S17A1541. PIKE v. THE STATE.
S17A1541
Supreme Court of Georgia
January 29, 2018
302 Ga. 795
FINAL COPY
Mаtthew Jacob Pike appeals his conviction and sentence for malice murder and related crimes in connection with the death of Justin Klaffka. He challenges the denial of severance of his trial from that of his co-indictees, the admission of certain evidence, and the legal sufficiency of the evidence of his guilt. For the reasons that follow, the challenges are without merit and we affirm.1
On April 10, 2012, Klaffka‘s girlfriend, Amanda Mitchell, witnessed a fight between Pike, Slaton, and Klaffka at 119 Dixie Trail in Houston County, where Pike was living along with Slaton, Daniel, and Pike‘s brother, David Pike (“David“). Pike and Slaton confronted Klaffka and began to beat him; Pike hit Klaffka on the right side of his head. After the beating, Klaffka was bleeding very badly and was taken into the bathroom shower to be cleaned up. Then
On April 15, 2012, fishermen at Knowles Landing discovered Klaffka‘s body floating in the river. The medical examiner determined that Klaffka‘s injuries were consistent with manual strangulation and that the cause of death was asphyxia due to strangulation in conjunction with blunt force head trauma.
1.
In separate enumerations of error, Pike contends that the State‘s evidence as a whole was legally insufficient to support his murder conviction, and that the trial court erred in refusing to direct verdicts of acquittal on all of the charges against him because the State failed to establish venue in Houston County. But, such contentions are wholly without merit.
The State presented ample evidence of the elements of the crimes charged, including that of venue, which is a jurisdiсtional element of every crime requiring that the State prove it beyond a reasonable doubt. Bulloch v. State, 293 Ga. 179, 187 (4) (744 SE2d 763) (2013). Consequently, we view the evidence of venue as we do in a challenge to the general sufficiency of the evidence, that is, the evidence of venue is viewed in a light most favorable to supporting the verdicts in order to determine whether the evidence was sufficient to permit a rational trier of fact to find beyond a reasonable doubt that
In this case, the State presented testimony at trial establishing that the crimes against Klaffka culminating in his murder were committed in Houston County. Such testimony included, inter alia, that Knowles Landing, the place where Klaffka‘s body was discovered, wаs in Houston County, that Klaffka was
2.
Pike next contends that the trial court erred in denying his motion to sever because his defense, which was that the State‘s evidence did not overcome his presumption of innocence, was antagonistic to that of his co-defendant, Slaton;3 Pike argues this was so because in the joint trial with Slaton he was forced to defend himself against not only the proof offered by the State, but also the alibi defense argued by Slaton‘s counsel,4 i.e., that only Pike and Daniel killed Klaffka and Slaton was not present, so that he suffered prejudice
First, the transcript of the hearing in the matter reveals that Pike failed to make the present argument to the trial court. His argued basis below for severancе was the likelihood that at trial the State would “get into” Slaton‘s extensive prior criminal history, and that Pike would get “lumped up with that,” and thus, prejudice the jury against him. In any event, even if the present challenge of antagonistic defenses is preserved for our review, “antagonistic defenses are insufficient to require severance in a non-death penalty case absent a showing of prejudice.” Johnson v. State, 301 Ga. 205, 208 (III) (800 SE2d 296) (2017).
[I]t is not enough for a defendant to raise the possibility that a separate trial would have given him a better chance of acquittal; a defendant is entitled to severance only where there is a clear showing of harm or prejudice and а showing that failure to sever would result in the denial of due process. [Cit.] A defendant cannot rely upon antagonism between co-defendants to show prejudice and the consequent denial of due process; a defendant must show that
the failure to sever harmed him.
Kelly v. State, 267 Ga. 252, 253 (2) (477 SE2d 110) (1996). Pike‘s claim that the joint trial with Slaton forced him not only to defend against the proof offered by the State, but also to defend against the defense pressed by Slaton does not demonstrate the required prejudice and denial of due process because such a situation exists in any case in which co-defendants have antagonistic defenses. Marquez v. State, 298 Ga. 448, 450-451 (2) (782 SE2d 648) (2016). What is more, despite Slaton‘s argued alibi defense, the jury arrived at guilty verdicts against Slaton as well as Pike, obviously accepting the State‘s case which was substantially the same for Pike and Slaton. There is nothing to suggest that the outcome of Pike‘s trial would have been different had he been tried separately from Slaton. Simply, Pike has failed to demonstrate that he was prejudicеd by the joint trial so that he was denied due process; consequently, there is no showing that the trial court abused its discretion in denying severance. Id.
