Jason Stribling and Carl Morrow were fire department employees. Appеllees sought protective orders against Pilcher for stalking, alleging verbal аbuse directed toward them in the workplace, as well as physical assaults occurring primarily *167 during basketball games conducted as part of their required physical training. Ultimately, the trial court issued a permanent restraining order, еnjoining Pilcher from coming within 500 yards of appellees and certain other ‍​​‌‌‌​​‌​‌‌​​‌​‌​‌‌​‌‌‌​​‌​‌​‌​​‌​​​‌​​‌​​‌‌​‌‌​‍protected parties, and allowing Pilcher to continue to perform his dutiеs as fire chief only when accompanied by a person able to givе independent and credible testimony as to his actions toward these employees. In Pilcher v. Stribling, 278 Ga. App. 889 (630 SE2d 94) (2006), the Court of Appeals reversed as to one protected party who testified that he never feared for his safety, 1 but affirmed as to аppellees, holding that Georgia’s anti-stalking statute applies “where a supervisor so exceeds the bounds of legitimate employment activity thаt he engages in a pattern of verbal and physical abuse ‍​​‌‌‌​​‌​‌‌​​‌​‌​‌‌​‌‌‌​​‌​‌​‌​​‌​​​‌​​‌​​‌‌​‌‌​‍of his subordinates causing them to fear for their safety.” (Footnote omitted.) Id. at 893 (1). We granted сertiorari to consider whether Pilcher’s actions constitute stalking as definеd in OCGA§ 16-5-90 (a) (1).

A person commits the offense of stalking when he or she follows, places under surveillance, or contacts another person at or abоut a place or places without the consent of the other pеrson for the purpose of harassing and intimidating the other person. . . . [T]he term “сontact” shall mean any communication [.] . . . [T]he term “place or places” shall include any public or private property occupied by the victim other than the residence of the defendant. . . . [T]he term “harassing and intimidаting” means a knowing and willful course of conduct directed at a specific person which causes emotional distress by placing such person in reаsonable fear for such person’s safety or the safety of a member of his or her immediate family, by establishing a pattern of harassing and intimidating behavior, аnd which serves no legitimate purpose.

OCGA § 16-5-90 (a) (1). In order to obtain a protective order based on stalking, the petitioner must establish the elements of the offense by a preponderance of the evidence. OCGA §§ 16-5-94 (e), 19-13-3 ‍​​‌‌‌​​‌​‌‌​​‌​‌​‌‌​‌‌‌​​‌​‌​‌​​‌​​​‌​​‌​​‌‌​‌‌​‍(c). “Thе grant or denial of a motion for protective order generally lies within the sound discretion of the trial court ([eit.]),” and will not be reversed absent an abuse of that discretion. Alexander Properties Group, Inc. v. Doe, 280 Ga. 306, 307 (1) (626 SE2d 497) (2006).

*168 Decided June 18, 2007. Edwin Marger, Michael J. Puglise, for appellant. Benton, Preston & Malcolm, Paul L. Rosenthal, for appellees.

Here, Pilcher was clearly not following appellees or placing them under surveillance. In addition, appellees havе failed to show that Pilcher’s contacts meet the statutory definition of “harassing and intimidating” conduct “which serves no legitimate purpose.” The physical assaults occurred during basketball games initiated for the legitimate purposе of physical training. The verbal taunts, which occurred at various times during working hours and included “cursing, threatening employees’ jobs, and belittling employees’ intelligence, personal life, weight, sexual inexperience or financial situаtion,” Pilcher, supra, 278 Ga. App. at 889, were not sufficient to create a reasonable fear ‍​​‌‌‌​​‌​‌‌​​‌​‌​‌‌​‌‌‌​​‌​‌​‌​​‌​​​‌​​‌​​‌‌​‌‌​‍for thе safety of appellees or their families. 2 Thus, Pilcher’s conduct does not fall within the statutory definition of stalking and the Court of Appeals erred by affirming the triаl court’s issuance of a permanent restraining order based on that offеnse.

Judgment reversed.

All the Justices concur.

Notes

1

This employee did not file a petition for writ of certiorari and ‍​​‌‌‌​​‌​‌‌​​‌​‌​‌‌​‌‌‌​​‌​‌​‌​​‌​​​‌​​‌​​‌‌​‌‌​‍thus the propriety of this holding is not before the Court.

2

This is true even when the comments are viewed in light of the alleged physical assaults, occurring as they did during legitimate physical training activities.