48 Me. 539 | Me. | 1861
Lead Opinion
The opinion of the Court was drawn up by
The instructions of the presiding Judge were entirely in accordance with the weight of judicial 'authority in this country, in the courts of the United States and in those of the several States.
“It is a well established principle of the common law,” ’remarks Grier, J.,in Day v. Woodworth, 13 How., 371, “that, in actions of trespass, and all actions on the case for torts, a jury may inflict what are called exemplary, punitive or vindictive damages upon a defendant, having in view the enormity of his .offence, rather than the measure of compensation to the plaintiff.” This statement of the law was in perfect conformity with the previous decisions which had received the sanction of the Court, when illustrated by the logic of Marshall and the learning of Storv. In Tillotson v. Cheetham, 3 Johns., 56, Kent, C. J., says, “the actual pecuniary damages in actions for defamation, as well as in other actions for torts, can rarely be computed, and are never the sole rule of assessment.” In Taylor v. Church, 4 Selden, 452, in delivering the opinion of the Court, Jewett, J., affirms that “ the principle is
Nor were the damages in this case unreasonable. Indeed, as was remarked by Wilmot, C. J., in Tullidge v. Wade, 3
The question here presented has never before been determined in this State. In Worcester v. Great Falls Man. Co., 41 Maine, 159, the suit was not of a character like the one before us. If the rulings were erroneous as to the rule of damages, the error was favorable to the excepting party, who had, therefore, no cause of complaint. Such, too, was the case in Wardsworth v. Treat, 43 Maine, 164, and in the other cases cited by the defendant. Exceptions overruled.
Dissenting Opinion
dissenting. — In actions of tort, damages are given as a compensation for injuries received, and should be commensurate with those injuries; no more, no less. Exemplary, vindictive, or punitive damages are something beyond, given by way of punishment. This rule of damages is presented in the ruling in this case distinctly and without any ambiguity. Hitherto it has not been adopted in this State. Deeming it unsound and pernicious in principle, I cannot concur in engrafting it upon our law, nor in adopting it as a rule of practice in our Courts,
Under the rule, as stated in this case, a defendant may be_ required to make full compensation to the injured party, be punished by fine, without legal limitation, by a jury, for private benefit, and then be liable to indictment by a grand jury, for a public wrong, and punished by the Court to the extent of the law, and all for the same transaction.
The soundness of the "rule has been much discussed pro and con by courts and jurists. The authorities upon the subject areo numerous. To collate or analyze them would give no' additional light. A statement of the proposition itself, is, to a legal mind, on principle, a conclusive argument against it. It stands only on contested and doubtful authority. Rut no number of cases nor weight of authorities, can, in my judgment, relieve the rule of its inconsistency with the universally