3.
Pike also contends that the trial court erred in allowing, over objection, certain autopsy photographs of Klaffka, maintaining that the photographs were not only gruesоme, but had no independent probative value and served only to
Inasmuch as Pike‘s trial occurred after January 1, 2013, the effective date of Georgia‘s new Evidence Code, the Code is applicable to the admissibility of the photоgraphs.
Pursuant to
probative force, dragged in by the heels for the sake of its prejudicial effect.‘”
Ragan v. State, 299 Ga. 828, 832 (3) (792 SE2d 342) (2016) (citations omitted). Moreover, “the exclusion of relevant evidence under Rule 403 is an extraordinary remedy that should be used only sparingly.” Benton v. State, 301 Ga. 100, 103 (4) (799 SE2d 743) (2017) (citation and punctuation omitted).
The challenged рhotographs do not depict the victim‘s autopsy incisions, and they are not especially gory or gruesome in the context of autopsy photographs in a murder case; furthermore, they were relevant to show the nature and location of the victim‘s injuries, which corroborated the State‘s evidence of the circumstances of the killing. Moss v. State, 298 Ga. 613, 617-618 (5) (b) (783 SE2d 652) (2016). Contrary to Pike‘s assertion, Klaffka did not die solely from manual strangulation, but also from blunt force head trauma, and the photographs illustrated the nature and extent of the physical beating and resulting trauma sustained by Klaffka. What is more, the state in which Klaffka‘s body was found was the result of the crimes committеd against him, including the dumping of his body into the river.
The challenged photographs were relevant and admissible and there is no
4.
Finally, Pike contends that the trial court erred in granting the State‘s motion to present evidence of other crimes, wrongs, and acts pursuant to
Rule 404 (b) is, on its face, an evidentiary rule of inclusion which contains a non-exhaustive list of purposes other than bad character for which other acts evidence is deemed relevant and may be properly offered into evidence. Despite its inclusive nature, Rule 404 (b) prohibits the admission of such evidence when it is offered
The trial court found that evidence of the armed robbery was admissible to show the motive to commit Klаffka‘s murder, and evidence of motive is
As to the second prong of the test for admission under Rule 404 (b), which is scrutiny under Rule 403, the trial court found that the probative value of the evidence outweighed any prejudice from its admission. And, this determination is within the discretion of the trial court after “a common sensе assessment of all the circumstances surrounding the extrinsic offense.” Bradshaw v. State, 296 Ga. 650, 657 (3) (769 SE2d 892) (2015), quoting United States v. Perez, 443 F3d 772, 780 (11th Cir. 2006). What is more, the prohibition of evidence under the Rule 403 balancing test is an extraordinary remedy which, as has been noted, should be used only sparingly inasmuch as it permits the exclusion of concededly relevant evidence; in close cases, balanсing under Rule 403 should be in favor of admissibility of the evidence. State v. Jones, 297 Ga. 156, 164 (3) (773 SE2d 170) (2015), citing United States v. Merrill, 513 F3d 1293, 1301 (11th Cir. 2008) and United States v. Terzado-Madruga, 897 F2d 1099, 1119 (11th Cir. 1990).
Lastly, contrary to Pike‘s assertion, the trial court found, and properly so, that there was sufficient proof that Pike committed the prior armed robbery. Consequently, there was no abuse of the trial court‘s discretion in admitting evidence of it at trial.
Judgments affirmed. All the Justices concur.
Decided January 29, 2018.
Murder. Houston Superior Court. Before Judge Lumsden.
Jeffrey L. Grube, for appellant.
George H. Hartwig III, District Attorney, Daniel P. Bibler, Alicia D. Gassett, Assistant District Attorneys; Christopher M. Carr, Attorney General, Patricia B. Attaway Burton, Deputy Attorney General, Paula K. Smith, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Matthew M. Youn, Assistant Attorney General, for appellee.