64 Tex. 447 | Tex. | 1885
The first assigned error relates to the overruling of defendant’s motions to quash the attachment because of the alleged uncertainty and contradiction in respect to the amount of the indebtedness claimed by plaintiffs, as exhibited in the statements thereof in the petition, the affidavit for attachment and the recitals in the writ itself.
The record does not bear the construction which appellant urges. There is neither contradiction nor confusion in the statements referred to. The plaintiffs’ sworn account is an exhibit attached to and made a part of the petition. The account is for items running through the year 1881 and into the year 1882. The aggregate amount is $3,038.30. The plaintiff does not claim interest on any part of it previous to January 1,1882. At that date the account amounted to $3,015.56, interest at eight per cent, on which he claims from that date. The subsequent items of the account accruing in 1882 make the total or aggregate sum above stated, viz., $3,038.30. The plaintiffs’ petition, after thus stating the account, alleges that they have sustained damage by defendant’s failure and refusal to pay the debt in the sum of $3,450. This allegation of damage is not properly to be construed as an averment of the amount .of the indebtedness, especially where the specific facts constituting the amount of the plaintiffs’ debt are affirmatively and expressly stated and itemized. The attachment does not purport to be sued out for the plaintiffs’ damages, as contradistinguished from their debt, as such. All the proceedings harmonize with and are consistent with this statement of the plaintiffs’ claim as shown in the petition, affi
Second assignment of error: “ The writ of attachment having been issued for $3,038.30 only, the court erred in foreclosing the attachment lien, and ordering so much of the attached property to be sold as will satisfy the judgment, viz., $3,812.93, with interest thereon from date of judgment, said decree of foreclosure and order of sale being void for the excess over $3,038.30 and the costs of suit.”
The attachment law authorizes the seizure of “ so much of the property of the defendant as shall be sufficient to satisfy the demand of the plaintiff and the probable costs of the suit.” Art. 160, R. S. The “ demand ” of the plaintiffs was the principal and accrued interest, together with the interest accruing on their account up to judgment, and the costs of the suit. Art. 180, Revised Statutes, provides that if the plaintiff recover in the suit the attachment lien shall be foreclosed as in case of other liens. Art. 181, Revised Statutes, provides that when personal property has been levied on the judgment shall also be against the defendant and his sureties on his replevy bond for the amount of the judgment, interest and costs, or for the value of the property replevied and interest, according to the terms of such replevy bond.'
It is too plain for controversy that the same rule applicable to mortgages and other like liens applies to the foreclosure of attachment liens; and that the right to decree a foreclosure and sale of the property attached for the interest and costs accruing up to the date of the judgment is clear and unquestionable.
The appellant assigns numerous grounds of error, mainly relating to the charges given by the court to the jury. The case was tried by the court under a view which seems to have been entertained by the court, that, if the plaintiffs’ attachment was executed on the property before the deed of assignment was filed for record in the county clerk’s office, notwithstanding it may have been executed and delivered to the assignee before that period of time, that the rights of an attaching creditor would prevail against the assignment if the assignor was guilty of a fraudulent intent to defraud his creditors in making the assignment, and that evidence was admissible to establish such fraud, and, if so found, that the deed of assignment would be deemed fraudulent and void as to creditors.
If we have properly interpreted the view entertained by the court, as developed in a series of propositions contained in quite a lengthy charge, we conceive that it is founded in a misconception of the law applicable to this case. It is an erroneous idea, we think, to con
Under facts like these, the assignment law does not recognize or regard the intent of the debtor who sees proper to make an assignment of his property. It is sufficient that he does in fact do so —■ that he shall actually make a conveyance to an assignee for the benefit of his creditors which shall be sufficient to convey the property, and if he shall have in fact done so, a creditor cannot attach the property thus conveyed. The statute (General Laws, Acts of 1879, p. 58), regulating assignments for the benefit of creditors, provides that the assignee shall forthwith, after the execution and delivery of the deed of assignment, cause the same to be recorded as provided by that statute, and that he shall execute the bond required by the same law; but the statute does not make the validity of the assignment, and its completeness to pass the title to the property, depend upon the act of filing the deed for registry. Section 1 of the same statute provides that the deed of assignment “ shall be proved or acknowledged and certified and recorded in the same manner as provided by law in conveyances of real estate or other property.” The provisions of the statute are to be construed so far beneficially to the creditors, for whose benefit its provisions are intended, as to give effect to such advantages and benefits as its enactments are intended to confer on them as a class of persons; and
On the question of the fraudulent intent to defeat, delay or defraud creditors, as applied to this assignment, the case of Blum v. Welborne, 58 Tex., 157, need only be referred to without comment. The opinion in that case expounds with sufficient fullness the true doctrine for the construction of the assignment act, without further remark on the subject; and see, also, Keating v. Vaughn, 61 Tex., 521.
Under the view taken by us of the essential issues in the case and the rules of law applicable to them, we do not perceive the relevancy, in behalf of the plaintiffs, of the evidence mentioned in the second bill of exceptions. The deed of assignment to Lambert did not tend to show that the defendant was about to transfer his property to defraud his creditors, under any view of the pleadings which now occurs to us. If the deed did effect a transfer of the property, the law deemed it valid for the purpose, whether intended to be fraudulent in its consequences or not. See Blum v. Welborne, supra.
It is not deemed necessary to follow the numerous grounds of error assigned in regard to the charge of the court, as the case will be tried again under aspects of the law applicable to the questions in the case so different from those which were submitted on the trial. We shall therefore pretermit further discussion of them.
We are of opinion that the judgment be reversed and the cause remanded.
Reversed and remanded.
[Opinion adopted June 26,1885.]